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“Struggle for Solidarity: The New Left, African Decolonization, and the End of the 
Cold War Consensus” explores how Third World criticism of the Cold War changed 
Western foreign policy and activist ideologies. Between 1961 and 1975, the decolonization 
of Portuguese Africa inspired a diverse, decentralized transnational support movement. In 
the midst of the Vietnam War, Americans and Europeans disillusioned with the Cold War 
found models for transnational political, economic, and racial justice in the socialist 
freedom struggles of Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and Angola. A broad New Left 
coalition of youth, ethnic minorities, and religious activists rejected the anti-communist 
and Eurocentric diplomatic alliance with imperial Portugal. They embraced in its stead a 
new internationalism that championed self-determination and greater equality between 
global North and South. Drawing on over forty oral histories and extensive archival 
research on three continents in English, Portuguese, French, and Afrikaans, the dissertation 
reconstructs the transnational networks that animated this movement and its successful 
lobbying of Congress. The grassroots-legislative alliance increased pressure on Portugal 
and ended Gerald Ford’s anti-communist intervention in newly independent Angola in 
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1975, institutionalizing Vietnam era political and ideological cleavages in ways that 
defined the final decades of the global Cold War.   
The dissertation argues that decolonization and a new domestic internationalism 
merged to fundamentally alter Western attitudes toward the Cold War in three ways. First, 
it concretely illustrates how grassroots organizations gained access to American 
policymaking by providing information and framing options for Congressional legislators. 
Second, Portuguese African nationalists helped unify ideological and racial communities 
behind a New Left internationalism. Shared hostility to formal colonialism legitimized 
radical critiques of foreign policy, structural racism, and exploitative international business 
practices in ways the divisive Vietnam War could not, influencing social movements from 
anti-apartheid to the Seattle protests of 1999. Finally, this revived and expanded anti-
imperial coalition ended the Cold War anti-communist consensus. Success against Ford in 
Angola became a political and legislative model for constraining U.S. interventions in 
Africa, Latin America, and beyond. 
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 1 
Introduction: A Luta Continua 
 
A heavy drizzle was the only thing suppressing the excitement of the 50,000 people 
packed into Machava Stadium on the outskirts of Laurenço Marques. It was midnight on 
June 25th, 1975, the day that Portugal would formally dissolve its colony in Mozambique 
and hand power to a new, independent nation. The red and green of the Portuguese flag 
had been flying over the capital city – soon to be rechristened Maputo – on and off since 
its namesake explorer had first arrived in Delagao (Maputo) Bay in the 16th century. At 
12:20 AM, the symbol of 470 years of European rule over this corner of Africa descended, 
replaced by a new standard that featured a bayonetted gun and hoe crossed over a book. 
The khaki-clad Samora Moises Machel, a 41-year old nurse turned revolutionary, presided 
over the festivities. The second president of the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique 
(Mozambique Liberation Front, FRELIMO) had led the fight against the Portuguese since 
his party had begun an armed liberation struggle in 1964. This revolution had been the last 
to join the campaigns in Portugal’s other African colonies of Angola and the small enclave 
of Guinea-Bissau. Like his comrades, Machel had spent ten years fighting in the bush in 
anticipation for this day. Now he stood ready to accept the presidency of the nation, amidst 
drum rolls and booming cannons of a different variety to which he had long been 
accustomed. The mostly black African crowd roared its approval. “We have won our 
independence by dint of our struggle,” Machel proclaimed in his characteristically 
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animated way, “We shall make revolution triumph! Long Live FRELIMO! Long Live the 
People Republic of Mozambique! The struggle continues [A luta continua] . . .”1 
As Machel thundered through his lengthy speech that revisited the revolution and 
set the stage for his new government, he was surrounded by visiting dignitaries that had 
aided FRELIMO over the prior decade. Nearby was Portugal’s revolutionary Prime 
Minister Vasco Gonçalves, who had come to power after a coup toppled the fascist 
government in Lisbon the year before. Representatives of many African nations were 
present, notably Tanzania that had sheltered FRELIMO during much of its time in exile 
and Algeria that had armed it. India had sent its ambassador, ready to present his credentials 
to the government on its first day. The Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China 
had sizeable delegations on hand, and a smattering of eastern Europeans were present as 
well. Largely absent, however, were the major nations of the Western alliance. The United 
States, Canada, France, and West Germany had no officials at the ceremonies. Britain alone 
among the great powers had received an invitation, as had the Netherlands and the Nordic 
countries. Machel praised those present, singling out his African and socialist allies along 
with the Dutch and Scandinavians for aiding the revolution in its early stages. Amidst the 
fanfare, the century old American consulate located across the city lowered its own flag at 
midnight, since the independent government of Mozambique had not requested it reopen 
as an embassy. 
                                                 
1 Africa Fund, “Voices of Liberation #1: Message to the Nation on his Investiture as President of the 
People's Republic of Mozambique,” nd [c. fall 1975], African Activist Archive. For descriptions of the 
independence ceremony, see Gloria Negri, “Flag Raising Ceremony Heralds Free Mozambique,” Boston 
Globe, 26 June 1975.  
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This is not to say that there were no Americans in the audience. FRELIMO had a 
number of friends in the country. Black Congressional Caucus members Charles Diggs and 
Cardiss Collins were in the stadium as private citizens, and Senator Ted Kennedy had 
regretfully declined an invitation. A few others represented organizations that had aided 
FRELIMO, including two members of the American Committee on Africa.2 These 
politicians and activists had supported the liberations struggles, even as their government 
maintained the alliance with imperial Portugal. In the midst of the Cold War, papers across 
the world commented on the absence of American and European delegates, worrying that 
it might represent a sign of Mozambique’s embrace of a communism hostile to the West. 
But those in attendance understood that the snubs had less to do with Machel’s ideological 
plans for the country than his memory of the past. Diggs acidly assured a reporter that the 
United States would have been invited had it “followed a policy of more than lip service 
to the independence movements in Africa.”3 Those Westerners in attendance had 
championed the cause of African liberation in their own nations, thereby earning their 
positions in the football stadium that rainy winter evening.  
The mix of foreign dignitaries, legislators, and non-governmental representatives 
may have confused the international media but it was a reflection of an internationalism 
that was central to FRELIMO and the liberation of its fellow socialist parties in Angola 
and Guinea-Bissau. These African nationalists had sought independence through decade-
                                                 
2 Gloria Negri, “Flag-Raising ceremony heralds a free Mozambique,” Boston Globe, 26 June 1975; letter, 
Janet Hooper to Joaquim Chissano, 17 August 1975, Box 79, American Committee on Africa Papers, 
Amistad Research Center (New Orleans, LA).  
3 Dial Torgerson, “500 Years of Portuguese Rule Ends in Mozambique,” Los Angeles Times, 25 June 1975.  
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long military struggles, but their fortunes depended as much on battles as who supported 
them at the international level. This kind of “diplomatic revolution,” as Matt Connelly 
describes the Algerian War against France, relied on international pressure to magnify local 
military defeats into crushing blows against traditions of racial and economic exploitation 
in Africa and elsewhere.4 It was as much a war of ideas and ideology as weapons. Press 
releases, personal networks, and media joined guns as essential elements in achieving 
independence. Globalization – whereby states and their citizens became more closely 
intertwined through new transportation, economic, and communication networks – had 
blurred borders. For the first time, marginalized and disempowered peoples had ready 
access to pathways for informational and material exchange that allowed them to challenge 
imperial rule. In this new diplomatic revolution, liberation was not won by force alone, but 
rather changing relative inequalities of power in all their aspects. Emerging standards of 
equality and self-determination helped strengthen the liberation movements, while 
promoting the political isolation of metropolitan states.  
An international struggle was particularly attractive to Portuguese African 
nationalists. Lisbon’s dictatorial politics and self-imposed economic isolation constrained 
the growth of anti-colonialism in both the metropolis and the colonies. As a result, the 
formative influences for Portuguese Africans were primarily foreign, slowing the 
development of cohesive resistance movements but exposing emerging leaders to a 
multiplicity of sympathetic constituencies in Europe, Africa, and the Americas. FRELIMO, 
                                                 
4 Matthew  Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution:  Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins of the 
Post-Cold War Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 4-5.  
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the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (African Independence 
Party for Guinea and Cabo Verde, PAIGC), and competing Angolan nationalist groups all 
appealed to foreign governments for assistance in pursuing their independence. When they 
were rebuffed by Western officials in the midst of the Cold War, they shifted their efforts 
to courting religious humanitarians, radical leftists, and ethnic minorities unsympathetic to 
colonialism. This decision reflected a commitment by FRELIMO and PAIGC to a policy 
of non-alignment, which sought to unite a variety of global constituencies behind a search 
for self-determination, independent economic development, and representative governance 
in Africa. Indeed, the parties viewed themselves as part of a global revolution rebelling 
against antagonistic ideologies that divided nations. Their diplomacy sought to overcome 
not just the formal boundaries of colonialism, but the more elusive lines of thought that 
separated East and West, North and South.  
 While the transnational aspects of the Lusophone struggles for independence are 
fascinating in their own right, this dissertation is not a global history of Portuguese 
decolonization. Rather, it takes as its subject the relationships that simultaneously baffled 
and frightened the foreign press covering Mozambican independence. The mixture of 
official and non-governmental Western organizations that aided and impeded PAIGC and 
FRELIMO’s long struggle for freedom reflected an era of globalization that saw the 
centrality of state sovereignty diminished and the number of influential international actors 
multiply. Convincing Western governments to isolate a North Atlantic ally in the midst of 
the Cold War would prove difficult, but there existed in Euro-American polities 
populations sympathetic to the concept of decolonization. Nationalist parties like 
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FRELIMO worked around state borders by forging contacts with civil society groups that 
prioritized a set of international values beyond the preservation of capitalistic democracy 
that usually informed Cold War strategy. These values included self-determination of 
political and social norms, global racial equality, and real economic sovereignty.   
Importantly, the formation of a transnational movement advocating for African 
liberation had a greater impact on its host societies than the Lusophone colonies. For while 
Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau would likely have gained independence at some 
point with the arms provided by Eastern European and African governments, the growth 
of a popular Western commitment to these liberation struggles contributed to the 
transformation of Euro-American society. Decolonization occurred at the same time the 
West experienced a veritable revolution in the way it understood the civil and economic 
rights of its own citizens. But the dominant Cold War liberal consensus that promoted anti-
communism and narrow national identities prevented the integration of these processes 
until the cathartic years of the Vietnam War. The conflict inspired a deep soul searching in 
the United States and the wider North Atlantic alliance, pushing many Westerners to 
reevaluate international policies in light of new domestic emphases on equality, 
democracy, and justice. This applied particularly to the Third World, where Western 
governments had long emphasized stability and access over the best interests of local 
peoples. Radical Portuguese African criticisms of the Western alliance, advanced most 
vociferously by socialist parties such as FRELIMO and PAIGC, helped expand this soul-
searching beyond the narrow question of Vietnam to a wider anti-colonial/anti-imperial 
critique of the Cold War.  A growing sense of solidarity with Portuguese African liberation 
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thus became a central element in the fundamental alteration of how Western peoples 
understood their national engagements with the Third World: Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America – which this dissertation will also refer to as the global South.  
The socio-political impact in Western societies of the transnational solidarity 
movement with the socialist nationalist parties of Portuguese Africa illustrates an 
underappreciated historical reality: Third World peoples and ideologies affected the local 
politics and policies of the superpowers. Beyond governments reacting to trends in the 
global South, the lowering of state barriers opened Euro-American societies to criticism 
most clearly articulated by colonial peoples. Radical concepts once depreciated by Cold 
War liberalism found new lives in more flexible ideological spaces defined by activists 
working with nationalist movements. New visions of the future, values, and rhetoric were 
imported and created in these exchanges, which continued to inform Euro-American 
political movements – particularly on the left. Building on a recent literature that has 
privileged such transnational elements in ethnic studies, this dissertation contends that 
broad popular embrace of socialist-egalitarian ideologies defined in dialogue with anti-
colonial movements empowered Westerners to challenge inherited understandings of 
Euro-American hegemony from within. This approach demands a reconsideration of the 
dialectic present in the global Cold War. For while Odd Arne Westad rightfully points out 
the tendency for competing parties in the global South to couch local conflicts in terms 
defined by the competing superpowers, his and other scholarly depictions of rigid Soviet-
American ideologies underappreciate how Third World internationalism transformed the 
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societies of the global North. 5 Westerners frustrated by ideological conformity and seeking 
to reshape their own nations adapted universally attractive elements embedded within 
struggles for self-determination to inspire, reinforce, and legitimize their own movements. 
Beyond influencing social and political relationships, the creation of a transnational 
movement advocating for foreign nationalist interests helped transform Western 
approaches to the Third World. And it is in this key intersection that the Portuguese African 
example is so pivotal. While it is difficult to gauge the impact of the West’s gradual and 
incomplete isolation of imperial Portugal, the impact of a newly critical Euro-American 
internationalism is clear in the case of Angola’s contested independence in 1975. The 
decision by the United States government to intervene on behalf of an anti-communist 
nationalist party against the socialist Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (Popular 
Movement for the Liberation of Angola, MPLA) provided the first test of recently 
empowered American constituencies critical of the Cold War. The network of activists 
assembled during the earlier struggle for liberation successfully mobilized against a 
reactionary American internationalism, realizing the potential of this transnational 
movement. That it did so through popular organizing and congressional constraints offered 
a replicable path for future attempts to limit presidential adventurism. For while similar 
restrictions on the Vietnam War had illustrated the ability of civil society to influence Cold 
War policy, Angola implied this was not an isolated incident. The activism and 
congressional action in effective defense of the MPLA drew on tactics pioneered during 
                                                 
5 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
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the anti-war and anti-colonial periods, but deployed them in a different context. This would 
provide a model for challenging reactionary American and Western policies in the global 
South for the remainder of the Cold War.   
At its core, then, this study asks a pair of interrelated questions: how did the 
development of transnational social movements affect Western societies, and how did these 
changes concretely affect Cold War foreign policy– particularly in the most powerful 
country the United States? It uses the case of Lusophone African liberation due to its 
pivotal timing at this moment of transition between 1961 and 1975, but also because the 
resolution of the independence question offered the first test for what might best be termed 
a New Left internationalism. This admittedly fluid ideology took as its common unifying 
elements a new respect for the nations of the global South and their priorities, as well as a 
deep cynicism of the Cold War and the longer history of Euro-American hegemony of 
which it was the latest manifestation.   
 
Portuguese African Decolonization in an International Context 
Portugal has been the outlier in the historiography of decolonization. The country’s 
retreat in 1975 after the high tide of independence has made linking it to familiar narratives 
complicated. Scholars have tended to focus on the more populous (and better funded 
studies of) Francophone and Anglophone worlds, reinforcing the historic marginalization 
of Lusophone states like Angola and Mozambique.6 Portuguese scholars contributed to this 
                                                 
6 The list of major studies on Portuguese decolonization includes Norrie MacQueen, The Decolonization of 
Portuguese Africa: Metropolitan Revolution and the Dissolution of Empire (New York: Longman, 1997); 
Stewart Lloyd-Jones and António Costa Pinto, eds., The Last Empire: Thirty Years of Portuguese 
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trend with a tendency to focus less on recent history than the country’s overseas expansion, 
not its declension. Such emphasis has bred a remarkably international outlook in the 
academe of the small country, but it has retarded the growth of the historiography of 
decolonization at a time when scholars of the Britain, France, and most other European 
states have devoted ever greater attention to near contemporary events.7 The result is a 
narrative of decolonization that generally ends around 1968, with an asterisk marking 
Portuguese Africa and the equally problematic cases of Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) and South 
Africa.8  
 This oversight is unfortunate for international histories of decolonization, because 
Portugal was perhaps the most interconnected imperial nation and elicited noteworthy 
reactions from other empires and minority governments. Small and relatively undeveloped, 
it was intimately tied into colonial, economic, and alliance networks with the United States, 
Britain, France, and South Africa. This outward looking nature of Portuguese imperialism 
implicitly tied other American and European states to its colonial plans, calling into 
question the Western commitment to full decolonization in the 1960s. A recent generation 
of scholars has embraced this global perspective, engaging with the question of Portuguese 
decolonization primarily through bilateral diplomatic histories and biographies of key 
                                                 
Decolonisation (Chicago: Intellect, 2003); António Costa Pinto, O Fim do Império Português. A Cena 
Internacional, a Guerra Colonial, e a Descolonização, 1961-1975 (Lisbon: Livros Horizonte, 2001). There 
is a larger but still relatively small literature on the decolonization of individual Lusophone state, most 
notably Mozambique and Angola.  
7 Jean-Frédéric Schaub, “The Internationalization of Portuguese Historiography,” E-Journal of Portuguese 
History 1:1 (Summer 2003): 
http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Portuguese_Brazilian_Studies/ejph/html/issue1/pdf/schaub.pdf.  
8 See for example, Martin Shipway, Decolonization and Its Impact: A Comparative Approach to the End of 
the Colonial Empires (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008); Frederick Cooper, Decolonization and African 
Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).  
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leaders.9 A common argument contends that the Cold War alliance system helped the poor 
Iberian nation retain its territories far longer than it otherwise would have.10 Through 
skillful use of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and new economic links with 
European and southern African countries, Portugal funded three overseas wars for well 
over a decade. Unfortunately, focus on bilateral relations between Lisbon and various 
European capitals, Pretoria, and Washington explain how Portugal could delay 
decolonization, but they have greater difficulty addressing the seemingly inevitable 
collapse of the empire.11 The ahistorical tendency to accept decolonization as a fait 
accompli is simply too tempting. By falling into this ahistorical trap, scholars have failed 
to truly interrogate Lusophone Africa’s relationship to wider global trends.  
 Integrating Portugal’s experience into the tripartite formula first proposed by John 
Darwin clarifies the Iberian state’s position in the process of decolonization, while 
recovering the role of transnational actors largely excluded from narrowly defined 
diplomatic histories. According to Darwin, the interaction of metropolitan politics, African 
                                                 
9 See Filipe de Ribeiro de Meneses, Salazar: A Political Biography (New York: Enigma Books, 2009); 
Tiago Moreira de Sá, Os Estados Unidos e a Descolonização de Angola (Lisbon: Dom Quixote, 2011); 
José Freire Antunes, Kennedy e Salazar: O Leão e a Raposa (Lisbon: Dom Quixote, 2013); Emídio 
Fernando, Jonas Savimbi: No Lado Errado da História (Lisbon: Dom Quixote, 2012); Luís Barroso, 
Salazar, Caetano, e o Reduto Branco (Lisbon: Gradiva, 2012).  
10 Witney Schniedman, Engaging Africa: Washington and the Fall of Portugal’s Colonial Empire 
(Lanham: University Press of America, 2004);José Manuel Duarte de Jesus, Eduardo Mondlane: Um 
Homem A Abater (Coimbra: Almedina, 2010; Thomas J. Noer, Cold War and Black Liberation:  The 
United States and White Rule in Africa, 1948-1968 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1985); Julião 
Soares Sousa, Amílcar Cabral: Vida e Morte de um Revolucionário Africano (Lisbon: Nova Vega, 2011). 
11 See for example, Daniel da Silva Costa Marcos, Salazar e de Gaulle: a França e a Questão Colonial 
Portuguesa, 1958-1968 (Lisbon: Ministério does Negócios Estrangeiros, 2007); Luís Nuno Rodrigues, 
Kennedy-Salazar: A Crise de uma Aliança. As Relações Luso-Americanas entre 1961 e 1963 (Editorial 
Notícias, 2002); Pedro Aires Oliveira, Os Despojos da Aliança. A Grã-Bretanha e a Questão Colonial 
Portuguesa, (Tinta da China, 2007). 
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resistance, and international legitimization of self-determination all contributed to the pace, 
style, and results of European contraction.12 Yet Darwin’s British narrative provides a case 
study of one of the more exceptional examples of flag independence, which has nonetheless 
become the primary theoretical foundation for decolonization. According to Darwin and 
others, Africa’s most politically sophisticated colonies negotiated with a metropolitan 
power willing to give up governmental control for continued economic influence. The need 
to legitimate claims to democratic and open markets, both of which were key elements of 
Western ideology during the Cold War, made decolonization politically and economically 
expedient for Britain, especially as colonial resistance increased.13 French historiography 
has followed a similar line, albeit one in which armed revolution in Algeria plays a 
prominent role in compelling an adoption of this logic.14 What this popular Anglo-French 
narrative cannot explain is why metropolitan governments would resist decolonization 
after the rise of serious colonial resistance, and what happens when allied diplomatic 
pressure is not enough to force European withdrawal. These are the two questions that 
define the supposedly unique Portuguese case. However, looking closely at the African 
                                                 
12 John Darwin, Britain and Decolonization: The Retreat from Empire in the Postwar World 
(New York: Macmillan, 1988), 25. 
13 For example, Jason Parker, “Cold War II: The Eisenhower Administration, the Bandung Conference, and 
the Reperiodization of the Cold War,” Diplomatic History, 30:5 (November, 2006); Ronald Hyam, 
Britain’s Declining Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 243. Hyam’s approach to 
decolonization lacks a universal component, as his claim that the East-West dynamics of the Cold War sped 
North-South decolonization is only partly true. Though it certainly helped motivate African pressure from 
the colonial angle and persuaded any British officials, both France, Portugal, and South Africa used anti-
communism to legitimize their recalcitrance with some success. See Ebere Nwaubani, The United States 
and Decolonization in West Africa, 1950-1960. (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2001). John 
Darwin, Britain and Decolonization: The Retreat from Empire in the Postwar World 
(New York: Macmillan, 1988), 25. 
14 Tony Chafer, The End of Empire in French West Africa: France's Successful Decolonization? (Oxford: 
Berg, 2002); Charles Robert Ageron, La D’ecolonisation Française. 2nd ed. (Paris: A. Colin, 1994). 
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colonial component and the way it related to the international context reveals additional 
nuances to this tripartite relationship that operated under the surface of earlier phases of 
the decolonization struggle but came to the forefront as time progressed.  
Specifically, the ability of liberation parties to mobilize support in supranational 
institutions like the United Nations, independent African capitals, Eastern bloc countries, 
and Western populations constrained determined metropolitan responses. Martin Shipway 
has offered a framework for understanding this process in his comparative analysis of 
decolonization (which characteristically excludes Portugal), arguing transfers of power to 
nationalists emerged from a “sense of diminishing options” available to the colonial 
powers.15  In the case of Portugal, an especially determined and cohesive dictatorial regime 
clung tenaciously to its traditions of imperial rule. It only capitulated as worsening social 
and economic conditions compelled it to accept its own demise and the liquidation of its 
empire. Nationalist parties – often developing in exile due to the repressive conditions of 
Portuguese colonialism – forced metropolitan reconsideration by waging military battles 
in Africa and propaganda battles internationally. Arms obtained from African and Eastern 
European sources sustained the war, but the increasing isolation of Portugal within the 
North Atlantic alliance prevented the state from responding with the full might of a modern 
arsenal due to embargoes and economic limitations.  
The history of this Lusophone African internationalism has received increased 
attention in recent years, but there has remained only passing attention to this transnational 
                                                 
15 Shipway, 202. 
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campaign for Western support.16 Scholars have focused on the aid provided by socialist 
countries, notably Piero Gleijeses impressively researched volume on Cuban foreign policy 
in Africa and Vladimir Shubin’s more anecdotal work on the Soviet Union.17 This 
dominant focus on military aid has simplified the nuanced strategy of the Lusophone 
freedom fighters who maintained their appeals to Western peoples despite official 
indifference. The omission also hides another important element explaining the character 
of decolonization; that the Portuguese African solidarity movement was similar in 
structure, style, and indeed chronology to the better known anti-apartheid movement. Many 
historians have yet to make this connection, but the activism on behalf southern Africa that 
begins earnestly with parties like FRELIMO and concludes with the collapse of apartheid 
is a feature of many narratives penned by activist scholars on individual national 
movements.18 This dissertation builds on this continuity showing that while Portuguese 
                                                 
16 Both Garcia and Guimarães discuss the role of Western aid in their valuable but somewhat shallow 
international studies, as does de Jesus’ biography of Eduardo Mondlne. Francisco Proença Garcia, Análise 
Global de Uma Guerra: Moçambique 1964-1974 (Prefácio, 2003); Fernando Andresen Guimarães, The 
Origins of the Angolan Civil War: Foreign Intervention and Domestic Political Conflict (London: 
MacMillan Press, 1998). 
17 Vladimir Shubin, The Hot “Cold War:” The USSR in Southern Africa (London: Pluto Press, 2008); 
Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions:  Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2002). For individual sections on other socialist aid to various 
movements, see Jeremy Friedman, “Reviving Revolution: The Sino-Soviet Split, the ‘Third World,’ and the 
Fate of the Left, dissertation, Princeton University (2011) and Philip Muehlenbeck, Czechoslovakia in 
Africa, 1945-1968 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). There is little serious scholarship on African 
aid to the liberation movements, which was arguably the most important and deserves attention.  
18 Most of the scholars mentioned Portuguese Africa tangentially. Francis Njubi Nesbitt, Race for 
Sanctions: African Americans Against Apartheid, 1946-1994 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2004), see also Roger Fieldhouse, Anti-apartheid: A history of the movement in Britain, 1959-1994 – A 
study in pressure group politics (London: Merlin Press, 2004); David Hostetter, Movement Matters: 
American Antiapartheid Activism and the Rise of Multicultural Politics (New York: Routledge, 2009). 
Works that give clear credit to the role of Portuguese Africa in rejuevenating and expanding anti-apartheid 
activism include See for example Tor Sellström, A Suécia e as Lutas de Libertação em Angola, 
Moçambique, e Guiné-Bissau. (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2008); Sellström, Sweden and National 
Liberation in Southern Africa, 2 vols. (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1999; 2002); Sietse Bosgra, 
“From Jan van Riebeek to Solidarity with the Struggle,” in SADET, Ed, The Road to Democracy in South 
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African parties did not pioneer the use of popular global networks, they created the first 
truly cohesive and effective transnational solidarity movements. This stateless diplomacy 
directly informed the rejuvenation of the anti-apartheid movement, creating an unbroken 
deepening and expansion of anti-colonial internationalism from Algeria to South Africa. 
In so doing, it pushes for a greater examination of how globalization and the softening of 
state sovereignty contributed to the timing and form of decolonization.  
  
The Anti-Colonialism and New Left Internationalism 
 The international isolation of Portugal relied on the creation of popular solidarity 
that tapped into an existing anti-imperial sentiment, which became increasingly central to 
leftist politics in the postwar period. The dissertation uses solidarity in terms defined by 
geographer David Featherstone as a relation forged by political struggle against perceived 
repression. The process through which individuals define this common bond is 
transnational and inventive, drawing on existing identities to forge empathies across 
borders in terms of racial, ideological, class, or political similarities.19 There have been 
many studies on the creation of solidarities within the Western world during this period, 
but few have connected political activism with decolonization proper.20 This is surprising 
considering the centrality of anti-imperial – and by extension anti-colonial – rhetoric to 
                                                 
Africa Volume 3: International Solidarity, 2 Parts (Pretoria: UNISA Press, 2008); Arquivo Historic 
Moçambique, Brothers from the West (Amsterdam: Netherlands Institute for Southern Africa, 2005).   
19 David Featherstone, Solidarity: Hidden Histories and Geographies of Internationalism (New York: Zed, 
2012), 5-6.  
20 Popular topics include a large literature on the anti-apartheid movement, solidarity with Cuba, Chile, and 
parts of Latin America, Vietnam, and Poland. The only literature that deals seriously with Western anti-
colonialism is that on Pan-African activism, discussed at greater length below.  
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leftist organizing in the last third of the twentieth century. This scholarly indifference is 
the result of a national silo effect. Historians and even political scientists studying social 
movements often view domestic politics as wholly discrete, concentrating primarily on 
issues affecting the nation or narrowly defined interests abroad. Rarely do such interests 
include the freedom of foreign peoples. The result is a surprisingly small literature on 
European popular resistance to their own empires, which shrinks to almost nothing in the 
case of dictatorial Portugal.21 This dissertation argues that while Portuguese anti-
colonialism struggled to cohere, nationalists developed a global solidarity that 
encompassed the exiled resistance movement and placed pressure both internal and 
external on the Lisbon regime. The African parties did not create this sentiment from 
scratch but expanded and deepened an existing anti-imperialist sentiment within the leftist 
tradition of Western states. Recovering this interaction complicates the idea of a liberal 
consensus that seemed especially strong in the United States, but it also demonstrates how 
the socialist anti-colonial politics revived and expanded existing anxiety over the Cold War 
and anti-communist internationalism.  
 Generally, scholars have failed to appreciate the extent to which radical ideas had 
extended lives in mainstream movements, particularly the New Left and the global 
generation of 1968. This is surprising, because Third World actors and ideas proved 
                                                 
21 Only a handful of books have studies the topic including Stephen Howe, Anticolonialism in British 
politics: the Left and the End of Empire, 1918-1964 (New York: Oxford, 1993); Fenner Brockway, Toward 
Tomorrow: the Autobiography of Fenner Brockway (London: Hart-Davis, MacGibbon, 1973); Claude 
Liauzu, Histoire de l'Anticolonialisme en France : du XVIe Siècle à Nos Jours (Paris: Armand Colin, 
2007). Only in the United States is there major attention to popular anti-colonialism, though serious 
scholarly attention becomes thinner after the embrace of imperialism and the subsidence of political 
debates on the topic in the early twentieth century.  
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important influences on how activists and socialist politicians understood everything from 
aid to domestic racial relations. Scholars agree on the pivotal role played by such ideologies 
during high tide of the anti-war movement, wherein the most radical elements articulated 
a solidarity with the North Vietnamese (or an idealization of them). Nonetheless, the 
historiography has defined this activism within a narrative of the rapid rise and decline of 
popular organizing.22 Broader histories of the New Left by scholars of domestic politics 
such as Doug Rossinow have better contextualized the trajectory of youth criticism of the 
Cold War, but here too they are thematically and chronologically limited by a tendency 
toward declension.23 For New Left scholars, Vietnam distracted youth and their allies from 
organizing a new society, with anti-war activism itself divided by the splintering of groups 
who moved beyond Vietnam to adopt sectarian ideologies of anti-imperialism.24 There is 
little attention to the anti-colonial/anti-imperial activism in the 1970s, nor even much 
appreciation for how specific tactics for championing foreign causes perfected during the 
anti-war years found new life as the lifeblood of later movement such as that against 
apartheid.  
                                                 
22 Charles DeBenedetti with Charles Chatfield, An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the 
Vietnam Era (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1990); Terry H. Anderson, The Movement and the 
Sixties (New York: Oxford, 1995); Melvin Small, Antiwarriors (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002); 
Eley, Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe, 1850-2000 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2002); David Farber, The Age of Great Dreams (New York: Hill & Wang, 1994).  
23 Douglas Rossinow, Visions of Progress (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2008), chapter 6; 
Michael Kazin, American Dreamers: How the Left Changed a Nation (New York: Vintage, 2011), 248-264 
This owes much to the “good 1960s, bad 1960s” paradigm established by activist/historian Todd Gitlin, 
who too narrowly understands the New Left and popular internationalism through the lens of Students for a 
Democratic Society. Todd Gitlin, The Sixties: Year of Hope, Days of Rage (New York: Bantam, 1993), 
chapter 17,  
24 Max Elbaum, Revolution in the Air: Sixties Radicals Turn to Lenin, Mao, and Che (London: Verso: 
2002). 
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The primary exception to the dearth of scholarship on anti-colonial solidarity is that 
on African American internationalism and Pan-African organizing. African Americans 
became the leading critics of American acquiescence to colonialism beginning in the 
1930s, articulating a critique of race and racism by linking capitalism, imperialism, and 
unrepresentative democracy. These commonalities became central components in defining 
a transnational critique of Western and particularly American society in the way it treated 
people of the global South and their descendants. In so doing, they ran afoul of the 
government deeply concerned about anything smacking of radicalism or communism.25 
Simultaneously, the apparent death blow to colonialism that was the Year of Africa in 1960 
combined with the disillusionment of radicals with heretofore model states like Ghana 
seemingly shifted the emphasis toward the growing success of the domestic Civil Rights 
Movement.26 The commitment to integration under the weight of Cold War 
internationalism undermined the calls for systemic socio-economic reform that had been 
central to the transnational anti-imperialism of earlier decades. 27 These facts led scholars 
such as Penny Von Eschen to lament the collapse of a Third World Solidarity movement, 
but recent scholarship of Black Power has demonstrated this was far from the case.28 
                                                 
25 Penny Von Eschen, Race Against Empire: Black Americans and Anti-Colonialism, 1937-1957 (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1997); Gerald Horne, Black and Red: W.E.B. DuBois and the Afro American 
Response to the Cold War (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986); Carol Anderson, Eyes Off 
the Prize: The United Nations and the African American Struggle for Human Rights, 1944-1955, (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
26 James Meriwether, Proudly We Can be Africans: Black Americans and Africa, 1935-1961 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Kevin Gaines, American Africans in Ghana: Black Expatriates 
and the Civil Rights Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006). 
27 Von Eschen, 187.  
28 Peniel Joseph has illustrated the international influence on the growth of Black Power, but there is 
relatively little discussion of internationalism. Waiting ‘Til the Midnight Hour: A Narrative History of 
Black Power in America (New York: Henry Holt, 2006). The international aspects of notable groups like 
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Indeed, though perhaps having somewhat tenuous ties to the anti-colonialism of earlier 
decades, black populations actually expanded their definitions of solidarity to include 
“darker” peoples as part of what Cynthia Young as termed a “U.S. Third World Left.”29 It 
was just such an inventive process of self-identification that Lusophone nationalists 
required to promote foreign activism, using the rediscovery and redefinition of minority 
identity in the United States to help build a movement.  
Nonetheless, the narrow focus on African American and ethnic politics has limited 
the reach of these important works, failing to draw sufficient connections with 
contemporaneous politics – New Left and mainstream. The insularity of these 
historiographies has hidden the interconnectedness of Western anti-imperial movements in 
Europe and the Americas and their institutionalization in the 1970s.30 The dissertation 
argues that popular critiques of Cold War foreign and domestic policy based on issues of 
racial equality, economic egalitarianism, and resistance to undemocratic power were a 
constant if sometimes underrepresented presence in the United States and Europe from the 
1960s onwards. Through ebbs and flows, the discrete elements of a transnational resistance 
remained at the grassroots level and actually expanded in the 1960s and 1970s, during a 
                                                 
the Black Panthers have only begun to be explored, see Kathleen Neal Cleaver, “Back to Africa: The 
Evolution of the International Section of the Black Panther Party (1969-1972),” in Charles E. Jones, ed., 
The Black Panther Party Reconsidered (Baltimore: Black Classics Press, 2005). 
29 Cynthia Young, Soul Power: Culture, Radicalism, and the Making of the U.S. Third World Left 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2006). See also the discussion of the darker nations present in Vijay 
Prashad, The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World (New York: New Press, 2007); 
Brenda Gayle Plummer, Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935-1960 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 327. 
30 Quinn Slobodian offers a valuable corrective to these tendencies to canalize scholarship, demonstrating 
how Third World peoples played active roles in the creation of the German 1968 generation. Quinn 
Slobodian, Foreign Front: Third World Politics in Sixties West Germany (Raleigh: Duke University Press, 
2012). 
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time when a similar reassertion of radicalism arose in Europe. The Vietnam War 
punctuated the Cold War equilibrium in both Europe and the Americas, allowing 
subterranean currents of dissent to gain additional adherents through racial, ideological, 
and humanitarian appeals. As Vietnam deescalated, the Portuguese African movements 
and their inclusive transnational socialism became prominent, providing an avenue for 
uniting disparate constituencies into coalitions and networks. The result was what might 
best be termed a New Left Internationalism, which viewed the world not through a lens of 
communism versus capitalist but rather in terms of a search for global social justice. While 
the specifics of this vague concept were fluid, they generally included economic and 
political self-determination, racial equality, and a respect for the still vaguely defined rights 
of peoples in the global South and their descendants. New Left internationalism therefore 
embraced a more cooperative foreign policy that rejected the reactionary associations with 
unrepresentative anti-communist governments and interventions in favor of the status quo 
that had typified past policy in the Third World.  
The New Left internationalism, refined in many during its embrace of the African 
nationalist cause, created a rhetorical and ideological space to articulate criticisms of 
Western foreign and domestic policy. In the process of forging this dialogue, North-South 
exchanges created a sense of solidarity that flowed both ways and encouraged activists to 
continue the struggle despite repeated setbacks. While never achieving a consensus to 
replace liberal anti-communism, constituencies challenging the Cold War actually 
broadened as they incorporated additional causes in the 1970s and achieved greater 
success. As Van Gosse has argued, “an a amorphous bloc that spanned the distance 
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between polite liberalism and unalloyed radical came together in opposition to U.S. 
policies in the Third World . . . an rather than falling apart, this broad foreign policy 
opposition consolidated and advanced in the seventies.”31 While there were a number of 
causes that filled the void after Vietnam, Lusophone liberation and the subsequent 
protection of the socialist government of Angola first demonstrated the real political power 
of the movement. In so doing, it helped legitimize and mainstream Third World criticisms 
of undemocratic governance, unrestrained capitalism, and Western intervention in the 
developing world entered into the mainstream of politics in the mid-1970s. 
 
Civil Society and the Final Phase of the Cold War 
Though this study takes seriously the need to recover the cultural and identity 
politics of social movements, it nonetheless emphasizes the importance of how New Left 
internationalism and popular advocacy worked to influence policy. In this sense it follows 
the recent trend in international history to seriously consider the agency and effectiveness 
of groups and institutions below the state. Until recently, diplomatic history had, in the 
words of Brenda Gayle Plummer, the “tendency to ground itself in the world view of 
policymakers . . . and to see as both normative and neutral the clearly ethnocentric 
commitments of elite national leadership.”32 A flood of excellent monographs since the 
late 1990s has challenged this preconception, replacing straightforward diplomatic history 
                                                 
31 Van Gosse, “Unpacking the Vietnam Syndrome: The Coupe in Chile and the Rise of Popular Anti-
Interventionism,” in The World the Sixties Made: Politics and Culture in Recent America (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 2008), 111.  
32 Plummer, Rising Wind, 5.  
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with a transnational perspective that now recognizes the formative roles played by 
everything from global corporations to local coffee klatches. Yet in doing so, many of these 
works have replicated the tendency to conflate authorial voices with their subjects, no 
longer Washington elites but marginalized internationalists with limited access to the levers 
of economic or political power. This has been especially true concerning historical studies 
of ethnic internationalism mentioned above.33 The tradeoff here has been a better 
understanding of ethnic identity and social politics at both the local and international levels, 
but a still sketchy understanding of whether and how transnational movements affect 
policy. 
The goal of this dissertation is to bridge this gap between activist and policymaker. 
The emergence of this new grassroots leftism and the end of decolonization had deep 
effects on the trajectory of the Cold War and the foreign affairs that defined it. 
Demonstrations, education campaigns, lobbying, and cooperation with legislative politics 
all aimed to use this belief in real self-determination to constrain a tradition of Western 
intervention in the developing world. States confronted by foreign intervention responded 
military and diplomatically, but they also relied on transnational allies to represent their 
interest abroad through the democratic mechanisms of voting and agenda setting. Studies 
of this overlapping space that Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall call the “intermestic” 
                                                 
33 Notable exceptions to this generalization include Akira Iriye, The Global Community: The Role of 
International Organizations in the making of the Contemporary World (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2004); Paul Thomas Chamberlin, The Global Offensive: The United State, the Palestine Liberation 
Organization, and the Making of the Post-Cold War Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).  
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are in their infancy.34 Jeremi Suri’s important Power and Protest, for example, has 
demonstrated the importance of such an approach, but structural explanations for precisely 
how civil society affects policy are only beginning to be clarified by scholars, notably those 
in the field of human rights.35 Indeed, most histories that do allow for the role of civil 
society concentrate heavily on presidential calculations of popular opinion, which are 
difficult to gauge and prone to the vicissitudes of individual personalities in the White 
House.36  
These studies are not wrong, but resistance to Cold War adventurism after Vietnam 
demonstrated much more straightforward if complex trend. The more developed social 
science literature on transnational network building and grassroots advocacy provides 
some guidance on how movements accessed levers of power. In their groundbreaking work 
Activists Beyond Borders, Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink identify the central 
operating component of transnational advocacy as information exchange: “nontraditional 
international actors . . . mobilize information strategically to help create new issues and 
categories and to persuade, pressure, and gain leverage over much more powerful 
organizations and governments.” Foreign actors provide otherwise inaccessible 
perspectives, allowing domestic activists to wield power based on a monopoly on 
                                                 
34 Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall, America’s Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2012).  
35 Jeremi Suri, Power and Protest:  Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2003). For an example of the promising scholarship on human rights that addresses these 
structural issues, see Sarah B. Snyder, Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War: A 
Transnational History of the Helsinki Network (New York: Cambridge, 2013).  
36 Lyndon Johnson’s extended handwringing over Vietnam is arguably the most important example, but 
there are others. Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of the 
Vietnam War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Richard D. Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal in Africa 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1983).  
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information. Activists use this unique material to influence levers of power through both 
the ability to generate politically useful reports and symbolic politics, which expands 
movements through dramatic publicity and media coverage.37 Jeffrey W. Knopf argues that 
activists then access policymaking through one of three avenues (specifically referencing 
the United States) – “electoral pressure, changing coalitions in Congress, and feeding ideas 
into the bureaucracy” – with the Congressional route being the most likely to succeed.38  
This owes much to two facts. First, transnational social movements wield 
information in ways that can establish policy agendas in legislative bodies, especially in 
terms of regions of the world where there is little extant knowledge and weak commitments 
such as Africa. Members of Congress, and more broadly parliaments, lack the vast 
informational structures offered by the American executive branch or ministerial 
appointees and are therefore dependent on outside experts. Especially where limited 
information is available, advocates have the power to frame international issues and shape 
political responses. Second, policy advocates can more easily organize electoral pressure 
in the small regions that elect legislators than on a national scale. Especially in terms of the 
American system, this allows campaigns that appeal to specific racial or ideological 
constituencies to more easily claim electoral power with individual members of Congress, 
who can than provide advocates with access to the larger political body. While Vietnam 
                                                 
37 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1998), 2.  
38 Jeffrey W. Knopf, Domestic Society and International Cooperation: The Impact of Protest on US Arms 
Control Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 50, 251. On the role of media, see William 
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was a national issue that logically attracted the attention of many congressman, issues of 
African solidarity had greater weight in areas with sizeable minority populations and where 
liberal international causes were especially popular.    
Though there remain relatively few Congressional histories of the Cold War, there 
is evidence to support this grassroots-congressional coalition as an important element of 
foreign policy after the 1960s.39 In addition to the obvious Vietnam example that is 
surprisingly understudied, historians writing on the popular opposition to Ronald Reagan’s 
approach to Latin American in the 1980s have touched on this topic. They argue that 
organizations such as the Washington Office on Latin America filled this advocacy role, 
linking foreign nationals and popular protests with the growth of Congressional 
opposition.40 A few others have explored similar relationships concerning anti-apartheid 
activism during its high tide in the 1980s.41 In concentrating on this latter era, however, 
                                                 
39 Two of the few broad overviews of the Congressional role in the Cold War are Robert David Johnson, 
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scholars have failed to seriously explore the common elements linking the Reagan years to 
the political reorganization of the 1960s or the evolution and institutionalization of New 
Left organizational strategies. As a result, scholars have failed to appreciate the role that 
socialist revolutionaries such as FRELIMO and PAIGC played in legitimizing and 
extending criticisms of the Cold War and global North hegemony, as well as active 
solidarity with socialist parties. Many activists first mobilized in support of Lusophone 
liberation became key components of the anti-apartheid movement, while the legislative 
constraints placed on Angola became models for similar action in Latin America. By the 
1980s, both leftists and centrist humanists rallied behind socialist, militant parties like the 
Sandinistas and the African National Congress (ANC) in large numbers – a reality almost 
impossible to imagine in the early 1960s.   
The longer and better integrated history of grassroots Western policy advocacy 
therefore hints at something approaching what some scholars have called a “global civil 
society.”42 While this dissertation does not champion this lofty idea, the networks that 
linked nationalists to Western activists argue for the creation in the globalized postwar era 
a transnational civil society, or perhaps overlapping civil societies. Formal political and 
informal economic divisions continue to create what Jackie Smith and Dawn Wiest have 
called an “uneven geography” that has prevented the formation of anything approaching a 
singular global forum for interactions of individuals, groups, supranational institutions, and 
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state actors.43 Rather there exist a multitude of fragmented and contested networks of 
individuals and institutions that operate across state borders around contested 
internationalist ideologies. For while the term civil society does not imply agreement, it 
does involve a shared sense of association. In this case, the association formed around 
discussions of social justice-based issues of race, economics, and politics, cutting across 
the political boundaries defined by the Cold War in order to create new linkages between 
global North and South.  
While this dissertation takes as its focus the chronologically bounded struggle for 
Lusophone independence, the selection of this important transitional case demonstrates 
that this transnational society also cut across regional boundaries. The formation of a 
transnational network and the affirmation and expansion of an inclusive New Left 
internationalism depended directly on the political opening in Western society created by 
the Vietnam War. Socialist movements that had struggled to build alliances found after the 
mid-1960s new allies willing to look beyond the Cold War. Their success both in 
organizing and in proactively blocking interventions such as the one in Angola legitimized 
activist networks and ideologies, while establishing models of action that would inform 
future movements that involved African, Latin American, and Asian nations.44 After 1975, 
domestic debates revolved less around the tactics used to fight the Cold War, and more on 
the legitimacy of the superpower conflict – especially as it pertained to the global South. 
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In the United States in particular, transnational coalitions of mostly left-leaning activists 
would rely on Congress to constrain the anti-communist interventionism of a previously 
unchecked executive branch. The Portuguese African experience acted as a pivot point in 
Western international history, helping to extend the exceptional case of Vietnam so that it 
became a defining element of the domestic politics of the final phase of the Cold War. 
 
Chapter Outline   
This dissertation draws on Thomas Bender’s definition of transnational history as 
a “weaving together of coexisting histories.” Instead of promoting a single overarching 
narrative, the following chapters explore in detail the concrete linkages between Africa, 
Europe, and North America that helped create a politically effective transnational 
network.45 In weaving together this complex intercontinental tapestry, choices of emphasis 
are necessary. As a result this dissertation is a mix of histories. It is primarily a transnational 
history operating across national boundaries and below the governmental level.  
Secondarily, it is an American history examining the way Third World ideologies came to 
shape domestic politics and set the model for foreign policy debates after the Vietnam War.  
Thirdly, an African history recovers the international strategy and diplomacy of Luosphone 
African nationalists. Lastly, it touches upon a European history that demonstrates changing 
American perceptions of the Cold War and the global South were part of a larger shift in a 
transnational civil society. 
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The first two chapters provide the political context for the creation of this 
transnational network. Chapter One explores the origins of Portuguese decolonization in 
the wider Western context. It introduces the primary nationalist parties and demonstrates 
how Angola forced the Portuguese colonial question onto the global agenda. Despite some 
success in gaining a fleeting level of official support from the world powers, the dual 
concerns of African stability and European unity led Portugal’s most critical allies in the 
United Kingdom and the United States to gradually retreat from initial pressure for 
decolonization. Chapter two explores the effective embrace of Portugal by these same 
governments, which fueled nationalist frustrations and provided additional justification for 
the turn to arms. With limited popular solidarity advocating for the nationalists during the 
1960s, Rhodesia’s unilateral declaration of independence reinforced official Western 
calculations of Portugal as a valuable ally. Events effectively denied nationalists access to 
foreign governments, leading them to redouble their efforts to work with civil society 
groups.  
The next three chapters explore the expansion of this grassroots organizing on 
behalf of the liberation parties. Chapter three focuses on early successes in Europe, where 
case studies of Sweden, the Netherlands, and Britain demonstrate Lusophone attempts to 
encourage and utilize independent but interrelated transnational networks. Coalitions of 
youthful leftists, humanitarian moderates, and government officials provided material 
assistance to the liberation movements while advocating for policies to isolate Portugal. 
Chapter four follows the parallel construction of this movement among the New Left in the 
United States. Leftists and religious youth radicalized by Vietnam gravitated toward 
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Portuguese Africa, helping to introduce the cause into wider anti-imperial discussions in 
the United States. As these young people promoted solidarity with African socialists, they 
helped pull centrist organizations further leftward. United around a New Left 
internationalism, these coalitions used boycotts, divestment, and public demonstrations as 
a way of publicizing American complicity with the Portuguese regime and drawing the 
attention of sympathetic legislators. Chapter five completes the survey by focusing on the 
African American community, long prized as a necessary component of effective 
American solidarity with Africa. Better able to mobilize large numbers than among radical 
whites, this segment of the network dramatized the potential electoral power of the 
advocacy network during the Black Power era. With the encouragement of the nationalists, 
this Pan-African solidarity eventually became a component of a multiracial coalition trying 
to isolate Portugal.  
Chapter six recovers the afterlife of the transnational liberation network, which 
reached its peak shortly before the Carnation Revolution of 1974 that would eventually 
lead to decolonization. While the solidarity movement had an indeterminate effect on the 
downfall of the Portuguese regime itself, it had lasting effects on Euro-American views of 
the Cold War. Continued organizing in the United States promoted a new interest in the 
cause of southern African liberation and helped legitimize the idea of socialist self-
determination. When Gerald Ford intervened in Angola against the MPLA, the solidarity 
movement mobilized against the president. Allies in Congress successfully blocked the 
executive action with legislation, which itself was encouraged by public demonstrations 
against the intervention. In both Europe and the Americas, this decentralized movement 
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pushed the issue of southern Africa to the forefront of national consciousness months 
before the Soweto uprisings. The result was a sustained left-leaning challenge to Cold War 
hawkishness that would grow as the years passed. After Portuguese Africa gained 
independence, the Western struggle for a more justice foreign policy in the global South 
would continue.  
  
 32 
Chapter 1: The Last Empire 
Portuguese Africa and the Crisis of 1961 
 
 
It had been 500 years since the death of the Infante Dom Henrique, the spiritual 
father of Portugal’s overseas empire known worldwide as Prince Henry the Navigator. In 
1960, his homeland was celebrating this event with the pomp and circumstance that would 
remind the world of the country’s once and future greatness. The small Iberian state had 
declined precipitously since its Golden Age in the 1500s, but it retained a far flung empire 
centered on the large African colonies of Mozambique and Angola, complemented by 
coastal and island holdings including Guinea-Bissau in West Africa, Macao in China, Goa 
in India, and the mid-Atlantic Azores archipelago. Portugal used these colonial artifacts of 
a rapidly disappearing era to claim equality with its far more powerful European neighbors, 
which had long ago surpassed the agrarian dictatorship in economic and political power.  
The sheer geographical extent of Portugal’s overseas possessions made the 
celebration of the long-dead provincial prince a global event, despite the fact that 
nationalists in Asia and Africa had spent much of the last fifteen years reversing the 
European expansion Henry helped instigate. The quincentenary coincided with the “Year 
of Africa,” when over a dozen countries declared independence from foreign rule, but such 
contradictions did not stop allies new and old from celebrating the world’s oldest surviving 
empire. In August, ten thousand people watched alongside the presidents of Brazil and 
Portugal as ten square-rigged vessels from eight European nations rounded the country’s 
southernmost point of Sagres, trailed by 33 flag-bedecked warships representing North 
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Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies like Italy, France, and Canada as well as a 
dozen other countries. The United States, Britain, and the friendly dictatorship of Spain 
provided an air guard that saluted the old seaside fortress from which Henry had organized 
his voyages of discovery and colonization.46 Portugal designed these commemorations as 
a tribute to its past glory and continued dedication to the imperial mission. It alone among 
the European powers remained determined to preserve its international empire. While most 
of its neighbors sending delegations to the celebrations had come to terms with the rising 
tide of Third World nationalism and were making moves to accommodate Asian and 
African demands for political self-determination (if not yet economic autonomy), Portugal 
hoped, in the words of one British newspaper, to “stop the clock” before the colonial era 
completely expired.47  
Centuries after Prince Henry bid farewell to his intrepid explorers, Portugal seemed 
the least likely of empires, certainly not one that would have challenged the global forces 
that were cowing mightier powers like Britain and France. The small nation failed to meet 
the criteria that bound the majority of Western Europe together in the postwar period; it 
was economically weak, dictatorial in its politics, and perpetually backward-looking in its 
colonial policies. The country had little to its credit except an oversized empire inherited 
from past centuries and the canny if unimaginative mind of its long-serving premier, 
Antonio de Oliveira Salazar. The diminutive, sickly looking former economist had quietly 
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moved from isolation to membership in NATO by leveraging overseas possessions like the 
strategically located Azores islands and its massive African colonies. Decolonization 
threatened to strip Portugal of its last vestiges of international influence. A new generation 
of leaders was arising the world over, committed to a vision of global politics that sought 
to upend traditional relations between the global North and South, a scenario in which 
Portugal would likely suffer. How Salazar would deal with this generational shift – 
amongst his allies and colonial subjects – might have remained a matter of great importance 
only to the Lusophone world, but both the wily dictator and those who sought to challenge 
his power understood decolonization in larger terms. Salazar’s challenge to the prevailing 
trends, tacking like Henry’s caravels into the “wind of change,” would affect not just the 
ongoing North-South debate but also the East-West competition becoming increasingly 
global in scope. 
 When rebellions in its largest colony of Angola finally forced Portugal to put words 
into action in 1961, Portuguese Africa became a litmus test for decolonization and the 
Euro-American support for this project. This owed much to the fact that Portugal had 
maintained strict control of its colonies, forcing anti-colonial leaders to journey abroad to 
find support for their movements. As the Cold War stabilized in Europe, the superpowers 
shifted their competition to regions like Africa, forcing both East and West to engage with 
the ongoing North-South reorganization. Competing Cold War globalizations offered by 
U.S. democratic capitalism and the Soviet Union’s universalistic communism opened new 
avenues for nationalists to operate outside the traditional confines of the metropolitan-
colony relationship. But the centrality of the industrialized north to the U.S.-Soviet 
 35 
competition reaffirmed the traditional importance of Europe, even as both sides sought to 
rhetorically legitimize the emerging political power of Asia, Latin American, and Africa. 
As a result, the decolonization and the Cold War became inextricably intertwined, 
simultaneously reinforcing and challenging the other though actors in both the global North 
and South worked in vain to separate them.    
In the midst of this ongoing dialectic, the decisions by France and Belgium to grant 
their last African colonies political independence in 1960 had seemingly created 
momentum for the idea of political self-determination that tiny, impoverished Portugal 
could not resist. Among the proponents of this view was John Kennedy, the young 
American president who seemed to represent a new era in American and wider Western 
engagement with the global South. For the administration, Lusophone decolonization 
represented an opportunity to demonstrate to the wider world a new American resolve that 
would support the aspirations of Afro-Asian peoples and win them to the side of democratic 
capitalism. Yet Kennedy, like much of the rest of the world, underestimated the resolve 
and skills of the Salazar dictatorship. The resulting clash between the small Iberian nation 
and the global forces backing self-determination would be a test for the Western 
commitment to decolonization, revealing the extent to which Cold War strategy continued 
to define the global South as subservient to European interests.  
 
Transnational Revolutions 
 As unlikely an empire as Portugal may have been in the 1960s, its colonies were 
even less likely candidates for organized revolutions. Salazar had institutionalized the idea 
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of empire into the very fabric of the nation more than any other postwar European leader. 
Losing the colonies would undermine popular morale and almost certainly topple his 
regime. He guarded the borders of his country and its colonies jealously, carefully 
controlling the influx of goods, people, and ideas. This situation made the development 
and organization of nationalist movements difficult, forcing many potential anti-colonial 
leaders into exile. In an empire ruled meticulously from the center, it was by looking 
outside of its borders that anti-colonialists were able to find ideologies, allies, and 
assistance as they quietly prepared to challenge the Portuguese imperial state.  
Though a ruthlessly effective dictator, Salazar stands in a class apart from the 
megalomaniacs and generals with whom he often shared the fascist label. He looked more 
like a patent clerk than a strongman, having begun his career as an economics professor 
before being invited to serve in the government after a conservative military coup in 1926. 
Beginning as finance minister, the abstemious Salazar - who often worked wrapped in a 
blanket to save on heating costs – restored order to a country wracked by revolutionary 
upheavals. He balanced budgets and prioritized conservative economic and social 
practices, parleying the public confidence into a virtual dictatorship as president of the 
Council of Ministers beginning in 1932. The Estado Novo (New State) centrally managed 
the country through an extensive system of syndicalist organizations, isolationist 
regulations, and an effective if not overly violent secret police known as the PIDE (Polícia 
Internacional e de Defesa do Estado – International and State Defense Police). Portugal 
remained a bastion of stability through the Great Depression and World War II under the 
firm tutelage of a man committed to preserving social cohesion and traditional values at all 
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costs.48 Unfortunately for most Portuguese, economic modernization and political freedom 
were sacrificed at the altar of stability, meaning the country did not participate in the 
postwar European recovery common under socialist governments.49 For Salazar, domestic 
peace came not from material gain or creature comforts but from the preservation of order 
and tradition. “I do not believe in equality,” Salazar once remarked, “but in hierarchy.”50 
Hierarchy is also the best way to understand the Estado Novo’s relationship to its 
African colonies, which Salazar used to provide an economic and ideological foundation 
for his regime. Overshadowed by the former colony of Brazil and the richer Asian enclaves 
of Goa and Macao, Portuguese settlement in Africa long remained confined to the coast 
and small pockets in the interior of Angola and Mozambique that concentrated on coffee 
and cotton, respectively. The smallest mainland possession, Guinea-Bissau, was little more 
than a moderately sized trading center as late as the 1920s.51 Though initially indifferent, 
Salazar came to see Portugal’s remaining colonies as the salvation of the nation. The 
professor promoted imperial investment and trade to decrease foreign imbalances, prop up 
metropolitan industries, and strengthen the Portuguese currency, the escudo. New laws 
                                                 
48 Filipe de Ribeiro de Meneses, Salazar: A Political Biography (New York: Enigma Books, 2009). 
Chapter 1 provides a good overview of Salazar’s rise to power; chapter 2 focuses on the creation of the 
Estado Novo.  
49 As late as 1950, nearly half the population worked in fields while three quarters of industrial firms 
employed four people or less. See Werner Baer and António P.N. Leite, “The Peripheral Economy, Its 
Performance in Isolation and with Integration: The Case of Portugal,” Luso-Brazilian Review 29:2 (Winter, 
1992), 2 and 23. 
50 Basil Davidson, In the Eye of the Storm (New York: Doubleday, 1972), 121. 
51 In Guinea-Bissau there were less than 1,000 settlers, 18,000 in Mozambique, and barely over 20,000 in 
the largest colony of Angola. In no colony did settlers approach one percent of the total population. See 
Patrick Chabal, Amilcar Cabral: Revolutionary Leader and People’s War (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983), 20; Malyn Newitt, A History of Mozambique (Johannesburg: Wits University 
Press, 1995), 442; and Gerald J. Bender, Angola Under the Portuguese: The Myth and the Reality 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 20. 
 38 
raised barriers to foreign investment and formalized African labor conscription to expand 
cultivation.52  In the postwar period, growing coffee yields provided important revenue for 
Portugal – whose primary domestic exports remained wine, cork, and people – while ports 
such as Mozambique’s Beira, Laurenço Marques (modern Maputo), and Angola’s Lobito 
became profitable railway heads for goods from the British colonies, South Africa, and the 
Belgian Congo. While other European nations flirted with liberalization as a way of 
maintaining their empires, the Estado Novo established a neo-mercantilist strategy that 
sought to control its remaining colonies through isolation and increased oversight from 
Lisbon.    
 Salazar also understood the imperial hierarchy as a popular rallying point for his 
otherwise uninspiring regime. The Estado Novo drew on traditional narratives of national 
destiny and imperial success to unite the country and claim continued international 
relevance. Salazar became especially dependent on such narratives as limitations of free 
speech, economic isolationism, and slow industrialization further marginalized Portugal 
among its European neighbors. Facing foreign critics who dismissed the state as backward 
and unimportant, the government relied on a rhetorical use of the empire to celebrate 
Portugal as the vital center of a Lusophone world.53 This exaggeration helped tie the 
national identity together and invested citizens with enough pride in their state that they 
accepted the frustrating experience of living under the regime. Unfortunately, the grafting 
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of the Estado Novo to the empire also made the retention of colonial relationships essential 
for the maintenance of the state. The regime became, in the words of historian Margarida 
Calafate Ribeiro, a “unique singularity fulfilled only in that empire.”54 Given its 
dependence on the empire, Salazar’s Estado Novo jealously guarded its borders from the 
rising tide of African nationalism with seeming success.  
 Constant vigilance was needed as the extractive mindset of Portuguese colonists 
produced difficult conditions in the African empire. In both Mozambique and Angola, large 
European-owned plantations took much of the best land, leaving many Africans to scrape 
out subsistence existence or submit to brutal conditions as laborers. Practices of forced 
labor in Angola produced conditions nearing slavery, while Portuguese authorities profited 
from the sale of Mozambican workers to South African mines.55 Guinea-Bissau faced less 
exploitative conditions due to the small European population, but it – like most of the 
African colonies – received minimal investment in terms of infrastructure and education. 
With most Portuguese services confined to the coastal cities, until the 1950s, schools in the 
interiors of Angola and Mozambique were largely left to protestant missionaries, who the 
Catholic Portuguese barely tolerated.56 Only predominantly mixed-race population of Cabo 
Verde approached in any way the Portuguese ideal of an assimilated society, receiving 
special privileges reserved mainly for Europeans. Yet beyond this special status Lisbon 
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paid minimal attention to drought prone islands, doing little to assuage the occasional 
famines that seemed to mark each generation. Given these conditions, the potential for 
unrest was high, and the Estado Novo repeatedly used its secret police and rapid, violent 
reprisals to prevent the irregular protests from escalating to serious revolts.  
As late as 1960, Portugal faced little visible colonial discontent, while other 
Europeans struggled to respond to calls for greater black participation in government in 
such places as Kenya, the Congo, and South Africa. In fact, Salazar’s greatest challenge 
had come not from the colonies but from India, which consistently criticized Portugal at 
the United Nations (UN) for its ongoing presence in the enclaves of Goa, Daman, and 
Diu.57 With Jawaharlal Nehru inconsistent in his attention to Africa, threats to Portugal’s 
monopoly on power there seemed scarce, despite the growth of economic ties with the 
outside world. “Angola’s period of isolation is ending,” one British official noted in the 
late 1957, though he concluded that “there are no native troubles and no hint that any are 
brewing for the foreseeable future.”58 The powerful PIDE and Salazar’s careful 
management of colonial relationships quieted any outward signs of African nationalism. 
Given the hostile colonial climate, black nationalists were obliged to look abroad as they 
prepared to challenge the regime. It is in part this reality that gave the Lusophone 
revolutions a peculiarly transnational character, but it also hid the slow process of 
organization from the view of many outside observers.  
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Portugal’s control of its colonies seemed a welcome respite to Western 
governments that viewed the Third World in the 1950s as a series of crises. Decolonization 
in Asia and parts of Africa had given rise to a new sense of independence in the Third 
World, led by fiery nationalist leaders like Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah and Egypt’s Gamel 
Abdel Nasser, which threatened to shift whole continents away from the NATO camp 
during the most dangerous stages of the Cold War. The United States recognized the signs 
of the times and hoped that its European allies would accept the need for self-
determination, but it also worried that postcolonial nations might drift into the Soviet bloc 
as nationalist preferences for centralized development plans and semi-authoritarian cults 
of personality provided common ground for alliances with the USSR.59 Events like the 
independence of the Congo in 1960 only fueled such Cold War fears. When Belgium 
hastily dismantled its colonial apparatus in the sprawling state, it handed power to the 
incautious Patrice Lumumba, who unsuccessfully tried to use the Cold War to obtain much 
needed aid for his country. Fearful that the mineral rich state could defect to the 
communists, Western interests and their local allies murdered Lumumba, backed the 
secession of Katanga, and plunged the country into years of chaos that made it the first real 
casualty of the Cold War in Africa.60  
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Most importantly, the Congo gave Western officials pause as to the desirability of 
universal independence. Americans may have hoped that managed decolonization could, 
as Dwight Eisenhower explained to Salazar in 1960, “swing this nationalist feeling to the 
side of the West,” but the Congo illustrated that it could also open the door for Soviet 
intervention if mishandled.61 Salazar’s refusal to consider self-determination for its 
colonies was inopportune, but at least Portugal seemed in control. The United States was 
unwilling to force the matter and potentially destabilize another major African state 
bordering the already problematic Congo. Other major European powers agreed with 
Washington, preferring to focus on their own territories so long as no crisis was apparent. 
Therefore, when U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower visited Lisbon in May 1960, he praised 
Portugal publicly as a “tremendous friend” and expressed his concerns about growing 
African nationalism privately and discretely.62 When Salazar argued that “giving” 
independence to Africans before they were ready would be “a crime,” Eisenhower 
assented, revealing the central concern of American officials remained pro-Western 
stability.63 With little sense that the nationalist “wave” would sweep over Portuguese 
Africa anytime soon and appreciating the relative predictability the Estado Novo provided 
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in Africa, the Western alliance was happy to attend to more urgent regional matters, 
returning to Lisbon when events demanded much later down the road.64 This poor 
prognostication would exaggerate Euro-American shock at the Angolan rebellion, feeding 
fears that the chaos would likely replace Portugal’s steady hand.  
But there were Westerners who had long warned that rebellion was imminent, and 
the most prominent among them was the American Committee on Africa (ACOA). Barely 
a year before the outbreak of violence in Angola, members of the New York-based 
committee had publicly warned the U.S. government of brewing unrest.65 It had a right to 
claim a unique knowledge of events on the continent. ACOA had been founded in 1952 as 
a way to connect domestic civil rights activists with an emerging anti-apartheid movement 
in South Africa, but it had quickly shifted to support continent-wide self-determination. 
Under the leadership of George Houser, a Methodist minister involved with the Fellowship 
of Reconciliation (FOR) and the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), ACOA had 
developed strong relationships with many of Africa’s leading nationalists including 
Kwame Nkrumah, Tom Mboya, Kenneth Kaunda, and Julius Nyerere. The committee 
sponsored speaking tours for these men, aided African petitions to the UN, and 
promulgated anti-colonial perspectives through publications like the monthly Africa 
Today. It also gained insight into the realities of evolving nationalist struggles as members 
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provided assistance and the occasional overnight couch to Sub-Saharan Africa’s future 
leadership.66 ACOA’s professed goal was to “keep the conscience of Americans alive to 
the issues at stake in Africa – to gain sympathetic support for the aims of self-government 
and equality.”67 It had succeeded well to that point, counting among its backers such 
prominent figures as Eleanor Roosevelt, A. Phillip Randolph, Martin Luther King, Jr., 
Jackie Robinson, Oscar Hammerstein II, Senator Hubert Humphrey (D-MN), 
Congressman Adam Clayton Powell (D-NY), and socialist Norman Thomas.68 
 The relative prominence of ACOA and its advocacy work at the UN made it an 
attractive ally for African nationalists excluded from discussions with Washington 
officials. Among the committee’s early contacts and the one who would become most 
important for informing its reaction to Angola was Holden Roberto. Born in the northern 
Bakongo region in the early 1920s to a family with Baptist missionary ties, Roberto spent 
much of his early life in the Congo after tensions between the Portuguese and Protestants 
forced his family over the border. An uncle loyal to the former Kongo Kingdom schooled 
Roberto in Angolan politics and launched an ethnic nationalist organization in Leopoldville 
with ambitions to restore the splintered polity, installing his nephew as the international 
face of the movement.69 It was in this context that Roberto first came in contact with ACOA 
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after his uncle utilized missionary linkages to request Houser help champion the Kongo 
cause at the UN in 1956.70 Long exiled from Angola with limited contacts over the border, 
Roberto’s international appeal nonetheless seemed the best option for the nationalist cause 
in the late 1950s. Houser was skeptical of such ethnocentrism, but there were few 
organizations openly agitating against Portuguese colonialism.  
ACOA became a key ally for Roberto as he became the preeminent Angolan 
nationalist leader of the late 1950s. He used the committee’s New York office “virtually as 
his headquarters” during his time at the UN, while Houser helped facilitate interactions 
with various African nationalists after Roberto attended the Accra Conference in 1958.71 
Interactions with Pan-Africanists such as Nkrumah and Frantz Fanon convinced Roberto 
of the limitations in the ethnic movement his uncle had started, launching a process that 
would result in the creation of the Union of Angolan Peoples (União dos Povos de Angola, 
UPA) with Roberto as the sole leader.72 The UPA opened itself to all Angolan nationalists, 
claiming an anti-colonial position that sought to replace Portugal with a vaguely 
redistributive black state, which Roberto made sure did not hint of communism. The UPA 
began quietly preparing an armed revolution with aid from sympathetic African states and 
nationalist parties such as the Algerian National Liberation Front (Front de Libération 
Nationale, FLN), while continuing to petition the UN. This careful political positioning 
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allowed the revolutionary to make overtures to American politicians with support from 
ACOA – which arranged among other meetings a forty minute discussion with John 
Kennedy in January of 1960 – in hopes of mobilizing pressure on Portugal in advance of a 
domestic revolt.73 ACOA and religious connections also encouraged Roberto’s ties to 
sympathetic officials in the State Department.74 The UPA struck upon a formula for 
advancing the revolution in exile: ACOA became the primary organ for communicating 
with the West, while it prepared for an extended armed revolution with aid from African 
states. Vaguely aware of Roberto’s plans if not necessarily their timing, ACOA understood 
by 1960 that Lisbon’s supposed peace was tenuous at best.  
 But Roberto was only part of the equation, and ACOA maintained an equally 
important relationship with another Lusophone African who also used church ties to build 
a network in the Western world. Eduardo Mondlane came to the United States for training 
to become a religious leader in his native Mozambique, but there was little doubt of his 
strong nationalist tendencies. Born in 1920, the son of a Tsonga chief, he attended a Swiss 
Missionary School that sponsored his education in social work in South Africa. 75 Forced 
to leave after the implementation of apartheid, Mondlane became an activist and operated 
a political education campaign in Mozambique under the cover of social and cultural 
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activities.76 Concerned about growing official interest in his activities, Swiss missionaries 
worked with the U.S. National Council of Churches (NCC) to arrange for Mondlane to 
spend a year studying in Lisbon before finishing his undergraduate education at Oberlin 
University in Ohio. Mondlane married a young American woman he met at a religious 
retreat before earning a doctorate from Northwestern under pioneering anthropologist 
Melville Herskovits. After rejecting an offer to teach in Lisbon that wreaked of imperial 
cooptation, he accepted a position researching trust territories for the United Nations, 
where he could more freely travel while working on anti-colonial issues – including a 
return to Mozambique.77  
 Even more so than the itinerant Roberto, Mondlane spent his time in the United 
States cultivating an American anti-colonial solidarity that would come to include ACOA. 
He used Protestant networks to champion continental independence, addressing 
conferences, congregations, and spiritual retreats during the early years of the Civil Rights 
Movement. Speeches often connected domestic struggles for equality with international 
ones for self-determination.78 Mondlane believed that personal testament and careful 
framing would provide the foundations for meaningful popular support, remarking 
“American public opinion tends to be predominantly sympathetic to almost any desires for 
political freedom manifested by the colonial peoples of empire other than their own.” 
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While he understood that there were limitations on the U.S. commitment to international 
justice, Mondlane believed that the country’s anti-colonial heritage, democratic traditions, 
and reverence for a sometimes secularized Christian ethic would provide the foundations 
for transnational cooperation. As such, he argued that the domestic movement for equal 
rights should adopt a more global perspective and integrate support for the Portuguese 
African self-determination.79 For nearly a decade, Mondlane promoted this view to become 
one of the most consistent voices in the country championing decolonization, building 
strong relationships with ACOA, the churches, and civil rights leaders.80 This unique 
political maturation isolated Mondlane from certain radical nationalist theories, but it 
provided him with a uniquely Western outlook that would shape the way he approached 
African politics.81 Instead of the ethnic identifications first used by Roberto or the leftist 
ideologies favored by other nationalist parties discussed below, the Mozambican relied in 
these early years on a universal understanding of Christian ethics – which came to inform 
contemporary human rights discourse – to build a solidarity that could pressure Portugal 
into liberalization. 
These African connections provided ACOA with direct knowledge of the 
Portuguese colonies, but they also revealed the limitations of American solidarity in this 
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period. African nationalists appreciated ACOA’s staunch anti-colonialism, but it was by 
no means a revolutionary organization. An extension of the Civil Rights Movement, it 
encouraged peaceful transfers of power brought about by diplomacy and, if pushed, non-
violent demonstrations. It was also a product of its times, hewing closely to a Cold War 
liberal view of the world that championed self-determination along democratic lines as the 
best chance for peace and development. As an early document explained, ACOA aimed  
to help in every way the emergence of democratic self-governing states . . . and to 
free the people on the African Continent from the exploitation, poverty and racial 
discrimination under which they suffer. Our Committee opposes the fanaticism and 
totalitarianism of the doctrines of Communism, Mau Mau, White Supremacy and 
Imperialism and seeks to help the African people to find a democratic peaceful 
pathway into the new day of the 20th century world.82 
 
This attitude allowed ACOA to appeal broadly to centrist institutions like the Protestant 
churches that paid many of its bills, while also providing a foundation for building 
constructive relationships with government officials interested in fighting the Cold War.83 
Still, ACOA understood colonial repression and slowly accepted the idea of armed 
revolution as an unpleasant necessity, eventually supporting the Algerian revolution 
without providing overt aid to the fighting itself. Therefore, Mondlane and Roberto – who 
had few leftist connections and continued to publicly urge UN action until the 1961 revolt 
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– were ideal allies. ACOA’s goal in the 1950s was to gain early acceptance for these brands 
of African self-determination in order to avoid the violence of armed revolution and the 
drift toward communism that was a logical outgrowth of continued Western support for 
the outdated imperial model.  
 But this Cold War liberalism prevented ACOA from tapping into a second, more 
radical form of anti-colonial nationalism originating, of all places, in the universities of 
Lisbon. Educational advancement was a remote possibility for the vast majority of colonial 
peoples (and most citizens of Portugal for that matter), but there were some opportunities 
for the gifted and well-connected. A handful of mostly mestiço (mixed race) youth gained 
access to Portuguese schools as part of the assimilado (assimilated) class from which some 
advanced to metropolitan universities.84 Colonials gravitated together as they confronted 
life in Portugal, where few citizens had seen Africans from their supposedly integrated 
empire. Many African university youth were involved with the Casa dos Estudantes do 
Império (House for Colonial Students), which served as the social, cultural, and political 
incubator of revolutionary leadership.85 Their experiences of both racism and comradery 
in Lisbon reinforced a sense of shared continental identity, which fueled what the Angolan 
nationalist Mário Pinto de Andrade termed “a re-Africanization” as the first step in the 
development of an anti-colonial ideology.86  Study in Portugal also introduced them to the 
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revolutionary politics of Marx, French African nationalists, African Americans, and the 
underground Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) – with medical student and future 
Angolan president Agostinho Neto acting as a bridge between the two groups. In Lisbon, 
bright young colonials found a furtive ground for articulating increasingly leftist critiques 
of the fascist empire.  
 Amílcar Cabral, the founder of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea 
and Cape Verde (Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde, or PAIGC), 
provides a window into this culture. Born in Portuguese Guinea in 1924 to Cabo Verdean 
parents, Cabral spent a decade on the mainland before attending school in the more 
assimilated if marginalized islands first colonized by Portugal in the 1460s.87 Taking 
advantage of the special status that the creolized Cabo Verdeans held in the empire, he 
studied agriculture at the Technical University of Lisbon, living with a number of other 
African students in the western Ajuda district and becoming active in the Casa dos 
Estudantes do Império. Cabral became a leader of a veritable who’s-who of the 
revolutionary generation from Lusophone Africa, notably de Andrade and Neto from 
Angola and the Mozambican Marcelino Dos Santos.88  The cadre formed a seminar to 
explore Marxism, African nationalist ideas like those of Leophold Senghor, the poetry of 
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Pablo Neruda, the literary soul-searching of the Harlem Renaissance, and a great deal else 
forbidden by the government. It was these readings and exchanges that, in Andrade’s 
words, “opened [Cabral’s] mind to the understanding of the world.”89 This communal 
exploration helped revitalize their identities as African peoples, providing an important 
mental challenge to their status as colonial subjects. The fact that they had come to this 
conclusion together also forged lasting bonds between the African revolutionaries. Cabral 
later explained that this time in Lisbon had been the genesis of “the long march towards 
the liberation of our people.”90   
 Over the next decade, this community of Portuguese African leftists evolved into a 
network of closely associated revolutionary movements. They drew on each other to help 
define their objections to Portuguese colonialism and develop methods for attracting new 
recruits. After their studies, most students returned home, though a few like De Andrade 
and Dos Santos settled in France where they developed unfettered contacts with the 
European left.91 Cabral was in many ways the unofficial leader of this movement. He 
became intimately familiar with Guinea as a census taker, before taking a position within 
the colonial state that sponsored his travel between Portugal, Guinea, and Angola. During 
one such trip to his birthplace in September of 1956, he founded PAIGC on vaguely 
Marxist principles. Three months later he was in Angola with Andrade and Neto when they 
formed the leftist Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (People's Movement for 
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the Liberation of Angola, or MPLA).92 The final movement to emerge from this network 
was the União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique (National Democratic Union of 
Mozambique, or UDENAMO), founded by nationalist exiles in Southern Rhodesia and led 
internationally by Dos Santos.93 Together, Cabral and his Lisbon associates began to lay 
the groundwork for leftist anti-colonial revolutions that would repudiate the Salazar 
regime. They coordinated their activities after 1958 through a series of international 
organizations, culminating in the creation of the Conferência das Organizações 
Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas (Conference of Nationalist Organizations of the 
Portuguese Colonies, or CONCP) in 1961.94   
The CONCP illustrated the inherent internationalism of the socialist nationalist 
parties that had emerged from 1950s Lisbon independent from the church-ACOA network. 
Yet the goals were similar, in that the parties hoped to pressure Portugal into liberalizing 
its relationship with its colonies – even as they sought monetary and military aid for 
potential revolutions. The CONCP parties worked cooperatively to “develop propaganda 
in order to obtain the effective support of world public opinion.”95 Given the political 
inclinations of the constituent members, it would have been logical for the international 
organization to focus its efforts on the communist East and Third World. This it certainly 
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did through participation in forums like the All-Africa’s People Conference of 1960, which 
helped launch the CONCP’s immediate predecessor. Yet from the late 1950s onward, the 
Lusophone nationalists sought to create a broad coalition that also included leftists in 
European countries. It believed the support of Portugal’s European allies could force 
Salazar to liberalize policy in the colonies. It created a number of valuable contacts with 
French communists and the British anti-colonial movement, even revisiting ties first 
pioneered by Neto in Lisbon by working with Portuguese exiles in London.96  
The CONCP alliance was also the vehicle through which the socialist nationalists 
sought international attention for their cause. In 1960, the MPLA tapped into the 
momentum of the Year of Africa to make the first serious appeal for independence of 
Portugal’s colonies. The party explained that it and its allies had been preparing for 
revolution, which would enter the armed stage soon. It requested that Lisbon recognize the 
tide of history and promise eventual self-determination, allow the establishment of political 
parties, and prepare negotiations with colonial nationalists by the end of the year. Only 
these measures, the MPLA claimed, could prevent the looming specter of bloodshed and 
“find a peaceful solution to the colonial problem.” When Salazar refused to respond to the 
declaration, the CONCP countries held a press conference in London where they decried 
“Portuguese obstinacy” and urged international action to sway the Salazar regime.97 
Unfortunately for the Portuguese African leftists, their calls fell on deaf ears – receiving 
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limited media coverage and never reaching the desks of Western decision makers. There is 
not even evidence that ACOA took notice. The CONCP emphasis on socialism and its 
connections to the European left offered little opportunity for early cooperation with 
Houser’s respectably liberal organization in New York. But the unity shown at this 
supranational level by Lusophone nationalists would come to play an important role in 
creating a single vision of “Portuguese African liberation” and a commitment to a kind of 
transcendent, universal iteration of a specifically Third World socialism that would appeal 
to a broad array of peoples worldwide. 
 By 1960, both primary currents of Lusophone African nationalism were preparing 
for self-determination. The first was an ill-defined and politically varied assortment of 
individuals and groups whose primary unifying element was a relationship with the 
international Protestant network, limited ties to the trans-imperial intelligentsia, and a 
commitment to a centrist nationalism. The second included the better organized groups 
associated with the CONCP, more radically oriented in their leanings, that often traced 
their lineages to the Casa dos Estudantes do Império. While the first built strong 
relationships in the United States, the latter found greater support in Europe, where the 
integration of socialism into nationalist politics proved less controversial. Bridging the gap 
between these two groups was difficult, as evidenced by an abortive attempt to merge the 
UPA and MPLA in the late 1950s. Holden Roberto had scuttled the talks, fearing that his 
Bakongo dominated UPA would become a secondary partner in a socialist front. He 
consolidated control of his party and portrayed his rejection of the MPLA union as proof 
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of his commitment to the anti-communist West.98 While there remained deep divisions 
between the nationalists, they did agree on the need to make appeals to Portugal’s allies in 
the West, even as they prepared for armed revolution with African and Eastern weapons. 
At the same time, these tenuous transnational manifestations of anti-imperialism stood in 
place of the local nationalist organizing familiar to Anglo-French decolonization but 
difficult under the repressive conditions of Portuguese rule. This new formulation of 
revolution from the outside-in – and in some ways from the top-down – meant that official 
observers were slow to recognize the true power of these revolutions. How Western 
policymakers would respond to either form of anti-colonialism when the myth of 
Portuguese stability had been called into question remained to be seen.  
 
Salazar, Kennedy, and the International Response to the Angolan Rebellions 
 Official ignorance of the emerging Lusophone revolutions ended with a jolt in 
1961. In the first three months of the year, a series of popular protests and rebellions shook 
the tranquility of Salazar’s tightly controlled empire. After two months of low level unrest 
in the north of Angola over poor wages, a coordinated attack against political prisons 
occurred in Luanda in February, killing fourteen Europeans and eliciting harsh reprisals 
from colonial officials and vigilantes. The MPLA claimed credit for the Luanda uprising, 
though it inspired no sustained revolt.99 Then in mid-March, the UPA launched a rebellion 
                                                 
98 Houser, Rain, 152. 
99 See Marcum, Angolan Revolution vol I, 123-130; Guimarães, 42-45; Jean-Michel Mabeko Tali, 
Dissidêdencias e Poder de Estado: O MPLA perante si próprio (1962-1977), Vol I (Luanda: Nzila, 2001), 
68-76. Mabeko Tali notes that some at the time and since have sought to place blame on American agents – 
including ACOA – though no evidence exists to tie any U.S. nationals to the events. At the time, even 
 57 
in the north, crossing over the Congolese border and taking advantage of the earlier 
disruptions to begin the first Lusophone independence struggle. During these first months 
of 1961, Portugal attempted to restore order through brutal reprisals that left hundreds – 
perhaps thousands – of Africans dead, but struggled in the face of multiple revolts. The 
façade of peace had finally been shattered, and governments across the globe took notice 
as Portuguese Angola seemed on the precipice of collapse just across the border from the 
already chaotic Congo.100  
African nationalists were especially interested in the reaction of the United States, 
Portugal’s most powerful ally. When reports of anticolonial unrest first began filtering 
through Lisbon’s censors in January, John F. Kennedy had just entered the White House. 
The youthful president, though still new to the office, had clear ideas on decolonization. 
He believed that the developing world had the potential to become the future battleground 
of the Cold War and had expressed an early interest in Africa. While chair of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa, Kennedy had criticized the French handling of 
Algeria and built personal (if not necessarily close) relationships with nationalists including 
Kenya’s Tom Mboya and Roberto.  He had also backed colonial independence on the 
campaign trail, scoring points with liberals and African American voters who were 
understandably less enthusiastic about the Democrat’s carefully moderated statements on 
domestic civil rights. 101  
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Importantly, Kennedy’s position had less to do with a specific ideology than his 
insightful observation of international affairs. He recognized the geostrategic implications 
of peripheral independence movements and believed decolonization in some form to be 
inevitable. As early as 1957, he had expressed concern that Asian and African states would 
“look with suspicion on the Western nations who impeded their steps to independence” – 
and likely ally with communist states.102 Kennedy sincerely believed the United States had 
an opportunity to encourage the transition to majority rule in a way that would win friends 
and avoid the traditional quiescence to European interests that had alienated Third World 
nationalists in previous decades.103 The Congo crisis validated this concern even as it 
warned of the chaos possible with poorly managed transfers of power. Halting the spread 
of unrest further south was especially important, as South Africa’s continued resistance to 
majority self-determination had the potential to transform localized struggles into a wider 
regional race war that could invite foreign intervention. It was, according to Secretary of 
State Dean Rusk, this potential “alliance between Communism and racialism” that most 
concerned the administration.104 Angola offered an opportunity to undermine the alliance 
if the United States could help manage Portugal’s transfer of power. Facing a relatively 
weak ally, Kennedy felt confident he could facilitate a gradual self-determination, which 
would ideally stabilize a region on the verge of becoming a Cold War flashpoint.  
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 Most Americans believed Salazar faced a serious crisis. Washington had little 
confidence that Portugal, given its limited economic and military resources, could long 
hold out against an organized revolt. U.S. leaders were concerned that a full-scale 
revolution in Angola could force the Lisbon regime from the continent, making the earlier 
Belgian exit seem smooth in comparison. Kennedy sought to place gentle pressure on 
Portugal but quickly adopted a harder line as Salazar seemed to be losing control in Angola. 
Even before the March 15 invasion by the UPA, Secretary of State Rusk had contacted 
Salazar about Washington’s “[deep concern] over [the] deteriorating position [of] 
Portugal” in Africa. Rusk, a southern liberal and Rhodes Scholar, shared his president’s 
view of colonialism but remained sympathetic to Europe. He was nonetheless blunt in his 
warning to Salazar: continued inaction would only worsen the situation. American officials 
were concerned not only about Portugal’s military situation but also about the criticism of 
Afro-Asian states – some directly allied with Roberto’s UPA – who had used the outbreak 
of violence to draft a UN resolution on Portuguese colonialism that threatened to force the 
issue onto the international agenda.105 Discussing the issue with C. Burke Elbrick, the 
career Foreign Service officer who had been the U.S. ambassador in Lisbon since January 
1959, the secretary commented that “if [the] Portuguese did not bring [the] overseas 
provinces to self-determination, they would be creating worse Congos.” The 
communication softened the blow by proposing economic assistance to offset the economic 
consequences of decolonization if only the Estado Novo would show some sign of moving 
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toward greater African participation in colonial affairs.106 Salazar accepted the warnings 
courteously without official response, presuming that the message was the posturing of a 
new administration and that NATO allegiances would prevent any further action.107 
The aged dictator sorely underestimated deep American concern about instability 
in Portugal’s colonies. Rusk’s Congo comment encapsulated the fears of the Kennedy 
administration. Still settling into the Oval Office, Kennedy had little knowledge of Salazar 
but believed he understood events in Angola. Failing to realize the deep divisions between 
the nationalists, Kennedy presumed the weakening of central power would expand popular 
support for the cause of independence and military liberation as had happened in Algeria. 
Prolonged fighting would empower anti-Western radicals, while a forced Portuguese 
retreat would create a power vacuum in Africa and potentially topple the empire-dependent 
Estado Novo with unpredictable consequences. To Kennedy and his staff, the only way to 
avert this chain of events was for Portugal to embrace self-determination as a way of 
undermining support for armed conflict, thereby allowing a more gradual transition. 
Reports from Lisbon indicated that some high-ranking Portuguese officials – notably 
Defense Minister Júlio Botelho Moniz – recognized the need for flexibility and were 
willing to listen to American initiatives.108 Washington officials felt that placing greater 
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political pressure on Portugal would embolden these dissenting voices and convince 
Salazar to reverse course in order to preserve power in Angola and within his own cabinet.  
It was in this context that Kennedy made his most aggressive move. On March 15, 
the U.S. delegation to the UN voted in favor of a Security Council (SC) resolution calling 
for Portugal to move toward self-determination in order to avoid “another Congo . . . [and] 
disastrous consequences.” The Liberian sponsored resolution did not pass due to a high 
number of European abstentions, but it represented the first time the United States had 
voted against a NATO ally (and with the Soviet Union) on a colonial issue.109 The vote 
raised the stakes on Portugal but less than many historians have assumed. The 
administration believed that the relatively moderate Liberian proposal in the Security 
Council – which was assured to fail due to French and British hostility – would soothe calls 
for more assertive measures in the General Assembly. This second route held the potential 
for the “creation of UN machinery on Angola,” which Rusk and the State Department 
wanted to avoid at all costs given the difficult situation the international body had caused 
in the Congo as well as Salazar’s assuredly irate reaction.110 Rusk saw the vote as making 
the best of an exceedingly difficult situation, simultaneously protecting a NATO ally while 
encouraging Portugal to reevaluate existing policies. That the United States would gain 
some traction with African states was important, but it also bought time for Lisbon.  
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 Despite its intent, the vote infuriated Salazar and launched a summer of diplomatic 
maneuvering and confrontation. Rather than empower critics within the regime, American 
action had the opposite effect. Preparing for a long political and military struggle, the cagey 
Salazar consolidated his rule by installing a number of new ministers and ambassadors who 
shared his view of the colonies.111 He also rallied the nation, using the colonies’ keystone 
position within the Estado Novo to tap into a well of popular support. The state-controlled 
media portrayed the vote as a direct attack on Portugal, fueling violent anti-American 
protests in the metropolis and Angola that were tolerated and likely encouraged by the 
regime. In one such incident in late March, a large crowd damaged the Lisbon embassy 
when the local police were slow to arrive – a rare incident in a country that prided itself on 
maintaining order.112 The country was further incensed that the United States had voted 
alongside the Soviet Union, since Salazar asserted that the nationalists were armed, funded, 
and led by outside communist agitators. “It’s impossible to maintain a situation in which 
the United States has an alliance with European countries to defend the West against 
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Russian action,” one Portuguese official fumed, “and on the other hand, in relation to 
Africa, aid communist bloc positions against European interests.”113  
While the Portuguese smoldered, nationalists looked at the vote as an early victory. 
Roberto had been at the UN when the UPA invasion occurred, taking advantage of the 
sudden importance of Angola to gain media attention. He praised the Security Council vote 
as an important “reversal in American politics regarding Africa and colonial empires,” but 
he reminded listeners it was just a first step. The UPA leader demanded that the world 
follow the example of the UN and “exert pressure on Portugal to bring an immediate end 
to the atrocities in Angola.”114 He also privately urged the State Department to continue its 
activity, warning inaction could result in the growth of communist sympathies.115 This last 
point was important, because Roberto spent the first months of the revolt reinforcing his 
image as a moderate nationalist and potential ally for the United States, even as his party 
took up arms. “If the Portuguese have been accusing us of being communist – it’s because 
it’s the only argument they have now,” Roberto assured an NBC documentary crew, “We 
are not communist but are fighting for freedom.”116  
Roberto would soon discover that serious aid to the nationalist cause was not yet 
on the administration’s agenda. Rusk heard enough good things to order the embassy in 
Leopoldville to maintain discreet contact with Roberto “for [the] time being” and explore 
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American involvement in the struggle short of support for a government in exile. As Rusk’s 
carefully chosen words communicated, the administration remained wary and was still in 
the process of assessing “Holden’s integrity, character as leader [of the] UPA.”117 Roberto 
had been on the CIA payroll since the Eisenhower years, and Kennedy continued to provide 
assistance. But the State Department purposely limited these funds to prevent Roberto from 
purchasing weapons and sought ways to insulate government agencies from direct contact 
with the UPA leader. What many historians have identified as proof of Kennedy’s 
commitment to self-determination was in Rusk’s own words barely more than a bribe, 
designed to maintain contact with Roberto as the government pondered its future 
strategy.118  
The UN vote represented a shift in the rhetoric of American policy, but it did not 
necessarily connote the policy change that either the Portuguese or Roberto assumed. A 
close reading of documents reveals that the Kennedy administration’s view of African 
independence in Angola was limited in scope, advocating for increased political autonomy 
while simultaneously seeking to reinforce Lisbon’s economic, cultural, and diplomatic 
control of the colonies. Discussions repeatedly highlighted the American desire for 
Portugal to retain a substantial presence in Africa, albeit in a form that assuaged the 
nationalist demands of apparent moderates like Roberto. State’s European Bureau 
highlighted the objectives of a new policy towards Lusophone Africa, which included 
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protecting metropolitan economic interests and “laying foundations for a new political 
status for the Portuguese territories and a new relationship with Portugal.”119 Though 
articulated in the section of the State Department most friendly to Lisbon’s interests, the 
comment reflected a common logic. Speaking with Salazar in March, Rusk “noted relative 
success [of] British in retaining close ties with former colonies after their independence 
and deplored cases where former profitable relationship broken (Dutch-Indonesia, 
Belgium-Congo).”120 Even UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, identified by historians as a 
key pro-African liberal in Kennedy’s foreign policy team, offered a nuanced reading of 
American anti-colonialism. “The official attitude of Washington,” Stevenson explained to 
his Portuguese counterpart after the vote, “was not to provoke ‘hasty movements to self 
government’ but to develop gradually,” requiring only a vague pledge to independence at 
some future date.121 The administration believed that it was important for Portugal to retain 
political and economic relationships with its dependencies, but it believed that Portuguese 
commitment to direct rule threatened this very goal. 
But this measured approach meant little to Salazar. Already feeling isolated as 
European empires capitulated around his colonies, the dictator perceived American 
intentions as a mortal threat to the Estado Novo. To Salazar, Kennedy’s calls for gradual 
self-determination could mean nothing more than the complete independence of the 
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colonies and the division of multi-continental Portugal.122 The small Iberian state lacked 
the economic might to tie its colonies to the metropolis after a transfer of power, meaning 
comparisons with Britain and France were at best shortsighted and perhaps disingenuous. 
The regime believed that, rhetoric aside, the United States was colluding with African 
countries to seek the ouster of Portugal from the continent in search of political and 
economic advantages.123 Salazar’s newly appointed foreign minister, Franco Nogueira, 
summarized the attitude of Lisbon when he wrote privately that  there “is some plan of the 
United States, and it has the objective of placing Portugal outside of Africa.”124 On the 
defensive after nationalist victories elsewhere on the continent, the Estado Novo invested 
American rhetoric with far greater ambition and resolve than most Washington officials 
could have ever imagined.  
Even when Salazar set aside his fears of an American power play, he considered 
the initial demarche shortsighted, because it sought to undermine the long history of 
European authority on the continent that he believed was key to a lasting peace. The 
dictator retained strong views on the inherent inferiority of Africans and warned American 
officials that local peoples would “soon revert to tribalism” without European guidance.125 
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Borrowing from the Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre, officials argued Portugal was 
especially well-positioned to play this civilizing role. The warm Iberian climate supposedly 
prepared colonists for settlement in tropical regions, while a lack of formal segregation had 
produced a history of cultural mixing evidenced in multiracial Lusophone nations like 
Brazil.126 This theory of lusotropicalism became the Estado Novo’s leading defense of 
Portugal’s imperial role in Africa, though proponents demurred it would take decades or 
even centuries before Africans were fully prepared for self-rule. Forced separation of 
Angola and Mozambique would not only deprive Portugal of its historic mission but also 
threaten Western desires for regional stability.127 Armed with this defense of empire, 
Salazar responded to American overtures that he was “deeply concerned over what he 
considers a self-defeating policy of [the] US with regard to Africa,” and Portugal would 
play no part in the dissolution of its own territories.128 As long as Portugal retained its 
colonies, the Estado Novo considered itself a bulwark against anti-Western intrigue and a 
world power that could resist external pressure for internal reform.  
If the United States had any hope of changing Salazar’s mind, additional support 
would be necessary. The Kennedy administration believed a joint NATO approach was the 
best option for cajoling the Salazar regime, illustrating the administration’s continued 
deference to Europe. Rusk had discussed options with Britain and France in early March, 
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but neither had committed to supporting the U.S. approach and abstained from voting in 
New York.129 The French foreign minister had been particularly hostile to requests that 
NATO criticize Portugal. Not so subtly alluding to the rising number of Franco-American 
disagreements that ranged from Algeria to a nuclear Germany, he lamented that the 
situation represented “one more crisis for the west.”130 France had always been a 
somewhat unpredictable Cold War partner, and relations with Washington had frayed 
after Eisenhower had humiliated its ally by opposing the Euro-Israeli invasion of the Suez 
Canal. The advent of Charles de Gaulle’s Fifth Republic had only amplified this split, as the 
proud general chafed under American leadership and pushed for greater 
independence.131 Though de Gaulle accepted the necessity of decolonization, the how 
and when of the event in Africa remained a point of contention. France agreed with 
Portugal on the “fundamental importance of Africa in the Western defense system” and 
had expanded cooperation between the two countries as NATO distanced itself from 
involvement in the continent in the 1950s. The common bonds and interests of the two 
countries thus boiled down to an interrelated list: “the defense of Africa, close Western 
solidarity, the problem of NATO, assessment of American policy and incidences of anti-
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colonialism in defense of the free world.”132 It was this European solidarity that prevented 
France from backing the young American president’s call for pressure.  
 This solidarity was no accident. Salazar had anticipated American policy and begun 
strengthening continental relationships. In October 1960, he had sent his foreign minister 
to France, where de Gaulle confirmed his sympathy for Portugal. Daniel da Silva Costa 
Marcos argues that this event was important in reassuring the Lisbon regime it would not 
be alone in confronting looming difficulties in the colonies and the UN.133 Encouraged by 
the response, the Portuguese government decided a few months later to “reduce our 
dependency on traditional allies,” namely the United States and Great Britain, in favor of 
building new associations around common colonial interests and frustrations. Salazar 
found a number of allies perturbed at what they believed were presumptive American 
actions regarding imperial ties. Most European governments believed NATO was a tool 
for coordinating European defense, not providing a forum for the liquidation of 
empires.134 In addition to de Gaulle, Salazar reached out to the conservative Dutch 
Foreign Minister Joseph Luns and the Belgian Secretary General of NATO Paul-Henri 
Spaak, who sympathized with Portuguese goals. He hoped to take refuge within a 
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European bloc based largely on, as one Portuguese document explained, “Belgian, Dutch, 
and French dissatisfaction with the United Nations and with the United States” over 
colonial questions.135 These new relationships took many forms including access to 
military arms, cross-border cooperation in Angola, and rhetorical support against Afro-
Asian revolutions at the UN.136 The Portuguese hoped that de Gaulle and other European 
leaders would provide protection from the American agenda within NATO, thwarting the 
coordinated pressure Kennedy desired.  
Kennedy found that even Washington’s most stalwart postwar ally was unwilling 
to directly confront Portugal over the complicated politics of Sub-Saharan Africa. In 
contrast to de Gaulle, Kennedy had quickly developed a bond with the Tory Prime 
Minister Harold MacMillan, who had famously backed decolonization in his “wind of 
change” speech and had the potential to make inroads with Salazar as the leader of a 
nation whose alliance with Portugal dated to 1386. But while the British shared the 
American concern with Portugal’s precarious position, they were equally unwilling to take 
a firm stand. The United Kingdom had begun its own phased withdrawal from central 
Africa, and it did not appreciate the precedent of either the UN or NATO meddling in 
colonial affairs. As one Whitehall official explained to an American diplomat, the British 
were doing “our best . . .to avoid making trouble for [Portugal]. . . Inevitably the attack is 
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to some extent directed at all European Powers with interests in Africa.”137 As a result, 
Britain expressed sympathy for the American approach and even joined – over the 
objections of the foreign minister – in requesting that Portugal supply information on the 
colonies to the UN. But Whitehall adopted, in the words of historian Glynn Stone, “a more 
reserved attitude toward putting pressure on Portugal,” seeking to temper international 
criticism and moderate African opinion in ways that would help preserve stability in a 
region still critically important to British interests.138 
Discouraged but not dissuaded, the Kennedy administration made a final push for 
coordination over the summer. Again, the goings were difficult for the United States, with 
ministerial meetings among NATO’s big three accomplishing little. The French preferred, 
according to a British diplomat, “to wait and give the Portuguese a chance to weather the 
storm both in Angola and in the United Nations,” while the British refused to commit to 
any unified action.139 The president finally took charge of the situation himself in June, 
broaching the Portuguese subject in a meeting with President de Gaulle. The elder 
statesman briskly ended the conversation, declaring it a mistake to “bully Portugal or 
place it in the pillory of world opinion.”140 In contrast, the Portuguese ambassador to 
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France recalled that de Gaulle had told him personally that Portugal should continue to 
resist American pressure and that “France will help you.”141 Kennedy had clearly 
underestimated Portugal’s position within the alliance and overestimated allied 
willingness to promote decolonization, meaning any American action would likely be 
unilateral and effectively in opposition to European wishes. By the middle of the summer, 
Kennedy’s approach to Portugal was paying few dividends but exacerbating NATO 
tensions.  
Faced with serious opposition, the Kennedy administration began to revisit its 
strategy toward Lisbon. As early as the end of May, State Department officials recognized 
that dire predictions of Portugal’s collapse had not come true, and they recommended 
that Kennedy take a step back to see if Salazar could restore order in Angola, then open 
a less contentious dialogue.142 Moderating its initial concern with Portuguese collapse and 
recognizing Salazar’s surprising level of support domestically and in Europe, the Kennedy 
administration was slowly coming to the point that it desired little more, in the words of 
one diplomat, than to “put the Angola question ‘on ice.’”143   If African nationalist desires 
for increased American pressure were to become a reality, they would need to find new 
ways to steel the president’s resolve in the face of a cool reception from his most 
important European allies.   
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The Anti-Colonial Lobby in the United States and Great Britain 
 The solution lay in the emergence of a popular anti-colonialism in the Western 
world. Portuguese diplomacy had successfully rallied continental frustration with the 
United States to blunt the Kennedy administration’s initial hope for an international 
consensus on the Lusophone colonies, but Salazar could not control the growth of popular 
foreign criticism. For a brief period in the summer of 1961, Angola became a transnational 
rallying cry for a small but vocal segment of liberals and radicals concerned about Africa. 
A short-lived coalition of activists, grassroots humanitarians, and policymakers pushed 
both the United States and Great Britain to take action. Under pressure from his liberal 
base, Kennedy weathered European criticism to adopt the most severe measure to date –
arms sale limitations – which tellingly followed a similar British action, itself a product of 
popular protest.  
 ACOA emerged as one of the first voices pushing Kennedy to continue the 
momentum begun at the UN. In the year preceding the Angolan rebellion, ACOA had taken 
an active interest in the Portuguese colonies. It had published two sizeable pamphlets: one 
urging Americans to write the president in support of Angolan freedom and another on the 
Portuguese forced labor system. ACOA distributed these at the UN and in Washington, 
becoming one of the first sources of information as both policymakers and the general 
public scrambled to educate themselves when the rebellions began.144 Houser arranged for 
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distribution of UPA statements and speaking events for Holden Roberto, notably the 
Angolan’s participation in the annual Africa Freedom Day. There he shared the stage with 
civil rights leader James Farmer, Hubert Humphrey, jazzman Dizzy Gillespie, Tom Mboya, 
and African National Congress leader Oliver Tambo.145 In most of these appearances 
Roberto presented a vision of an inclusive, multiracial Angola and demanded that the 
United States cease supplying arms to Portugal. ACOA helped integrate Roberto into the 
wider currents of civil rights and liberal politics, which he used to expand his brand in the 
United States through additional speaking events and positive mentions in the black 
media.146 
 ACOA also helped publicize the equally negative perspective on Portugal being 
adopted by the Protestant churches. Methodist and Baptist missionaries had been active in 
Angola and Mozambique since the early 1900s, but tensions with Lisbon increased as 
Salazar believed the foreigners threatened his control of the colonies. A number of the 
Angolan and Mozambican nationalists including Neto and Mondlane had been educated 
and groomed by missionaries, who often quietly supported calls for liberalization. As a 
result, the Portuguese associated Protestantism with nationalism and targeted African 
converts in the early stages of pacification, inspiring reports of government massacres that 
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challenged press coverage emphasizing only nationalist violence.147 American Methodist 
Ralph Dodge, whose central African bishopric included Angola and Mozambique, urged 
action from the National Council of Churches (NCC), an ecumenical bureaucracy based in 
New York that coordinated the activities of American Protestant denominations on matters 
of national and international importance. The NCC sent a letter of protest to the Lisbon 
government in May, but this did little to prevent Salazar from imprisoning and expelling 
most of the American and British missionaries he blamed for the rebellion.148 
Salazar’s actions inadvertently strengthened domestic American concern with 
Angola. Beginning in the early summer, Protestant missionaries returned to the United 
States with harrowing stories. With NCC assistance, they recounted tales of Portuguese 
brutality to congregations across the country and demanded parishioners write the U.S. 
government. They hoped their fellow Christians would take a stand in support of self-
determination, if not necessarily the violence associated with the UPA rebellion. The result 
was what one Portuguese operative in the United States called “an aggressive publicity 
campaign against Portugal and its administration of Angola” that would continue into 
1962.149 The most influential of these missionaries was Malcolm McVeigh, who warned 
that only a “radical re-thinking” of Portuguese policy could avert an all-out war along racial 
lines. ACOA, having good relations with the nearby NCC through Houser and other 
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religious civil rights activists, welcomed the new voice speaking on behalf of African 
liberation and distributed missionary testimonies via its secular mailing list.150  
 The visibility of this liberal-religious coalition pushed the Portuguese alliance to 
the front of domestic debates about American engagement with the world. The 
administration could not help but take notice. The State Department played middle man 
between the churches and Portugal as they discussed remuneration, and both ACOA and 
the NCC used personal and professional connections to lobby Washington politicians and 
officials – mostly in the executive branch.151 ACOA membership included administration 
liberals such as Kennedy adviser Arthur M. Schlesinger, while church officials could speak 
of millions of Protestant votes.152 Civil rights groups, unions, and student organizations 
also began to pledge at least rhetorical support for African liberation.153 The gradually 
expanding coalition pushed for a stronger government response, with ACOA even asking 
in June that Kennedy and Rusk consider expelling Portugal from NATO if violent reprisals 
continued in northern Angola.154 These pleas received a particularly friendly hearing in the 
State Department’s Africa Bureau. Kennedy had staffed the upper echelons of the fledgling 
unit with civil rights proponents he thought might be supportive of decolonization, most 
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notably appointing the progressive former Michigan governor G. Mennen “Soapy” 
Williams as assistant secretary for African affairs.155 ACOA and the churches provided 
Williams’ office, the UN staff, and other sympathetic officials with information on 
occasion, with ACOA even becoming part of the Africa Bureau’s new advisory council.156 
Their greatest impact was likely to reinforce the existing liberal belief that, at some level, 
American citizens were concerned about decolonization.  
Such demonstrations of support were necessary because the most pro-African 
members of the administration faced an uphill battle against official indifference toward 
Angola as the summer progressed. Rusk’s decisions to cut nearly a million dollars in 
military aid to Portugal – made as much on budgetary grounds as on principle – convinced 
many moderates within the administration that they had done all they could on the matter 
of Angola and faced decreasing returns if they continued to push the matter. While most 
American officials agreed with Kennedy’s assessment of the inevitability of 
decolonization, there remained different judgments of American responsibilities in this 
arena and the direness of the situation in Angola. The tepid response of U.S. allies in 
Europe further encouraged advocates of a “wait and see” approach, notably George Ball 
and Ambassador Elbrick.157 Shortly after the aid reduction, the State Department’s Policy 
Planning staff wrote Kennedy security adviser McGeorge Bundy urging patience: “At this 
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juncture it is doubtful any useful purpose would be served by the United States applying 
further pressures. . . We now should give Portugal a reasonable time to see if it can restore 
peace and order in Angola.”158 Kennedy seemed to accept this logic for at least part of the 
summer as European cooperation proved difficult, but liberals within the administration 
such as Williams and critics outside of it continued to agitate for action. 
 Seeking to establish a more coordinated response to the situation, Rusk created a 
task force headed by Williams to study the Portuguese question. Williams designed the 
task force in a way that would prioritize a commitment to self-determination and the 
improvement of Afro-Asian relations. In early July, he completed a draft report, making 
the bold claim that Angola represented “for much of the world, as Berlin is for Europe . . . 
the test case of America’s commitment to freedom.” The authors recommended that the 
United States seek ways to persuade Portugal to grant Angola a new level of self-
government, and “failing such persuasion, provide the leadership to compel the 
achievement of this objective.” Yet the details of how the administration should compel 
the Lisbon regime were complicated. The report recommended that the United States deny 
authorization for the export of arms and equipment to the colonies, but also made clear that 
NATO assistance should continue and that American diplomats should also seek to 
dissuade African governments from providing equipment to African nationalists. 
Concurrently, U.S. officials should expand contacts with responsible nationalists and 
establish training programs for Lusophone Africans. Presuming that Portugal could not 
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hold out long against nationalist forces, Williams recommended that the United States 
move in bold new directions should the Salazar regime persist in its policies: recognizing 
an African government in exile and seeking a new leadership in Portugal. 159 
Williams’ conclusions were striking and reflected the most assertive liberal opinion 
within the administration, but they were in the minority. State officials from the European 
Bureau fearful of alienating Portugal balked at the initial report’s vigorous tone. The 
Defense Department expressed concern that “overly aggressive implementation of 
policies” would surely rupture the American alliance with Portugal and potentially other 
European countries, costing the United States access to important bases like the Azores 
pivotal to the defense of Western Europe and the Middle East.160 While recognizing such 
concerns as legitimate, liberals nonetheless dismissed them as acceptable costs in the 
courting of Afro-Asian states deeply attentive to issues of decolonization. Full agreement 
on the proper approach to the Portuguese situation was nearly impossible.161 The result was 
a greatly watered down report that finally made it to the president in mid-July over military 
protests, which advocated for arms restrictions, educational aid, and refugee assistance. 
Kennedy approved many of the recommendations but, in direct contradiction to Williams’ 
more assertive plan, requested that implementation occur “quietly insofar as possible.”162  
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Most importantly, the Kennedy administration continued to rely on its European 
allies to pressure Portugal. Almost half of the initiatives approved by the president in July 
required the support of European allies. Even Williams, who had recommended deposing 
Salazar, maintained deference to NATO and presumed that American initiatives within the 
alliance and at the UN would be undertaken with the aid of France and Britain.163 However 
much Kennedy and his administration sympathized with the cause of African nationalism, 
they still understood decolonization as a process bounded and constrained by the 
geostrategic requirements of the Cold War and Africa’s relationship to metropolitan 
interests. Groups like ACOA could prioritize the global South, but Europe was still the 
priority and demanded careful consideration. Kennedy had broken with the rhetoric of his 
predecessors, but he still had to balance the needs of his most important allies with demands 
for a new form of global leadership coming both from within the United States and abroad.   
Not coincidentally, Kennedy’s most assertive policy occurred in conjunction with 
similar actions by a European ally – export controls for Portuguese arms. Kennedy’s 
approval for the policy happened almost concurrently with a similar British decision made 
in the face of domestic pressure. More than in the United States, the population of the 
United Kingdom was primed to respond to events in Portugal and its colonies. Lusophone 
colonialism was not a completely foreign issue, as the Indian dispute over Goa in the 1950s 
had garnered extended Parliamentary attention. Lawyer João Cabral had established an 
information office representing the nationalist Goa League in London around 1960, which 
                                                 
163 See pages 8-10, 13 of Williams, “Report of the Chairman,” 2 July 1961.  
 81 
he also allied with the socialist parties that made up the CONCP. Cabral built relations with 
an informal bloc of mostly Liberal and Labour members of Parliament (MPs) associated 
with the domestic anti-colonial movement, who naturally gravitated to a critical readings 
of their oldest ally’s ancient empire. At the same time, this interest was encouraged by the 
presence in London of a number of Portuguese exiles with ties to African liberation leaders, 
providing an important anti-fascist element to nationalist condemnations of the Estado 
Novo. Though concentrated in London, the activities of Cabral and the anti-Salazarists 
provided an alternative view of metropolitan and colonial realities that contrasted with the 
rosy depictions offered by Lisbon.164 Britain’s unique connections to Portuguese 
imperialism therefore provided a more conducive political context, though little concrete 
policy was made until the events of 1961 sparked a national movement.  
As in the United States, religious Britons challenged the government’s ambivalent 
policies toward Portugal, offering the first glimpses of a transnational network with 
foundations in the Protestant churches. In June, the World Council of Churches (WCC), an 
ecumenical confederation of national Protestant organizations that included the American 
NCC, delivered a statement that it identified as “one of the strongest ever issued” calling 
for Portugal to accept demands for self-determination. It requested that Portugal avoid 
violent reprisals and that 176 constituent congregations of the WCC “press upon their 
governments the urgency of the situation.”165 This request was taken up especially strongly 
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in Britain, where Baptist missionaries were returning with the same tales of atrocities 
carried by their American colleagues.166 Shortly after the WCC’s statement, reports of 
Portugal’s use of NATO arms in Angola spurred British ministers. They demanded the 
Parliament halt all military sales to Salazar’s government, collecting in one day more than 
37,000 signatures of support that a Labour MP presented to the government.167 Pickets also 
began at the Portuguese consulate, while one concerned Baptist walked 158 miles to 
personally protest Portuguese violence at Westminster.168 The Baptist demonstrations 
publicized the problem of Western aid to Portugal in ways that inspired the creation of new 
organizations such as the London-based Angola Action Group.169 Conscious of the 
limitations of anti-colonial appeals in the waning years of the British Empire, these 
organizations depicted Salazar as a fascist heir to Hitler, making Angola a humanitarian 
crisis that demanded international response. Letters of protest poured into the government, 
and religious leaders pressed the Foreign Office for face-to-face meetings on how it would 
address the matter.170 A clergyman noted, “On every hand we heard of MP’s being 
inundated with letters until some even pleaded for mercy.”171 Even more than in the United 
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States, popular concern with the Portuguese colonial crisis grew rapidly and directly 
targeted Western aid to the dictatorial regime.  
 Portuguese African nationalists welcomed these developments. Whereas Roberto’s 
UPA was most active in the West among Americans, the CONCP took the lead in Europe 
and particularly the United Kingdom.172 In addition to his work on Goa, João Cabral had 
represented the MPLA and PAIGC in London since at least 1960, among other activities 
facilitating the visits of African nationalists. Amílcar Cabral made his first major 
international appearance in London in early 1960 and coordinated with noted journalistic 
authority on Africa Basil Davidson to publish a well-distributed pamphlet, Facts About 
Portuguese Colonialism.173 Just four months before the March uprising, a Labour politician 
even hosted MPLA spokesmen at a press conference in the House of Commons, where 
Mário Pinto de Andrade criticized the British and American governments for long 
tolerating Portugal’s claims that its colonies were legitimate components of an extended 
NATO defense system.174 Yet beyond these largely symbolic demonstrations of sympathy, 
African nationalists had received no concrete support from the British government. But the 
events of 1961 changed the political playing field. As broad public discussion of Angola 
grew – much of it “in our favor” – João Cabral recommended to CONCP Secretary 
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Marcelino Dos Santos that the parties press their advantage in the country.175 The socialists 
reached out to their existing contacts and worked to construct a campaign that would depict 
their parties as the logical heirs to Portugal’s collapsing rule. By July, mainstream 
organizations such as the War on Want, a development organization with ties to the Labour 
Party, began making material donations to Angolan nationalists – including the MPLA.176 
The CONCP also reached out to the influential liberals of the Movement for 
Colonial Freedom (MCF) and their pacifist chairman, MP Fenner Brockway. Long 
opposed to British imperialism and increasingly concerned with the threat of apartheid, the 
MCF had not regularly agitated against other European empires. But Portugal was a 
different case, both because of the colonies’ close proximity to Anglophone territories like 
South Africa, Namibia, Tanzania, and Rhodesia and because of the historic relationship 
between the two countries. It was Brockway and other MCF MPs who had shown interest 
in João Cabral’s activities, and they now saw an opportunity. At the request of the MPLA, 
Brockway worked with Portuguese exiles in Britain to form the Council for Freedom in 
Portugal and the Colonies to lobby the government. It pressured Lisbon to moderate its 
most repressive actions in Angola’s wake, achieving among other things the transfer of 
MPLA President Agostinho Neto from a Portuguese prison to house arrest, from which he 
would eventually escape.177 The MCF also produced pamphlets and broadsides introducing 
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the British public to Portugal’s colonies, linking them strategically with South Africa, 
which had itself been the object of popular scorn for its shooting of unarmed protesters in 
the township of Sharpeville barely a year before. For a brief period, the MCF actually 
shifted its focus to Portugal, which seemed at the time to be the most aggressive and 
vulnerable of the colonial redoubts in southern Africa. “During the last three months,” 
Brockway told a crowd of 300 in July at Trafalgar Square, “more Africans have been killed 
in Angola than in the Union of South Africa in the last century.”178 Portuguese imperialism 
grabbed British popular attention even more than it did in the United States, inspiring the 
idea that solidarity with Angolans could topple Lisbon’s empire and begin chipping away 
at white minority rule in southern Africa.   
 The growth of domestic attention to Angola demanded an official response. 
Parliamentary criticism inspired by religious activism had increasingly zeroed in on 
Lisbon’s use of NATO weapons to pacify the revolution, and officials began to worry how 
Britain’s African allies (and subjects) might respond. Labour MPs in the House of 
Commons repeatedly used Angola to attack the Conservative government, demanding a 
review of the policy for supplying arms to Portugal and its colonies.179  Facing both this 
domestic pressure and African anger, the government began reconsidering its approach in 
June. As Baptist ministers threatened to make the matter a by-election issue, MacMillan 
finally decided to publicly distance Britain from its oldest ally.180 The government claimed 
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it would not sell or ship military equipment specifically designated for the colonies. It 
would, however, continue to supply weapons and equipment as part of Portugal’s NATO 
requirements, and British officials quietly admitted that they would “not look behind 
Portuguese statements re[garding] such use.”181 The decision drew the ire of Portugal, but 
MacMillan seemingly had few other options. Popular and political pressure demanded 
action from a leader who, like Kennedy, had publicly indicated that Britain would sail with 
the “wind of change.” In the words of one Tory backbencher, anything less would have 
shown a “lack of moral leadership.”182   
 The British arms policy provided an opening for Kennedy to implement the most 
aggressive measure in William’s task force report within a broader Trans-Atlantic context. 
American officials had known about the diversion of NATO equipment to its colonies since 
June and likely earlier, quietly requesting that Portugal cease such transfers.183 Salazar had 
not complied, but the United States had hesitated to act even after Kennedy approved the 
task force recommendation to deny export authorizations for arms. But popular attention 
continued to grow. By late July, the religious-liberal campaign on Angola was making 
official inroads. Led by Harlem Representative Adam Clayton Powell, a handful of 
congressman challenged the administration to stop the use of American arms in Angola, 
specifically referencing reports by missionary Malcolm McVeigh to make their cases.184 
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Kennedy now had to contend not only with liberals in the State Department but also those 
within his party. Britain had set a precedent in the matter of selling military equipment to 
Portugal, legitimizing a similar American policy at the same time that popular concern 
reached its apex. On August 16, the government finally – and quietly – announced the 
limitation of arms sales to Portugal for use in the colonies.  
 Though lauded by many at the time and since, the realities of the policy 
demonstrated the ambiguous approach the Kennedy administration took toward the 
contested issue of African self-determination.  On August 16, Elbrick explained to 
Noguiera that the U.S. forbade the diversion of equipment to the colonies, requested any 
equipment already in use be returned, and required all military aid be “certified by Portugal 
as actually needed by Portuguese NATO forces in Europe.”185 Kennedy and subsequent 
presidents would portray the policy as an embargo, but it was only slightly more stringent 
than its British counterpart. Shipments of arms continued to go to Portugal and judgment 
of needs for all but the largest items were left to Lisbon, which was also responsible for 
returning NATO materiel to Europe. When the media reported that bombs stamped “Made 
in America” had fallen on an Angolan village shortly after the policy began, the 
government simply released a statement reiterating its earlier stance without seriously 
pressuring Portugal on the matter.186 Over the next two years in office, the administration 
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would approve the sale of items officials claimed had little value in Africa yet were 
retrofitted and adapted to become key components of Portugal’s imperial wars, notably 
naval craft that became the backbone of Lisbon’s riverine warfare.187 The use of American 
military equipment in colonial wars had troubled administrations dating back to the late 
1940s, and Kennedy proved only slightly more successful than his predecessors. But the 
effects of the supposed embargo were far less important than the image it communicated – 
both to the American people and to allies outside Europe.  
 This high tide of public concern both abroad and domestically also justified 
Kennedy implementing other suggested measures concerning the nationalists. Kennedy 
quietly followed through with the task force’s recommendations regarding the courtship 
and training of a native Portuguese African leadership. The State Department established 
a small program to train a new generation of African leaders at Lincoln University under 
Dr. John Marcum, an ACOA board member and arguably the premier U.S. expert on 
Angolan politics. The student body numbered barely twenty by the end of 1961, mostly 
Angolans and Mozambicans recruited from refugee centers in neighboring states.188 The 
government focused on recruiting young men with leadership potential, because “a trained, 
non-communist native cadre would be essential regardless of what happens in Angola.” 
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This attitude was shared throughout the administration among liberals and the more 
cautious alike.189 But as with the aid to Roberto, this program had no intention of ousting 
Salazar. Few if any students were politically active. Kennedy was simply building 
connections with a generation of leaders whom he hoped would look kindly on the United 
States when independence inevitably arrived. In the American approach, investment in 
moderate Africans did not necessarily contradict the desire to retain the Portuguese 
presence. Indeed, this dual approach seemed to offer the best option for maintaining pro-
western stability in Angola and Mozambique for the long-term with minimal political 
impact on the Salazar regime.  
 While many historians view the American actions of 1961 as proof of Kennedy’s 
commitment to actively pursuing decolonization, the reality is more complex. The 
president and many of his advisers recognized the strength of anti-colonial nationalism, but 
they remained cautious in their dealings with Europe. Concerned with Portugal maintaining 
a semblance of control and dissuaded by its allies from adopting an overtly critical rhetoric, 
the Kennedy administration moved carefully in the months after the UN vote. The most 
assertive initiatives advocated by liberals like Soapy Williams were often moderated by 
the bureaucracy, incredulous allies, and the president himself. Though there were some 
attempts to court an African leadership, these moves were covert or unobtrusive. Indeed, 
the single most dramatic move – the arms restrictions – owed much to British precedent 
and domestic criticism. The result was a policy that sought to pressure Portugal without 
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threatening its ally’s core interests in a situation where it was unclear who would prove 
victorious in the near term.  
 
Portugal Pushes Back 
Perhaps not coincidentally, the height of American activity coincided with the final 
weeks of the Angolan crisis. Lisbon’s military response to the rebellion had begun to pay 
dividends by August, and the rebellion slowly faltered throughout the fall as pacification 
operations proceeded. At the same time, Salazar undertook a multi-pronged offensive 
against the American administration. He approved limited reforms to undermine 
international criticism, launched a propaganda campaign in the West, and leveraged 
Portugal’s one trump card in its relationship with the United States – NATO membership 
and access to the strategic Azores, where the United States operated a mid-Atlantic air base 
and submarine tracking station at Lajes Field on Terceira Island.190 The result of this careful 
diplomacy was a shift in the tenor of domestic discussions of Portugal, which further 
restrained the already cautious Kennedy. As a result, American pressure for decolonization 
declined as the year came to a close.  
In order to reach this point, however, the Portuguese had to convince their Anglo-
American allies that their fears of a second Congo were unfounded. Over the summer, the 
massive influx of Portuguese soldiers and materiel had set the stage for Operation Viriato, 
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which beat back the UPA rebellion and pacified the countryside. Beginning in August, the 
Portuguese military began recapturing a number of key settlements in the area between the 
capital of Luanda and the Congo border, declaring the “reconquest of the north” on August 
8.191 The restoration of colonial control after the deep UPA incursion surprised many 
outside observers who had underestimated Portuguese abilities and given undue credit to 
Roberto’s poorly trained revolutionary forces. Liberal members of the Kennedy 
administration remained skeptical, but by December the Lisbon embassy considered order 
to have been reestablished.192 Throughout the fall the fear of a Portuguese colonial collapse 
that had motivated American policy since March waned.  
At the same time, Portugal instituted measures that allowed Kennedy to ease 
pressure without losing face. Building on a mild reform program that had actually begun 
shortly before the rebellion, the Lisbon government improved labor conditions, created 
local elective councils, and expanded health and social services in the colonies. Throughout 
the summer the privately confrontational Salazar had struck a more conciliatory tone in 
public. While still criticizing “certain of [Portugal’s] Atlantic alliance partners” for their 
contribution to the “disintegration” of Africa, the aging dictator admitted in May that 
Portugal “may have erred on the side of excessive caution” and would move more swiftly 
in the future to bring colonial populations “into local political and administrative life.”193 
At the end of August, the newly installed overseas minister announced a broad package of 
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reforms that made all African subjects nominal citizens of Portugal while also pushing for 
greater mainland emigration to Angola. The state also made plans to expand the education 
system, in a seemingly direct response to Anglo-American concerns.194 Soapy Williams 
and the most pro-African State Department officials criticized the measures for failing to 
address the issue of self-determination and actually endangering long-term prospects by 
strengthening the political power of white settlers, an opinion quietly shared by a British 
officials facing similar concerns in nearby Southern Rhodesia.195 But most of the 
administration, including Rusk, chose to side with the more hopeful reading offered by 
Elbrick in Lisbon that the measures offered “considerable hope for the future,” if only by 
providing some signal of progress to the UN and temporarily quieting international 
criticism.196  
As officials in Washington pondered how to react to the new state of affairs in 
Africa, the Portuguese government sought to strengthen moderate opinion by building 
popular foreign support for their empire – in direct competition with the pro-liberation 
campaigns of the churches and groups like ACOA. Soon after the March uprising, a 
regime-backed assembly of Portuguese businessmen hired the Madison Avenue 
advertising agency of Selvage and Lee along with the conservative British public relations 
consultant E.D. O’Brien to burnish the Estado Novo’s tarnished image in the Anglo-
American states. The tastemakers believed that Lisbon’s image problem grew from the fact 
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that few Westerners and even fewer Americans knew about Portuguese Africa before 
March: as Selvage and Lee explained, “about 99 people in this country or more out of 100 
did not know whether [Angola] was a country or a goat.” When Angola suddenly became 
newsworthy, press and experts alike had turned to the “hostile propaganda put out by 
certain committees in this country” – namely ACOA – who had anticipated the revolt.197 
What was needed was an alternative perspective. Therefore, Selvage and Lee helped 
coordinate a government propaganda barrage in the United States, while also funding the 
Portuguese-American Committee on Foreign Affairs (PACFA) under the leadership of 
New England lawyer Dr. Martin Camacho. The combative immigrant became the regime’s 
primary American proponent, regularly attacking anti-colonial groups and distributing pro-
Portuguese literature.198 Through these efforts, Salazar’s regime hoped to discredit critics 
and establish a more positive image of Lusophone colonialism.   
Beginning in the early summer, a steady stream of publications provided 
counterpoints to ACOA and church depictions of Portuguese rule in Africa. Among the 
major themes was the familiar idea of Lusotropicalism, which highlighted Portugal’s 
supposed success in preparing racially mixed states for self-rule as evidenced by Brazil. In 
one English-language pamphlet, a University of Coimbra professor argued that Angola and 
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Mozambique would follow Brazil in creating “two multi-racial nations” when “their 
respective populations have attained a social and political status enabling them to part from 
the Mother Country as a ripe fruit breaks away from the parent tree.”199 Depictions of 
Westernized blacks interacting with white populations in the rapidly modernizing cities of 
Luanda and Laurenço Marques seemingly attested to this maturation process, proving to 
many Americans steeped in racialized depictions of African backwardness the value of 
Lusophone development. While there was some truth to claims that Portugal lacked a 
formal system of segregation – visitors regularly expressed surprise that black and whites 
lived side-by-side in the poor neighborhoods of colonial cities – this myth downplayed the 
political and economic realities weighted heavily in favor of ethnic Europeans, even in the 
unique context of Brazil.200 It also hinted at an embrace of racial miscegenation that few 
continental Portuguese accepted and Salazar himself had adamantly opposed until he found 
such images offered a novel defense of empire.201 Despite the gulf between claims and 
reality, such depictions appealed to Americans who equated Westernization with stability 
and accepted a racialized responsibility to promote Euro-American visions of 
modernization.   
Positive portrayals of Portuguese rule seemed most attractive when juxtaposed 
against graphic anti-colonial violence, which Portuguese propagandists depicted as racially 
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motivated and encouraged by international communist agitators. This intertwining of racial 
and Cold War fears worked particularly well in the United States, where southerners 
confronting the Civil Rights Movement depended on similar justifications for the 
maintenance of white governance.202 Pamphlets distributed throughout the country 
included sensational pictures of mutilated white Angolan settlers and condemnation of 
American policy. Portugal claimed the role of bulwark protecting the West from the violent 
excesses of communist-stoked nationalism. According to one publication on the March 15 
uprising, these atrocities showed undeniably that the nationalists were unfit to govern and 
should not “merit the support of the United Nations, or any Christian, civilized society.”203 
Salazar’s apologists understood Kennedy’s actions since March as directly aiding 
Portugal’s enemies, and they begged the question of whether Americans in fact agreed with 
their government. As one publication of Camacho’s PACFA asked “Men, women, and 
children – white and black – tortured and maimed on explicit directives attributed to 
Communist-backed leader – should the U.S. support the forces behind these unspeakable 
acts?”204 Presuming most readers would answer in the negative, Salazar hoped American 
sympathy with Portugal’s plight would undermine Kennedy’s strategy.  
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In linking fears of racial violence and international communism, Portugal’s allies 
had tapped into a strategy that had largely defined American involvement in Africa since 
the beginning of the Cold War. And they wielded it efficiently, attacking pro-liberation 
organizations while building support among conservative constituencies. Selvage and Lee 
provided carefully managed junkets to Portugal and its colonies for members of the 
conservative press, who returned to the United States depicting the Iberian state as a 
champion of Western interests in Africa. Among Portugal’s American allies was the retired 
army general and vice-president of New York University Frank Howley, who wrote 
approvingly of Portugal’s management of its colonies after a Lisbon-sponsored trip to 
Angola. His widely reprinted article first appeared in the November issue of Reader’s 
Digest alongside a critical piece on Kennedy’s African policy by reformed communist Max 
Yergan, whose American-African Affairs Association was directly supported by the 
apartheid government in South Africa.205 While conservative members of the press lined 
up on the Portuguese side, Lisbon and its representatives viewed African American support 
as particularly important due to the widespread association of the minority with continental 
issues. Reader’s Digest had demonstrated as much by citing its inclusion of white and black 
perspectives as representing two sides of the argument on self-determination, despite the 
fact that Howley and Yergen both sided with Portugal.206 Beyond Yergan, the conservative 
columnist for the Pittsburgh Courier George Schuyler became a particularly vocal 
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proponent of Portuguese rule in the black press, praising Portuguese multiracialism, 
depicting Roberto as a communist pawn, and accusing ACOA of “serving the Soviet 
purpose” in Africa.207 With increasing regularity after the declarations of Anglo-American 
arms policies, apologists openly criticized anti-Portugal initiatives and the nationalist 
cause, with Howley even testifying at the UN.208  
Portugal’s American allies capitalized on this improved situation to press for 
greater political support against Kennedy by doubling down on the Cold War appeal. 
Selvage and Lee declared it an “absolute top priority” to woo elected officials, who were 
likely to side with Portugal in order to appear tough on communism while appeasing 
Northeastern constituents with ethnic ties and Southerners ambiguous about black self-
determination.209 A number of politicians had already expressed concern about Kennedy’s 
policy, with Senate Minority Leader Everett Dirksen (R-Il) publicly registering his 
objections to the March UN vote as “hardly a proud moment for Uncle Sam.”210 Beginning 
in August, Portuguese-Americans – likely Camacho’s organization – began meeting with 
congressmen and State Department officials to defend Salazar’s position in Africa.211 
PACFA also sent letters critical of ACOA and the NCC to organizational board members, 
politicians, and newspapers in the latter months of 1961 into early 1962 claiming their 
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actions deserved serious scrutiny.212 These appeals adopted self-consciously Cold War 
rhetorical devices, as revealed by the pro-Portuguese letters sent to a list of mostly Southern 
and mid-Western legislators that claimed Roberto’s real mission was “to make Angola a 
satellite in the communist orbit . . . for the rich raw materials of that territory to make 
Russia more powerful against America and the free world.”213 While liberal legislators 
were likely skeptical, many others concerned about rumors of Soviet involvement in the 
Congo felt duly warned. Congressmen now had to weigh religious and liberal interest in 
decolonization against the necessities of Cold War defense in Africa.  
The revolutionary parties had difficulty combatting the Portuguese information 
offensive. Roberto lacked the resources of the Portuguese state and was distracted by the 
collapse of the UPA rebellion in Angola. When he did respond directly to Portuguese-
sponsored attacks such as the ones carried in Reader’s Digest, he was rebuffed by the 
editors who had no interest in supporting purveyors of violence.214 Missionaries like 
Malcolm McVeigh had greater success in presenting objections to the pro-Portuguese 
propaganda, but they were responding to arguments of national security with humanitarian 
appeals that merited limited attention during this period of renewed Cold War tensions.215 
While the black press largely allied itself with nationalist aspirations, the presence of 
authors like Schuyler and the mainstream media’s own hesitation to weigh in too heavily 
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on the Angolan issue after the summer hindered the development of anything resembling 
a united front. As the year drew to a close, Houser worried that the colonial propaganda 
was having a greater effect than ACOA’s own efforts.216 While there was little chance the 
administration would completely abandon its approach, the pro-Portuguese activities 
helped stir congressmen to the defense of NATO ally Portugal and made Kennedy’s plans 
to quietly pursue diplomatic pressure increasingly difficult, much to the executive branch’s 
dismay.217 
And if activists had any hope that the heretofore more successful British movement 
might help entice Kennedy with action from Whitehall, they would be sorely disappointed. 
Portuguese propaganda was equally active in the United Kingdom, courting conservative 
MPs still smarting over the decline of Britain’s empire.218 Moreover, the hollow victory of 
Britain’s limited embargo had sapped the strength of the shallow British movement. The 
policy gave pacifists the illusion of victory at the same time the Portuguese cracked down 
on missionaries, ending the flow of new information to the most important religious 
organizers. Without their sources on the ground, groups like the Angola Action Group had 
little to publish and slowly dissolved into obscurity.219 As memories of Portuguese 
atrocities faded, that section of British public opinion interested in Africa returned to its 
own colonies and former dominions, especially as Southern Rhodesia’s transition to 
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independence threatened to extend white minority rule beyond South Africa’s borders. The 
MCF, Council for Freedom in Portugal and the Colonies, and the Anti-Apartheid 
Movement (AAM) did hold a conference in early 1962 on the “unholy alliance” of 
Portugal, South Africa, and Rhodesia, but this would be a pyrrhic moment for the 
nationalists.220 After this one event, the AAM distanced itself from the Portuguese issue, 
fearing in the words of chronicler Roger Fieldhouse, that such tangential activities “would 
dilute its primary campaign against Apartheid in South Africa.”221 Likewise, the MCF had 
never built close relations with the liberation movements, and attention returned promptly 
to matters of empire and race in the Anglophone as the flow of information from 
Portuguese Africa shrunk.222 As a result, MacMillan’s government faced less domestic 
pressure to isolate Portugal and returned to its previously passive approach, denying 
liberals within the Kennedy administration an important international ally.  
 Finally, Salazar helped stoke domestic and international complaints against 
Kennedy’s policy by leveraging Portugal’s most important Cold War asset, the Azores 
Islands. By the end of 1961, Salazar was tying the American position on Angola to the 
looming bilateral lease renegotiations that had taken place regularly since the 1940s.  The 
Azores facilities were valuable strategic assets for the Americans; the air and sea abilities 
had proved vital in the transport of troops to Lebanon in 1958, Berlin in 1961, and the 
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Congo in the first two years of the decade, while the communications facilities would prove 
important during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.223 All this led the military to claim in 
the summer report on the Portuguese situation that “The military air base at Lajes in the 
Azores is the single most valuable facility which the United States is authorized by a 
foreign power to use.”224 And Salazar was conscious of this value. Having little else with 
which to bargain, the Portuguese prolonged the negotiations for the base rights that were 
set to expire at the end of 1962. In a conversation with President Kennedy, Ambassador 
Elbrick explained that “it could be expected that the Portuguese will demand some political 
compensation from the US in connection with the Azores base agreement,” and that an 
abstention for future public criticism might assist in the long-term prospects for a 
successful bilateral agreement.225 
 The Azores maneuver irked American officials, but it was only one element 
contributing to a larger reconsideration of American policy as the year approached its end. 
Many within the State Department saw it as a negotiating ploy and believed that in all 
likelihood Salazar was probing for signs of American weakness. But there was a minority 
within the administration who took the aging dictator at his word and believed he might go 
even further, not only denying a renewal of the base lease but potentially exiting the 
American-led NATO alliance. Beginning in March, Portuguese officials had repeatedly 
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made clear that Salazar would abandon NATO before he would leave Africa. The 
Portuguese intimated that they were far from alone in their frustrations, and that other 
European states might follow their precedent, including France and the Netherlands.226 The 
thinly veiled threat took on a new seriousness after the arms policy of August.  The Estado 
Novo’s diplomats constantly reminded their American counterparts that the choice between 
the Western alliance and their African possessions threatened to undermine the foundations 
of NATO. “Portugal would have no interest in ‘US victory over USSR,’” Noguiera told 
Elbrick after the August embargo, “if in achieving it Portugal itself should be lost.”227 In 
this context, denying American base rights became a symbolic severing of ties between 
Portugal and the larger Cold War alliance system. The true danger of the Portuguese threat 
to the Azores was that it would be the first step in a major reordering of NATO and 
European defense. 
American diplomats downplayed such concerns, but they could not completely 
ignore them. Tensions were high in NATO, and at times it seemed it would not take much 
for the house of cards to topple. Elbrick had captured American concerns succinctly shortly 
before Kennedy entered office: “If France joined Portugal in such a move [leaving the 
alliance] for reasons of its own, the whole fabric of NATO would be destroyed.”228 
Kennedy’s trouble finding aid over the summer had illustrated to the neophyte president 
just how wide the distance was between Washington and continental governments 
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concerning decolonization. Most recently, the Dutch government in The Hague, and 
specifically arch-imperialist Foreign Minister Joseph Luns, had been engaged in 
increasingly heated debates with Kennedy over its colony in New Guinea. Conservative 
Dutch officials wondered if similar American attitudes toward Belgium and Portugal 
implied a broader American indifference to European priorities.229 The always colorful 
adviser Bob Komer did not think “Netherlands would quit NATO or otherwise cut off its 
nose to spite its face,” but a simultaneous exit by Portugal and France could change 
circumstances dramatically.230 Here was a wholly different domino effect from the 
communist variety, where one NATO defection could bring down the whole structure. This 
political backdrop loomed over Azores negotiations, creating a level of American anxiety 
that went far beyond the loss of the airbases. By December, the energy with which the 
administration had initially approached the Angolan program had all but disappeared, 
discouraged by European recalcitrance and Portugal’s neutralization of domestic 
supporters of decolonization. With a semblance of order restored to the colony, the 
president was seriously reassessing his approach to Portugal and the potential cost of 
prioritizing African self-determination.231  
 As officials in Washington continued to debate, it was events beyond Africa that 
helped make the Anglo-American retreat a fait accompli. During the previous months, both 
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the United States and England had assuaged Portugal’s worst fears by assuring Salazar that 
neither government wished to see Portugal forcefully ousted from any of its possessions 
and would not aid neighboring states pondering invasion or rebellion. But neither side had 
seriously considered the fate of Portuguese Goa when making such statements. India had 
long roiled over Portugal’s ongoing presence in the coastal enclaves of the sub-continent, 
and Jawaharlal Nehru saw in the Angolan rebellion an opportunity. Under pressure from 
both domestic critics and African nationalists – including the CONCP leadership – Nehru 
prepared to launch a military action that would finally resolve the issue and burnish his 
reputation as a leader of the Third World.232 After years of unsuccessfully seeking a 
peaceful transfer of power, the student of Gandhi now declared that the West had been 
“backing the wrong horse” and that India was obliged to act.233 As Kennedy was 
reconsidering Portuguese policy in December, India invaded Goa and the small enclaves 
of Daman and Diu, overwhelming the paltry European garrison that had been unable to 
receive reinforcements due to Portugal’s military commitment in Africa. Though Salazar 
ordered his troops to fight to the death, casualties were minimal and surrender came 
quickly. On December 19, Portugal’s 450 year old Indian empire ended amidst cheers from 
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African nationalists who hoped the invasion might inspire similar actions against the 
remaining colonies.234  
 Salazar was apoplectic at Goa’s loss and would severely punish the military 
commanders who returned home in defeat, but he also cast blame on inaction in 
Washington and London. In the weeks preceding the invasion, the dictator had entreated 
his allies to dissuade India - a member of the British Commonwealth and major recipient 
of American aid – from its militaristic course. Though MacMillan’s government had 
attempted to diffuse the matter, it refused to arm or otherwise defend its oldest ally when 
negotiations proved futile, presuming the use of British weapons against a major 
Commonwealth partner would be a political disaster.235 The United States proved more 
assertive in its entreaties to India, but the liberal Ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith 
personally accepted Nehru’s claim to Goa and purposefully avoided the appearance of 
“doing the work for the Portuguese.”236 American officials had no enthusiasm for the task 
of defending Goa and therefore achieved little. At the last hour, Galbraith unsuccessfully 
sought to defer the conflict with a plan that would have Portugal cede sovereignty while 
maintaining its economic and cultural influence in the region, a proposal Salazar would not 
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accept but one that revealed the thinking of even liberal American policymakers.237 After 
the invasion began, UN Ambassador Stevenson provided what one historian has called a 
“violent diatribe” against India to the surprised appreciation of the Portuguese delegation, 
but satisfaction turned sour when a Western proposal for a ceasefire was vetoed by the 
Soviet Union amidst relatively mild protest from the United States.238 As Nehru began the 
process of occupation and annexation, Kennedy chose not to challenge India, while 
MacMillan wished nothing more than to “bury this bone as soon as possible.”239 Even more 
than the vote in March, Salazar viewed the loss of Goa as a Western betrayal, steeling the 
dictator’s resolve to work independently of the Anglo-American powers.  
New Year’s 1962 was arguably the nadir of Portugal’s relationship with its Anglo-
American allies, and the threat of a NATO exit was more real than ever. Salazar had shown 
in Goa that he planned to protect his empire to the last man, while Portugal’s erstwhile 
friends had proved themselves untrustworthy in his eyes. Watching from New York, 
Mozambican nationalist Eduardo Mondlane believed Goa “represented a precedent or a 
lesson for Portuguese Africa . . . [it] would harden the Portuguese government, [but] still 
it was obvious that it felt humiliated and abandoned by its allies.”240 The prediction proved 
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prescient; American and British diplomats found Portuguese officials increasingly 
inflexible and unpredictable in the first months of the new year, choosing retrenchment 
when the regime seemed at a loss for what to do next.241 Where there had been some hope 
in the fall that Salazar might work with the Anglo-American entente to continue reforms, 
this now seemed unlikely. It was almost impossible to imagine the dictator moderating his 
approach to the colonies – in the words of a widely circulated American report – “without 
benefit of a frontal lobotomy.”242 Given the deep resentment present in Lisbon, American 
officials expected Salazar to immediately end the renewal of the Azores lease when he 
made his first public appearance of 1962.  What happened next would be beyond American 
control. “Goa,” one pessimistic foreign diplomat told a reporter, “could be the king-pin 
which brings down the United Nations and NATO.”243 
Salazar was stubborn and emotional in his attachment to the colonies, but he was 
nothing if not calculating. The dictator realized that Goa had changed the international 
mood, and he refused to give up his last trump card.244 In January, the dictator declared 
only an intent to review his nation’s membership in the UN, though he did publicly threaten 
the Azores, NATO, and future cooperation with the British in Africa 245 These statements 
tapped into the currents of Western anti-communism Salazar had cultivated over the 
previous months, working especially in the United States to promote a backlash against 
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Kennedy’s seeming dependence on the UN and his poor treatment of European allies in 
favor of states in the global South. The Western press had been almost universally critical 
of Nehru’s actions, and conservative pundits in the United States in particular openly 
sympathized with Portugal in a direct rebuke to the president.246 Goa proved to many the 
hypocrisy not just of the UN but of the Kennedy administration, which had broken with 
Portugal over its use of arms in its own colony of Angola but had seemingly acquiesced to 
an Indian invasion. Journalist Roscoe Drummond captured the prevailing mood against 
such seeming double standards when he wrote “African and Asian nations are disposed to 
support the use of force when they like its purposes (as in the case of Goa) but oppose it 
when used by Western countries.”247 Republican congressmen in particular used the 
situation as a bludgeon against the administration, criticizing its seeming dependence on 
the UN and its ongoing abandonment of European allies.248 The trend line connecting 
Angola to Goa worried many in the political establishment, helping to promote a new 
domestic defense of Portugal – specifically around the Azores base negotiations. Cold War 
politicians and pundits now believed the state of Luso-American relations was less about 
military necessity or African self-determination so much as “the solidarity of NATO,” just 
as Salazar had desired.249 
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The resulting shift in opinion cemented Portugal’s popular diplomacy from the fall 
and created an increasingly hostile environment for Kennedy to launch new initiatives in 
favor of self-determination. The majority of the Congress adopted a hostile view of 
Kennedy’s approach to Portugal, worried less about the role of NATO arms in Angola than 
the potential loss of Portugal as a trans-Atlantic partner.250 Republicans and conservative 
southern Democrats were especially concerned on this front, but so too were politicians 
from states like Massachusetts and New Jersey with large numbers of Portuguese-
American constituents. Before the end of the year, even the veteran liberal legislator Tip 
O’Neill (D-MA) would come to Portugal’s aid, noting that “the Belgian Congo indicates 
that freedom for a former colony is by no means the solution to that colony’s difficulties” 
in a statement where he compared Angola and Mozambique favorably with Alaska and 
Hawaii.251 After Goa, administration critics felt comfortable expressing concern with the 
direction of Portuguese relations given clear evidence of Afro-Asian overreach, an 
incensed NATO ally, and a greatly weakened anti-colonial lobby. Salazar had weathered 
the storm created by the Angolan rebellion and now seemed capable of maintaining a multi-
continental Portugal for the foreseeable future.  
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Conclusion 
 For much of 1961, Angola had forced Portugal and its colonies to the forefront of 
international discussions of decolonization in the Cold War. But by January of 1962, the 
momentum created by the UPA rebellion had foundered amidst the surprisingly stalwart 
response of Salazar’s Estado Novo. While international observers from India to the United 
States still viewed decolonization as inevitable, there was a noticeable loss of confidence 
in just how rapidly the wind of change would progress down the continent. The pacification 
of Angola, the mobilization of a potent Portuguese propaganda machine, and the 
contentious invasion of Goa had convinced many Westerners that a pause was needed to 
reassess the style and pace of African self-determination. Kennedy hesitated to wholly 
abandon his previous policy, but international and domestic trends argued for more 
cautious maneuvering. One last time the administration joined with Britain to criticize 
Portugal at the UN in January, casting its vote for a mild resolution in the General 
Assembly deprecating repressive measures in the maintenance of empire in Angola and 
urging political reforms. Though historians have occasionally classed this alongside the 
March vote, the resolution was toothless and widely supported, garnering only two 
predictably negative votes from South Africa and Spain alongside a single French 
abstention.252 Only on such innocuous matters was Kennedy willing to oppose Portuguese 
interests.   
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In this first international round of Portugal’s battle against decolonization, the 
Estado Novo had beaten back the nationalist challenge, and this was nowhere more 
apparent than in the United States. Where Kennedy had once had a Congress and public 
largely sympathetic to his initial desire to lean on Portugal, he faced a much different 
situation in 1962. Salazar’s fall offensive – both in Angola and among Anglo-American 
populations – had proven better organized, better funded, and more convincing than the 
nationalist appeals. ACOA and the churches continued to speak on behalf of Roberto and 
the independence movement, but they had little news to convey and found dwindling 
support. When both Roberto’s UPA and Portugal based their appeals on Cold War logic, 
the historic Western preference for a European-backed status quo was likely to prevail in 
the long run.  
American opinion now aligned closely with that of much of Europe, which had 
expressed disapproval of Portuguese actions but had no interest in pursuing the issue. 
Britain, often the bellwether for American action on Portuguese matters after the summer, 
embraced a political retreat, since Goa and reduced domestic interest made haggling with 
a still fuming Salazar an unprofitable prospect. And the Portuguese understood they had 
achieved the upper hand. Speaking with Rusk in March 1962, Foreign Minister Nogueira 
smugly marveled that “It was extraordinary what we [Portugal] had done in the space of a 
year with American public opinion. There was no doubt that the atmosphere was entirely 
different and in our favor.” Proponents of Portugal both in the United States and abroad – 
particularly the French – believed that the pacification of Angola demanded the United 
States reassess its policies toward its ally, and Rusk found himself in reluctant 
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agreement.253 Kennedy had seriously moderated his initial approach to Lisbon in the 
preceding year based on a growing fear of a NATO crisis, and this momentum accelerated 
as the concern about a Portuguese collapse in Africa subsided. American interests now 
seemed better served by preventing a sudden Portuguese exit from NATO than in 
promoting self-determination in Africa. Salazar had subtly shifted Kennedy’s conversation 
on decolonization into a referendum on NATO’s commitment to European values, with the 
Azores becoming a symbol of trans-Atlantic tensions. Always a conflicted champion of 
Africa who viewed the continent from a strategic perspective as much as an ideological 
one, Kennedy was headed toward an acceptance of the fait accompli with Portugal – at 
least for the near future.  
Yet there remained a possibility for the United States to take one last stand on behalf 
of Lusophone self-determination. As the Kennedy administration weathered a storm of 
criticism for its handling of Portugal and the UN, Eduardo Mondlane was working quietly 
to bridge the gap between the two nationalist internationalisms and form a new political 
party that had not yet turned to armed struggle. The Mozambique Liberation Front (Frente 
de Libertação de Moçambique, or FRELIMO) would still be open to a negotiated solution 
to the issue of decolonization, and it would look to the United States and Western Europe 
for assistance in achieving its goals. It would not be communist in its politics, but neither 
would it or its leader use Cold War anticommunism as the foundation for American 
support. With friends from both the Euro-American Protestant networks and the political 
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left, the party promised to rise above the sectarian conflict that had splintered the Angolan 
movements and defined liberation in terms of Cold War strategy. Yet with both the United 
States and Britain moving toward an acceptance of continued Portuguese rule in Africa, it 
was by no means clear if FRELIMO could change the hearts and minds of Westerners 
struggling to view the value of self-determination outside of superpower conflict.  
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Chapter 2: “The Winds of Change Stopped Here” 
The Struggle to Separate Decolonization from the Cold War 
 
It is unlikely the students taking Dr. Eduardo Mondlane’s sociology class at 
Syracuse University knew their tall, balding professor would one day become the father of 
independent Mozambique. In 1962, he had spent the better part of ten years in the United 
States, marrying an American and starting a family. Mondlane could have easily settled 
into the staid life of an academic, but he remained driven to help free his homeland from 
Portuguese rule. While working in the trusteeship system of the United Nations, the 
Mozambican had built contacts with other nationalists scattered across the globe. These 
included committed Marxists like Marcelino dos Santos with close ties to the CONCP, as 
well as exile youth attending college in Europe. Yet Mondlane had been unable to 
participate in nationalist politics from his position in New York. This likely frustrated 
Mondlane, but it also meant he remained above ideological and personality divisions that 
hampered the movement in its early years. Therefore, when the president of newly 
independent Tanganyika (Tanzania after 1964), Julius Nyerere, insisted that any 
Mozambican independence movement operating within his country represent a united 
front, Mondlane seemed the natural leader – respected by a number of independent parties 
but tied narrowly to none. The result was his election as the first president of FRELIMO, 
a merging of Dos Santos’ National Democratic Union of Mozambique and two other 
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nationalist parties operating in the Tanganyikan capitol of Dar es Salaam.254 Mondlane’s 
rise to prominence effectively united the radical and religious strands of African 
internationalism, introducing into the CONCP alliance new avenues for courting Western 
support.  
Indeed, Mondlane’s election was as much symbolic as practical, demonstrating the 
central importance of internationalism in the Lusophone struggles for liberation. Mondlane 
commanded respect outside Mozambique and the African continent. As Dos Santos 
recalled, the party elected the “American” professor due in no small part to his 
“connections and influence abroad.”255 As a party in exile, FRELIMO understood the 
revolution as a global process that demanded the participation and assistance of outside 
actors, and Mondlane was the best resource for navigating competing international 
rivalries.256 His background made him uniquely prepared to sell the revolution to foreign 
audiences. One party member later recalled, Mondlane “was able to speak for us the 
language of other men – the language of the diplomats, the language of the universities, 
and the language of power.”257 In contrast to other nationalists like Holden Roberto, 
Mondlane did not speak in the language of the Cold War. Rather than seeking advantage 
in playing one global camp against another, FRELIMO sought to build a transnational 
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alliance network that committed allies from both East and West against a single enemy. 
FRELIMO’s foreign policy was, in the words of Mozambique’s first president Samora 
Machel, “an expression of our fundamental principle of internationalism . . . against 
colonialism and imperialism, against exploitation, and in favour of the building of a new 
society based on social justice, democracy, progress and peace.”258 
Mondlane’s job was to sell to the world a vision of a newly independent 
Mozambique under FRELIMO – both destructive in its anti-colonialism and constructive 
in its pursuit of social justice. This would not prove difficult in the East or the global South, 
where long histories of anti-imperialism fit well with Lusophone visions of independence. 
The difficulty would be making this appeal in the Western alliance and the United States, 
devoid as it was of Cold War or national security rhetoric. This more than anything was 
Mondlane’s task. Americanized down to his love of baseball and Sunday football, the 
Mozambican understood how to operate in the United States and work with Euro-
Americans. Though he held a positive view of communism and dismissed Western 
sensitivity to it, he understood how to articulate FRELIMO’s most radical policy departures 
in terms of global justice, equality, and even human rights.259 He would become the 
CONCP parties’ most prominent proponent in the Western world.  
Yet his ambitions for Western and specifically American assistance were 
unattainable. Continued deference to Cold War considerations would prove a major 
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obstacle, especially as the Angolan revolution took a backseat to larger regional crises in 
southern Africa. Continued attempts to build solidarity that could influence foreign 
policymaking in the United States and the United Kingdom accomplished little, leading 
nationalists to take up arms as the only solution to the problem of Portuguese rule. While 
neither Roberto nor the CONCP parties would give up on the promise of Western pressure 
on Lisbon, the gradual embrace of the last European empire by John Kennedy and his 
successors would demonstrate to the leftist nationalists in particular the limitations of 
extant strategies.  
In these frustrations, however, the CONCP nationalists – Mondlane in particular – 
learned valuable lessons about selling the concept of revolution abroad. Angola would 
recede from the global agenda, not because colonialism triumphed or fell, but due to the 
internal weakness of the nationalist movement and the sudden shift of international 
attention to new hotspots in Africa. A successful revolution at home and abroad required 
unity – as well as constant demonstrations that the nationalists were gaining ground. Cold 
War strategic considerations would be difficult to overcome at the official level, but 
sympathetic populations existed who were willing to prioritize humanitarian and 
egalitarian concerns over power politics. However, relationships had to be maintained, 
strengthened, and expanded if such groups were to prove effective in terms of sustained 
material and political aid, and not fade as did initial Angolan solidarity efforts. Perhaps 
most importantly, Mondlane and FRELIMO learned that the early 1960s were not the best 
time to champion foreign revolutions: a period of high tension in the Cold War and real 
domestic progress in the United States. The CONCP parties would benefit from a period 
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in the near future when traditions of anti-communism and anti-radicalism faltered under 
the weight of the global Cold War. These lessons, however, would be hard learned and 
come only after Western and American assistance seemed nearly unattainable.  
 
Closing the Door to the White House: Kennedy’s Final Years 
 To FRELIMO and the other CONCP parties, the key to gaining Western support 
was disconnecting decolonization from the Cold War.260 The United States and Great 
Britain viewed the future of the Lusophone colonies through the lens of great power 
conflict. When given the choice outside a crisis, they would cautiously side with the 
reactionary stability offered by Salazar over the potentially chaotic postcolonial future. 
FRELIMO understood this, but hoped it could provide Westerners with a more positive 
vision of what could happen if they compelled Portuguese decolonization. The party 
presented itself as a solution to Western policymakers sympathetic to nationalist demands. 
Here was a united front that represented peoples from across Mozambique, led by a 
moderate, articulate leader with a clear affinity for Western democracy – if not necessarily 
an equal warmth for capitalism. Though refusing to pander to Cold war fears as had 
Roberto, Mondlane’s FRELIMO kept a careful distance from the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe. FRELIMO made “a tremendous effort,” as one party member later recalled, “to 
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depolarize the issue of the liberation struggle.”261 In short, Mondlane’s FRELIMO was the 
perfect party with which any administration that tolerated neutralist countries could work 
– carefully reformist, Western-friendly, and still willing to negotiate. Historians such as 
Roberto Rakove have argued that John Kennedy led such a government, and Eduardo 
Mondlane shared this opinion when he took control of FRELIMO. “While the Portuguese 
are not rational,” the Mozambican explained to an American audience, “the rest of mankind 
is.”262  
 What Mondlane failed to grasp is that Kennedy and his administration had little 
choice but to view the Third World in the context of the Cold War. The president had 
always understood the nationalist question within the context of the global conflict, fearing 
the long-term ramifications of ignoring the demands of majority populations in Africa and 
Asia. Though the United States had tried desperately to separate decolonization from Cold 
War interests at the strategic level, at least subconsciously most American policymakers 
knew this was unrealistic. Salazar’s use of the Azores and Portugal’s membership in the 
NATO alliance to combat the president’s agenda inextricably linked the two global 
processes. Stability in both Europe and Africa – as it had been throughout 1961 – remained 
the priority for the president and his advisers, but the variety of options for pursuing this 
course shrunk as Portugal manipulated both international and domestic politics. As the 
decade progressed, working directly with the Estado Novo seemed the only viable path 
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forward. Kennedy’s reluctant acceptance of this fact set into motion a policy momentum 
that continued under his successors, eventually leading to the full embrace of Portugal 
under Richard Nixon and the successful negotiation of a new Azores lease.  
American officials accepted the necessity of working with the Estado Novo 
relatively quickly after the pacification of Angola and the Goa incident. The administration 
had always desired that its NATO ally maintain a presence in Africa, albeit in a modified 
form. As Rusk clarified to a number of European ambassadors, “our policy is to encourage 
Europeans to stay in Africa because they have important interests and contributions to 
make there which in case of Portugal is almost unique because of language factor.”263 The 
United States had learned from its experience in the Congo that it had neither the interest 
nor the motivation to manage a transfer of power without a capable metropolitan partner, 
who would necessarily retain some level of influence after its official departing. Therefore, 
the implied reasoning that had motivated American policy during the period of the Angolan 
rebellion now emerged more clearly. Maintaining Portugal’s position on the continent was 
necessary to avoid the “violence, chaos, and distress . . . from which only the communist 
bloc would profit,” but the administration maintained this would only be possible through 
“an evolution of Portuguese policies to make possible a continued Portuguese role.”264 
The United States was committed to self-determination but it made clear that, as Rusk 
stated simply, “’our’ [idea of] autonomy or self-determination is not that of the United 
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Nations.”265 Far from wanting Portugal out of Africa, American officials wanted to find a 
way to insure Lisbon’s continued influence – a fact few nationalists fully understood.   
As a result, the Kennedy administration changed its tone greatly in 1962, 
approaching Salazar with more measured rhetoric and cautious proposals. The goal was 
to encourage a restructuring of Portuguese rule without resorting to the frenetic efforts 
that had classified earlier actions. American diplomats seized on every opportunity to 
praise Portuguese initiatives and promote gradual liberalization. For instance, the reform 
package of the late fall of 1961, as well as the appointment of the relatively liberal Adriano 
Moreira as overseas minister in the cabinet reshuffle, encouraged many State 
Department officials, who used this opening as a way to deflect international critics and 
justify cooperation with Salazar’s government.266 Foreign Minister Franco Noguiera even 
held talks with conservative Angolan nationalists. They did not include either the UPA or 
MPLA, but were innovative enough to assure sympathetic observers like Burke Elbrick 
that a moderated change was possible.267 Real progress was unhurried at best, but the 
United States acclaimed stale initiatives as “steps in the right direction” that would 
“provide the best assurance that Portugal will be able to continue in Africa.”268 With the 
possibility of near-term collapse greatly reduced, the State Department embraced “a new 
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approach to Portugal” that emphasized cooperation rather than public criticism. Even the 
Williams’ Bureau of African Affairs, which just a few months prior had advocated for the 
overthrow of Salazar, now shifted their efforts to designing generous economic assistance 
packages tied with new political concessions for the colonies.269  
 That the Kennedy administration’s primary interest was restoring order in the 
region is perhaps best revealed by the tight diplomatic focus on Angola. American 
discussions with the Estado Novo throughout 1961 focused on the largest colony, and this 
continued after the collapse of the rebellions. Washington often spoke broadly of social 
and economic assistance to Portugal’s overseas possessions, but there was limited 
concrete interest in Mozambique and virtually no mention of the other African colonies 
like Guinea-Bissau, Cabo Verde, or São Tomé and Príncipe. Certainly, American officials 
believed that convincing Portugal to grant self-government to its most economically 
important colony would provide a path for the others to follow, but at its core the issue 
concerned a perceived need to arrest the spread of regional unrest for strategic reasons 
rather than pursue decolonization on its own merits. When Nogueira at one point asked 
Rusk why the Americans expressed minimal interest in Portugal’s other African colonies, 
the secretary captured the American mindset by responding that Angola was “the current 
problem, and it was imposed against his will.”270 Simply managing the crisis had always 
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been the top priority of the president and his senior advisers. Without looming catastrophe, 
the Kennedy administration was now seeking ways to compel Salazar to continue 
implementing reforms without threatening the wider alliance.  
 Reinforcing this adjustment to policy were the ceaseless negotiations over the 
Azores base. While Kennedy hoped to improve Portuguese relations and preserve NATO 
unity, he refused to retreat for broader diplomatic reasons. As Secretary of Defense 
Robert McNamara explained to Dean Rusk, “the military assets we derive from Portugal 
and South Africa must be weighed against those now available to us in the ‘African 
bloc.’”271 Any visible sign of abandoning the embargo or rhetorical criticisms of Portugal 
would draw African ire and threaten important American assets. Therefore, even as the 
president decided against further criticizing Portugal at the UN and sought more 
constructive policies that would effectively bribe Portugal toward reform, he accepted the 
need to prepare for the potential loss of the islands – even after they proved valuable for 
tracking submarines during the Cuban Missile Crisis.272 Indeed, Kennedy’s most pressing 
concern was retaining the unity of NATO, which the more cooperative strategy seemed to 
accomplish.  Salazar failed to request that the Americans leave the islands when the formal 
lease ended in 1963, preserving the status quo – albeit without any assurances that Portugal 
would continue to do so in the future.273 With tensions easing throughout 1962, this 
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undesirable but workable standoff proved acceptable to both sides, since few in the United 
States or elsewhere believed that Salazar would be likely to waste his “only trump card” 
when relations were on the mend.274 Kennedy was prepared to abandon the bases, but he 
felt the pressure to moderate future approaches in order to avoid an ongoing conflict that 
could, as one widely circulated report warned, “severely damage NATO.”275 
 Unwilling to distance itself from its rhetorical pledge for self-determination, the 
Kennedy administration assuaged Salazar’s damaged ego by taking into account a whole 
host of minor complaints about American policy. In addition to the obvious anger at past 
UN votes, the Portuguese regularly complained about U.S. political contacts with African 
nationalists – Lusophone and otherwise – as well as statements critical of colonialism made 
by liberal members of the administration, most notably Soapy Williams. Salazar also 
learned quickly of the Lincoln program, and demanded it be shuttered. At the very top of 
the list of issues drafted by the Foreign Office were the actions of the American Committee 
on Africa (ACOA) and affiliated organizations such as the Methodist Church and the AFL-
CIO, who were aiding the nationalists and Angolan refugees that had fled to the Congo.276 
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ACOA earned much of Portugal’s ire, not least because Salazar assumed its elite 
membership – notably Kennedy adviser Arthur Schlesinger – helped shape foreign policy, 
reinforced by the greatly exaggerated role Lisbon attributed to Houser on the African 
Bureau’s advisory council.277 Salazar was especially irate that Americans were assisting 
Roberto in the form of monetary aid, medical supplies, and political networking in the 
United States.278 The conspiratorial Salazar became convinced that these groups – and 
ACOA in particular – were acting as pro-revolutionary proxies for the government, 
regardless of American protests to the contrary.279  
 That these non-governmental groups became the primary stumbling block in Luso-
American relations had much to do with increasing official accommodation of many 
Portuguese demands. In an attempt to calm the NATO crisis, Kennedy made a number of 
moves to reassure Salazar of his good intentions. Washington could not control 
independent organizations like ACOA, but the State Department sought to quiet vocally 
liberal elements of the administration – notably ordering that speeches by Stevenson and 
Williams on the topic of Portugal receive departmental approval.280 Rusk went so far as to 
pay a personal visit to Salazar in June of 1962, hoping to discuss forthrightly and honestly 
the issues dividing Portugal and the United States; however, little came from the meeting 
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that the secretary likened to having a séance with a ghost.281 In an attempt to further shift 
the tone of relations, Kennedy replaced Ambassador Burke Elbrick with Admiral George 
Anderson over the protests of State Africanists in early 1963. While the promotion was a 
way of removing the contentious navy officer from Washington, the selection of a military 
man gave the Portuguese a vocal champion within the diplomatic apparatus.282 Taken 
together, these efforts communicated to the Portuguese and the wider world a willingness 
to work with the Lisbon government.  
 A new approach to the UN accompanied the changing rhetoric and confirmed for 
many that Kennedy’s aggressive policies from the summer of 1961 were the somewhat 
panicked reaction of a neophyte administration. Throughout 1962 and into 1963, American 
officials cooperated with the Portuguese at the UN. In an attempt to appease all parties 
involved, the United States proposed a UN rapporteur visit Angola and Mozambique in 
order to report favorably on the reforms installed in the wake of pacification, to which 
Salazar surprisingly agreed.283 Washington officials hoped the maneuver would diffuse 
international pressure and force Lisbon into dialogue with the UN, but it served primarily 
to disillusion both Roberto and the African countries that supported him. When an African 
delegation ignored American calls for moderation and denounced Portugal’s “mass 
extermination of the indigenous population of Angola” in a resolution calling for sanctions, 
the United States joined Portugal, South Africa, and most of its European allies in voting 
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negatively. The new sense of Western solidarity helped calm Salazar, whose government 
began backing away from earlier threats to abandon both the UN and NATO.284 But 
Kennedy’s new approach to Portugal effectively completed the strategic retreat, 
undermining the only peaceful pathway African nationalists believed might compel 
Portugal to decolonize. Despite the high hopes of many around the globe, the initial U.S. 
vote from March 1961 now appeared, in the words of historian Witney Schneidman, “more 
as an anomaly than as a point of departure for a new policy on decolonization and Third 
World issues in general.”285  
As the administration distanced itself from the proverbial stick method used 
unsuccessfully in 1961, Kennedy’s hope for Portuguese reform now depended on lucrative 
combinations of “carrots” that might help offset the loss of certain colonial benefits while 
guaranteeing the Iberian state a continued role in Africa. The culmination of these 
initiatives came in the final half of 1963. The Bowles plan, named for its author, the former 
Undersecretary of State Chester Bowles, set out a detailed roadmap for accomplishing 
“some means of orderly transition” toward relative independence in the African colonies. 
It hoped to take advantage of improving Luso-American relations and the goodwill 
supposedly created by Portugal’s moderate reforms to identify a “third choice” for Portugal 
between an isolated stand against the winds of change or a humiliating retreat from the 
continent. It offered sizeable American aid that would promote the “(1) substantial and 
rapid economic progress for metropolitan Portugal, and (2) simultaneous development of 
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the overseas territories toward early self-determination.”286 Bowles admitted that his 
initiative was unlikely to effectively guide developments, but he was optimistic that it 
might “at the very least enable us to strengthen the moderate forces . . . and at best to lay 
the basis for a rational constructive solution.”287 The new offer would be delivered 
personally by Undersecretary of State George Ball.  
 The decision to present the plan to the Portuguese through Ball cemented the drift 
of Kennedy era policy after 1962. In contrast to Rusk, who more readily agreed with his 
president on the significance of the Third World, Ball was an ardent realist and a Europhile 
at heart, who was often dismissive of the African continent and its importance to 
international affairs.288 He seemed a prime choice to negotiate with the conservative 
Salazar. At the end of August, Ball delivered to the aging dictator a lengthy letter that hued 
closely to the Bowles Plan, then returned again after a week’s travel to continue talks. The 
pair of conversations covered familiar ground regarding self-determination, but there was 
no doubt that the tone was far from adversarial. As the undersecretary explained, “the 
United States was searching for a basis of a position that would allow us to support the 
Portuguese position.”289 Washington would welcome any sign of an evolution in political 
participation, which Salazar did not reject out of hand. At one point, Ball even proposed 
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the creation of “a bond similar to that between the United States and Puerto Rico.”290 For 
the Portuguese who had often compared their colonies to the U.S. territories, this change 
in rhetoric was a victory. Disagreement continued to be over the question of timing, with 
the Portuguese believing that the level of African civilization prevented any swift move 
toward political expression while Ball pressed for a more tangible timetable.291 Ball 
reiterated that the United States desired to assist in the expansion of educational 
opportunities in order to prepare a responsible social citizenry in the colonies. Salazar 
acknowledged the offer of education and infrastructural aid, but claimed that concrete plans 
had not been submitted to the U.S. government because of unspecific complications 
associated with the UN.292  As Ball prepared to leave in September, he promised to continue 
the dialogue through an exchange of letters. 
 Ball and many in the administration saw the interchange as an important step in the 
direction of reform, which was more forthright and honest than previous exchanges. But 
the reality is it accomplished little. Over the following months, serious discussions 
occurred about how to manage what Ball argued was a period of rapid transition from the 
traditional European-dominated order to an as yet undefined state of affairs in Africa. The 
United States hoped Portugal would play an active part in shaping this new reality in a way 
that would protect Western interests and preserve NATO unity.293 But the Portuguese were 
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unwilling to imagine an alternative to empire. When pressed on a timeline for self-
determination, Salazar and his acolytes continued to speak grandly about centuries of 
European tutelage. The Estado Novo was willing to dabble in minor reforms at the margins 
of its political control of the colonies, but officials believed that even the most open-ended 
statements on self-determination were bound to fail, since, as Nogueira told the president, 
they “unleashed forces which cannot be controlled.”294 The Portuguese refused to accept 
American infrastructural assistance if it meant losing their complete sovereignty over their 
colonies. The hidebound, hierarchical Salazar believed that Ball’s old order was in decline 
because European leaders lacked the vision and resolve to maintain it. The rhetoric of self-
determination was a Pandora’s Box, and no amount of American aid would convince 
Lisbon to even hold the key. This was the ally the United States was now gradually 
embracing for Cold War strategic reasons, subsuming the widespread faith in the 
inevitability of decolonization. 
 Lyndon Johnson inherited this state of affairs after John Kennedy’s assassination 
in November of 1963. The United States remained in the Azores on the whim of the aging 
Salazar, but the new approach to Portugal had calmed bilateral tensions and effectively 
quieted threats to bolt NATO and the UN. Angola remained quiet, as did Mozambique. 
The PAIGC had launched a revolution in January 1963, but few American officials took 
much notice. Africa was not high on Johnson’s priority list and he had only the most 
                                                 
African attitudes in a manner conducive to an eventual option favorable to Portuguese aspirations for a 
continuing presence in Africa.” “Political Aspects of U.S. Proposal,” Enclosure to Telegram, Lisbon to 
Secstate, 18 September 1963, Box 203, Country File, NSF, LBJL. 
294 Memcon, Kennedy, Ball, Noguiera, et. al. 7 November 1963, White House, Box 154B, NSF, JFKL.  
 131 
general affection for nationalist causes, though he too viewed colonialism as antiquated. 
He therefore followed his predecessor’s lead with limited enthusiasm, authorizing 
continued discussions with Portugal about financial assistance. Little progress would be 
made, but at least from the American perspective both the African and European status 
quos seemed sustainable for the near future, while more pressing matters in Vietnam and 
elsewhere began to demand presidential attention.  
 
Nationalist Frustrations 
That is not to say that Kennedy wholly abandoned his previous interest in moderate 
nationalists before his death. Existing policies remained in place, most notably the arms 
embargo. The Lincoln program also continued, though the emphasis on Lusophone 
students lessened as Portuguese complaint increased.295 Despite these efforts, the 
administration failed to seriously expand contacts with nationalists, despite the emergence 
of attractive actors like Mondlane and FRELIMO. Indeed, beginning in 1962, the Kennedy 
administration proved frustratingly ambiguous in its approach to black African demands 
for self-determination in the colonies, offering little more than token amounts of political 
aid that frustrated both anti-colonials and their most ardent American supporters. By the 
time of his death, Kennedy had not simply made peace with Portugal; he had succeeded in 
alienating most nationalist movements, bequeathing to his successor a situation that would 
almost inevitably be resolved through a conflict of arms.  
                                                 
295 Marcum interview.  
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The limitations of Kennedy’s willingness to support nationalist claims to authority 
was evidenced by the administration’s cautious handling of both Roberto and the more 
charismatic Mondlane. Around the same time FRELIMO was coming together in Tanzania, 
Roberto formed a political front to help legitimize his movement by expanding it beyond 
his predominantly northern, Bakongo constituency. The UPA became the core of the new 
National Liberation Front of Angola (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola, or FNLA), 
which included the relatively obscure Kikongo-dominated Democratic Party of Angola 
(Partido Democrático de Angola) and a handful of Ovimbundu from the south of the 
colony – notably the missionary educated Jonas Savimbi. Barely a week into its existence, 
the FNLA declared the Angolan Revolutionary Government in Exile (Govêrno 
Revolucionário de Angola no Exílio, or GRAE). Roberto acted as president and appointed 
Savimbi foreign minister, though the vast majority of the leadership positions were 
dominated by Bakongo appointees. The goal was to show to the world the continued 
relevance of the Angolan nationalist movement, despite recent setbacks on the military 
front, and to offer the world an identifiable alternative to imperial Portugal. That the FNLA 
was barely more than Roberto’s cronies in Leopoldville and a poorly managed relief 
service for Angolan refugees mattered less than the symbolic gesture of declaring the 
government. A series of African governments moved to recognize the GRAE, followed by 
a handful of Eastern bloc states courting Third World nationalists. A year later, when the 
newly formed Organization of African Unity (OAU) decided to financially support 
nationalist movements through its Liberation Committee, it chose the FNLA over the 
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MPLA due to its somewhat dubious claim to be the most ready to govern an independent 
state.296 
Outside Africa, response to the FNLA’s declaration was far less enthusiastic. 
Europeans ranging from Portugal to Britain clearly had no interest in recognizing the 
government, but the United States also objected negatively to the new state of affairs. The 
Kennedy administration quietly appreciated Roberto’s attempts to create a unified 
nationalist movement, but it responded with mild horror at the FNLA’s claim to 
government status. Many officials feared it would force Portugal into a defensive position, 
leading to a collapse of Portuguese relations with the Congo and closing any possibility of 
a negotiated transition of power. There was virtually no discussion of supporting the GRAE 
idea outside the African Bureau, and the Kennedy administration actively opposed 
Roberto’s initiative. American officials secretly advised Congolese President Cyril Adoula 
not to recognize the FNLA’s exile government, though this proved unsuccessful thanks to 
Roberto’s extensive ties to high-ranking Congolese politicians.297 The United States was 
unable to prevent the formation of the GRAE, but in trying to do so it demonstrated to 
Roberto the inherent conservatism of the American government.  
As Luso-American relations gradually improved, African perceptions of the 
Kennedy administration worsened. Though Roberto benefited from both governmental and 
private American aid – albeit less so than either Portugal or some anti-Western detractors 
presumed – the president of the FNLA became increasingly frustrated with the United 
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States after 1962. Kennedy had been far less helpful on the global political front than early 
indications had promised, and American actions after the exile government declaration 
further soured relations. By the end of 1963, the U.S. embassy in Leopoldville, which had 
the most extensive contacts with the FNLA head, noted that “he feels that he carries the 
reputation of an American stooge without receiving any of material benefits.”298 A tinge of 
anti-Americanism began to creep into official pronouncements as a lack of military success 
in Angola led Roberto to cement his control of the party and nationalist movement by 
appealing to local frustrations with the Western bloc. This frustration was directly 
attributable to the inconsistency with which the administration was handling the 
nationalists – providing nominal covert aid on the one hand and offering minimal public 
support on the other. Reflecting a widespread attitude, one ACOA representative working 
with the FNLA in the Congo complained, “American policy is so ambivalent, in a situation 
in which there is no room for ambivalence.”299 Roberto himself began to denounce the 
American tendency to pay “lip service to self-determination” while supplying “arms that 
are used to kill us.”300 Frustrations were convincing Roberto that he might find more 
reliable support from the countries he had long denigrated in pursuit of U.S. assistance: 
China and members of the Eastern bloc. 
Rapprochement with the Portuguese and rapidly cooling relations with nationalists 
like Roberto led to a reconsideration of American policy, encouraged by less sympathetic 
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members of the State Department like Ball and the European Bureau. The widespread 
African support to the FNLA represented by the OAU Liberation Committee decision to 
back it over the MPLA seemed to have emboldened Roberto, who now adopted a more 
aggressive rhetoric –  not just in terms of the United States,  but the larger struggle overall. 
American diplomats began hearing reports that Roberto was threatening to drive the 
Portuguese from the country, while also criticizing the “mestiço” MPLA.301 Though 
skeptical of some information, they nonetheless worried that such pronouncements did “not 
jibe with impression that US policy seeks to create [of] reasonable Negro leadership willing 
to negotiate and recognition of continued Portuguese Mission in Africa.”302 With Roberto 
beginning to drift slightly from his original pro-Western stance and the new realization that 
the MPLA – with its Portuguese contacts – might actually be more likely to negotiate, Rusk 
actually ordered foreign diplomats not to choose between the movements in favor of 
waiting to see how the “fast-moving” situation played out.303 While hoping to remain on 
good grounds with both parties, the reality is that the United States was gradually 
distancing itself without cutting ties to Roberto, who it was coming to see as more 
independent and anti-Portuguese than served American purposes. Nationalists like Roberto 
had only ever been part of the solution, but now they could be potential liabilities as the 
Americans sought to work more cooperatively with the Estado Novo. The Kennedy 
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administration had changed tactics, with the president personally admitting to Nogueira 
that his government’s actions in 1961 had been “precipitous.”304 The current approach was 
to work with European powers like Portugal, rather than compelling moves toward self-
determination through the UN or directly aiding African nationalists.305  
 The limitations Kennedy placed on assistance to moderate nationalists is perhaps 
best exemplified by the experience of Eduardo Mondlane. Outwardly westernized, highly 
educated, and judicious in his rhetoric, the American-trained Mondlane was the model 
revolutionary from the American perspective. While in the United States he had established 
connections with officials in New York and Washington, with the State Department 
producing a praiseworthy profile of Mondlane while he taught at Syracuse.306 His relations 
with American government officials were sufficiently close that he gave them warning of 
his plans to return to Mozambique to become involved in the liberation movement, assuring 
them just months before his election as FRELIMO president that he remained committed 
and indeed hopeful of a negotiated transition of power.307 It was therefore no surprise that 
when Mondlane returned to the United States in 1963 seeking government assistance for 
FRELIMO’s educational and medical efforts operating in Tanzania, he was granted an 
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audience with Attorney General Robert Kennedy. The fact that the meeting was not with 
the president or a member of the State Department demonstrated the distance the 
administration was keeping from the nationalists, but it likely worked in Mondlane’s favor. 
The younger Kennedy was enthusiastic, praising Mondlane as “a terrifically impressive 
fellow.”308 Here was an opportunity to reinforce American linkages to nationalists who had 
not yet taken up arms against Portugal.  
 The president was interested in working with Mondlane but hesitated to make a 
serious commitment to the nationalist cause. According to John Marcum, Mondlane asked 
for more than just funding, urging the United States to move “to the forefront in this 
struggle for freedom.”309 Kennedy agreed FRELIMO deserved assistance in its social 
efforts among the refugees, but he balked at taking a public stand at the issue – especially 
when Mozambique remained a non-issue. The president and secretary of state also wanted 
to keep a clear distance from donations to even the most mundane refugee causes, 
requesting funds be funneled through third parties.310 A short time later, FRELIMO’s 
request for $100,000 from the Ford Foundation was granted, which was likely the result of 
unofficial government requests to the foundation’s director, former diplomat and Kennedy 
adviser John McCloy.311 Administered officially through the African-American Institute, 
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the money helped establish the Mozambique Institute in Tanzania under the direction of 
Mondlane’s white American wife Janet; it initially provided education to Mozambican 
refugees on behalf of FRELIMO, but later expanded to incorporate a number of medical 
and social services.312 It did not commit the American government to supporting the 
nationalist cause nor seriously increase political or economic pressure on Portugal. By 
outsourcing aid to FRELIMO and insulating the administration from Portuguese 
accusations through various third parties, Kennedy elided the question of self-
determination at the international level. To Mondlane, the silence was as good as 
supporting Portugal.  
 Mondlane was deeply troubled by the weak American response. Though 
appreciative of the financial aid, the FRELIMO president realized that a successful turn to 
self-determination – negotiated or taken by force – would necessarily demand a weakening 
of the relative power held by Portugal over its colonies. It was clear from his interactions 
with American officials that the United States, and the wider NATO alliance, would not 
participate in this process – whatever their previous public pronouncements. Only months 
after meeting with Bobby Kennedy, Mondlane expressed to ACOA’s Houser FRELIMO’s 
“great disappointment with the position of [the U.S.] government in relation to Portugal,” 
noting that even Soapy Williams had adopted an increasingly uncritical public approach to 
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Lisbon.313 Publicly, the FRELIMO head was even more frustrated with the “anti-African” 
position of the NATO countries. “All along these powers have been expressing their 
sympathies for the rights of self-determination of the colonial peoples of Africa, but when 
occasion was offered for demonstrating this in a concrete form they balked,” Mondlane 
complained to a U.S audience, “It is reprehensible that such great powers as the United 
States, Great Britain and France, hide behind a screen of pretty words when they should be 
taking positive action in support of the people’s struggle for freedom.”314 
  It was not just the nationalists who felt that the Kennedy administration had failed 
to live up to its initial promise. American activists from the churches and ACOA were 
equally distressed by the direction of American policy, which had visibly retreated to the 
status quo since early 1962. Attempts to reverse this momentum had met with little success. 
Sympathetic officials from the African Bureau were finding themselves increasingly 
marginalized within policymaking circles, while senior advisers like Rusk offered lip 
service to anti-colonial efforts in the United States but little else. Nationalist frustrations as 
well as Ball’s approach to Salazar worried ACOA that Kennedy’s forthright anti-colonial 
position was all but lost.315 Increasingly, Houser began focusing his efforts less on the 
executive branch that had seemed most promising in 1961 and more on the Congress, 
where he faced the difficult task of overcoming Portugal’s successful efforts in wooing 
ardent Cold Warriors. However difficult the task, Houser thought this would be the most 
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likely source of pressure to move Kennedy and Rusk in bolder directions.316 But despite 
this change in tactics, the reality was that Portugal’s careful diplomacy had effectively 
quieted the empire’s most ardent critic in the Western world. Houser admitted before 
Kennedy’s death that he did “not feel very encouraged by conversations I have had [in 
Washington].”317 Just over a year later, the generally optimistic secretary for ACOA had 
become sufficiently disillusioned to advise his African friends that it might be prudent to 
save their resources rather than traveling to Washington, since the likelihood of 
successfully lobbying the government was almost nil.318 That ACOA, which had worked 
for a decade to connect African nationalists with American officials, was giving up hope 
provided a testament to just how rapidly and completely the American government had 
abandoned its earlier policy.  
After 1961, Kennedy played a double game that sought to publicly maintain 
relations with Portugal while very quietly courting the nationalists, but the policy truly 
satisfied neither party. While scholarly advocates of Kennedy’s Third World policies have 
blamed Lyndon Johnson for the defection of sympathetic nationalists, the reality is that 
many had become disillusioned before Kennedy’s death.319 Kennedy’s attempt to play a 
double game failed to achieve full cooperation with Portugal on a host of issues and slowly 
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alienated the revolutionaries, who increasingly saw armed revolution as the only solution 
to the impasse.320 Well before Kennedy’s assassination, Amílcar Cabral’s PAIGC launched 
its own military revolution against Portugal in Guinea-Bissau, followed just over a year 
later by FRELIMO’s infiltration of Mozambique from Tanzania in September of 1964. The 
military struggles left little room for negotiated settlement. The CONCP parties would take 
advantage of military assistance from African and Eastern European states, while 
undermining Portugal’s war effort through continued calls for Western governments to 
economically and politically isolate the NATO member. This would be the most efficient 
way to defeat the Estado Novo – empowering the nationalist movements while weakening 
the empire. If the Euro-American alliance continued to aid Portugal, the nationalists would 
fight until the West lined up on what they considered the right side of history.  
 
ACOA and the Unfulfilled Promise of Pan-African Solidarity 
 Civil society groups struggled to arrest the drift of their government and contribute 
to the anti-colonial cause in what ways they could. They sought to replicate the grassroots 
pressure for Western action against Portugal that had peaked during the summer of 1961 
during a period when no crisis existed. This proved difficult as Portuguese Africa 
disappeared from the papers and there were few victories or atrocities with which to 
motivate activity. ACOA’s primary hope during this period was to link anti-colonialism to 
the idea of transnational Pan-Africanism, marshalling the collective voice of U.S. blacks 
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to sway a democratic president dependent on their vote for reelection. The assumption that 
African Americans had keen interest in events on the continent was a simplistic one 
recently popular among white politicians, but there was a certain truth. Over the previous 
decades, blacks had experienced moments of intense interest in the continent. Martin 
Luther King had become fond of citing decolonization as a source of momentum that fed 
the Civil Rights Movement, and a number of radical young blacks had disrupted the UN 
after the murder of the Congo’s Patrice Lumumba in 1960. Many still remembered the 
popular furor at the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935. Such displays of solidarity had 
often been spontaneous; none had ever formed into a truly cohesive movement after World 
War II, certainly not on the scale of the Civil Rights Movement operating in the 1960s. 
ACOA’s desire to harness the power of the grassroots campaign for equal rights in the 
United States and link it with anti-colonialism would be a difficult one, made only more 
challenging by the divisions in Angola that prevented its revolutionary policies from 
finding a unity of their own.   
 ACOA had to try, though. After 1961, the anti-colonial organization and its 
religious and liberal allies did their best to aid the liberation movements, but they did so on 
a small scale with decreasing returns. ACOA worked in vain alongside American 
missionaries like Malcolm McVeigh to keep the Portuguese colonial plight in the public 
eye, despite waning press attention. Mostly they provided limited humanitarian relief. In 
January 1962, George Houser and John Marcum crossed the Congo border into northern 
Angola to deliver medicine and supplies bought with funds raised since the beginning of 
the armed struggle. Upon their return they issued a number of statements and reports, 
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launching a sustained campaign to raise funds and material aid for Angolan refugees in the 
Congo (with some material likely crossing over into the shrinking rebel-held territories of 
Angola).321 ACOA worked especially closely with the UPA/FNLA’s medical wing, the 
Serviço de Assistência aos Reugiados de Angola (The Angolan Refugee Assistance 
Service, or SARA). Houser and Marcum carried with them the first shipment in a series of 
humanitarian contributions to the Angolan struggle for independence, with additional 
material and transportation provided in coordination with Protestant and Catholic relief 
agencies.322 ACOA also helped facilitate the visitation of skilled doctors and a donation of 
$5,000 worth of drugs from the AFL-CIO, which may have also reflected the desires of the 
Kennedy administration that some assistance finds its way to Angolan refugees in the 
Congo.323 Though ACOA’s ability to fundraise for aid would decline as Portuguese Africa 
continued to recede from the popular conscious, avenues for assistance established through 
religious services would remain open for much of the decade.324 These efforts, however, 
did little to isolate Portugal.  
 The American anti-colonial movement needed a way to demonstrate to the 
government that there was a true popular interest in the case of Portuguese and southern 
Africa that stretched beyond the small leadership circles of ACOA and the religious groups. 
Participaion by liberal organized labor groups moved in this direction, but what ACOA 
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and indeed the nationalists had always desired was a grassroots movement. Fortunately for 
Houser, there already existed a mass movement dedicated to ideas of global equality in the 
Civil Rights Movement, and key leaders such as Martin Luther King Jr. had connections 
to ACOA. Scholars such as Jim Meriwether and Brenda Gayle Plummer have documented 
how successful decolonization fueled a growth in black American interest in Africa, which 
Houser and others hoped to harness to pressure the government into supporting Lusophone 
liberation.325 Portugal had in fact been greatly concerned about the possibility of merging 
civil rights and anti-colonialism in the United States, and it had devoted resources into 
courting the black public – notably winning over George Schuyler and the anti-communist 
Max Yergan. Lisbon was equally happy with silence, and had even greater success 
convincing the American public that the situation in its colonies was too complex for a 
simple reaction based on a vague shared identity.  This strategy quieted enough critics that 
Roberto complained about Portugal’s “grandiose propaganda machine” and its surprising 
ability to silence black newsmen.326 Despite this success, legitimate concern remained. As 
late as 1963, Selvage and Lee advised Portugal that the “attitude of black American 
leaders” represented the greatest danger to improving relations with the United States, 
especially with the inveterate politician Johnson assuming the presidency with an eye 
toward reelection.327   
                                                 
325 See Meriwether, chapters 5-6. Plummer argues that “the African vista presented . . . an alternative to 
white nationalism and its political agendas,” though less radical leaders had trouble crafting a viewpoint 
beyond that neatly defined by the American states. Plummer, In Search of Power, 344.   
326 American Negro Press, “Angolan Leader Says Negro Newsmen Selling Out,” Atlanta Daily World, 31 
December 1961.  
327 Author’s translation. Memo, Ponto de Vista relativo a Portugal, from Washington, Selvage and Lee, 25 
November 1963, pasta 40, Box 413, NE-21, Antonio Salazar Archive, Torre do Tombo (Lisbon, Portugal).  
 145 
 The domestic political potential of a Pan-African commitment to anti-colonialism 
is exactly what ACOA hoped to realize when it helped organize the American Negro 
Leadership Conference on Africa (ANLCA) in the fall of 1962. A. Phillip Randolph, James 
Baldwin, James Farmer and Bayard Rustin all sat on the board of ACOA. Randolph in 
particular believed that the African American leadership should expand the movement for 
civil rights into a transnational struggle for global equality by taking a forthright position 
on the necessity of rapid decolonization. With Houser’s assistance, he pushed for a major 
convocation to outline a black agenda for foreign policy. This gathering of minds would 
address Angola and its sister colonies, while also calling for an American policy that would 
isolate South Africa and advance discussions on self-rule in Southern Rhodesia. The stated 
goal of the ANLCA was to “activize (sic) the political influence of America's 19 million 
Negro citizens on their government's role in the councils of the United Nations and other 
diplomatic channels on the critical areas of Sub- Sahara Africa.”328 The participants who 
gathered at Arden House on the campus of Columbia University in late November were a 
practical listing of the Who’s Who of the Civil Rights Movement and black leadership 
more broadly, assembling more than 100 participants including conveners Randolph, 
Farmer, Martin Luther King Jr., Whitney Young of the Urban League, and Dorothy Height 
of the National Council of Negro Women. Experts from across the country submitted 
dozens of reports on the challenges of decolonization and development in Africa. ACOA’s 
John Marcum provided the paper on Angola, and Eduardo Mondlane – recently elected 
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president of FRELIMO – offered another on Mozambique, though a national press still 
unfamiliar with the revolutionary reported his contribution to be on Kenya.329 The FNLA 
also sent a delegation to act as observers.330  
The gathering of so many people of African heritage to discuss African liberation 
and development illustrated a widespread interest in the topic and the possibility of 
concerted political action. Some present, like the labor activist Randolph, urged the 
creation of a political front dedicated to articulating black demands as part of a single 
transnational project. This could force the U.S. government to take decolonization as 
seriously as domestic civil rights. As a first step, Randolph counseled black Americans to 
articulate clearly “the meaning of Africa to them,” so that they could “be informed, 
awakened, aroused, and mobilized to protest, demonstrate, and march for African 
freedom.” Randolph wanted to develop concrete initiatives that would communicate a 
popular solidarity with an Africa still suffering under colonialism and racial repression, 
even proposing a major labor strike to protest apartheid.331 Mondlane lent support to these 
more vigorous initiatives, advising black Americans to stop “acting within the acceptable 
lines, typical of the American bourgeois.”332 Though Randolph shared Mondlane’s view 
that the struggles for domestic equality and global self-determination were inextricably 
linked, his proposals captured a tension. African Americans remained poorly informed 
about events on the continent, and there was no consensus as to what a newly rediscovered 
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African identity meant on a daily basis or how it fit with the civil rights goal of full 
participation in U.S. society. Over the coming years, Pan-African identifiers like “black” 
and “African American” would replace “negro,” but what did such transition in identity 
mean in practical political terms? As one black paper explained in the wake of the ANLCA, 
“only the stupid will declare that they ‘ain’t lost nothing in Africa,” but the next step 
beyond this most basic identification was less clear cut.333 
It was in this confusion about identity and action that the stultifying power of the 
Cold War proved dominant. Rather than accepting Randolph’s challenge to contemplate 
their obligations to an ancestral continent, more ANLCA attendees agreed with Roy 
Wilkins, the head of the NAACP and keynote speaker, who warned that “In developing 
this activity, we should not relax our prime effort to achieve our proper place in our own 
country.” Wilkins believed, like many well-intentioned Americans before him, that aiding 
Africa would arise as a natural consequence of gaining equality in the United States. 
Therefore, his demands focused more on the need for black participation in the diplomatic 
corps, an international extension of the equal hiring practices demanded by the Civil Rights 
Movement. Once fully integrated into domestic society and the policymaking 
establishment, blacks could guide the tiller of state in a parallel course with moderate 
African self-determination. No displays of international solidarity could prove more 
effective, despite the more strident proposals offered by Randolph and Mondlane.334 Here 
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in microcosm was the division between African Americans in the early 1960s. Randolph’s 
more radical solidarity with Africans as equals positioned itself against an 
internationalized, integrationist reading of the Talented Tenth, where black Americans 
would help their continental brothers after carving out a place in a more equalized society.  
These two conflicting visions of Pan-African identity – one focused on direct action with 
a sense of single struggle, the other one more elite-based and intent on working with the 
executive branch to cooperatively change American policy in Africa – hampered the 
growth of an effective solidarity movement. With no clear understanding of their relation 
to the continent, African Americans could not agree on a clear political agenda.   
Hemmed in by Cold War definitions of Americanism and focused primarily on 
guaranteeing civil rights, the less ambitious form of cooperation championed by Wilkins 
won the day for the time being. The ANLCA’s conclusions proved circumscribed. They 
eschewed Randolph’s calls for further exploring a transnational identity and engaging in 
mass protest, instead requesting the American government to act on behalf of the African 
American community on the world stage.335 The conclusions on Portuguese Africa are 
illustrative of the overall program. The conference recognized the need for self-
determination, but avoided the question of armed revolution. It encouraged the Kennedy 
administration to end shipments of military equipment to Portugal (mostly affirming 
existing policy), but said little about the continuing inflow of arms and aid through NATO. 
It made no requests for political assistance to the liberation movements beyond non-
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governmental humanitarian relief. Nowhere either were there calls for African Americans 
to expand contacts with the liberation leaders, despite the fact that Roberto and Mondlane 
were present and desired greater exchanges.336 These results in many ways confirm the 
positions of Brenda Gayle Plummer and Penny Von Eschen, who have noted that Cold War 
conformity and an emphasis on winning support for the Civil Rights Movement greatly 
weakened elite black internationalism.337 This reality was not lost on attendees, with one 
participant lamenting: 
if our brothers and sisters in Africa are waiting or depending on the American 
Negro Leadership Conference on Africa for aid and support, they might just as well 
make their peace with [Prime Minister of South Africa Henrik] Verwoerd, [Prime 
Minister of Portugal Antonio] Salazar, and [Prime Minister of Rhodesia Roy] 
Welensky.338  
 
The moderation inherent in the ANLCA did little to advance the domestic anti-colonial 
movement, remaining firmly within the realm of acceptable and loyal action defined by 
Cold War American culture. 
The ANLCA remained the most prominent demonstration of African American 
interest in Africa for the rest of the decade, but it would never overcome the limitations 
placed on it by its cautious leadership. It met rarely and accomplished little. For these elite 
actors involved with the Civil Rights Movement, the international struggle would benefit 
most from their full integration into society. Any attempts to push the liberal Cold War 
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envelope could undermine the necessary domestic achievements. As a result, the next 
meetings in 1964 and 1967 produced additional lukewarm calls for governmental action 
even as the majority of African Americans became ever more disillusioned with both 
American foreign policy and the government’s willingness to advance real equality.339 At 
the third ANLCA, Eduardo Mondlane complained that the anti-colonial cause had 
weakened in the United States. African Americans had failed to keep pace with many 
Southern legislators sympathetic to the white minority regimes of southern Africa who 
“contribute a great deal to the strength and power of the Portuguese.”340 By that point, the 
very future of the ANLCA – what George Houser called disappointingly a “part time 
operation” – stood in doubt.341 The civil rights leaders had missed an opportunity. During 
the mid-1960s when their influence was at its height, leaders like King, Wilkins, and others 
had been “too preoccupied by their own civil rights movement to pay much attention to 
Africa’s.”342 By the late 1960s, their time had passed, replaced by a younger generation of 
militant Black Power activists who understood African liberation as the core of a domestic 
movement, and were gradually organizing to support the Portuguese African cause (see 
                                                 
339 Randolph, generally known as one of the more radical leaders of the Civil Rights movement, praised 
Lyndon Johnson for his leadership in Africa during a time when most Africans had grown disaffected with 
the American government due in part to its slow rapprochement with both South Africa and Portugal as 
well as its toothless criticism of Rhodesia’s unilateral declaration of independence. See A. Phillip 
Randolph, Address to the Third Biennial Conference of the American Negro Leadership Conference on 
Africa, 26 January 1967, AAA.  
340 While Mondlane did not directly identify the “people on the other side,” an African American working 
on Capitol Hill defined them as “Southern legislators with an ‘empathy’ for the white Governments of 
Rhodesia, the Portuguese territories, and South Africa.” Joseph R. L. Sterne, “American Negro Leaders 
Urge Aid to Black Africa,” The Sun, 29 January 1967.  
341 George Houser, Memorandum on American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa, March 1967, 
AAA.  
342 Sterne, “American Negro Leaders Urge Aid to Black Africa.” 
 151 
chapter 5). Portugal, however, had delayed this grassroots organizing for years, and the 
moderate African American leadership that had the ear of multiple presidents had chosen 
not to spend valuable political capital.  The pursuit of domestic equality within the Cold 
War United States had simply taken precedence over continental liberation.  
The impotence of the ANLCA was the major reason American policy was allowed 
to drift toward a closer embrace of Portugal, but it was just one instance of the failure of 
Pan-African unity. Equally important in allowing the United States to retreat from its 
position of 1961 was the wholesale collapse of the Angolan rebellion due to deep 
nationalist divisions, which also threatened the dedication of the nascent solidarity 
movement. By 1962, most interested Americans knew the FNLA was not the only anti-
colonial movement in Angola. Agostinho Neto visited the United States in the fall of that 
year, making contact with George Houser via Methodist Bishop Ralph Dodge and likely 
engaging in discreet discussions with government officials.343 Despite Neto’s past 
communist affiliations and strong socialist program for an independent Angola, he 
sincerely wished to gain political and material assistance from the United States – both its 
government and its people. Neto wanted to maintain an independent foreign policy even as 
he began receiving military aid from the Soviet Union, and he believed working with 
Western countries was a way of balancing Cold War rivalries. Ideology mattered a great 
deal domestically, but less so on the international stage so long as allies were committed 
to the independence of Angola. As one MPLA member later explained, “One of the 
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principles guiding our relations with other countries and political organizations is that each 
one respect the other’s independence and right to follow the road suitable for the defence 
of the interests of their respective peoples.”344 This line was an important element of 
CONCP internationalism, already accepted by ACOA and religious activists to a certain 
extent in their work with Mondlane and FRELIMO.  
But MPLA initiatives did not reproduce the working relationship with ACOA that 
Roberto had developed. While Houser responded positively to Neto’s initiation overtures 
by offering his assistance at the UN, there remained a hesitance to commit the organization 
to seriously aiding the more leftist organization. Houser repeatedly stressed the need for 
unity while doing his best to avoid ACOA intervening in what he viewed rightly as an 
African debate. Eventually, he pledged the committee to respect the party favored by the 
OAU after its formation in 1963.345 In reality, ACOA continuously favored the FNLA for 
most of the 1960s even after doubts had begun to grow in the United States and among 
African countries about Roberto’s leadership. ACOA sent almost no material aid to the 
MPLA until 1969 and had very little contact with Neto or other party leaders after 1962.346 
Admittedly, MPLA activities were limited by poor relations with the Congolese 
government and difficulties gaining access to Angola, but after 1962 FNLA operations 
were also minimal. The Portuguese pacification of Angola meant neither party could 
seriously claim to be the leading nationalist movement. Rather, ACOA’s longtime 
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preference for Roberto relied on a long relationship of friendship and mutual trust, though 
Houser could not deny that Cold War considerations may have played some role in the 
decision.347 Whatever the causes, the decision by ACOA and most American organizations 
to remain loyal to the FNLA would greatly complicate efforts to aid the cause of Angolan 
independence.  
For at the same time irregular ANLCA meetings were failing to sway government 
opinion, the FNLA’s revolution was suffering a slow collapse under the poor leadership of 
Roberto. The FNLA declaration of the government-in-exile had been a bold move, but it 
was unable to parley this into military or international success. Attempts to find common 
ground between the MPLA and FNLA were equally unsuccessful. Both sides harbored 
deep suspicions of the other, and Roberto feared he would be unable to maintain control 
over the resulting union. A war of words broke out, with the FNLA criticizing its 
competitor for being mestiço dominated, while the MPLA dismissed Roberto as an 
ethnocentric racist. It had been this exchange that disturbed American diplomats, leading 
to a cooling of relations with Roberto. Relegated to the margins of Angola by the successful 
Portuguese pacification, verbal sniping devolved into violent confrontations that reinforced 
existing animosities. Intraparty intrigue followed soon after. One MPLA faction under 
party founder Viriato da Cruz defected for the FNLA after the Congolese recognition of 
the exile government, which Marcum partially attributes to a rejection of Neto and the 
predominately mestiço leadership.348 A badly beaten MPLA fled Leopoldville across the 
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river to Brazzaville in the Republic of the Congo, where the party gradually rebuilt its 
strength.  The period of troubles had temporarily weakened the MPLA, but it did little to 
aid the long-term prospects of the FNLA.349 Only Portugal claimed victory, using the 
situation to justify their continued control of their most valuable colony.   
Soon the FNLA faced its own crisis of leadership. Though it had greatly diversified 
its base membership, the party remained dominated by a small cadre of French-speaking 
Bakongo nationalists loyal to Roberto. Those identifying with other ethnicities and regions 
of Angola often felt marginalized, most notably the European-trained minister of foreign 
affairs, Jonas Savimbi. Savimbi had been born in the Ovimbundu region of southern 
Angola and received his education through Protestant missions. Well-spoken and 
charming, if also sometimes overbearing, Savimbi had received his senior position in the 
exile government as a symbol of the FNLA’s claim to represent all Angola. He became a 
key component of the FNLA’s international strategy – notably building an affinity for 
Maoist China when Roberto considered engaging with the Marxist state.350 But when 
Roberto continued to appoint corrupt Bakongo allies in regions populated by Ovimbundu 
refugees, tensions rose that allowed Savimbi to build an independent base of support within 
the exile government. Seeing such actions as treasonous, Roberto moved to consolidate his 
personal power by removing disloyal followers. Savimbi and a number of other senior 
FNLA officers proactively fled the party, accusing Roberto of dictatorial and insufficiently 
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revolutionary politics.351 While Savimbi toyed with joining the MPLA, he eventually 
decided to form the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (The National 
Union for the Total Independence of Angola, or UNITA) around an Ovimbundu core and 
with Chinese aid in March 1966.352 Though the Zambia-based UNITA was the weakest 
and most militarily unsuccessful of the three major parties, its formation further splintered 
the already chaotic Angolan nationalist movement.   
The CIA seems to have kept Roberto on its payroll for informational purposes, but 
by the time of Savimbi’s defection the U.S. government had limited contacts with the 
nationalists. ACOA was the primary organization aiding the FNLA by this point, and it 
found itself pulled into the internal conflicts despite Houser’s best efforts to stay above the 
fray. In addition to Savimbi, Roberto was deeply suspicious of the internationally well-
connected SARA medical branch, which included the Canadian physician Ian Gilchrist. 
Dr. Gilchrist was an ardent proponent of the nationalist cause, having developed a strong 
commitment to African independence during a childhood spent in the Congo. Sponsored 
by ACOA to work with the FNLA beginning in 1963, Gilchrist offered Houser a firsthand 
look at Roberto’s loss of control and the collapse of the once-promising movement.353 
When the head of SARA joined Savimbi and a number of others in fleeing the party, 
Gilchrest began to worry for his own safety. As he finally prepared to leave, the physician 
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warned Houser that the FNLA had become a party of “bandits, thieves, and scoundrels” 
and Roberto no longer represented the Angolan people.354  These events did not convince 
ACOA to immediately abandon the FNLA, but they revealed to many within the 
organization and in related missionary circles the underlying flaws of Roberto’s 
organizations. The nationalist movement in the most important and visible of Portugal’s 
colonies was irreparably broken. Despite years of effort, Roberto was incapable of 
formulating a Pan-African Angolan identity that could unite the country across ethnic lines. 
Not only was he unable and unwilling to unite with the MPLA, but now his own party had 
splintered. With both foreign governments and civil society groups looking to Angola to 
measure the health of the Portuguese empire, the disintegration of the revolution effectively 
confirmed Lisbon’s claim to continued sovereignty in its overseas territories.  
The disintegration of the FNLA seriously damaged relations with international 
supporters from which the party would never fully recover. Political purges effectively 
gutted SARA to the point that the Red Cross ended the refugee assistance it had provided 
since 1961, which had been among the most important sources of foreign aid.355 It also 
produced a radio silence between Roberto and his American allies that lasted two years.356 
When Roberto finally reappeared, Houser maintained the relationship with the FNLA 
because he believed “There is no alternative,” but he was finding it harder to defend his 
old friend.357 As the decade progressed, many of the party’s international allies outside of 
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the Congo disappeared. Arguably the most important, the OAU, recognized the MPLA 
alongside its faltering rival in 1964, steadily increasing contributions to the leftist party 
over the decade. In Brazzaville, the MPLA rebuilt itself on a less ambiguous commitment 
to Marxism and the socialist bloc, which helped arm a small but effective military group 
active in Angola’s oil rich enclave of Cabinda. By 1968, the FNLA received no funds from 
the OAU, and three years later the African organization withdrew its recognition of the 
GRAE as Angola’s government in exile.358 Roberto’s professed anti-communism had done 
much to win him friends abroad, but it could not hold together a multi-ethnic movement 
that chafed at his authoritarian leadership and Bakongo nepotism. A decade after it had 
commanded global headlines, the FNLA was the rump party behind a shell government 
almost wholly dependent on the Congo for its continued existence.   
The potential of Pan-Africanism had shown its limitations both in the United States 
and Angola. The limitations of black American identification with revolutionary Africa 
were laid bare at the ANLCA, even as events in Angola – the country best positioned to 
advance the winds of change – demonstrated just how difficult it was to achieve real unity. 
The dramatic collapse of the revolution in Portugal’s largest and most visible colony 
robbed ACOA and the nascent solidarity movement of a centerpiece for its campaigns, 
hampering organization and educational efforts as much if not more than the Cold War 
caution displayed by initially promising initiatives like the ANLCA. In the United States, 
as in Britain before it, solidarity with Portuguese African liberation receded to the 
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background during a period when the West’s most powerful governments were embracing 
imperial Portugal.  
 
Southern Africa Threatens the Cold War 
 The absence of a strong domestic commitment to liberation and the end of the 
Angolan crisis allowed the Western powers a freer hand in their relations with Portugal. 
They could be deliberate, but also now had the luxury of indifference, ignoring the issue 
of Lusophone decolonization as more pressing matters arose. These two factors would 
typify the Anglo-American reaction to Portuguese Africa into the 1970s. Kennedy’s retreat 
had largely set the stage for this state of affairs. The Johnson administration continued to 
follow the Bowles Plan in wooing Portugal toward greater reform, but the State Department 
was unwilling to invest either serious resources or prestige into a new initiative if Salazar 
remained difficult.359 There was little reason to do so considering American calculations 
of Portuguese strength in its colonies. The likelihood of a worthwhile payoff for the 
additional pressure, either political or strategic, was simply too small. The collapse of the 
nationalist movement in Angola allowed the anti-colonial revolutions to fade from the 
global agenda, and as Terrence Lyons has famously argued, Johnson had few qualms about 
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leaving them there.360 Portugal provided an element of stability – so much so that when 
events in sub-Saharan Africa once again demanded attention, the Anglo-American powers 
would find themselves looking to Lisbon for assistance in managing another crisis.  
By 1965, Western policymakers believed Portugal had proved itself to be the only 
power prepared to govern the areas of Mozambique and Angola. The failure of the 1961 
Angolan uprising made American officials increasingly skeptical of the real strength of 
Portuguese African nationalists. The revolution in tiny Guinea-Bissau was of limited 
importance; Mozambique demanded only slightly more attention. According to American 
intelligence reports, FRELIMO’s struggle was “limited and ultraclandestine” due to 
“public apathy,” Portuguese power, and the paucity of its trained fighting force. CIA 
reports quoted Mozambican leader Eduardo Mondale just months earlier describing the 
war against Portugal as hopeless, and it stressed that the early launch of military operations 
may well be a desperate bid to return international attention to Lusophone Africa in light 
of recent events in Angola.361 In contrast to such official dismissals of the nationalist 
movements as weak, intelligence analysts commented on the “unexpected” and 
“surprising” health of the Portuguese economy, the stability of Salazar’s regime, and the 
effective Portuguese pacification of the Angolan countryside.362 The CIA believed that 
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nationalists would likely succeed in the long run given increasing support and Portugal’s 
weak settler presence, but it did not believe a nationalist victory would be achievable in the 
foreseeable future. Since Johnson and his administration still fretted over the possibility of 
another Congo collapse and the possible spread of such instability, Salazar was the ally of 
the moment. Change remained necessary, but it would have to wait until Lisbon accepted 
it.   
This trend toward embracing Portugal gained momentum as a new crisis of self-
determination threatened Africa – the expansion reactionary white minority governance 
beyond apartheid South Africa, specifically in the form of an independent, white-led 
Southern Rhodesia. Since the 1950s, Britain had been trying to solve the problem of the 
settler state that was surrounded by predominantly African colonies. As John Darwin 
explained in his seminal work Britain and Decolonization, officials in London believed 
that a continued influence in the region depended on their ability to create a relative peace 
between the races.363 A number of schemes had been tried to create a polity that could 
assuage all parties, but all had failed – most notably the collapse of the Central African 
Federation. After MacMillan acknowledged the “wind of change,” the Conservative 
government bowed to pressure and granted independence to Nyasaland (Malawi) and 
Southern Rhodesia (Zambia) in 1964, and began a similar process for its protectorates on 
the borders of South Africa. The future of Southern Rhodesia remained unsettled, much to 
the chagrin of the minority government in Salisbury that felt increasingly endangered by 
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metropolitan plans for the African empire. With negotiations for this final transfer of power 
going poorly, the British feared throughout much of the early 1960s that Southern Rhodesia 
might break with Britain to follow its South African neighbor in establishing an 
independent minority regime.  
It was in part the fear of exacerbating racial tensions and undermining plans for the 
region that had led the British to handle Portugal with kid gloves. South Africa had been 
actively pursuing new allies in the region, and London diplomats in 1961 were fearful of 
how African states might react to a formal pact between white minority governments. Such 
an alliance would not only reinforce Portuguese intransigence, but potentially inspire the 
declaration of white minority regimes in Angola or Mozambique even if Lisbon accepted 
through some miracle the necessity of decolonization. Thus, Macmillan had warned 
Kennedy as early as 1961 about the dangers of pushing Portugal or its colonial constituents 
“into the arms of South Africa.”364 Any policy that might encourage Angola or 
Mozambique to adopt apartheid-like policies or form an alliance with South Africa would 
surely prove, as one contemporary official expressed, “fatal to British hopes of multi-racial 
co-operation in Africa.”365 Salazar’s Lusotropicalism was certainly a myth, but it 
nonetheless appealed to both British and American officials who were concerned about 
alternatives”366 And MacMillan hoped to keep it that way. British policy toward the Salazar 
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regime thus became a delicate matter, as Britain sought reform while avoiding any 
provocation that might trigger a white settler backlash. This had been a major factor behind 
British reticence to work with Kennedy after the Angolan rebellion.  
The United States had expressed concern about these issues as well, but race issues 
had been of secondary or tertiary concern. Yet as Britain continued to lose influence in an 
increasingly independent South Africa and struggled to manage the transfer of power in 
Southern Rhodesia, concerns about regional race politics crept into Luso-American 
discussions. The Ball-Salazar letter exchange of 1963, for example, revealed the oft-
unspoken American belief that both Angola and Mozambique occupied a special, 
transitional location between independent Africa and the minority governments. Ball’s 
concern with defining a new order implied that the United States hoped this would be one 
that would preserve the multi-racial image of Africa championed by Britain and its other 
Western allies, which also had the best odds of preserving Western interests on the 
continent. Ball warned that a return to arms in Angola would “perforce become racial. The 
position of the white man and even the mulatto will become impossible.”367 The nagging 
potential for a “race war” was clearly undesirable from the American point of view, not 
least because it would almost certainly invite some level of Cold War intervention.368 
Therefore, a component of the American search for stability had always involved 
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approaching Portugal in a way that would not lead to the creation of a formal alliance of 
minority regimes in southern Africa.     
Unfortunately for Anglo-American officials, Portugal had already begun to 
strengthen its ties to the minority regimes. Portugal had long been economically linked to 
South Africa and Rhodesia. Its colonies provided rail service to ocean ports, while it 
effectively rented Mozambican labor to work in Rand gold mines and as seasonal 
agriculturalists. Throughout the 1950s, Salazar saw in these relations the potential for more 
durable alliances in the face of rising African nationalism. Therefore, when Portugal began 
distancing itself from Britain and the United States, it logically embraced “the possibility 
and the advantage of concluding with these countries secret military pacts local, mutual 
assistance, and forms of economic co-operation to be regulated by bilateral treaties."369 
According to military historian Luís Barroso, covert informational and military 
cooperation with Pretoria began in the late 1950s but greatly accelerated after the Angolan 
rebellion, with a regional alliance becoming particularly important after FRELIMO 
launched its revolution on the borders of Rhodesia and South Africa.370 Though much of 
this diplomacy was conducted in secret, the British heard enough to worry about the 
ossification of the “white redoubt” in southern Africa to be cautious. In contrast, the United 
States reacted less strongly to hints of the growing ties between Portugal and its reactionary 
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white allies, continuing to deprioritize racial elements of the regional stand-off into the 
Johnson period. 
Southern Rhodesia’s unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) in November of 
1965 challenged these calculations. After months of tense negotiations, the British threat 
to impose direct control on the Rhodesian parliament inspired the state to proactively 
declare independence, using Jefferson’s 1776 document as a model. The British 
government was furious and spent the following months attempting to compel the 
capitulation of the regime under Ian Smith through political and economic isolation. 
Breaking with precedent, the British resorted to UN action, passing a number of 
condemnatory resolutions that culminated in the first ever mandatory trade sanctions 
placed on a country in December 1966. Working closely with the United States, the British 
hoped sanctions might reign in the rogue regime, but fear of confrontation with South 
Africa meant the measures passed by the UN lacked effective coercive power.371 
Enforcement of the economic embargo depended heavily on the cooperation of the 
surrounding states. The Portuguese government controlled the vital oil importing ports of 
Beria and Laurenço Marques, meaning it was a necessary ally in the suffocation of 
Rhodesia. Lisbon, along with the government in Pretoria, had provided the sole negative 
votes and refused to comply with international demands. Unwilling to start a shooting war 
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with either state, Prime Minister Harold Wilson wagered the future of British policy on the 
slight possibility that he could convince Portugal and South Africa to abandon Smith’s 
regime.372 While Portugal gave little indication it had any interest in cooperating, UDI 
effectively reinforced Britain’s willingness to work with Portugal and compelled a 
reevaluation of American priorities in the region. 
 In reality, Portugal – and to a lesser extent South Africa – benefited from 
Rhodesia’s existence, even as it continued to claim a multiracial empire. The international 
furor induced by the UDI distracted some of Portugal’s most vocal critics in Africa, who 
worried more about the expansion of white minority rule than the continuation of an 
anachronistic form of colonialism they presumed to be on its last leg.373 Salazar appreciated 
this fact but also sympathized with the country’s refusal to succumb to black nationalist 
demands, defending the Salisbury regime in such a way that rhetorically tied his 
government to the white settler state as early as 1963.374 Therefore, Portugal had no 
intentions of working with its oldest ally to squeeze Rhodesia. Shortly after the crisis 
began, Salazar agreed with a South African special envoy that: 
It is important that Portugal and South Africa form and present a “united front.” He 
did not properly suggest an alliance. But a firm solidarity by both on the Rhodesian 
question, discouraging those who would take drastic actions against [our] two 
countries. . . . We should be prepared for a conflict with England and the United 
States; not an armed conflict, but an open conflict with these two countries.375 
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But this consolidation of the “united front” behind the scenes did not preclude Portugal 
from justifying its empire on claims to Lusotropicalism. Rather, Portugal continued to 
decry “white racist” government in diplomatic conversations, even as it shored up its 
colonial borders by allying with minority governments.376 The result was a deceitful but 
crafty diplomacy that proved surprisingly effective in prolonging the Estado Novo’s control 
of its colonies.  
Despite Portugal’s two-faced diplomacy, British officials still believed Lisbon 
offered the best opportunity of escaping their dire situation. Taking encouragement from 
Salazar’s continued criticism of white minority rule, Britain began actively courting 
Portugal in hopes it would prove the weak spot of the redoubt. This continued despite 
Portugal’s refusal to commit to any noteworthy actions.  After more than a year of 
discussions, a cabinet continued to identify Portugal as the linchpin of the entire Rhodesian 
embargo. South Africa was determined to resist foreign pressure lest Rhodesia set a 
precedent for foreign intervention in the region, but it also had no interest in diverting 
attention from Salisbury’s politics to its own apartheid.  The British believed that Pretoria 
was trapped in an awkward situation and might be tempted to pursue “a more cautious 
policy and if the supply of oil to Rhodesia through Mozambique were stopped it might not 
be wholly replaced by supplies from South Africa.”377 Britain therefore devoted much 
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energy to negotiating with Portugal despite the lack of real progress, wholly abandoning 
its already muted pressure for colonial reform in hopes of winning Salazar’s cooperation.378 
Alienating Salazar would serve only to strengthen the white redoubt and threaten the 
economic well-being of the recently decolonized states of Malawi and Zambia – two 
landlocked Commonwealth nations dependent on Portuguese rail routes. After the UDI, 
the possibility of a South Africa-Rhodesia-Portugal axis appeared more realistic, and 
preventing its formal declaration became the primary motivation shaping British policy 
toward Lisbon.  
Deeply troubled by events in Rhodesia, American officials nonetheless deferred 
leadership to the British, which had lasting ramifications for how Lyndon Johnson’s 
administration approached Portugal. The president had largely continued Kennedy’s 
policies, but he lacked the personal investment in the Third World that his predecessors 
had brought to the Oval Office. The preservation of stability in central and southern Africa 
was the primary commonality between the two administrations, becoming ever more 
important as the United States became more deeply committed to the conflict in Vietnam 
after 1965. A new Cold War battlefield in Africa would further tax increasingly limited 
American resources, meaning a swift diplomatic conclusion to the Rhodesian crisis was 
desirable from the president’s perspective.379 The intersection of Portuguese colonialism 
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with white minority rule seemed the most likely source of conflagration.380 The State 
Department believed postcolonial nations would judge the United States on its dealings 
with southern Africa generally and the segregationist practices of South Africa and 
Southern Rhodesia in particular. Seeking to assuage continental anger and connect its 
foreign policy to its domestic focus on civil rights, the Johnson administration verbally 
denounced the minority states. Johnson’s 1966 speech on the third anniversary of the OAU 
asserted that the United States “will not support policies abroad which are based on the rule 
of minorities or the discredited notion that men are unequal before the law.” 381  
Nonetheless, officials in Washington did not consider all states equal in southern Africa, 
and the stirring speech mentioned only Rhodesia by name at the expense of a more 
ambitious regional approach.  
Following Britain’s lead, the American government prioritized the resolution of the 
Rhodesian question. The State Department reserved its strongest rhetoric and most 
concrete policies for Smith’s government in Salisbury, identifying Salazar as an asset in 
moderating the situation. In a memo to the president, Rusk set out American strategy 
towards its sometime ally: “Because of the location of the Portuguese territories of Angola 
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and Mozambique . . . we need Portuguese assistance in order to help the British achieve 
success in restoring constitutional rule in Rhodesia.”382 Lisbon’s rule was the final remnant 
of the increasingly discredited practice of direct colonialism. American officials rarely 
doubted its eventual failure. Apartheid and the domination of African peoples by local 
minority governments appeared far more threatening, and the UDI implied its spread 
northward. The United States believed these developments most directly threatened 
stability in the region, and it joined the United Kingdom in placing the former settler states 
at the top of its priority list. Policymakers sidelined the long-term desire for African 
independence in pursuit of a strategic alliance that might solve the more urgent issue.  
The attraction to increasingly strong relations with the Portuguese government in 
the region also grew from a new American acceptance of Portuguese proclamations 
regarding its non-racial aspirations. Many of Portugal’s most influential Washington critics 
had been pushed out of the State Department or reassigned, with Soapy Williams being 
among the last to depart in early 1966.383 Though diplomats remained skeptical of the 
realities behind such sentiments, the Lusotropical ideal stood in stark contrast to apartheid 
and became increasingly reassuring.  State Department reports from the last years of the 
decade continued to acknowledge the economic restrictions placed on black Africans, but 
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they also highlighted the increased Portuguese investment in education and infrastructural 
improvements that had come from Portuguese policies enacted after the Angolan rebellion. 
Additional reforms from the mid-1960s onward gave American officials hope that the 
Estado Novo might eventually achieve a smooth transition even as armed confrontations 
with liberation groups occurred with some frequency in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique. 
In a detailed memorandum to the secretary of state, the new Ambassador to Portugal W. 
Tapley Bennett summarized the opinion: 
in Angola and Mozambique the process of educational, economic, and social 
development has begun; there can be no turning back from the effects of this course. 
Whatever the failure in realizing the full ideal, race relations in Portuguese 
territories probably function more smoothly than in most parts of the world. Therein 
lies the hope that political strains anticipated for the future may be tempered on a 
base of human understanding.384 
 
Bennett advocated for a policy of closer relations, where U.S. friendship would encourage 
new policies that benefited African subjects and dissuaded the colonies from allying too 
closely with South Africa.385As Ambassador Bennett explained to Rusk in a way that 
would have met with Salazar’s approval, “The multiracial ideal as an ideal (rather than as 
an established reality – which it is not) is one on which the Portuguese cannot be faulted. 
‘Multiracialism’ would seem to be a healthy alternative to black racism or apartheid.”386  
This was in many ways a logical progression of the policy enacted under Kennedy in 1962, 
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now reinforced by the contrast between Portuguese colonial policy and apartheid.387 The 
cooperative reform strategy now offered the best opportunity to compel a peaceful transfer 
of power without risking a repeat of the Rhodesia situation in either Angola or 
Mozambique.  
 This drift toward greater cooperation with Portugal was reinforced in 1968 by the 
sudden incapacitation of Antonio Salazar. In September, a pair of intracranial hemorrhages 
incapacitated the septuagenarian dictator. He would linger for nearly two years, but he was 
incapable of ruling. In testament to Salazar’s impressive control of the nation and its 
colonies, the Estado Novo did not collapse as many would have predicted. Instead, control 
of the regime passed relatively smoothly into the hands of Marcello Caetano, who had held 
high office in the 1950s and developed a reputation as a moderate reformer. Though he had 
no desire to dissolve the empire, Caetano softened some of Salazar’s harder edges. He 
renamed the regime the Estado Social, reorganized the PIDE secret police, and allowed 
opposition parties to participate in elections, albeit at a great disadvantage to government 
candidates. He also doubled down on the Lusotripical justification of empire, and invited 
the United States to reopen negotiations on the Azores bases.388 The smooth transition of 
power demonstrated to the United States, Britain, and other world powers the still 
surprising strength of the Estado Novo, while Caetano’s more flexible leadership 
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convinced Portugal’s allies their hope for a gradual decolonization – and improved 
cooperation in terms of Rhodesia – were not misplaced.  
Portugal also benefited from Caetano’s economic reforms. Facing a crisis of 
agricultural and economic production, he opened the economy in a way that promoted 
greater investment from Europe and the United States. This openness extended to the 
colonial economies, simultaneously bringing in new sources of income to help prosecute 
the war while entangling its most critical allies in the long-term fortunes of the African 
territories. Salazar had first shown an interest in developing colonial oil resources in the 
early 1960s, desiring in particular to work with an Anglo-American company, likely as a 
way of influencing official policy.389 But the removal of political barriers quickened under 
Caetano, who even more than Salazar saw this tactic as a way of reassuring allied 
governments of Portugal’s willingness to negotiate. Under Johnson, American officials had 
argued that increased investment was a way of winning Portugal away from the minority 
regimes, anticipating Nixonian strategies and the more famous Reagan era policy toward 
South Africa of constructive engagement.390 By 1970, Portugal profited from Gulf’s 
discovery of oil off the shores of Angola, and it soon looked to European firms to help it 
construct a massive hydroelectric dam in Mozambique.   
 Johnson’s embrace of Portugal finally closed the door on the African nationalist 
hope of having the major Western powers force Portugal out of Africa. Britain had 
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continuously retreated from its 1961 position, and the high point of American relations 
with Lisbon was yet to come. The election of Richard Nixon was the nadir of American 
interest in African independence, marking a break from past policy in the alacrity with 
which it embraced the minority regimes. Most presidents since Eisenhower had expressed 
at least a nominal interest in promoting decolonization. The realist team of Nixon and his 
influential national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, displayed little such concern. 
Indeed, the president was openly sympathetic to Portugal, having enjoyed a visit to the 
country as a private citizen during his wilderness years. Nixon had assured Franco 
Nogueira during this period in 1963 that he believed independence was “not the best thing 
for Africa or the Africans.” Now as president, he brought a similar ideology to the Oval 
Office.391 Outwardly, State Department diplomats continued to speak of self-
determination, but policies aimed to shore up the tenuous alliances with Portugal and the 
other white regimes. Early in 1969, the White House issued a directive ending all contacts 
with nationalists, though the CIA effectively defended Roberto’s regular retainer. Nixon 
also sought to encourage improved high-level dialogue, meeting with both Caetano and 
Nogueira in his first few months in office. Both conversations sought to assure the 
Portuguese that Luso-American relations had turned a page.392 At one White House 
celebration in honor of the 20th Anniversary of NATO, Nixon (probably intoxicated) 
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grasped Nogueira by the shoulders and promised, “I’ll never do to you what Kennedy 
did.”393 
This final policy shift was formalized in National Security Study Memorandum 
(NSSM) 39, which first presented the policy famously dubbed by former Foreign Service 
officer Anthony Lake, the “Tar Baby Option.”394 The memo presented a variety of options, 
but the one embraced by the White House extended the logic that had allowed the Anglo-
American powers to embrace Portugal and South Africa to the entirety of the region. In a 
global context where the United States had to manage myriad regional crises in order to 
focus on its priority of competing with the Soviet Union, Portugal and the neighboring 
white minority regimes represented an invaluable source of stability. Both Lisbon and 
Pretoria had weathered a decade of constant antagonism and seemed unlikely to fall. 
Therefore, the United States needed to begin a “relaxation” of existing policy, “broadening 
the scope of our relations and contacts gradually and to some degree in response to 
tangible—albeit small and gradual—moderation of white policies.” Therefore, Kissinger 
and Nixon embraced the predictability of unpopular stability, theorizing that increased 
corporate and diplomatic ties with the United States might encourage political and 
economic liberalization.395 While the latter factor was no more likely to work for Nixon 
than it had for his predecessors, the value derived from the strategy depended on 
abandoning any level of commitment to self-determination in southern Africa in favor of 
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access to resources and political capital for use in areas of greater importance. Nixon 
summarized his view succinctly in a staff meeting in late 1969: “It is obvious that we have 
to avoid the colonialist label but we must analyze where our national interest lies and not 
worry too much about other peoples’ domestic policies.”396 Domestic policies in this case 
included not only the actions of the white minority regimes, but the continued rule of 
Portugal over its colonies.  
 From 1970 onward, critical observers witnessed a rapid thaw in Luso-American 
relations. Seeking to avoid the label of colonialist, Nixon did not abandon either the 
embargo against Portugal or a similar one in place against South Africa, but he did issue 
an order to allow the export of “non-lethal equipment which has dual civilian and 
military.”397 Kennedy and Johnson had done so on a case-by-case basis, but this opened 
the doors for large items forbidden under previous administrations. An early and 
controversial example was the sale of a pair of Boeing 707s in February, which the 
Portuguese had configured to carry troops and cargo. Made with reinforced undercarriages 
specifically for landing in warzones, the long-distance planes became the workhorse of the 
Portuguese military – almost doubling air transport capacity by flying 299 missions in 1973 
alone.398 With both Nixon and Caetano seeking to improve relations, Portugal finally took 
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its last trump card off the table. In December 1971, the two countries reached an agreement 
on the Azores lease for three years, which provided a $400 million Export-Import line of 
credit to the government for infrastructural improvements, millions more worth of surplus 
agricultural commodities, and a smaller amount of non-offensive defense department 
supplies.399 While most of these funds went to mainland Portugal, they did much to free 
government spending for use in the colonies. 
 A decade after the Angolan revolution had threatened to sever Luso-American 
relations, Portugal had returned to the Western fold. No longer threatening to abandon 
NATO or even the UN, the resilient Lisbon regime benefited greatly from its participation 
in military and economic exchanges with its Euro-American allies. This had been the result 
of the small country’s capable management of events largely outsides its control, 
continuously positioning itself in a way that could help manage Anglo-American anxiety 
in Africa and the wider world. The collapse of the revolution in its most visible colony of 
Angola and the struggles of Western anti-colonials to sell liberation abroad had allowed 
Portugal to reaffirm its position as guarantor of African stability, slowly building foreign 
confidence as Caetano’s Estado Social hid from the world the reality that, outside of 
Angola, its authority was on the wane.  
 
FRELIMO, PAIGC, and the Revolution at the Margins 
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 While Portugal successfully quieted diplomatic criticism of its empire, the country 
increasingly struggled to replicate its Angolan success in the other colonies. After the 
beginning of the armed revolutions in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique in 1963 and 1964, 
respectively, the CONCP parties of PAIGC and FRELIMO slowly gained ground against 
a determined imperial resistance. With greater internal cohesion and safe harbors in the 
stable neighboring states of Guinea and Tanzania, respectively, the two parties used foreign 
weapons, training, and supplies – provided by African and Eastern European states – to 
carve out small spaces of liberated territory. It was in these territories they began building 
their socialist nations. Though PAIGC and FRELIMO faced inner dissent during this 
period, they generally avoided the pitfalls of factionalism that had hamstrung the Angolan 
movements. For much of the mid-1960s, managing the armed struggle demanded party 
attention, but as situations improved then settled into a state of guerrilla war, both parties 
again looked abroad to help break the impasse.  Though Cabral’s PAIGC focused initially 
on the socialist bloc, Mondlane continued to look Westward in an attempt to balance his 
alliance system and navigate the dangers of the Cold War.  
 The gradual revival of Western interest in Lusophone anti-colonialism owed much 
to the military gains achieved by PAIGC and FRELIMO as the disjointed Angolan 
revolution stagnated. The PAIGC campaign had begun in the early 1960s with the 
methodical infiltration of the colony. The development of a discreet political presence 
allowed Cabral to launch a revolution in 1963 that soon claimed territory stretching from 
the Guinean to the Senegalese borders, mostly in rural areas where there had never been a 
strong Portuguese presence. The PAIGC’s army consisted mostly of local peoples armed 
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with Eastern European weapons, led by a handful of officers trained abroad in China, 
Ghana, and North Africa.400 Weapons and newly trained recruits traveled mostly via 
neighboring Guinea, where the leftist nationalist leader Sékou Touré had allowed Amílcar 
Cabral to establish his headquarters in exile. Though dogged at first by internal divisions 
exacerbated by Guinea-Bissau’s ethnic diversity and what Cabral disparaged as a tendency 
toward authoritarian militarism, historian Patrick Chabal estimates that PAIGC liberated 
roughly half of Portugal’s least settled colony by 1966.401  
 Arguably Portugal’s least important colony, the Estado Novo nonetheless identified 
it as a key symbol of empire. Salazar had built his government on the idea of an indivisible 
multi-continental state, so the loss of even this minor colony would weaken Lisbon’s ability 
to hold power in the larger and more valuable colonies of Angola and Mozambique. And 
Cabral understood this reality, seeking not just the liberation of Guinea-Bissau but his 
home islands of Cabo Verde. The small, isolated archipelago offered a more difficult 
prospect for revolution, so Cabral gambled the best bet for achieving independence would 
be to wage a costly struggle in the mainland that would force Portugal to reassess the very 
idea of empire. The likelihood of a decolonization en masse would be strengthened by 
similar victories in the major colonies of Angola and Mozambique. This Pan-African logic 
sometimes struggled to overcome ethnic tensions – especially within the PAIGC where 
some Guineans remained suspicious of assimilated Cabo Verdeans who the Portuguese had 
long used as colonial middlemen – but it provided the foundations for the socialist CONCP 
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alliance. As a result, both the nationalists and Portugal viewed Guinea as a potential 
linchpin within the continental struggle for Lusophone independence. To combat the influx 
of Eastern (and later Soviet) arms, Portugal used its NATO connections to send a large, 
comparatively well-equipped army to fight a protracted guerilla war in the tiny colony. 
American-made boats and planes, French helicopters, and German small arms defended 
Europe’s last empire against a slowly emerging alliance between global East and South.402  
 The liberation of territory allowed Cabral and PAIGC to pursue a second 
revolutionary goal that had been impossible in Angola: the establishment of a rudimentary 
socialist state. Cabral’s theory for a mass revolution involved winning the active 
participation of Guinea-Bissauans through the provision of some basic necessities. 
Rejecting Roberto’s failed assumption that a mass revolution could arise spontaneously, 
Cabral understood that local people “are fighting to win material benefits, to live better . . 
. to guarantee the future of their children.”403 A successful revolution had to deliver on at 
least some of its promises in order to win sufficient numbers of recruits. By 1964, PAIGC 
had begun establishing medical clinics, schools, and cooperative “people’s stores” where 
locals bartered produce for consumer goods. Though the quality of these institutions varied 
and their numbers were surely exaggerated for propaganda purposes, they nonetheless 
offered some of the first public services to Africans in rural regions where Portuguese 
development was largely absent. Mustafah Dada estimates that by 1970, the PAIGC 
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operated over 160 schools, 120 clinics, and four regional hospitals.404 These efforts helped 
legitimize the PAIGC and swell its ranks, but it also demanded the acquisition of medical 
supplies, educational materials, and goods for barter. Cabral, more a diplomat than a 
general, looked abroad to help build these services since so few could be independently 
produced even in free African states. 
 The merging of military and social activities provided an attractive model for 
selling the revolution to the West in particular, justifying donations to PAIGC on 
humanitarian grounds as much as anti-colonial ones. From this perspective, Cabral’s party 
was not only fighting for the freedom of Guinea-Bissau, but providing services to citizens 
that Portugal had promised as part of its civilizing mission but had never actually fulfilled. 
Unfortunately for PAIGC, the small colony demanded little press attention. Crises in 
Rhodesia, the Congo, and Nigeria demanded the majority of international press attention, 
especially in the West and the United States. Given the state of affairs, Cabral could have 
ignored the Euro-American alliance. A number of countries including the Soviet Union, 
Guinea, Cuba, and East Germany donated medical supplies and provided educational 
training, but the expansion of services in the 1960s demanded additional contributions.405 
The Western world represented an important resource, especially in terms of medicine and 
the consumer goods needed for barter in people’s stores.  
 Cabral had courted the West in the early 1960s, but had grown frustrated and spent 
much of the later years building relationships in Eastern Europe. But Eduardo Mondlane’s 
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FRELIMO had never fully abandoned his hope for Euro-American aid, though he too had 
refocused his attention as his party began its own revolution. Beginning a little more than 
a year after Guinea-Bissau, FRELIMO had begun armed operations in Mozambique in 
September of 1964. A simultaneous revolt throughout the country on the PAIGC model 
had failed, defeated by a far more extensive colonial government that arrested many would-
be conspirators soon after the beginning of hostilities. As a result, FRELIMO’s operations 
were limited at first to Niassa and Cabo Delgado, the less densely populated northeastern 
provinces of the y-shaped country closest to the exile base in Tanzania.406 The party faced 
a number of political crises as it struggled to manage the war, but it gradually consolidated 
its control of the two provinces and expanded its campaign to Tete province in the 
northwest. By 1968, FRELIMO claimed that it had liberated twenty percent of the country, 
though such figures were vociferously denounced by the Portuguese state that maintained 
complete control of vital cities located in the southern half of the country.407 
 As in Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique depended heavily on foreign arms to fight 
Portugal, but there were differences in the way these two allies approached their 
international alliances. More suspicious of the Soviet Union, Mondlane did not spend the 
same amount of time courting the world power. Instead, he worked with African and 
independent Eastern European states who had existing relations with FRELIMO’s host, 
Tanzania. Algeria proved incredibly important, training Mozambican revolutionaries and 
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providing the weapons that helped launch the armed struggle.408 Algeria remained 
FRELIMO’s major ally, but the party also received arms or other military support from 
Egypt, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and – in all likelihood – Romania.409 
Yugoslavia also became a surprising stalwart friend, moving beyond military needs to also 
donating scientific instruments for educational purposes, providing technical assistance, 
and sending at least one educator to Tanzania.410 Yet perhaps what set FRELIMO apart 
from PAIGC the most during its period was its utilization of Western aid to help fund social 
programs, now provided primarily through independent agencies with limited government 
contacts such as ACOA and church relief services.  
 Like Cabral, Mondlane understood the provision of social services as vital to the 
revolution, but FRELIMO had better utilized them to appeal to the Western humanitarian 
interests that had rallied to the Angolan cause at the beginning of the decade. Like Cabral, 
Mondlane identified the provision of “schools, health centres, and the promotion of trade, 
internal and external” as the only way to “[prove] to the people that a better life is both 
really possible and worth struggling for.”411 It had been with this idea in mind that he 
founded the Mozambique Institute in 1963 with the assistance of the Ford Foundation. The 
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Tanzania-based organization provided educational and relief services to Mozambican 
refugees before the beginning of the armed struggle, but shifted to become the primary 
coordinator of social programs in the liberated territories. After Portuguese complaints to 
the Johnson administration helped end Ford Foundation aid, assistance from the Swedish 
government and ACOA allowed the institution to expand to meet growing Mozambican 
needs.412 The medical clinics in the liberated territories required medication, which were 
partially filled by donations from ACOA and the NCC’s Church World Services. Indeed, 
ACOA had shifted much of its aid efforts to FRELIMO after its difficulties with Roberto.413 
While far from the only source of medical and educational aid, FRELIMO found Western 
contributions valuable for their high quality – particularly in terms of medicines.414 But the 
Western solidarity movement had struggled to expand much beyond the core that had 
existed in 1961, frustrating nationalist like Mondlane who still prioritized the isolation of 
Portugal.415  
 With Johnson and later Nixon committing to a policy that embraced Portugal, the 
question remained: how could the nationalists and their foreign allies affect policy? Houser 
had identified the Congress as a target in the early 1960s, but this hope had faded as national 
interest in Africa did as well.416 Since that time, the liberation cause had been further 
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weakened by the activities of independent Rhodesia, which shared with Portugal and South 
Africa a belief that lobbying of Western legislators was an efficient way of protecting its 
position. The rogue regime soon became the most vigorous member of what one NCC 
official referred to as a “powerful lobby” to defend the white regimes in the United States 
and Western Europe. Many of the same Republicans and Democrats who had sympathized 
with Portugal came to the defense of the white redoubt, including such notables as Senate 
Minority Leader Everett Dirksen (R-IL), Senate Republic Policy Committee Chairman 
Bourke Hickenlooper (R-IA), and Senate Judiciary Chairman James Eastland (D-MS). The 
long-serving southern democrats who dominated congressional committees were 
particularly hostile, given the shared interest racial conservatives had with the minority 
regimes.417 With Nixon and Kissinger embracing the “Tar Baby Option,” the Congress 
offered arguably the best opportunity for changing U.S. policy, but it would be difficult. 
Even liberal congressmen who chafed at the racialized internationalism of their colleagues 
had little to gain from rejecting NATO solidarity and bucking institutional leadership in 
support of African independence. “Some congressmen will be unable, and others will be 
unwilling to support southern African concerns,” one NCC lobbyist explained succinctly, 
“without some expression of concern from their constituents.”418 
 Herein lay the hope for nationalist foreign policy in the West, specifically that of 
the CONCP parties. While Cold War concerns had triumphed over the interest of 
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decolonization, the anti-communist consensus and the search for stability in the Third 
World that underlay this logic had begun to show cracks. These openings were not in the 
White House, where Nixon and Kissinger had doubled down on a traditional reading of 
foreign policy, but in the streets and even in the Congress. The Vietnam War that had done 
much to distract attention from Lusophone Africa inspired a new generation of young 
people to question the tenets of the Cold War and look at the world through new eyes. And 
at the same time, the civil rights revolution that had broken down barriers for African 
Americans in society and politics was helping to empower new actors, who openly 
sympathized with the liberation struggles. In one such case, Charles Diggs (D-MI), a long-
serving African American congressmen from Detroit gained the chairmanship of the House 
Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa in the same year Nixon entered the White House. 
While his position could not change American policy, the plethora of hearings he held after 
years of committee inactivity helped spread knowledge of the successful liberation 
struggles beyond ACOA or the churches during a period when young people were 
searching for innovative ideas.  
 These changes at the margins of American society and politics caught the attention 
of the CONCP nationalists and their U.S. allies. By 1967, both ACOA and the NCC were 
lobbying on behalf of southern African issues, partly in response to the newly aggressive 
activities of Rhodesia. Houser went so far as to place a full time staffer in ACOA’s new 
Washington office.419 The nationalists supported these efforts, hoping that a blow to 
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Portugal from abroad might help break the stalemates they were experiencing in Guinea 
and Mozambique. Mondlane began returning to the United States in an attempt to 
encourage fundraising and the broadening of solidarity efforts. In 1967, FRELIMO sent 
former Cairo representative Sharfudine Khan to New York, where ACOA helped him 
operate an office as the first Lusophone nationalist permanently stationed in the United 
States. There he not only lobbied the UN, but actively publicized FRELIMO to the country. 
Encouraged by Khan’s success, PAIGC sent its own roving ambassador to the United 
States on occasion – Gil Fernandes, an American educated Guinea-Bissauan who was also 
active in Scandinavia.420 After five years of lessened activity, the CONCP parties had once 
again embraced the potential of a global revolution.  
 But in contrast to earlier elite lobbying strategies, the CONCP hoped to construct a 
grassroots solidarity – a mass movement of people and organizations that could provide 
material aid and perhaps wield enough political power to force change on their democratic 
governments. Changing social conditions in the United States hinted that this might be 
possible, as did similar situations in Europe. The problem was overcoming the reactionary 
Cold War mindset that Portugal and other southern African minority regimes had used to 
buy Western complacence. “The whole problem basically is a lack of information . . .,” 
PAIGC representative Gil Fernandes explained, sounding a great deal like a young 
Mondlane, “I think that, if Americans were informed about what is happening, they would 
very likely come and help us. . . . There is always the possibility of getting some amount 
                                                 
420 Letter, Houser to Mondlane, 14 December 1966, Box 142, ACOA Papers, ARC.  
 187 
of aid from the United States – not the government, of course.”421 Years of frustration had 
taught the CONCP parties of FRELIMO and PAIGC valuable lessons about how best to 
appeal to the Western world. They would have to be united, consistent in their struggle, 
and present their revolutions as agents of social justice. They would have to work with 
groups like ACOA and the NCC to provide information, but they would have to do so in a 
way that resonated with a generation of Americans who questioned the Cold War anti-
communism that justified minority rule. This strategy would win the nationalists allies in 
the Western world that could support their revolutions, and potentially amass the political 
power necessary to change official policy. But it remained to be seen if they could manage 
this transnational solidarity campaign, or if security concerns would again overwhelm their 
appeals, which were based on the still unrefined international norms of self-determination 
and global equality.  
 
Conclusion  
 At the end of the 1960s, the Cold War had triumphed over decolonization in 
southern Africa. The momentum that had seemed almost unstoppable in 1961 had ground 
to a halt at the edges of Portugal’s two largest colonies. This reality was clear by 1963, but 
the subsequent independence of Rhodesia confirmed it for many around the world. The 
West – and the United States in particular – was willing to sacrifice African self-
determination for a modicum of stability, even as the slow embrace of sitting colonial and 
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minority governments inspired a turn to arms by frustrated nationalists. Britain accepted 
this status quo in the Portuguese colonies and South Africa in an unsuccessful attempt to 
manage its regional transfer of power, but calculations were different for the United States. 
Washington, from Kennedy to Nixon, demanded crisis to devote serious attention to the 
continent.  
While it is true that Kennedy invested the greatest weight to courting free African 
states and pushed Portugal harder than did any other president, the reality is that he was 
very much responding to a singular moment in 1961. The collapse of an already divided 
Angolan revolution amid ethnic and ideological squabbling and the lack of any sustained 
domestic political pressure removed the impetus for American action. Thus, Kennedy 
began to repair Lusophone relations in a pragmatic step that would establish a new 
direction in policy that would be taken up and encouraged by his successors. This strategy 
at its base involved active cooperation with an unpopular regime in Africa that had 
nonetheless proved itself resilient, hoping that private pressure and inducements might 
encourage gradual reform toward a more durable modus vivendi in southern Africa. 
Johnson reaffirmed the American desire to work with Portugal when Rhodesia provided a 
different moment of crisis, while Nixon achieved new levels of cynicism and hypocrisy 
when he used the same basic logic to strengthen ties with all of the southern African 
regimes. The Estado Novo had used a diplomacy of stubborn conviction, opportunism, and 
deceit - or to critics, “backwardness, tenacity, and pure accident” – to weather the wind of 
change in a way its European compatriots had not. Portugal could truly claim the mantle 
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of last empire.422 There was less clarity on whether this state of affairs could last, and for 
how long.    
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Chapter 3: “A War against the Whole NATO Machinery” 
The Development of a European Solidarity Movement 
 
By 1969, the major western powers retreated into NATO solidarity to validate their 
continuing acquiescence to Portuguese imperialism. Official victory for Lisbon did not 
however mean that transnational solidarity had been defeated. Even as ACOA seemed to 
be fighting a rearguard action in the United States and British activity all but disappeared, 
the liberation movements witnessed greater success on the margins of the European 
continent. Here, imperialism and great power politics did not play as large a role in the 
day-to-day operations of their governments. The revolutionaries achieved their first real 
breakthrough in Sweden, whose non-aligned foreign policy allowed it to avoid the East-
West conflict in favor of addressing North-South divisions. Yet this was the exception; 
more common were cases where governments lined up behind Portugal as part of the North 
Atlantic alliance. In these states, pressure from the bottom up was necessary to compel 
governments to adjust their policies. Solidarity initially grew – as it did in the United States 
– in the form of highly motivated and organized minorities, but in Europe it progressively 
expanded to become matters of truly national concern in a number of countries – notably 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.  
The growth of this movement owed much to the radicalization of the generation of 
1968. Popular disillusion with the Vietnam War, ideological conformity, and the spiritual 
emptiness of the contrasting models of the Cold War bred widespread popular protests, 
 191 
particularly in the western world.423 As Quinn Slobodian has shown in the case of 
Germany, the specific style and content of this grassroots movement owed much to the 
influence of citizens of the global South operating in Europe.424 This mass rejection of the 
extant international system and its accepted modes of conduct opened up broad spaces for 
the articulation of new identities. While much scholarship has rightfully focused on the 
domestic programs of these movements, youth activists also sought to revise unequal 
imperial relationships that had dominated the North-South exchanges for centuries. 
Activists at the time, as do historians today, understood this anti-imperialism in terms of 
the war in Vietnam, but it also drew on African revolutions to help it define its goals. As 
left-leaning socialists, the CONCP parties had a natural affinity with this new generation 
of radicalized youth.  
For their part, the nationalists recognized the promise of the revitalized European 
left, and they worked to link the transnational struggles. FRELIMO led the way, using the 
effective personal diplomacy of Eduardo and Janet Mondlane, as well as the positive social 
aspects of their ideological programs, to create an effective transnational network of 
European activists who championed solidarity in increasingly successful ways. Given the 
centrality of these individuals, Mondlane’s assassination in 1969 threatened to sever ties, 
but the opposite became true. The setback actually inspired FRELIMO to renew its 
international efforts, committing to the creation of a stronger international coalition. 
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Already active in Europe in a way they had not been in the United States, Cabral and 
PAIGC soon followed suit, concentrating their diplomatic efforts especially strongly on 
the continent in the 1970s. Consistent contact as well as an annual meeting of support 
groups from across Europe helped guide individual national campaigns and reinforce leftist 
identification with the CONCP parties.  
Importantly, the CONCP parties were not focused solely on the attraction of this 
radicalized leftist youth movement. Rather, they desired a broader solidarity network that 
incorporated an array of ideological and racial constituencies behind their cause. This, they 
believed, was the most likely way to achieve a critical mass of supporters that would be 
able to influence official policy, place pressure on Portugal, and, perhaps, directly support 
their liberation campaigns. The efforts helped build bridges – or in some cases reinforce 
existing connections – between the radical left and the more moderate elements of countries 
like the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. In so doing, solidarity movements 
convinced a number of nations who, outside of Sweden, had been firm members of the 
Cold War alliance, into backing leftist liberation movements in Africa. This broadened 
coalition achieved a level of political saturation that not even anti-Vietnam protests had 
fully achieved, while extending the critique of unrestrained Cold War alliance politics 
beyond Southeast Asia. The CONCP parties’ strategy in Europe occurred simultaneously 
in other areas of the world, but the early signs of success in Sweden, the Netherlands, and 
even the United Kingdom confirmed the Portuguese African model of broad solidarity 
building. Victory in the margins of Europe began the process of deconstructing the Cold 
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War consensus in Africa, opening the doors for similar developments in the United 
Kingdom, Canada, and the United States.  
 
The First Success: The Evolution of Official Solidarity in Sweden 
The socialist parties of the CONCP had long had an interest in courting Europe. 
With ties to leftist parties in Britain and France, PAIGC and the MPLA targeted these 
countries in the early 1960s as potential allies that could help compel Portugal to accept 
the necessity of decolonization. The nationalists, however, had not anticipated the extent 
to which Gaullist dreams of an African empire and British concerns with managing its own 
transfers of power would lead Europe’s major powers to embrace the dictatorial Estado 
Novo. While there were strains in the North Atlantic alliance, for the most part the system 
continued to provide Portugal with the weapons and supplies it needed to maintain its trio 
of wars. Arms unavailable due to the Anglo-American export limitations were provided by 
France and Germany.425 With the great powers of Europe choosing Portugal, the most 
likely source of assistance was likely to come at the margins of NATO, where concern with 
communism was less prolific and direct political interests in Africa were minor.  
Given these realities, it made sense to the nationalists that they found their first 
warm reception in the chilly climes of Scandinavia. Sweden in particular offered the perfect 
confluence of political factors in which anti-colonial solidarity could grow. Sweden had 
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founded its postwar foreign policy on a platform of non-alignment, which meant the 
country was not a member of NATO. There was little doubt Sweden was part of the West, 
aligning itself in most matters with Scandinavian partners like Norway and Denmark that 
were parts of the European alliance, but it retained an independent streak, especially as it 
applied to matters of the Cold War.426 Beginning in the 1950s, Sweden had begun pursuing 
an internationalist policy that emphasized building relationships with the global South 
through the expansion of aid programs. Despite having little official interests in Africa, 
Sweden nonetheless had important popular connections to the central and southern parts of 
the continent in the form of religious missionaries. For while Sweden never possessed a 
colony or a noteworthy African expatriate community, the writer Anders Ehnmark has 
noted “There has always been . . . a cousin Agnes working for the mission in Congo.”427 
Therefore, African issues demanded attention in a way they did not in other countries, 
providing an avenue for liberation leaders to cultivate Western allies.  
As would be the case in other countries, though, Lusophone parties were not present 
at the genesis of the solidarity movement. Rather, the issue of South African apartheid 
provided an early impetus for grassroots organizing. After the Afrikaner government 
established apartheid in 1948, international concern about the policy had grown steadily. 
By the late 1950s, a small but vocal movement had appeared in Sweden protesting the 
policy, centered on students who had visited the region or interacted with South African 
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exiles attending university in Scandinavia. Even before the Sharpeville Massacre of March 
1960, civil society organizations had begun fundraising to aid black South Africans, though 
the revelation of official brutality inspired a popular boycott against goods imported from 
the country.428 A few politically active South Africans studying in Sweden, notably Billy 
Modise, joined with some progressive students to form the Swedish South Africa 
Committee to help organize such activities.429 From this youth core grew a popular 
movement, which brought into its fold newspaper publishers, churches, and even Swedish 
politicians. The African National Congress, banned from South Africa in 1960, welcomed 
these developments and began sending representatives to Sweden, notably its exiled leader 
Oliver Tambo.430 During this period the newspaper Expressen also devoted much space to 
the Angolan rebellion and conducted a relief campaign, but participation was limited.431 It 
was popular opposition to apartheid that ran wide and, in some places, deep. Unfortunately, 
the banning of the African National Congress (ANC) and the imprisonment of much of its 
leadership greatly weakened the South African anti-apartheid movement. As had happened 
for Angola elsewhere, a lack of news led to a declension in activism. By the middle of the 
1960s, the solidarity movement had faded, though a widespread concern with inequality in 
Southern Africa remained.  
Anti-apartheid organizing had expanded popular interest in Africa and the plight of 
black citizens, and it coincided with an equally propitious set of events that would provide 
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an opening for the CONCP. For during this same period, Swedish foreign policy began a 
gradual transformation from active non-alignment to a more assertive internationalist 
foreign policy. Leading this charge was the creation of the Swedish International 
Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) in 1965. Whereas the Foreign Service had a 
somewhat conservative character that defined non-alignment as non-involvement, SIDA 
recruited from a younger generation that had come of age during the period of popular 
boycotts and protests. The organization therefore had few qualms about supporting 
nationalist programs.432 That same year, a young politician named Olof Palme first became 
a prominent force in guiding Sweden’s foreign policy. An early and vocal critic of the 
expanding Vietnam conflict and the larger Cold War, Palme pushed from his position 
within the ruling Social Democratic cabinet for a foreign policy that could make Sweden a 
“third force in international politics.”433 Drawing on his party’s long history of 
transnational labor solidarity, he argued for a similar connection with the global South and 
the search for economic and political freedom:  
the efforts to achieve liberation set their stamp on the world today . . . What we are 
hearing are the same demands for liberty and equality for the great mass of the 
population as kindled the hopes . . . of the emerging workers’ movements in the 
countries of Europe. The only difference is that the present demands are at least 
partly directed at us.434  
 
SIDA was a first step in aiding these movements, but as Palme rose through the ranks – 
eventually becoming prime minister in 1969 – he pushed his country to adopt ever greater 
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engagement with the problems of the Third World. Together, these developments would 
open the door for cooperation with the nationalists.  
 This new foreign policy direction coincided with the expansion of the revolutions 
into Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, making the CONCP parties natural allies for a 
country with a long history of socialist solidarity. The services programs established by 
FRELIMO and PAIGC in the liberated territories and their exile bases were attractive 
candidates for Swedish aid. While the government shared the liberal American concern 
about directly supporting armed revolutions, it had few qualms about aiding the nation-
building aspects of revolution. As it would in other Western countries, FRELIMO 
pioneered contacts, sending Janet Mondlane to tour the country and speak with influential 
national unions. In 1965, SIDA made its first donation to a liberation party, directly 
contributing to the Mozambique Institute during the same period that the Ford Foundation 
withdrew its funding.435 Already impressed by the organizing the newspaper Expressen 
had done during the Angolan rebellion, Cabral made overtures to Sweden after 
FRELIMO’s success. Though slower to receive aide than FRELIMO, politician Pierre 
Schori remembers Cabral as a “master of diplomacy” who “understood the importance of 
making personal links.”436 He built a friendship with Palme, paving the way for additional 
aide as relationships with the CONCP parties matured.  
 The two parties became the primary beneficiaries of Swedish aid, receiving 
increasing amounts of assistance as the years progressed. Both FRELIMO and later the 
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PAIGC sent representatives to Sweden on multiple occasions, with a handful taking up 
extended residence with support from the government.437 As trust between Swedish 
officials and the liberation leaders grew, so too did the financial donations to the social 
programs of the parties. The Mozambique Institute was the major recipient in the early 
years, but PAIGC was the first of the southern African parties to receive direct support. 
But they desired more than just material aid, requesting political help in isolating Portugal. 
Though this had presented a problem in the American context, Sweden more readily 
aligned itself with the nationalists due in part to its lack of membership in NATO. With no 
standing in the alliance, Swedish politicians instead criticized Portugal’s membership in 
the European Free Trade Association, through which Portugal sold almost a third of its 
total exports. As early as 1967, Sweden raised objections to Portugal’s membership in the 
organization, since it used the revenues acquired from its expanding continental business 
dealings to finance its war machine.438 Sweden would return to the issue repeatedly over 
the years, constantly threatening Portugal with exclusion from the important body. Both 
Mondlane and Amílcar Cabral applauded these efforts, especially after Norway joined its 
neighbor in lambasting Portugal, this time in NATO council meetings.439 
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 The two liberation parties also encouraged the government to provide aid to the 
MPLA. The Angolan socialist party was a member of the CONCP, but other nationalist 
groups were also active in Sweden – particularly UNITA. Unable to launch an armed 
struggle from it base in Zambia, the FNLA separatists who formed the party with Jonas 
Savimbi took a proactive approach to international diplomacy. In Sweden, they acquired 
influential political friends in the ruling Social Democratic party, with Savimbi visiting the 
country in 1967.440 Yet they were unable to claim aid from the government. Both PAIGC 
and FRELIMO representatives urged their Swedish allies to embrace the MPLA. As 
UNITA member Jorge Valentim recalled, “[The CONCP] acted as a group. They 
represented each other, and that had some influence.”441 The result was an acceptance of 
the socialist Angolan party as part of a larger Lusophone movement, linking all three 
together in a singular conception of Portuguese African social revolutions. That the MPLA 
had liberated nothing meant little when associated with the successful revolutions of its 
fellow CONCP members. As SIDA official Soren Lindh remembered, friendship with one 
CONCP party naturally produced good relations with others; it was therefore very easy to 
be a “Lusophonist” within the government.442  
 The official interest in the Lusophone liberation movements grew in unison with 
the revival of popular activism. During the mid-1960s, Sweden was not immune from the 
growth of political protests against the restrictive democratic capitalist system of the Cold 
                                                 
440 Sellström, 406-407.  
441 Jorge Valentim, interview with Tor Sellström, in Swedish voices, 35.  
442 Soren Lindh, skype interview with author, 18 December 2013.   
 200 
War. For while Sweden was not part of NATO and proved a vocal critic of the Vietnam 
War, it remained deeply integrated into Western social and economic systems.443 Swedish 
youth who identified with the 1968 generation therefore channeled their opposition to the 
Vietnam War to demand a greater emphasis on national morality, which the government 
attempted to subdue with its public criticism of the United States. Nonetheless, youth 
adopted an aggressive anti-imperialism that owed much to Third World critiques of 
traditions of Northern hegemony of which Swedish corporations and society were still a 
part. This manifested itself most vociferously in terms of opposition to the Vietnam War, 
but it also included a southern African component. When a Davis Cup tennis match was 
scheduled between Swedish and Rhodesian players, a number of young activists associated 
with the South Africa Group in the university town of Lund organized a mass protest of 
more than 700 people, which included religious organizations and unions.444 Though 
relatively small, it nonetheless refocused Swedish attention to the problem of colonialism 
and minority rule in southern Africa. Yet because Rhodesia lacked an active revolutionary 
movement, popular attention quickly shifted to the cause of the Portuguese colonies.445  
Given the economic integration of Sweden into the much maligned Western 
system, activists specifically aimed their ire at corporations active in southern Africa. The 
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most successful campaign revolved around Swedish participation in the construction of the 
Cahora Bassa Dam. The Lisbon regime had long dreamed of building a dam across the 
Zambezi River in order to modernize the country, but in the late 1960s the plan morphed 
into one of imperial survival. Plans for the dam now involved a major settlement scheme 
around the hydroelectric plant. The influx of Portuguese, it was hoped, would help pacify 
the Tete province where FRELIMO had gained the military advantage. At the same time, 
Portugal would sell its excess electricity to neighboring Rhodesia and South Africa, 
providing much needed funds to fight its wars.446 Unable to pursue the goal alone, Lisbon 
looked to its allies to provide the loans and expertise needed to complete the massive 
project. The ZAMCO consortium that coordinated these multinationals contained British, 
French, American, German, and Swedish companies. The economic equivalent of NATO, 
the transnational cooperative drew the ire of solidarity movements across the world and 
became the first major target of the Swedish activist movement. 
Among the companies was the Swedish hydroelectric engineering firm ASEA. 
FRELIMO had already pointed its allies in the country toward the company as early as 
1967, so when the news of the firm’s ZAMCO bid went public, a handful of groups 
interested in South Africa launched a national campaign. They found willing collaborators 
among newspapers and youth organizations who chafed at the Swedish governments’ 
seemingly two-faced policy of criticizing the southern African regimes while allowing the 
participation of major companies in imperial development plans. A number of 
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parliamentarians devoted their time to the cause, while leaflet campaigns helped organize 
workers within ASEA factories.  Sit-ins, teach-ins, and local debates culminated in a large 
demonstration that featured the local FRELIMO representative in Sweden, Miguel 
Marupa.447 Though never violent, the movement demanded attention through highly public 
and occasionally militant actions, which commanded the attention of local media and 
helped expand membership.448 Faced with strong domestic pressure, ASEA eventually 
pulled out of the ZAMCO syndicate.449 The news vindicated the solidarity efforts. 
FRELIMO praised the campaign in its English language publication as “an event of the 
utmost significance, for it demonstrates the influence and effectiveness of organized public 
opinion.” Such popular organizing, the author continued, “can be as effective a contribution 
to our liberation struggle as material assistance . . . [because Portugal] can wage war against 
our country only because of the support she receives from her capitalist allies.”450 
According to Dick Urban Vestbro, it was the combination of the Cahora Bassa campaign 
and the Rhodesian tennis match that revived attention to southern Africa.451 For while 
Vietnam dominated headlines and activist attention, members of the Portuguese African 
solidarity movement felt it important to remind the country that inequality existed outside 
Southeast Asia and that Sweden was complicit. As one Swedish activist group that backed 
the MPLA explained, it was important that “Swedish public opinion is given several 
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examples of the different forms of imperialism,” including those in which their own 
country played a role.452  
It was in part the growth of this popular movement along with existing sympathies 
within aid agencies that encouraged the government to expand its relations with the 
liberation movements. Beginning in 1969 after the Cahora Bassa campaign, the 
government provided the first financial assistance directly to a liberation party, with the 
understanding this would be acceptable to the public. Agencies such as SIDA had 
heretofore given assistance primarily to independent service organizations like the 
Mozambique Institute, but the government decision went further in legitimizing the parties 
and treating them as legitimate components of the international system. Official aid grew 
rapidly, so that by 1972 grants to PAIGC social programs amount to $900,000.453 These 
contributions not only funded major programs in education and medicine, but helped offset 
the costs of goods that were then exchanged for agricultural products in the people’s 
stores.454 By the time Portugal finally collapsed in 1975, Sweden had provided 
humanitarian assistance worth roughly $10.3 million to PAIGC and $4.4 million directly 
to FRELIMO.455 While Sweden, and its Nordic allies, had never been able to truly isolate 
Portugal either in the European Free Trade area or in regional politics more generally, Olof 
Palme’s government had met the expectations of the Lusophone movements. Sweden had 
remained separate from the East-West conflict, and engaged seriously in an active foreign 
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policy that sought to redress North-South inequalities. The question would be whether 
countries that were integral parts of NATO could adopt the same approach to international 
affairs.   
 
Dutch Solidarity Work: The Angola Comité and the Birth of a Movement 
 After their success swaying Sweden, the nationalists hoped the Netherlands would 
follow. If Sweden proved the exception by providing official assistance early, then the 
Netherlands provides an alternative example whereby official support grew from popular 
agitation. The small country has appeared sparingly in histories of radical internationalism 
produced outside of its own borders, but the rise of a new, more probing left rattled the 
firm NATO member and launched a major reassessment of its role in North-South 
relations. At the time, radicals hoped the Netherlands could become what politician Bas de 
Gay Fortman called a “guiding country” (gidsland), moving the Western alliance toward a 
more egalitarian relationship with the global south.456 There has been debate as to what 
extent this desire came true, but in terms of Portuguese African solidarity, the Netherlands 
did help set the standard for wider organizing.457 The Angola Comité (AC) and its longtime 
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head, Sietse Bosgra, became arguably the most formidable node in the network of anti-
colonial western activists assembled by the CONCP countries. It would eventually become 
a center of information on the Portuguese struggles, as well as one of the innovators of 
popular organizing methods. In a country that had strong ties to the Afrikaners and 
hesitated to criticize their policy of apartheid, the activities of the AC and the success of 
the Portuguese movements helped focus popular attention onto southern Africa.   
 This solidarity was neither natural nor easily constructed. The Dutch had a long, 
uneasy history with southern Africa. It had been the Netherlands that founded the first 
European colony in South Africa, whose descendants would become the Afrikaans 
architects of apartheid. Linguistic and cultural ties continued to inform relations between 
the two states. As international criticism grew in places like Sweden and the United States, 
the majority of the Dutch population actively avoided the topic, preferring to strike an 
ambiguous pose that neither supported nor abandoned their colonial kin. This proved 
especially true as the Netherlands debated its future as an imperial power in Asia. The 
willful ignorance of events in Africa extended to neighboring colonies, as the government 
had little to gain from newly independent black governments but much to lose from 
weakening its economic and social ties to Pretoria. As a result, the Dutch government and 
more importantly the public was slow to take notice of events in the region during the 
tumultuous 1960s until a single organization led by the small cadre of committed leftists 
forced the nation to recognize the struggles.  
As in the United States, Angola became a rallying cry for foreigners concerned 
about southern Africa, particularly leftists already concerned with issues of European 
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empire. AC founders Sietse Bosgra and Bertus Dijk had been involved in anti-colonial 
causes for some years. Bosgra had rebelled against his father’s support for the Dutch 
Empire in Indonesia in the late 1940s, and he had become involved in campaigns against 
the French war in Vietnam while a student and later in solidarity with Algeria. These 
various interests had combined into a broad front known as the Third World Group, which 
had constituent committees on Cuba, Algeria, South Africa, and a handful of other 
causes.458 As fighting against the French began to near its end, the Angolan rebellion 
offered a new opportunity to adopt the cause of an ongoing revolution. The decision to 
launch the Angola Comité was a continuation of a larger struggle, not one of East vs. West 
but rather against the lingering problem of global inequality. Later addition Aart ter Stege 
completed the trio that would undertake the majority of the organizing in the early years.459  
Though historians have tended to privilege the histories of Anti-Apartheid groups 
due to their later prominence, the original Dutch manifestation, the Comité Zuid-Afrika 
(CZA), simply did not motivate much action either before or after Angola. Bosgra and a 
few other early members of the AC had participated in CZA activities, but they had grown 
distrustful of the relatively conservative leadership running the constant part of the more 
radical Third World Group. He explained to South African activist Ruth First, “I’m not so 
happy with these people, not very active, very formal, not to [sic] progressive.”460 The 
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problem was that Dutch society had extremely ambivalent relations with South Africa. The 
Afrikaner people had developed from the original Dutch settlers, and they continued to 
draw emigrants from the motherland in the twentieth century.461 Most Dutch were critical 
of their own empire by this point and overwhelmingly against racialism, but cultural and 
familiar bonds colored the way the country related to South Africa.462 Jan Van Pronk, later 
minister for development cooperation, remembered later: “South Africa in Holland always 
had been an important issue, though racism was not.”463 To those on the left, the Dutch 
response to both South Africa after Sharpeville and Angola a year later illustrated more 
than just indifference. National complacency illustrated a disturbing ability to overlook the 
inhumanity practiced by both Portugal and South Africa toward its black subjects. Bosgra 
shared this opinion at the time, noting “there are not to [sic] many people openly pro-
Apartheid, but a lot are secretly. They can understand the difficulties of Whites in S.A.”464 
This covert affinity for the Afrikaners meant that the CZA hesitated to even endorse a 
consumer boycott, feeling that it could harm the population of the apartheid state and the 
committee’s future in the Netherlands. These historical, cultural, and linguistic ties 
enhanced the unease that existed in Britain and the United States about how to deal with 
the question of the settled Afrikaners. Angola and its case of clearly defined settler 
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colonialism presented a simpler gateway into southern African activism. The AC 
recognized this fact, and it used the cause to break with the CZA permanently.465 The 
apparent moral simplicity of the anti-Portuguese solidarity cause could make it especially 
attractive in the Netherlands, as it provided an area for action that initially skirted the 
question of opposing the Afrikaner community.  
Given the general unease with which the nation viewed the situation in southern 
Africa, it was not surprising that the news of the Angola rebellion only momentarily 
grasped the public consciousness in 1961. Many of the country’s daily papers initially ran 
headlines on the violent revolution, but as the war dragged on, press attention wandered to 
other more pressing topics that did not include the continent.466 Seeing a cause worth 
defending, the AC took action to keep Angola in the public eye. The committee initially 
adopted some of the same tactics being used in the United Kingdom during this period, 
most notably a petition (see chapter 1). Already at this point a few young activists 
understood Portuguese imperialism as not just an African problem, but one that directly 
undermined the supposed western commitment to freedom. Taking specific aim at the 
NATO alliance that now harbored two empires in the form of Portugal and France, Bosgra 
and Dijk worked with the Actie Informatie Algerije (Action Information Algeria) to 
circulate letters among prominent leftists. They demanded the government support self-
determination in Angola and Algeria in the United Nations, voting against its close allies 
and effectively undermining the unity of NATO. It distributed posters across the country, 
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trying to maintain public interest in the topic of African decolonization.467  In contrast to 
the broader religiously inspired efforts in the United Kingdom, this first action assembled 
a mere 7,000 signatures despite occurring over a much longer period of time.468 Such 
numbers proved disappointing, but from the beginning the AC provided a subtle critique 
of the Cold War order from a new perspective: that of redefining North-South relations.  
In 1961, the opinions of 7,000 leftists stood little chance of swaying the Dutch 
government, one of the most loyal NATO members on the continent. A strong sense of 
anti-communism had invested large segments of Dutch society since before World War II, 
so the Dutch Labour Party (Partij van de Arbeid or PvdA) led coalition naturally aligned 
itself with the Atlantic alliance. The Netherlands was not a completely unquestioning ally, 
especially in regards to the sometimes impetuous United States, but a “deeply felt sense of 
mutual interest” tied the government firmly to the NATO alliance.469 Foreign Minister 
Joseph Luns was currently invested in his own battle to defend the Dutch empire in 
Indonesia and directly sympathized with Lisbon’s goals. The conservative Catholic “still 
had difficulties adjusting to a world in which former colonized territories played a more 
important role than age-old European countries” according to historian Marc Frey, and he 
invested Hague diplomacy with an imperial conservatism for the entirety of his nearly two 
decades in power.470 While the general population may not have cared as deeply about its 
                                                 
467 Twintig Jaar Angola Comité, 6.  
468 Letter, A. Dijk to Secretary of the Union of Angolan Populations (UPA), 29 April 1962, Folder 32, 
KZA Papers, IISH. 
469 Paul Koedijk, “The Netherlands, the United States, and Anticommunism during the Early Cold War,” in 
Hans Krabbendam, et. al. Eds, Four Centuries of Dutch-American Relations, 1609-2009 (Albany: SUNY 
Press, 2009), 603.  
470 Marc Frey, “Decolonization and Dutch-American Relations,” in in Hans Krabbendam, et. al., 616.  
 210 
empire as their foreign minister, NATO ties and an ambiguous relationship with 
colonialism led most people to feel little concerning the Portuguese situation. Whatever 
interest there was in Angola faded rapidly as the Portuguese pacification effort succeeded. 
In 1962, Bosgra lamented “In Holland, people show little interest in Angola and the 
newspapers publish very little news about it.”471  
The AC became the only consistent font of information on the Portuguese colonies 
and the continent more generally. The group distributed posters across the country trying 
to maintain public interest in the topic of African decolonization.472 It also produced two 
pamphlets on Angola in the year after the revolutions began.473 Since there were almost no 
Dutch books available on the problem of Portuguese colonialism, it looked abroad to 
sustain its education campaigns. It developed relationships with a number of the liberation 
groups, as well as the primary solidarity organizations in the United States and Britain. It 
sold foreign language material and even translated activist-produced literature from 
English and French, most notably the British “Unholy Alliance” released by the AAM, 
MCF, and Council for Freedom in Portugal and the Colonies.474  In 1962, it launched the 
Dutch bimonthly Angola Bulletin, providing constant updates on not just the struggle in 
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Angola but news on all of the Portuguese colonies.475 These efforts were complimented by 
the distribution of leaflets and posters that hoped to raise awareness of the solidarity cause, 
especially among the nation’s youth.  
Though relatively modest, this early effort demonstrated the AC’s ongoing interest 
in tying the cause of Portuguese Africa to the topical events of the day that were motivating 
leftist activism in particular. By targeting NATO, Bosgra and his allies attracted a number 
of youthful constituencies, including the segment of the population that was starting to 
demonstrate an interest in the American war in Vietnam. By 1963, this youthful generation 
participated in the AC’s most visible public display to date, when hundreds of activists 
rushed onto the pitch of the Amsterdam Olympic Stadium during a NATO celebration that 
included a Portuguese military band. Soon after the committee would lead the occupation 
of the Portuguese consulate in Amsterdam in protest of Salazar’s fortieth year in power. 
All of these activities were accompanied by calls for financial support, which eventually 
funded the publication of more than 30,000 books for MPLA schools.476 Unlike in Britain, 
the AC found success by focusing its activities solely on the matter of Portuguese anti-
colonialism. The natural affinities between the Lusophone struggles and other causes like 
those in Algeria and the one developing in Vietnam meant that cooperation was natural. 
They created public actions by diluting the central message and built relationships by 
appealing to common goals of Third World development. 
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 Another reason for the success of Dutch activism emerged from the genuine 
solidarity with the nationalists. Sietse Bosgra and the leadership of the organization 
consistently sought to tie their activities to the needs and ideologies of the parties operating 
on the frontlines of imperialism. After founding the committee, the Dutch activists quickly 
sent letters to the major Angolan parties requesting guidance on support work.477 They 
eventually committed themselves to working with the communist MPLA due to the natural 
sympathies that existed between the leftist groups.478 In 1962 and 1963, the committee 
arranged for MPLA representatives to speak in the Netherlands, launching a series of 
personal appearances by liberation leaders that helped expand popular interest in the 
revolutionary cause, especially in the capital of Amsterdam.479  
In the quest to consult with the MPLA, the AC opened lines of communication to 
the other anti-Portuguese nationalist movements. In late 1961, committee members began 
a correspondence with the CONCP as its other member parties were preparing to launch 
their own revolutions.480 The PAIGC began operations in 1963, while FRELIMO (formed 
in 1962) would launch its own armed struggle in Mozambique the next year. These other 
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fronts proved even more successful than had the rebellion in Angola, and Bosgra and the 
AC adapted their work to represent the entirety of the CONCP alliance. Eventually, the 
internal coherence of the PAIGC and FRLEIMO, as well as their commitment to building 
international ties, allowed them to eclipse the MPLA as the primary allies of the AC.481 
These connections were cemented when FRELIMO President Eduardo Mondlane and his 
American wife Janet visited the Netherlands in September of 1964, followed just seven 
months later by PAIGC head Amilcar Cabral.482 The pair of visits would launch the 
beginning of the AC’s activity as the organization representing all of socialist Portuguese 
Africa in the Netherlands.  
 The relationship with FRELIMO proved especially important. Under Eduardo 
Mondlane, the party remained the most committed of the CONCP parties to developing an 
influential solidarity in the Western states. Within a few years of Mondlane’s first visit, the 
AC would devote the majority of its energy to aiding the Mozambican party through Dutch 
action.483 The party’s socialist ideology melded well with the Dutch activists’ politics, as 
did its commitment to multiracialism. FRELIMO stood out in particular to its commitment 
to this latter issue. While many African nationalist parties made claims to inclusion and 
often were sincere, FRELIMO had actually acquired a number of white members.484 But 
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perhaps most importantly, Mondlane’s party articulated its revolution as one against a 
reactionary Cold War mindset, which particularly appealed to the radical Dutch activists. 
As Mondlane explained in 1965, the CONCP welcomed the support of “peace-loving 
peoples of Europe and the Americas,” but noted that if the West continued to side passively 
with Portugal “Then our war against Portugal in Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea is a 
war against the whole NATO machinery.”485 What the nationalists were asking their allies 
to do was not simply provide aid, but rather to challenge the very foundations of the 
Western alliance.  
In pursuit of this goal of weakening the North Atlantic alliance and isolating 
Portugal, FRELIMO consulted regularly with Bosgra, requesting that the committee 
undertake certain actions in Holland. The most important of these requests involved the 
search for official government support. By the late 1960s, FRELIMO and the PAIGC had 
built an effective movement in Sweden that convinced the government to provide non-
military material aid to the liberation movements. FRELIMO hoped that the Netherlands 
would be the second western country to offer such support. Yet in order to achieve this 
goal, the party understood that a wide swath of the Dutch public would have to support the 
movement, since foreign policy remained committed to maintaining the NATO alliance. 
Trinike Weijdema, Bosgra’s wife and one of the most active members of the AC, recalled, 
“[Marcelino Dos Santos and Janet Mondlane] came to us . . . she thought that the Dutch 
government could be the second [After Sweden to offer official support]. If we wanted 
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that, we’d have to move more to the center . . . so we changed.”486 Taking the request to 
heart, the committed leftist core of the AC began to shift its focus away from radical action 
toward crafting the broad front that could sustain a mass movement in support of the cause 
of self-determination. Only such an inclusive movement could hope to place sufficient 
democratic pressure on elected officials to achieve a meaningful adjustment to government 
policy. 
Much of the AC’s work focused on gathering and publicizing information about 
western involvement in Portugal’s colonial wars. The committee hoped that confronting 
their own complicity would force the Dutch public to urge political action within the 
NATO alliance.  Yet because NATO was an international body, they did not limit their 
work to Dutch borders. They sought to implicate all of the governments of the North 
Atlantic. In one case, Sietse Bosgra worked with a number of groups including the 
American Committee on Africa to produce a pamphlet critically examining accusations of 
ongoing support to Portugal. Not content with hearsay or rumor, Bosgra spent months 
researching in libraries across Europe, including a few military repositories where he 
worked under the watchful gaze of soldiers hovering over his shoulder.487 The result was 
the pamphlet, NATO and the West. In Dutch, English, and French, it described with copious 
statistics the way that Portugal used western support to sustain its military campaigns on 
three distinct fronts. Beyond the familiar assertion that Portugal used NATO arms illicitly, 
the book revealed that European loans allowed Lisbon to devote over half its state spending 
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to the colonial wars without inciting domestic rebellion.488 For the first time, solidarity 
activists had a tool for concretely binding their domestic governments to the colonial wars. 
The popularity of the pamphlet was immense, and it produced at least three English editions 
updated in 1970 and 1971. The AC even produced a Portuguese language version for 
distribution within the dictatorship itself. The pamphlet contributed to the demystification 
of defense and foreign policy that had traditionally been the realm of a narrow political 
elite, feeding into a popular desire to democratize both domestic and international policies 
in Western Europe.489  
The criticism of NATO had a dual effect. In addition to shining light on the 
cooperation that helped sustain the Portuguese war machine, it also endeared the AC to the 
large portion of the country that was growing increasingly tired of the Cold War and the 
rigid anti-communism of the Western alliance. A sense of independence, absent earlier in 
the decade, had developed as East-West tensions decreased and the United States became 
increasingly bogged down in the unpopular Vietnam War. The formation of the Nieuw 
Links (New Left) within the Labour Party (PvdA) provided for the creation of a vocal 
opposition to the heretofore accepted Cold War ideology. Anti-Americanism grew at a 
rapid rate in the late 1960s, focusing on NATO as the institution linking the Netherlands 
to an unjust war. This involved not only resistance to Vietnam but also the inclusion of 
undemocratic, imperial Portugal. PvdA politicians actively demanded the ouster of 
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Portugal, threatening a Dutch exit if the fascist state remained.490  In the midst of more 
general protests against the stilted power relations of Dutch society, protests against NATO 
were not just statement of foreign policy but acted, according to historian Rimko Van Der 
Maar, as “a means of putting pressure on the establishment.”491 The links between the two 
causes were further cemented by the inflow of both American and Portuguese deserters, 
who found refuge with leftist groups like the AC.492 The Portuguese colonies were certainly 
less central than Vietnam to popular protest, but they offered additional proof of the 
corruption of the NATO system. By linking the wars together through the centerpiece of 
the alliance, the AC refocused some of the energy of the revolutionary left onto the 
struggles in Portuguese Africa.  
Ironically, the committee’s efforts were assisted by the government itself. The 
Conservative, anti-communist Minister of Foreign Affairs Joseph Luns refused to even 
broach the topic of using NATO to confront unpopular allied policies. Luns had held 
tenaciously to the last Dutch colony in Indonesia despite internal demands for 
decolonization, and he viewed the Portuguese situation in a similar light. As protesters 
demanded the Dutch government address the issues of the NATO wars in the institution’s 
council, the minister dug in his heels. On Vietnam, he defied the Parliament when it urged 
a censure of the American invasion of Cambodia in 1970, while his response to Portugal 
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was even more favorable.493 Luns, a ceremonial knight of the Portuguese “Order of Christ,” 
stood before the Dutch assembly that same year and said that it would “not do to let a 
NATO partner down like that,” before praising Salazar’s leadership and lauding the 
Portuguese civilizing mission in Africa.494 The foreign minister’s bold support for both 
imperial Portugal and the United States horrified the youth left, reinforcing the links 
between the two causes. “He was on the wrong side,” Bosgra noted later, “but in a way he 
helped us very much.”495 Luns’ vocal refusal to abandon Portugal helped raise the profile 
of the African revolutions to the level of the U.S. war in Vietnam, since both were tied very 
closely to the question of continued Dutch participation in the NATO alliance. As the 
Vietnam War began to slow in the early 1970s, the secondary matter of Portugal came to 
the fore. The AC had failed to change government policy under Luns, but in this denial it 
gained a new level of notoriety that would carry it into a new era of activism devoted to 
the Portuguese colonies.    
The AC parlayed their newfound status into one of the single most successful 
solidarity campaigns in the history of Europe. The committee had always tried to tie its 
informational duties to action, but they had often struggled to find the right cause that 
would mobilize the full population advocated by FRELIMO. NATO was certainly a hot 
topic, but targeting it appealed primarily to leftists. Moderates still considered it a 
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worthwhile institution. The AC needed an object universal enough that most of the 
Netherlands could take action, but clear enough in its moral choice that few would 
challenge the legitimacy of action against it. The ultimate solution was brilliant, because it 
proved to be an essential element of Dutch society that drew on long associations with 
colonialism. It was coffee. Bosgra remembered: “When Indonesia became independent, 
[coffee importers] went to Angola. The Netherlands imported more coffee than all the other 
European countries outside of Portugal . . . Coffee is a very good subject to campaign on. 
. . you drink at the church meeting and after it, coffee. In the schools, coffee.”496 Coffee 
was ever present in Dutch lives, and it also was one of Angola’s single largest exports. 
Given the use of such profits to fund the wars and the exploitative labor conditions within 
Portuguese Africa, the opportunistic import of Angolan coffee had the potential to outrage 
not just the political left but also the humanitarian moderates who had yet to become fully 
involved in the cause.  
Beginning in February of 1972, the Coffee Campaign urged consumers to boycott 
coffee roasters and grocery stores that sold stocks from Angolan farms. The purpose of the 
action was twofold: it aimed to remove the Portuguese profits used to sustain the wars 
while also shifting Dutch business to independent coffee growers like Tanzania that 
supported the liberation movements.497 As the second largest importer of Angolan coffee 
in the world (after the United States), the loss of Dutch profits would be a noticeable blow 
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to the Portuguese balance of payments. The AC published a number of small pamphlets 
and leaflets, which they distributed in front of stores and in commuting stations. Bearing 
graphic images, including one of a severed black head lying on a bed of drying coffee 
beans, they shocked the public. Local groups, labor unions, and political parties all helped 
expand the boycott, while newspapers devoted attention as well.498 One contemporary poll 
found that 85 percent of the country knew about the problem of Angolan coffee, and many 
supported it.499 Within a matter of a few weeks, public consternation had reached the level 
that most roasters agreed to end their imports from Angola. In April, the committee proudly 
proclaimed that 98 percent of Holland’s traditional imports from Angola would no longer 
be entering the country by the beginning of 1973.500 At the same time, coffee trade with 
independent states on the continent had more than trebled in direct correlation to the drop 
in sales from Angola.501 
The Coffee Boycott also proved a boon to the wider activities of the AC. The 
circulation of the Angola Bulletin nearly doubled to 15,000, as did the orders of books and 
pamphlets. At the height of the campaign, the small AC was sending out more than 400 
leaflets, posters, and books a week. The outflow of information also produced more feet 
on the street, as the number of local groups associated with the AC tripled to roughly 30 
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scattered across the country.502 The expansion of the boycott activities also promoted the 
growth of material assistance. As Weijdema explained “Every campaign was based on 
political action here and support to the liberation movements.”503 The Coffee Campaign 
was no different. As new organizations contacted the AC asking what they could do, 
recommendations included not just picketing but material aid collection as well. The 
committee tapped into this newly expanded network for the 1972 fall fundraising 
campaign, which collected more than 70,000 blankets for the liberation groups. Profits 
from the same drive came to $60,000, buying two heavy trucks for the MPLA.504 In the 
span of barely a year, the AC had effectively expanded beyond a leftist group into a broad 
front that was able to mobilize mass power in support of the liberation struggles.  
 The new power of the AC became evident when the national supermarket chain 
Albert Heijn (popularly abbreviated AH) threatened the initial success of the Coffee 
Boycott by reneging on its promise not to sell Angolan product in 1973. Even as the grocery 
giant prepared to restock in August, Sietse Bosgra and his committee had drafted a 
response. Dockworkers unloading the coffee marked Angola had alerted the committee to 
the arrival of the product, familiar with their efforts in the spring. Before the coffee even 
appeared on shelves, papers were already going to print with the AC press release and more 
than 800 organizations received letters announcing the news.505 Though concerned about 
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the poor publicity, AH continued with its sale of “Indonesian” coffee (which contained 
30% from Angola) under the myopic slogan “A free choice for free people.” The company 
hoped this appeal to the Dutch sense of independence would boost sales, but it simply fed 
the reignited movement. Negative press and radio reactions followed. The AC produced 
its own scorching response, which linked anti-colonial solidarity with a leftist critique of 
the moral bankruptcy of the unrestrained capitalist system. “Albert Heijn does not advertise 
here for the freedom of the consumer, but for the freedom of the producer,” the AC wrote, 
“Albert Heijn wants to have the freedom to choose for the bondage of others if he can 
increase his profit that way. What Albert Heijn wants to sell here is bondage and forced 
labour in Angola.”506 Labor unions and politicians joined the committee in condemning the 
sales, while local political parties, women’s groups, and citizens groups all boycotted the 
stores. By the 12th of October, the cost to sales and the distraction of constant picketing led 
the management of AH to again abandon the import of Angola coffee after only six 
weeks.507 Twice the AC had marshalled the full force of the country against economic 
immorality, achieving for the first time a total victory for a boycott aimed at a minority 
regime in southern Africa.  
 The Coffee Campaign represented the pinnacle of the AC’s national organizing. It 
demonstrated not only the potential of mass action, but the barbarity of colonial and 
minority rule in southern Africa and European complicity in it. The reverberations of this 
victory echoed beyond the Dutch border, inspiring similar actions among other solidarity 
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efforts. In Eastern Europe, Poland became the first communist state to pledge an end to 
imports of Angolan coffee.508 In mid-1973 in Canada, the Southern Africa Information 
Group launched by far the broadest movement outside of Holland, taking aim at 
corporations including Maxwell House, Taster’s Choice, and Nescafe that accounted for 
roughly 6.4% of Angola’s exports.509  In October alone, activists covered more than 80% 
of Ottowa’s major supermarkets with protesters, while a coalition of organizations 
“blitzed” Quebec Province with 50,000 leaflets and 20,000 informational pamphlets.510 
The activists achieved a two/thirds decrease in imports in less than a year.511 The AC 
boycott became a model for emulation, attesting to the development of a truly transnational 
solidarity network around the Portuguese cause.  
The AC also pioneered new ways to provide information to the nationalists, which 
they used to advance the revolutions. In the 1970s, the growing discontent with NATO and 
its wars in the developing world turned Holland into a refuge for soldiers avoiding service 
in Vietnam and the Portuguese colonies. The AC was especially active in working with 
Portuguese deserters, and it built an extensive network of contacts with sympathetic left-
leaning soldiers who had remained in the military. AC member Paul Stahl became the 
intermediary between this hidden oppositional element within the Portuguese state, feeding 
it information on the African nationalist views of the ongoing wars and acting as currier 
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for the publication of secret government documents that publicly admitted in the 1970s 
how poorly the war was going in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique.512 The AC’s activities 
revealing the success of the revolutions helped legitimize FRELIMO and the PAIGC and 
reinforce the commitment of African allies in particular to support the liberation 
struggles.513 
Most importantly, the mobilization of mass opinion did succeed in changing Dutch 
government policy. Beginning in 1970, the AC had succeeded in convincing a majority of 
the Dutch Parliament to fund the Portuguese liberation movements over the objections of 
minister Luns. This attitude had emerged gradually over the prior years, after CONCP 
parties had personally met with Dutch parliamentarians and convinced them to publicly 
criticize Portugal and NATO.514 The aid amounted to a few hundred thousand guilders per 
year, split between the three CONCP liberation organizations. The AC gained permission 
to hold the funds and purchase items at the request of the liberation groups.515 The 
organizing around the coffee campaigns helped fuel popular interest in the revolutions and 
expanded the movement to isolate Portugal within NATO, leading to a new level of 
political pressure on the government.516 In 1973, a new left-leaning coalition government 
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came into power, placing the Labour politician Jan Pronk in the position of minister of 
development cooperation. Pronk dramatically expanded the program, putting the 
equivalent of 6 million Euros into the 1975 budget for aid to the liberation groups (most 
going to the newly independent leaders of Mozambique, Angola and Guinea Bissau).517 
The government also helped sponsor the AC program to select cooperantes, Dutch citizens 
who volunteered to work for the newly independent countries of southern Africa for short 
periods of time after independence. By the time freedom arrived in 1975, the AC had built 
the broad solidarity movement that FRELIMO and before it the CONCP had envisioned.  
 
One Success Follows Another: The Re-Emergence of Solidarity in the United 
Kingdom 
 As FRELIMO and the PAIGC gained ground in their military struggles, Western 
solidarity groups outside of the Netherlands began to take notice. The Vietnam War 
radicalized many young people, opening a space within Cold War societies where 
solidarity with the predominantly leftists African nationalists could find some support. In 
the United States, the American Committee on Africa chose to concentrate its efforts on 
the Portuguese colonies. In Sweden, a handful of activists broke with the predominant spirit 
working against the war in Southeast Asia to back the Lusophone groups in Africa. British 
society may have lagged behind, but it also took note of the growing success of the 
Lusophone liberation leaders. As it did in the Netherlands, support developed around 
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FRELIMO, branching out to embrace the other movements. Though the solidarity efforts 
in the United Kingdom would never rival the success of the AC, it too developed a broad 
following and greatly expanded interest in the socialist agendas of the Portuguese African 
liberation parties. Due to Britain’s preoccupation with South Africa, these two movements 
would work closely together, and increased attention to the colonies provided a boost to 
the flagging activity around South Africa.  
Both the Anti-Apartheid Movement and the Movement for Colonial Freedom 
rediscovered Portuguese Africa in the late 1960s. As the only revolutions actively 
undertaking an armed revolt, FRELIMO, the PAIGC, and the MPLA demanded attention. 
When Jamaican Rhodes Scholar Trevor Munro invited Eduardo Mondlane to visit Oxford, 
the MCF and AAM organized a number of public appearances for the liberation leader in 
London. The FRELIMO president attended a press conference at the House of Commons, 
gave interviews to a number of national newspapers, spoke to a handful of international 
organizations, and addressed the students at Oxford.518 He even gave an interview for the 
Portuguese broadcast of the BBC.519 Finding a predominantly positive response to their 
leader, FRELIMO raved that the visit “proved the British people . . . is in solidarity with 
the struggle for the liberation of oppressed peoples.” Noting that this popular sentiment 
likely swayed the London government to ignore Portuguese demands that Mondlane not 
be admitted, the party claimed that “the British people therefore can force [Prime Minister 
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Harold] Wilson to change his position towards the colonial policy of Portugal.”520 The 
Mozambican leader may have been encouraged by his reaction, but he was also distressed 
during his visit to learn just how little these same audiences truly understood about his 
struggle. Not a single organization worked in support of the Lusophone states, nor did 
much information penetrate the largely indifferent mass media. “Appalled” at the state of 
affairs in the United Kingdom, Mondlane and his party sought to develop a domestic 
organization that could replicate the role played by the AC in Holland.521 
  To accomplish the task, FRELIMO tapped two of its own.  A year before 
Mondlane’s visit, a pair of British nationals had become inspired by the socialist, 
multiracial party and begun work in Tanzania with the FRELIMO government in exile. 
Polly Gaster and Margaret Dickinson had been traveling across the continent when they 
met Eduardo Mondlane in a Cairo bar. Inspired by the charismatic man and attracted to the 
idea of spending time in the exciting milieu of revolutionary Dar Es Salaam, the two 
progressive young women offered their services to FRELIMO. A budding filmmaker, 
Dickinson joined the Department of Information with the goal of creating a record of 
FRELIMO’s activities in the liberated territories and began working with Mondlane on the 
book Struggle for Mozambique. Gaster quickly became an indispensable addition to the 
main office, helping draft letters in support of FRELIMO’s international relations and 
                                                 
520 “FRELIMO President in UK,” Mozambique Revolution, 33 (March 1968). Emphasis in original.  
521 Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola, and Guine, “Report: April 1968-1970,”no date, Box 
80, American Committee on Africa Papers, Amistad Research Center, Tulane University (New Orleans, 
LA). The CFMAG noted that Mondlane was “appalled by the lack of knowledge that he found.” 
 228 
assisting Janet Mondlane in the administration of the Mozambique Institute.522 It had 
partially been through their efforts that Mondlane had first made contacts with the AAM 
and MCF before his visit to the United Kingdom. When Tanzania forced the pair out after 
a failed coup temporarily ignited the anti-western paranoia of Julius Nyerere’s government, 
they seemed the logical choice to head the new organization in London given their close 
connections to the Mondlanes and dedication to FRELIMO.523  
 The Committee for Freedom in Mozambique launched operations in 1968 with 
Polly Gaster as its primary organizer. The committee drew on some of the more avant-
garde elements within the anti-colonial movement that advocated for direct support to the 
liberation movements and an expansion of interests beyond the traditional confines of 
British domains. Judd came to feel that “the watershed in southern Africa was going to be 
the Portuguese territories.”524 Judd joined with Gaster, the widely published expert on 
African liberation Basil Davidson, and the young Lord Anthony Gifford, a protégé of 
Fenner Brockway and the chair of MCF’s 1968 event with Mondlane.525 While either the 
MCF or the AAM would have been likely champions for Mozambique, their focus on the 
British colonies and decisions to articulate campaigns against colonialism did not quite 
                                                 
522 Nadja Manghezi, O Meu Coração Está nas Mãos de um Negro, 2nd. Edition (Maputo: Centro de 
Esutdos Africanos, 2001), 271-272. Also, Gaster interview and Margaret Dickinson, Skype interview with 
author, 2 October 2013.   
523 Gaster Interview.  
524 According to Judd, it had actually been Frank Ferrari of the American African Institute that first 
convinced him of this position. Lord Frank Judd, Interview with Christabel Gurney, 29 November 2000, 
reproduced on the Anti-Apartheid Movement Archives Committee Forward to Freedom Project, online: 
http://www.aamarchives.org/ 
525 Dickinson at this point remained in Kenya working with Mondlane on the book, but she would rejoin 
Gaster and the newly formed CFM upon her return to the UK in May 1968. Other early supporters included 
Liberal Hilary Wainwright, Labour MP Frank Judd, and Lord Kilbracken, the latter of which mainly 
occupied a prominent place on the letterhead.  
 229 
capture the transnational goals of FRELIMO. Rather, Mondlane desired an organization 
that could pledge, as Gifford remembered, “solidarity with the nationalist movement.”526 
The main difference was the emphasis laid by the activists on their support for the 
revolutionary aspects of the solidarity struggle:  
We had a difference in approach in that we were directly in support of FRELIMO, 
rather than against anti-colonialism. The Anti-Apartheid Movement tells you what 
it is against, but it’s not very clear what it is for. . . We supported FRELIMO without 
reservations . . . We believed not only in their goals, but we believed in their 
methods –their means, which was, although they were a military movement . . . to 
educate, and uplift, and eventually liberate their people.527  
 
This committed core of activists devoted their energies to publicizing FRELIMO, often 
promoting a slightly more radical agenda than the AAM that felt obliged to cater to the 
mainstream public. This focus on the rightness of the active armed struggle appealed to the 
’68 generation that had grown disillusioned with the preference for non-violence still 
dominant in the British Anti-Apartheid movement. Angola and Mozambique were more 
understandable for students who had come to support the struggles in Vietnam and Cuba.528 
Membership ranged from center socialist MP Judd to a handful of communists.529 The 
positive socialist nature of this work as well as its relation to an armed military movement 
helped bridge the gap between southern African and popular organizing around Vietnam 
in a way that the AAM had not yet managed.  
                                                 
526 Gifford, 62-64. Quoted, 63. Mondlane introduced Gifford to Gaster at the MCF event, while both had 
existing contacts with Basil Davidson.  
527 Tony Gifford, phone interview with author, 1 August 2013 (Jamaica).   
528 Peter Brayshaw, Interview with Christabel Gurney, December 2013, reproduced on the Anti-Apartheid 
Movement Archives Committee Forward to Freedom Project. 
529 Judd Interview, AAM.  
 230 
This did not mean that the Committee for Freedom in Mozambique rejected the 
established anti-colonial groups; rather it considered itself an important compliment to the 
activities of these broader based movements. It remained small without a rigidly enforced 
structure as a way of maintaining flexibility and accomplishing its goals with a minimum 
of bureaucratic waste. Margaret Dickinson remembered, “It wasn’t a membership 
organization. It was a kind of ‘anyone who wants to put in a bit of work can come and work 
with us.’”530  In order to build the mass political base in Britain that FRELIMO desired, it 
worked closely with the AAM. The committee would tap into the national network of local 
South African committees to find support for its programs and help distribute its literature, 
welcoming anyone who was willing to give their time to the liberation parties. In this way, 
the committee literally worked fist-in-glove with the larger AAM, using its established 
manpower to create a new movement that included a more diverse political and racial 
array.531 As the committee began distributing its pamphlets on FRELIMO and traveling 
around the country, the other CONCP parties requested that the committee also work on 
their behalf, since the three considered their struggles to attain socialist African states as 
indivisible. With the quick approval of FRELIMO, the group broadened its activities to 
include the other embattled colonies, changing its name to include them as the Committee 
for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola, and Guine (CFMAG).532 By 1969, the CFMAG had 
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become the most vocal proponent for the Portuguese colonies in the United Kingdom. 
Given the lull in South African activism during this so-called “difficult decade,” the 
Lusophone liberation cause swiftly ascended to be among the most important popular 
issues of the early 1970s.  
 Much like the AC in the Netherlands, the committee adopted as its primary mission 
the publicizing of the ideologies and activities of the three Lusophone parties. The first 
publication set a tone for future campaigns when Mozambique – County at War appeared 
in early 1969. In the introduction, Eduardo Mondlane depicted in sometimes grisly detail 
the Portuguese war in his country and British complicity in providing financial and military 
support. Yet more important was his overview of Mozambican efforts to build a society in 
the liberated territories. Indeed, in his final message to the British people, he urged them 
to force political action against Portugal not for the negative purpose of destroying 
colonialism, but for the more positive and universal campaign to overcome racialism and 
economic inequality.533 Sadly, the CFMAG’s commitment to this cause would be tested by 
Mondlane’s tragic death in 1969.  
 Mondlane’s assassination emerged from deep divides within FRELIMO that 
extended back into the years before the union of the various parties in 1962. Power 
struggles for leadership of the party, as well as disagreements over the requirement of 
educated youths to fight on the frontlines led to criticisms of the sitting president, notably 
attacking his marriage to a white American. Though Raimundo Pachinuapa, the military 
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commander of Cabo Delgado, maintains that the majority of the people and all of the 
military backed Mondlane, the situation in Tanzania became toxic.534 With possible 
encouragement from antagonistic southern African security forces, the internal conflict 
culminated in February of 1969 when a bomb hidden in a book killed Mondlane. The party 
filled the void left by the assassination with a triumvirate leadership that include Marcelino 
dos Santos, military commander Samora Machel, and longtime vice-president, Uriah 
Simango. This situation lasted only a few months, as tensions continued until Simango was 
expelled from the party’s central committee, taking with him a number of other high 
officials who would eventually form a small, competing nationalist party. The Simango 
defections included representatives in Egypt and Sweden, effectively broadcasting to the 
world the depth of the schism.535 Though FRELIMO quickly righted itself, it faced an 
uphill battle convincing the world that it remained able to persecute the war.  
As a result, nationalist diplomacy accelerated again after 1969. According to 
Samora Machel, this infighting effectively “paralyzed” the party’s leadership between 
1967 and 1969, providing Portugal with an opportunity to claim a partial victory in 
Mozambique.536  Moreover, Lisbon had effectively used the rise of conservative 
governments in the United States and Britain to gain new financial and military support.537 
These developments threatened the gains of the liberation movements in all of the colonies, 
particularly Mozambique and Angola. The CONCP solution: “the internationalization of 
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colonialist aggression must be opposed with internationalized anti-colonial and anti-
imperial action.”538 Winning Portugal’s allies to its cause would strike a double blow in 
this battle, weakening Lisbon while strengthening the nationalists.  Moreover, the growth 
of interest in the revolutions in Sweden and the Netherlands proved to the CONCP parties 
that they could find a positive reception among a wide swath of Europeans. Therefore, the 
liberation movements agreed that changing events had made “the mobilisation of public 
opinion in the West . . . a task of the first importance.”539  
The events surrounding FRELIMO provided the CFMAG with more reasons to 
expand its informational campaign, which produced impressive results in a short time. In 
addition to its publications, which included the magazine Guerillheiro, CFMAG members 
became regular staples on the university and union speaking circuits. Especially popular 
were the handful of films that committee members accompanied around the country, 
including a Yugoslavian movie about FRELIMO and the British-produced documentary 
on the military struggle in Guinea-Bissau.540 Miffed by the focus on armed conflict, 
CFMAG member Margaret Dickinson journeyed to Mozambique to make her own film, 
privileging the social reconstruction occurring in the liberated territories. Her film, Behind 
the Lines, became one of the CFMAG’s most important contributions to spreading 
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knowledge about the revolutions, though the film proved too controversial to be shown on 
BBC.541 The committee also hosted half a dozen visits by FRELIMO party members, as 
well as one each from the PAIGC and MPLA within the first two years of its existence.542 
The committee did not seek to establish local affiliates but rather to encourage existing 
organizations to establish their own solidarity programs. By 1971, student groups, 
community organizations, and unions in nearly a dozen cities had begun working for the 
cause of African liberation. In 1970, the Labour Party even passed a resolution at its annual 
conference favoring moral and material support for the liberation movements. The 
CFMAG remained skeptical of the extent to which the nice words would translate to 
concrete action, but it noted with satisfaction that the resolution “makes a useful 
weapon.”543 
The success of the revolutions and CFMAG information campaigns in Britain 
provided an opportunity for the expansion of British solidarity into something larger, which 
might recapture some of the grassroots participation of 1961. This earlier coalition had 
included the AAM, which CFMAG had worked with closely since it founding. Impressed 
by the success of Portuguese solidarity network and having little news to work with in 
South Africa, the older organization gradually shifted its emphasis away from South Africa 
toward a much broader approach to the region. By 1970, the movement had come to realize 
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that “battles fought in any one of the Southern African territories will be battles for the 
future of the whole region.” Portuguese Africa had become the center of the active struggle, 
and thus one of the primary objects of British activism.544 But in order for these parties to 
grow this coalition and build a true grassroots movement, they needed a cause that 
resonated in Britain. And the problem of Cahora Bassa that had so affected the Swedish 
offered the perfect solution, because within the transnational conglomerate assisting in the 
construction of the dam were a handful of British firms. Sietse Bosgra had first revealed 
this fact in an exposé on the project published in the Angolan bulletin.545 But it would be 
more than mere information that would be shared, because the British Cahora Bassa 
campaign would be the first to benefit from the formalization of the emerging transnational 
solidarity network.  
This took the form of a meeting Italian activists organized on behalf of the 
Portuguese colonies in Rome. The conference had emerged from FRELIMO’s concern 
with its international standing and a wider CONCP anxiety about Portugal’s sudden 
attempts to ingratiate itself in the Western alliance under Marcello Caetano. With a special 
reference to large-scale economic projects like the Cahora Bassa dam, the parties feared 
the “open-door policy in the colonies. . . corresponds to a more accentuated international 
type of aggression” that might threaten the progress they had made in the West. The 
conference was designed to reaffirm the commitment of European solidarity groups and 
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create structures for the exchange of information and tactics.546 At its heart, though, the 
conference also hoped to reinforce Western identification with the global South through 
the affirmation of what FRELIMO called a singular “internationalist identity.” The Rome 
gathering would show “in practice that there is identity of interests among the masses of 
all continents, thus contributing to the consolidation of friendship and solidarity among the 
peoples of the Portuguese colonies and the peoples of the world.”547 
 While the conference would be pivotal in formalizing a Western network, this first 
meeting was a truly global event. More than 250 delegates representing 177 solidarity 
organizations from 64 countries attended the event. More than just a gathering of activists, 
unions, religious groups, youth and women’s movements, student organizations, and 
political parties were all represented. Among the participants were members of the AC, the 
CFMAG, the AAM, various Swedish solidarity groups, and a handful of radical American 
groups just beginning to cohere (see next chapter). They were joined by representatives of 
African, Asian, and Eastern European countries, as well as the senior leaders of the three 
CONCP liberation parties. The gathering was the culmination of the inclusive 
internationalist movement the parties had been building for half a decade, providing 
evidence, according to FRELIMO, than the anti-imperial “interests which link the peoples 
fighting for independence, the Western peoples opposing capitalist oppression and the 
peoples of the socialist countries, are already understood by everybody.” As a result, 
individual sessions focused less on specifics of ideology than on practical matters, 
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specifically how to organize a “mass popular action” in the West that could prevent 
Portugal from implementing new military strategies to combat the revolutions.548 
Individual sessions provided activist and their allies with an opportunity to meet each other, 
exchange ideas, and plan future projects. It was here that groups like the CFMAG and the 
AAM learned how they could replicate successful grassroots organizing around Cahora 
Bassa, which they launched with similar success to its Swedish predecessor in the United 
Kingdom. After, its conclusion the AAM marveled the conference was “the first of its kind, 
[and] marked a significant advance in international recognition of the liberation movements 
and increased support for the struggle of their peoples.”549 Annual Easter Conferences 
reuniting the Western solidarity movements would continue until 1974, providing a forum 
for regular exchanges of information and campaign ideas.  
Encouraged by this international show of solidarity, CFMAG and AAM launched 
their own campaign against Cahora Bassa around the time of the Rome Conference. With 
the assistance of a handful of other progressive groups, they took aim at the ZAMCO 
consortium as part of the inspirationally named Dambusters Mobilising Committee.550 
According to longtime MCF chair Fenner Brockway, the dam represented the “climax” of 
both Portuguese Africa’s integration into the regional bloc of southern Africa and the 
regime’s attempts to buoy its wars through the entanglement of its Western allies.551 As 
                                                 
548 “The Rome Conference,” Mozambique Revolution 44 (September 1970), 13. 
549 AntiApartheid Movement, “Annual Report September’69/August ’70,” (London: AAM, 1970), 33.  
550 The name of the committee played on the famous “Dambusters” raid of 1943, attesting to the important 
role played by solidarity groups in packaging solidarity action in a way that directly appealed to local 
contexts.  
551 Brockway, The Colonial Revolution, 391.  
 238 
such, the campaign made sense as both solidarity with Portuguese Africa and with the anti-
apartheid cause. These facts have led many like Roger Fieldhouse to attribute the genesis 
of the work to the AAM, but clearly this is at best an oversimplification.552 Polly Gaster 
confirms that the AAM came to the CFMAG with the idea of a protest program, but the 
organization and its ANC allies drew directly from FRELIMO and the inspiration of the 
Swedish, Dutch, and German movements that had already taken action by the fall of 1969. 
Moreover, though the CFMAG received almost no mention in the literature on Anti-
Apartheid organizing, Polly Gaster and Lord Gifford were important components 
providing knowledge of the Mozambican revolution and introducing the matter into 
political debates.553 It was this coalition that decided to focus their activism on Barclay’s 
Bank, which was providing loans to ZAMCO.  
 Cahora Bassa inspired a two year war on Barclay’s. The Dambusters urged a 
boycott of the bank, pushing members to close their accounts and discouraging students 
from opening new ones. Pamphlets, posters, speaking engagements, and teach-ins pushed 
the message that supporters of repressive southern African regimes “are in every town and 
high street.”554 As with coffee before it, banking with Barclay’s implied the use of blood 
money. The Mobilising committee also explored novel methods of publicizing their 
activities, hosting a “Cabora Bassa game” that encouraged public participation in the 
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problem in order to raise awareness.555 Very quickly, public sympathy started to build. In 
midst of campaign, CFMAG hosted Amílcar Cabral, who made appearances in Manchester 
and London. In stark contrast to Mondlane’s appearance three years earlier, thousands 
attended Cabral’s speeches.556 Cabral proved especially popular with Britain’s black, 
primarily Caribbean community, who came in masses to hear him speak. Urged by the 
Guinean leader to look beyond their race to the cause of solidarity, he and other liberation 
representatives who visited Britain during these years urged that African peoples cooperate 
with progressive groups like the CFMAG and the AAM.557 As a result, black participation 
in the campaign grew tremendously in the early 1970s, adding yet another element to the 
broad front targeting Barclay’s.558 Cognizant of the growing hostility to the dam, the British 
government prepared statements with the expectation that its foreign officials would be 
questioned in Parliament. British companies were involved in the ZAMCO consortium to 
back the dam, but it elided the more problematic role of Barclay’s in offering to finance 
the project.559 
 After two years of protest, the bank finally withdrew from the ZAMCO consortium 
in 1972. Like ASEA before it, the company protested that other factors forced it to revisit 
its investment plans. Activists claimed victory nonetheless. Whatever the exact truth, the 
                                                 
555 CFMAG, “Report of Activities, 1970-1971,” Paper submitted to Easter Conference 1971, Folder 1, 
CFMAG Papers.  
556 Tony Gifford Interview.  
557 Polly Gaster Interview.  
558 Tony Gifford noted that it was especially strong for the End the Alliance Campaign of 1973.  
559 Speaking notes [for defensive purposes only], “Southern Africa,” no date, Folder: UK Policy for Export 
of Ammunitions to Portuguese Africa, FCO 45/513, United Kingdom National Archives, (Kew, United 
Kingdom).  
 240 
Dambusters campaign was a milestone in organizing around the cause of southern Africa. 
As the AAM noted in its annual review for 1971, the campaign “exposed the role of western 
economic involvement . . . in Southern Africa in a highly specific way” and “brought those 
companies involved into open conflict with anti-apartheid forces.”560 Investigations into 
the bank also revealed its extensive dealings with South Africa. Even after the company 
ended its participation in the dam scheme, the AAM maintained its boycott until the bank 
finally withdrew completely from South Africa in 1986. As chronicler Roger Fieldhouse 
has argued, the bank campaign that began by targeting Portuguese colonialism became 
“one of AAM’s most high profile” in the history of the movement.561 
More importantly for this narrative, the activities of the CFMAG and its allies 
effectively changed the British view of Africa. As Polly Gaster recalled, the Dambusters 
were “The first thing that put the Portuguese colonies on the map.”562 Now cognizant of 
the CONCP parties and their policies of socialist self-determination and interracialism, 
subsequent campaigns were able to draw on a greatly expanded base of sympathizers. 
When dictator Marcello Caetano visited Britain in 1973, the CFMAG marshaled thousands 
of activists to take to the street demanding an end to the centuries old alliance with Portugal. 
Streets leading to Buckingham Palace were crowded with protesters estimated at well over 
ten thousand.563 Planned to be the debut of Caetano’s modern totalitarianism to the 
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European public, the visit turned into a fiasco much to the dismay of the Lisbon regime.564 
Importantly, this mobilization did not fall away after Caetano left British shores, as a 
number of the local committees established to organize demonstrations became the first 
iterations of CFMAG sub-groups across the country.565 The ability of the CFMAG to 
marshal these forces was never fully realized though, as the Portuguese regime collapsed 
under domestic pressure nine months after Caetano’s visit. Yet far from representing a 
failure, the creation of this solidarity movement and the forging of transnational 
connections across the continent would set the stage for the revival of the anti-apartheid 
movement.  
 
Conclusion 
 After the Angolan rebellion of 1961, Portuguese Africa became one of a number of 
causes backed by European champions of the developing world. Though not as widespread 
as the later anti-apartheid movement or the contemporary anti-Vietnam demonstrations, 
activists developed effective campaigns to support the cause. As the Cold War helped 
remove barriers to support for socialist parties, solidarity with Portuguese Africa emerged 
as one of the preeminent European movements of the 1970s.  During this period, activists 
created extensive networks of contacts with the socialist liberation parties. FRELIMO in 
                                                 
564 Tony Gifford believe that the failed publicity tour had much larger effects, stating that “I have no doubt 
at all that the Caetano visit led directly to the overthrow of Caetano . . . I do think there was an example 
there about the combination of the work of the liberation movement with solidarity movements like ours, 
being echoed inside Portugal.” Tony Gifford Interview.  
565 Polly Gaster estimates there were about 10-20 that conducted activities after the End the Alliance 
campaign, though the collapse of the regime nine months later meant that the effects of the newly expanded 
CFMAG were never fully tested. Polly Gaster Interivew.  
 242 
particular was especially active in promoting the expansion of solidarity, pushing its 
European allies to develop the broadest possible movements in order to sway official policy 
against allied Portugal. While the movement struggled in early years, it began to make 
progress in the late 1960s based on a strategy of tying its campaigns to radical critiques of 
both the Cold War in Vietnam and elsewhere. Though most activity emerged from the left, 
the pursuit of international justice in the form of domestic boycotts helped incorporate the 
socialist CONCP parties of Portuguese Africa into the moderate mainstream of European 
politics. These events in the midst of the Cold War helped pave the way for widespread 
acceptance of similar parties from Zimbabwe and South Africa in later decades.  
 The tactics pioneered during this period would also become mainstays of future 
movements. Successful boycotts, the use of stock to disrupt corporate shareholder 
meetings, and government lobbying were all perfected in the early 1970s around the 
question of Portuguese Africa. In some cases like that of the AC, this expertise would be 
directly carried over into a new organization. Thus, anti-apartheid organizing was able to 
draw on a professional activist leadership that had learned from both its success and its 
mistakes in the 1960s and 1970s. Many of these individuals, like Sietse Bosgra, had a bevy 
of contacts in Africa, Europe, and even the Americas that contributed to the creation of a 
kind of transnational civil society. Many of these groups had also established extensive 
contacts within the government by the collapse of the Portuguese empire, making it far 
easier for Bosgra, Tony Gifford, and others to have new ideas on South Africa considered 
seriously – if not always successfully – in the halls of power. European solidarity had 
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established the model, especially in the NATO countries of Britain and the Netherlands. It 
remained to be seen whether a similar movement could be assembled in the United States.  
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Chapter 4: “Something More than Words” 
The New Left, Liberal Humanitarianism, and Grassroots Solidarity 
 
In April of 1970, the struggle for Portuguese African liberation was finally taken 
up by American activists, not in the form of bombs or bullets, but by a cross-section of 
American society wielding ballots at the annual shareholders’ meeting of the Gulf Oil 
Corporation. The Pittsburgh-based oil giant was the single largest American investor in 
Portuguese colonialism, turning a sizeable profit from its drilling facilities off the coast of 
Angola. For nearly a year, popular pressure had been building to launch a major boycott of 
Gulf, which would unite radical, religious, and liberal communities. More than three dozen 
protesters arrived at the shareholders’ meeting, holding tickets in proxy for major investors 
or having bought a single share that would allow them entrance to the Carnegie Music Hall. 
Four hundred more protesters marched in front of the entrance waving flags emblazoned 
with “Gulf Kills,” chanting constantly for the corporation to abandon its alliance with 
Lisbon’s blatant colonialism. The goal of the agitators was to make it impossible for Gulf 
to conduct its business as usual so long as the company remained steadfast in working with 
Portugal to exploit the African continent as usual.  
And disrupt the meeting they did – loudly, obnoxiously, but peacefully. The crowd 
of predominantly young people chanted and yelled slogans, quieting to let those among 
them share prepared statements. Activists lined up at the floor microphones to make long 
impassioned speeches on the wrongs of Gulf Oil, some taking so much time that Gulf 
Chairman E.D. Brockett declared them out of order and had the protesters removed forcibly 
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from the room.566  Their list of demands was simple and put them in solidarity not just with 
Angola but many Third World peoples: end exploitation of resources in the developing 
world, stop feeding the military sectors of the United States and Portugal, and replace the 
board with representatives democratically elected from the communities in which Gulf 
operated.567 One by one, protesters nominated their own candidates for the board, drawn 
mostly from the liberation movements abroad and the radical fringes of American society. 
Among other names proffered were PAIGC head Amílcar Cabral, David Dellinger of 
“Chicago Seven” fame, and Black Panther Angela Davis. George Houser of the American 
Committee on Africa (ACOA) nominated Agostinho Neto of the MPLA in a lengthy 
speech, before pro-management attendees shouted him down as he attempted to read 
excerpts from Neto’s poetry. Regular chants of “throw him out” proved almost as 
disruptive as the demonstration itself, reminding one young activist of the Passion play 
cries of “crucify him” she had grown up with in church.568  The disruptions eventually led 
to a number of arrests, mostly of students who refused to abandon microphones despite 
polite threats from security officers.569 
In contrast to the predominantly male, white, upper-class business crowd speaking 
on behalf of Gulf, the protesters represented a spectrum of interests and ideologies. From 
radicals to national religious leaders, they united in support of the Angolan cause and in 
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opposition to Gulf’s exploitative activities elsewhere. Speakers represented Houser’s 
ACOA, the Southern Africa Committee (SAC) from New York, the pacifists of the Quaker 
American Friends Service Committee, and church organizations. The local Pittsburgh Gulf 
Action Project helped organized the event, joining internationally minded groups with 
union-based demands that Gulf respect community calls for greater transparency and the 
interests of its workers. Ideological and tactical divides complicated relations between the 
40 or so protesters, with most chuckling at the communist demands to do away with a 
money system, while some senior church leaders were noticeably uncomfortable in the 
increasingly loud context. John Coventry Smith, the secretary general of the United 
Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, had come to Pittsburgh to voice his 
denomination’s dismay at Gulf practices in Angola, but he was noticeably uncomfortable 
with the tactics and rhetoric used by his younger colleagues. When it was his time to speak, 
he declined, replying that he had communicated his objections to chairman Brockett earlier 
in a written statement.570 Such divisions, however, were not apparent to outside observers, 
who only saw the success of the movement in achieving their goal: disrupting the business 
of Gulf Oil.  
Brockett and Gulf President B.R. Dorsey spent much of the two and a half hours 
defending their record overseas and at home. Amid the commotion, no one had a chance 
to nominate the management’s slate to the board of directors or elect outside accountants. 
Brockett announced both before he had a chance to pick up ballots for shareholders voting 
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in person, providing an illustration of the undemocratic nature of the corporation that 
confirmed for the activists one of their central criticisms. Despite their successful efforts 
to bring attention to Gulf’s foreign transactions, the forty demonstrators did not have the 
power to upset the board nominations or pass their amendments on transparency and 
exploitation. They had, however, made a point, and they exited the auditorium before the 
meeting concluded to march through the city and link up with other local protests 
conducted concurrently. During the period of quiet, Brockett announced that earnings had 
fallen 15% in the first quarter despite an increase in production volume.571 He did not 
speculate about the relationship between the drop in profits and the protesters who had 
overtaken the room. 
The Gulf boycott effectively launched that day was the most successful of a number 
of initiatives deployed by activists to help isolate Portugal and strengthen the revolutionary 
parties of the CONCP countries. As the most active and successful liberation movements 
during this period, the Lusophone struggles became a shorthand for wider demands for 
self-determination in southern Africa as they had in Europe. And also as in Europe, the 
growth of solidarity was heavily influenced by the Vietnam War, which disrupted Cold 
War politics and carved a space for activists across the political spectrum to question liberal 
dogma and articulate wider criticisms of American foreign policy. The solidarity 
movement grew in this space around a network of young radicals who understood 
FRELIMO and other CONCP parties as transnational extensions of the domestic civil 
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rights movement. These youths were in essence a part of the New Left, merging religious 
humanism with left-leaning Marxism, even as they retained ties to mainstream institutions 
like the National Council of Churches (NCC) and the ACOA. It was here that the liberation 
solidarity differed from much of the historiography of the anti-war movement. Whereas 
the rise and fall of a mass protest culture has been well documented, it has largely 
overlooked the margins of this fight where young radicals worked extensively and 
efficiently with establishment organizations.572 Uniting behind the CONCP and its member 
parties’ calls to build a mass movement to change American policy provided common 
ground that linked the far left to the center. A variety of organizations established distinct 
ideological, strategic, and regional identities. Yet most worked actively with any group 
championing decolonization, in shared actions like the one in Pittsburgh in 1972 and well 
into the decade often depicted as the vacuous dénouement to the idealistic 1960s.573  
This chapter builds on the contention that a new American internationalism 
emerged from global anti-racist and anti-imperial struggles, inspired largely by national 
liberation movements that, according to Max Elbaum, “seemed to be daily shattering the 
notion of U.S. invincibility.”574 Internationalists abandoned the idea that the United States 
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had the right or indeed the ability to intervene in the developing world, embraced socialist 
nationalists in these regions, and agitated for a serious reorganization of the global 
economic system that maintained deeply unequal relationships between the global north 
and south. Yet in contrast to Elbaum’s emphasis on Marxist-Leninist radicals, the 
development of the Portuguese African solidarity network reveals a much broader shift to 
the left.575 While young radicals certainly embraced a vaguely Marxist critique of the 
international system, many liberal and centrist groups also abandoned Cold War pretenses 
in favor of an internationalist outlook that demanded a new foreign policy based on greater 
cooperation with Third World priorities and moral constraints on unbridled capitalism. 
This leftward movement occurred in response to international events, but also with the 
encouragement of young radicals integrated into and allied with establishment institutions. 
This coalition harnessed various constituencies disillusioned with the Cold War and 
Vietnam behind a new internationalist outlook, which began the process of building a 
decentralized, diverse, but influential solidarity movement with socialist African liberation 
parties. Elbaum is correct that the Marxist aspects of this leftward shift withered in the 
1970s, but he and others fail to see that the broader and only slightly less radical critique 
of American society became embedded in a broad range of institutions – churches, 
lobbying organizations, and even the government – that offered a major dissenting voice 
against the ongoing Cold War and national power projection in the Third World. 
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Religious Radicalism: New Left Missionaries and the Zambia Group  
 More so than in Europe, religious ties laid the foundations for the growth of 
solidarity in the United States, but here too the movement depended on youth activists 
attracted to the inclusive leftist ideology of the CONCP parties. The Protestant missionary 
linkages with Angola, Mozambique, and South Africa helped introduce the cause of 
African liberation to the United States. Yet the boycotts of the 1950s and the religious 
outcry over the Angolan rebellion had been fleeting. The central role of the missions and 
Cold War concerns meant that Holden Roberto received the majority of American aid due 
in large part to his self-depiction as an anti-communist.576 As the Portuguese continued 
their campaign against foreign Protestants and Roberto became increasingly distracted by 
political infighting, American agitation for liberation receded. Certainly, South Africa and 
to a lesser extent Portuguese Africa remained a concern for religious leaders, but there was 
no meaningful action on the topic. The violence of the revolutions also alienated many 
churches, notably pacifists like the Quakers. Christians were concerned about racial and 
social justice overseas, but there were many ideas and few solutions.  
 Even as national attention to southern Africa waxed and waned, the churches could 
not ignore the rapidly shifting landscape of the international system. Decolonization 
challenged not only political but also religious borders. Most affected were missionaries, 
many of whom were concentrated in Third World countries. In the 1950s, a new generation 
of internationally minded Christians began to reconsider the traditional missionary impulse 
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within the context of changing perceptions of morality, economic development, and North-
South relations. Among the leaders of this movement was Margaret Flory, the dynamic 
Presbyterian secretary for student work of the Commission on World Mission of the 
National Student Christian Federation (NSCF).577 She believed Protestant churches had to 
rethink their patriarchal, Eurocentric forms of international engagement, but exactly what 
should replace the tradition was not clear. The question, as one of Flory’s programs would 
later put it, was “How can the movement of missions be shifted from the pattern of the 
West sending to the East, the older sending to the younger churches, to one of the whole 
Church – the churches together as peers – going together to live and work in the midst of 
frontiers that exist in every part of the world?”578 Flory hoped to find the answers by 
sending young people to explore a set of global challenges created by revolution, demands 
for racial equality, and the East-West conflict. 
In the closing days of 1959, the 18th Ecumenical Student Conference on the 
Christian World Mission began the process of addressing the heady topic. Under Flory’s 
leadership, the gathering of more than 3600 students from over 75 countries focused on a 
handful of these new “frontiers” – months before the election of the president that would 
introduce a similar vocabulary to the nation. They asked how the churches could deal with 
a range of issues from technological upheaval to the growth of a “university world,” but 
the majority of the nine frontiers dealt with matters connecting the West with the Third 
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World: racial tensions, new nationalisms, responsible statesmanship, displaced peoples, 
and communism.579 The conference provided a forum for the exchange of new ideas for 
how young, socially minded people could address the emerging global problems of the 
1960s, led by an international roster of famous contributors including Martin Luther King 
Jr.  
 Also at the Ohio Conference was Eduardo Mondlane, a pivotal figure driving a 
sustained interest in Africa within Protestant churches. As mentioned in previous chapters, 
his studies at Oberlin and Northwestern had been arranged and partially funded through 
the NCC, the New York-based bureaucracy that acted as a kind of deliberative council for 
the diverse Protestant churches, especially in international affairs. Through his church 
connections, he became a regular presence at Christian camps and deliberations as a 
spokesperson for African nationalism.580 It had been at these camps that he made 
connections with religious youth ranging from his wife, Janet, to the future civil rights 
leader Andrew Young. He also spoke regularly at churches, introducing middle-class 
parishioners to moderate African nationalism.581 This travel built a network of contacts in 
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the church and progressive political communities that dwarfed Roberto’s. Among its 
members was Margaret Flory, whom he had known since 1953.582 Nearly a decade of 
activism and travel provided Mondlane access to the religious youth culture that would 
prove vital in building a solidarity movement.  
This youth culture had one of its first African tests in 1961, when the Angolan 
revolution and the persecution of Protestants demanded church attention. The Methodist 
and Baptist missionaries who raised relief funds with dramatic tails about atrocities, torture, 
and imprisonment had a major impact on students. Young people were interested in hearing 
directly from Africans with experiences in the colonies, and Mondlane was the logical 
choice. He spoke widely in the wake of the Angolan revolution, often to youth and church 
organizations.583 In one example, the Methodist Student Movement focused their 1961 
annual conference on the plight of Portuguese colonies, and they looked to Mondlane to 
help organize it. He became the bridge to nationalist Africa. One staff member recalled: 
“[Mondlane] worked side by side with [Methodist students], relaxing over coffee, talking 
far into the night, explaining fine points of political or economic analysis, telling stories of 
his people, their suffering, and their victories.”584 Discussion bred action. The NSCF – a 
coalition of campus church groups – urged its members to lobby the government and the 
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UN on Angola, distributing resolutions drafted by Union Theological Seminary in New 
York and ACOA to build support.585  
These interactions provided a window into African struggles and introduced 
Americans to a new, more vibrant vision of African culture. They also inspired interest in 
the emerging frontiers of global life that Flory had begun to explore.586 Among the 
individuals leading this movement was Henry (Hank) Crane, the son of Congo 
missionaries, who had met Mondlane in the 1950s and roomed with him at the Athens 
Conference. In long conversations about both the politically volatile Congo and Africa 
more generally, Mondlane would “unmask the vagaries, inconsistencies, and hypocrisy of 
U.S. foreign policy in relation to Africa, exposing the vast chasm between the ideals we 
profess publicly as a nation and the narrow self-interest which actually determines our 
relations with the black people of Africa.”  Crane would later remember that these 
conversations “largely shaped my own attitudes toward events in Africa since.”587 While 
Mondlane’s return to Mozambique and the Portuguese reassertion of power dampened 
youth activism, it could not erase the impact that this early period had on people like Crane, 
their views of the continent, and its peoples’ struggles. As one youth without Crane’s 
personal ties to Africa remembered, “This exposure to the situation in Angola was 
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unforgettable. Students discovered a part of the world they had hardly heard of before and 
were drawn into personal connections with it.”588  
It was these personal connections and direct experiences of life on the global 
frontiers that Margaret Flory hoped to capture and build upon. While Angola was still 
grabbing headlines, Flory was formulating an innovative experiment in missionary activity 
that would put Christian youth on the conceptual frontiers first explored at the Athens 
conference. The result was the Frontier Internship in Mission (FIM). Beginning in 1961, 
the program recruited politically active young people – Christian and non-Christian alike 
– to spend two years abroad, engaging daily with issues of poverty, urbanization, racial 
tension, and nationalism among others. All interns would live at a subsistence level to 
provide perspective on the realities of life in their adopted communities, the majority of 
which were in the countries of the global South at the center of what one FIM publication 
called the global “revolutionary upheavals . . . based in large part on the Christian belief in 
the worth of the individual.”589 The FIM broke with traditional missionary practice and the 
concurrent efforts of the Peace Corps: the emphasis was less on spreading western 
knowledge than on learning. Interns went abroad to learn from those at the forefront of 
global change – people like Eduardo Mondlane. It sought to explore “the mission strategy 
of tomorrow: to come not as one having answers, but as one deeply desiring to discover 
the ultimate questions.”590 The goal of the FIM was to encourage young people to make 
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direct contacts with foreign peoples and “to be present, to listen, to study, to try to 
understand and to discover what new patterns might emerge to give guidance to the whole 
Christian community in its mission in that [frontier].”591 
The learning aspect of the FIM required a special kind of student, one who 
appreciated the challenges of revolutionary change and possessed the humility to recognize 
the United States and its Christian churches had much to learn from Third World peoples 
commonly considered backward. Flory was deeply interested in progressive politics and 
the FIM was backed by the NCC, which had supported civil rights and would become a 
vocal critic of the Vietnam War, so it was natural that participants would be young people 
already engaged with the frontiers of American society: race issues, poverty relief, and 
campus activism.592 Their time abroad then would be a way of pushing these youth already 
interested in changing American society to think and act more globally. It would be a new 
kind of religious internationalism that would make global events integral parts of daily 
life.593  
The merging of domestic and international activism is typified by the experience of 
two of the FIM’s first class of members, David and Marylee Wiley.594 The couple had 
learned about the interaction of race and power supporting African American candidates 
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for regional election while David was chaplain at the University of Delaware.595 The FIM 
sent them in 1961 to Salisbury (modern Harare), the capital of Southern Rhodesia 
(Zimbabwe). David Wiley taught night school, and they led work camps to promote 
interracial learning, discovering some of the liberation ideologies taking root under the 
minority government.596 The experience helped progressive youth like the Wileys see the 
world from a new angle. It also led them to question the role that Western powers, 
specifically the United States, played in supporting governments like the one in Rhodesia.  
As the pair explained at the time, “the universal fact is that all of us learned to open our 
eyes and ears. We thought we had the ideas and techniques, but we learned that we had 
only knowledge – others had the wisdom. . . . We uncovered our hidden prejudices about 
the superiority of Western or American knowledge and techniques.”597 Here was the 
beginnings of Flory’s goal in mission, to convert not foreign peoples but progressive 
Americans – convert them to a new way of seeing global problems as inherently 
intertwined and perhaps susceptible to cooperative transnational intervention.  
When the Wileys returned to the United States in 1963 at the end of their two-year 
mission, they fit naturally into the space created by youth activism around Angola and the 
horror of Sharpeville. Open revolution and the violent response from both Lisbon and 
Pretoria forced young Christians to reassess how they viewed the nationalists in Africa. 
The church leadership had rallied against Portugal due to their missionary connections but 
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blanched at the idea of directly supporting armed freedom movements, quietly using funds 
to bankroll refugee services in the Congo but providing little political assistance for the 
nationalists themselves. Drawing on their experiences over the last decade with the 
peaceful protests of the civil rights movements, most church members believed violence 
was unacceptable no matter the perpetrator. It was students with direct experience in Africa 
like the Wileys who began to question the universality of Protestant non-violence. In 1964, 
at the Student Conference on the Christian World Mission again held at Ohio, Kenneth 
Carstens, a young South African exile, gave voice to this sentiment. Responding directly 
to Angolan missionary Malcolm McVeigh’s denial of violence as a legitimate nationalist 
tool, Carstens asked the audience “if a chance is necessary because of the injustice and 
cruelty of the status quo – now these are big ‘ifs’ – and the only change that is foreseeable 
is a change by means of violence, then what are we saying about the native air of the 
Christian faith if we condemn revolution on both sides?”598 Carstens and the Wileys had 
witnessed the force minority governments used to maintain control of their states, and they 
understood that opportunities for peaceful protest had been exhausted. Carstens’ solution 
was to step back from the traditional missionary paternalism of the Western church and 
take a page from the FIM’s playbook, supporting the nationalists in addressing the problem 
of minority rule as they saw fit.  
Carstens was not alone in his call for greater activism on behalf of southern Africa, 
but he and others recognized that the bureaucratic structure of the Protestant churches 
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demanded that youth take the lead in building solidarity with the nationalist movements. 
In the early 1960s, the NSCF had begun to pay attention to the problem of apartheid in 
South Africa, making it a major issue within its Civil Rights Committee. Angola and 
tensions in Rhodesia had placed in a stark light the regional nature of racial injustice, 
beginning the slow expansion of focus.599 Among the actions the NSCF took was sending 
Eduardo Mondlane’s acquaintance Hank Crane on an extended mission to various parts of 
the African continent to ascertain realities on the ground. In the midst of the famed Freedom 
Summer of 1964, he attended the WCC’s Consultation on Race Relations in Southern 
Africa alongside mostly Anglophone church people and nationalists, but also including 
Mondlane. The FRELIMO president – by then readying to launch the armed revolution in 
the fall – joined with the attendees in urging a radicalization of support work and an 
acceptance of violent resistance. Crane remembers that he explained that what FRELIMO 
and the other active liberation groups needed was “the help of the Christian community in 
learning how to use violence without hate, with maximum restraint and discipline, and with 
the clear goal of the establishment of a non-racial society guaranteeing justice and dignity 
for all men.”600 Non-violence had worked in the United States and Britain’s colonies, but 
in southern Africa nationalists faced more dedicated foes. Under such repression, they had 
few alternatives but to match force with force, and Mondlane begged his Christian allies to 
see the humanity at the core of the revolutionary program.  
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Crane returned to the United States and urged fellow youth to engage with 
Mondlane’s vision of a non-paternalistic solidarity, which could merge the increasingly 
radical domestic rights movement and the African revolutions into a single if 
heterogeneous struggle. The search for racial justice was a global one, and in the same way 
northerners helped advance the southern civil rights struggle, so could those from the 
global North advance the campaigns waged by nationalists in Africa. The product of these 
calls to action was the expansion of the Civil Rights Committee’s initial concern with South 
Africa into the independent Southern Africa Committee (SAC) of the NSCF, which formed 
around the core of Carstens, Crane, the Wileys, and FIM alumnus David Robinson.601 
Housed within the progressive halls of the Union Theological Seminary, the SAC found a 
rich ground for recruiting members who were dedicated to global justice. It also was only 
a short distance from the headquarters of the NCC in the Morningside Heights 
neighborhood of Manhattan. Importantly, the SAC did not limit itself to the Protestant 
churches, drawing members from Columbia University as well.602 Despite their work 
within church institutions, many members were not religious or would soon drift away 
from their faith. What united these activists of differing commitments, backgrounds, and 
politics was the cause of southern Africa, and specifically solidarity with their struggles for 
freedom – no matter the method.603 Within a few years, the SAC became the locus of an 
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increasingly radical solidarity that would outlast the university Christian movement while 
maintaining access to the Protestant structure.   
The SAC united around common interests in Africa, but the backgrounds of its 
members varied widely. Unlike the elder pair of Carstens and Crane, few had extensive 
personal experience living on the continent. Rather, they had brief encounters through 
study abroad or understood African independence as a complement to the domestic civil 
rights movement. As a result, the SAC was in its earliest incarnation a kind of study group. 
Members sought to understand regional politics and devise strategies for supporting 
change, particularly in South Africa, which continued to be a priority for many involved.604 
It would not take long, however, for these foci to shift as the SAC matured and events on 
the continent continued to demand a regional approach. When Rhodesia declared 
independence in November 1965, David and Marylee Wiley spearheaded the publication 
of a special NSCF newsletter to disseminate information on the event. The bulletin would 
transition to a wider focus on Southern Africa news within six months, finally becoming 
the long-running Southern Africa magazine in 1967. The publications became important 
parts of the SAC identity, providing news on Africa directly aimed at youth readers on a 
regular basis. From the outside, the SAC became a kind of youthful ACOA, merging 
religious backgrounds, progressive politics, and educational outreach on African liberation.  
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The SAC was a product of its times, and it set itself apart from ACOA by moving 
in increasingly radical directions alongside a generation of student activists. In the mid-
1960s, the escalation of the Vietnam War was inspiring a mass anti-war movement, pushed 
by groups like the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) but increasingly involving a 
diverse array of participants, including Protestant churches.605 SAC members were 
cognizant of the escalating war and protested against it, but they saw American cooperation 
with countries like South Africa and Portugal as no different from the U.S. backing of 
South Vietnam. As groups like SDS adopted broad anti-imperial programs, they expanded 
their criticism of American policy beyond Asia to the point where it intersected with the 
SAC.606 While authors have rightly pointed out that this adoption of a multi-issue program 
distracted SDS from taking a leadership position on Vietnam, it also enabled joint action 
that publicized issues at the margins of the popular consciousness such as the African 
revolutions, which received relatively light attention during this period.607 These 
connections were key to integrating solidarity activism into the wider New Left.  
The joint SDS-SAC protest of Chase Manhattan Bank in 1965 is the first major 
example of this cooperation. The SAC explored a number of strategies to advance the 
liberation struggle including polite discussions with the State Department, but it gravitated 
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toward the more confrontational politics of its era.608 The SAC had been searching for an 
issue that could dramatize American complicity with South Africa, so it responded 
positively when the New York SDS chapter approached it on the issue of Chase.609 The 
bank had been a leading member of a consortium that extended credit to the South African 
government after international concerns over the Sharpeville Massacre led to an economic 
downturn. The use of American deposits to directly prop up the apartheid regime upset 
SDS and SAC, and they believed many young Americans would withdraw their funds if 
they realized how Chase used them. The groups launched the boycott alongside the 
Congress of Racial Equality and the NAACP with a sit-in at the headquarters in downtown 
New York. The SAC, seeking to broaden the movement, forged an alliance with ACOA, 
creating the Committee of Conscience Against Apartheid under the chairmanship of A. 
Philip Randolph. 610 It also reached out to the NCC and the churches, which had sizeable 
investments in Chase, but denominational leaders – many deeply ensconced in the business 
world – worried about criticizing such practices and did not act decisively. The SAC and 
ACOA continued to work on adjusting religious opinion even as SDS participation 
declined. It was slow going, and by the time the churches began to divest in the late 1960s, 
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the Portuguese colonies had begun to eclipse South Africa as the focus for activism. 611 The 
Bank campaign would begin the creation of a broad movement and a shift to the left, but 
as the church hesitation showed, there were still wide differences.  
 In the mid-1960s, a more radical anti-imperial philosophy and how it related 
directly to Africa was still defining itself against the left-liberalism of organizations like 
ACOA and the NCC. As Hank Crane had shown a year before, it still took the influence of 
African leaders like Mondlane to help even the most ardent activists adapt their inherited 
perspectives to the reality of revolutionary southern Africa. These personal linkages and 
experiences were invaluable in creating solidarity, and to find them many SAC members 
looked to Margaret Flory’s FIM. Over the next five years, the two organizations would 
construct an almost symbiotic relationship. Young activists approached Flory with plans 
for exploring the frontiers of revolutionary nationalism based on their research in New 
York, while FIMers in Africa would develop relationships with the SAC and its alumni 
through the community that Flory created.612  
One example of this process was William “Bill” Minter. Minter had first engaged 
with Christian internationalism when he attended the 1959-60 Athens conference. He 
became interested in Africa when he spent his junior year in Nigeria as part of another of 
Flory’s programs. When he enrolled at Union in the mid-1960s, he joined the SAC and 
soon became its president. There, Minter met Mondlane when he spoke on FRELIMO’s 
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vision of a new, multi-racial Mozambican society. Minter and his wife Ruth, who also 
participated in the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee’s (SNCC) South West 
Georgia project in the summer of 1965, were inspired by Mondlane’s mission of merging 
the liberation struggle with the wholesale reconstruction of the colonial nation and began 
to look for ways to aid the movement. This began an exchange of ideas about how the 
young activists could support FRELIMO, and two years later they approached Flory with 
the proposal that they work directly in the exile secondary school run by the movement in 
Dar es Salaam. Flory agreed, and Bill and Ruth Minter found themselves among a 
multinational group of teachers at the school, with Janet and Eduardo Mondlane and much 
of the FRELIMO leadership working nearby.613 This was exactly the kind of personal 
connections that inspired solidarity organizing, and the FIM made it possible by linking 
American activists with those already working on the global frontiers – in this case the 
revolutionaries themselves.  
In addition to the Minters, Flory sent a number of activists to southern Africa, 
including early SAC members Don and Gail Morlan and in later years Tami Hultman and 
Reed Kramer, who would eventually found the Africa News Service.614  But the FIM was 
also an important program for introducing motivated young activists to the problems of 
African liberation, even when the volunteers did not intern in the south. Flory’s progressive 
politics had become increasingly radicalized under the influence of past and present 
volunteers and the social pressures of Black Power, Vietnam, and women’s liberation. 
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“There has been a growing conviction within the program,” one FIM pamphlet explained, 
“that, in the face of Western dominance in the world, Christians must expose exploitative 
relationships and struggle for just and humane relations through interchange and 
interdependence.”615 Political and spiritual liberation became a defining element of the 
FIM, and Flory wanted to introduce volunteers in Africa to the movements seeking this 
goal – through violent and peaceful means alike.616  
Eileen Hanson’s experience provides an example of this process. The young 
Lutheran from the Mid-west had only a vague knowledge of the continent when she began 
preparations to serve in independent Cote D’Ivoire in 1966. She had worked with the NSCF 
in Chicago and briefly helped organize activities on southern Africa there, but it was two 
months of travel as part of the Southern Africa Seminar before her FIM service began that 
opened her eyes to the liberation cause. 617 Spending time in South Africa and Dar es 
Salaam, she was shocked to experience firsthand the deep segregation of minority society. 
Her upbringing in Minnesota and Illinois had shielded her from the worst kinds of racial 
discrimination, and she had not truly understood the challenges of life in South Africa or 
the colonies. In Zambia and Tanzania, she spoke with a variety of liberation leaders, who 
encouraged her to act in whatever way she could.618 This formative event shaped the way 
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she understood her two year mission even in independent Cote d’Ivoire, and – like the 
Wileys and Minters – it would inspire her to expand her work on behalf of the liberation 
movements when she returned home.  
The FIM’s most important role, however, was in cultivating an activist community, 
cementing and expanding the network begun with the SAC. While the Minters and the 
Morlans were scattered across the continent, Flory facilitated a gathering of African 
Frontier Interns at the home of Hank Crane in Zambia.619 Also attending were the Wileys, 
in Zambia while Dave conducted his doctoral research. Most knew each other through the 
SAC (now part of the recently renamed University Christian Movement, or UCM) but this 
meeting was a watershed. The attendees wrote a document that integrated their activist 
experiences, close associations with the socialist nationalist parties, and immediate 
knowledge of life under minority rule into a common set of goals and strategies.620 The 
paper captured an emerging consensus among activists on the relationship between the 
United States and southern Africa, expressing ideas that would influence American 
solidarity organizing for decades.  
 The group reaffirmed the regional definition of solidarity work but expanded it to 
include a wider condemnation of Euro-American anti-communist policies that helped 
sustain the conservative regimes. They recognized that as much as South African apartheid 
differed from the situation in Mozambique or Angola, they shared a common logic and 
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would require similar if unique strategies to undermine foreign support. The group pledged 
to work toward the creation of societies founded on the “basis of majority rule and an 
equitable distribution of wealth.” From the nationalists, the young Americans borrowed the 
idea of pursuing this goal through a three-pronged approach: internal change, military 
revolt, and external pressure. They focused their strategizing on the final element for 
obvious reasons. The goal was not just to change American policy toward NATO ally 
Portugal, Rhodesia, and South Africa, but also to eliminate the dominant reactionary 
mindset in Washington that viewed the region through narrow Cold War considerations. 
Conditioning the U.S. government to accept southern African independence in whatever 
form it may come would influence the responses of other NATO powers. This shift in 
thinking was essential “if Western response in the future, when it is forced to act, is to be 
a positive contribution rather than unthinking counter-revolution on the model of 
Vietnam.”621 The goal then was not a simple resistance to colonialism and minority rule 
but sincere support for the socialist nation-building projects, which needed protection after 
independence as much as aid before it.  
 The attendees understood this would be a herculean task, so they established a five-
part strategy for raising the profile of southern Africa and forcing it onto the national 
agenda alongside more pressing issues like Vietnam. First, sympathetic Americans needed 
to improve communications, both amongst themselves in the organizing of solidarity 
activities and with the nationalists who understood the needs of the revolutions. Second, 
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research was necessary to reveal the nature of American involvement in the region and 
what foreign influences were most pernicious in extending minority rule. Third, 
publications “geared to a wide variety of audiences” were necessary to expand the reach of 
nationalist appeals and concern with the American role in southern Africa. Fourth, activists 
must use this foundation as a platform for fundraising, providing material and monetary 
support for nation-building projects and military campaigns. Finally, each of these efforts 
would fuel constituency-building. The Zambia collective believed that small, local groups 
drawn from the broad base of universities, churches, labor unions, African exile 
communities, and Peace Corps alumni would inform a decentralized grassroots political 
solidarity structure. Contrasting their vision of what they called a “catalytic membership 
organization” with the more “elitist, single strategy” ACOA, the youth hoped their vision 
would produce a mass anti-imperial movement “concerned about constituency and supple 
and alert in its application of appropriate strategies.”622 They committed themselves to 
pursuing the same goals of liberation in southern Africa as had ACOA, but they wanted to 
do so in a way that privileged the needs of the nationalists and the emerging political 
opportunities present in the youth revolt.  
 
Creating the Solidarity Movement: Education and Activism in the Youth Left 
 “The Zambia Group” or simply “The Group,” as members would refer to 
themselves collectively, was not a formal organization but a network of like-minded 
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individuals who were determined to build an American solidarity movement with 
progressive African nationalists. As they returned to the United States, they carried a 
mission to establish a web of solidarity organizations that could aid liberation efforts. 
Fortunately, their time abroad had come at an auspicious time. The anti-war movement had 
reached its peak during the same year they had gathered in Zambia, while the Black Power 
movement continued to strengthen in the late 1960s. The Zambia Group took advantage of 
this new radicalism, joining its opposition to U.S.-backed minority regimes with popular 
anger at undemocratic American institutions to build new alliances. Still largely at the 
margins, this work expanded on the previous activity of the SAC, providing forums where 
anti-war activists could learn how southern Africa related to Vietnam, while new recruits 
could discover the racial inequalities that continued to plague the international system. The 
religiously affiliated Zambia Group was joined in its efforts by radical organizations that 
used Marxist-inspired criticisms of the international system to justify African liberation. 
The transition from the 1960s to the next decade saw these constituencies intermix and 
unite in a common movement supporting African liberation. As the struggles in Guinea-
Bissau and Mozambique advanced, the CONCP cause would become a major element of 
national youth activism.  
 This emphasis on the Portuguese colonies grew in part from the CONCP’s decision 
to court the West that had reinvigorated the European solidarity movement. Between the 
time FRELIMO first sent Sharfudine Khan to act as its emissary to the United States in 
1967 and the Rome Conference in 1970, the parties used existing ties primarily forged by 
Eduardo Mondlane to actively expand popular support. They did so by presenting their 
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struggles – particularly in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique – as direct confrontations with 
a Euro-American imperial system, which they fought both militarily and socially behind 
the frontlines. Khan argued that the transnational solidarity needed to “inform and educate” 
the new generation of sympathetic Americans on the realities of the revolutions, so they 
could intensify “pressure on Portugal and the governments supporting her.”623 But the 
parties understood that the creation of an effective solidarity movement required 
Americans to translate the cause for popular consumption in their national context, so the 
nationalists themselves played supporting roles. Khan explained at one point “You know 
better than ourselves the situation in which you work, so we can only suggest ways in 
which you might celebrate [solidarity] with us.”624 ACOA had been successfully fulfilling 
this task for years among civil rights liberals and union leaders, but the Zambia Group and 
others of the younger generation felt that the committee was not necessarily speaking to 
them. As a result, it became the mission of this loose network and a growing number of 
radical allies to broaden the movement by speaking directly to the anti-war generation.  
 As FIMers returned to the United States, life took them in different geographical 
and tactical directions, even as they remained committed to a common strategy. The SAC 
continued as an important node in this network. Though the majority of its earliest 
members, including the Wileys and the Minters, left the East Coast for professional 
reasons, the committee continued to operate around a core that included Gail Morlan (now 
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ACOA.  
624 “Solidarity Week with the Struggling People of Mozambique,” Sun Reporter, 26 September 1970.  
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Hovey), Tim Smith, and anti-war activist Robert Maurer. The group remained on Riverside 
Drive in the complex of religious organizations clustered around Union and the NCC, but 
it slowly became independent of the church structure, outlasting the UCM that did not see 
the end of the 1960s. Most importantly, the SAC greatly expanded its influence with the 
publication of Southern Africa in 1967. Its news did not come via Associated Press wire 
but through personal relationships and information exchanges in the nascent network 
established often by church connections. Along with the Dutch Facts and Report that 
would begin republishing carefully selected articles from around the world shortly 
thereafter, it became the primary source of information on events in the region.  
While the SAC expanded its influence, many of its former members continued to 
promote the cause of southern African liberation after they left New York. There were two 
main options: launch new organizations or join existing anti-imperial organizations 
evolving from the anti-war movement. FIM and SAC alumni would help found 
organizations in Chicago, Toronto, Raleigh, and elsewhere. One example was the Madison 
Area Committee on Southern Africa (MACSA), which played an important role in linking 
southern Africa to the emerging New Left. Dave and Marylee Wiley launched MACSA in 
1968, when Dave took a position as assistant professor at the University of Wisconsin. 
They were joined later by Bill and Ruth Minter, other Africanist graduate students such as 
Allen and Barbara Isaacman, and a number of black South African exiles.625 The small 
organization formed because there was growing interest in southern Africa but little formal 
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organization outside New York. The Wileys argued that “‘liberal,’ ‘student,’ and ‘civil 
rights’ organizations” had failed to maintain solidarity programs because of their tangential 
relationship to core domestic concerns. MACSA justified its focus on Africa by taking a 
radical anti-imperial approach, which presented the liberation movements as fighting 
global structures of racism and exploitation. Nonetheless, it encouraged participation by 
“any person or group” committed to the “weakening of the southern African systems,” and 
actively sought to cultivate relationships with Wisconsin politicians and other Midwestern 
congressmen including Charles Diggs and Donald Fraser.626 Though never numbering 
much more than 20 or so active members at any one point, the committee cooperated with 
black, religious, and anti-war groups to engage hundreds on campus and became a pivotal 
element of the Madison and Midwest political culture.  
MACSA focused on three activities: research, education, and coordination of 
activism in the upper Midwest. Taking a page from the SAC’s bank campaign and the 
embryonic boycott of Gulf’s activities, the committee explained in concrete detail how 
American business activities in southern Africa sustained the minority regimes, with an 
emphasis on Wisconsin firms. It also linked liberation in southern Africa with that of the 
Middle East by investigating Israel’s ties to the repressive regime in South Africa, the first 
ever such research.627 Other research informed articles appearing regularly in the bi-
monthly newsletter distributed throughout the Midwest in the early 1970s, small 
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MACSA, South Africa and Israel (Madison: MACSA, October 1971).  
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pamphlets, and educational outreach. MACSA used solidarity days and teach-ins to 
publicize their work and mobilize support in schools, universities, and religious 
institutions, while cooperation with local fundraising activities allowed it to send tens of 
thousands of dollars to the FRELIMO’s Mozambique Institute and smaller amounts to 
other parties.628 Under the influence of former FIMers and other members, the committee 
emphasized direct contact with African revolutionaries, making Madison a waypoint for 
nationalists traveling the country on speaking tours including Sharfudine Khan, 
FRELIMO’s Armando Guebuza, and Oliver Tambo of the ANC. Marylee Wiley developed 
the outreach program for the university’s African Studies Center, which encouraged local 
schools and religious organizations to invite continental students studying at Madison to 
translate their personal experiences for local people.629 By appealing to a diverse array of 
regional constituencies, MACSA acted as a coordinating point between for the various 
groups as they entered alliances across social and political fault lines.630 It became a 
significant conduit feeding information on African issues into the New Left while also 
promoting activism in a section of the country often isolated from existing groups like 
ACOA and the SAC that operated on the Eastern seaboard.  
In expanding this solidarity effort to the interior of the country, MACSA cooperated 
with a broader anti-imperialist collective that also served as a haven for members of the 
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Zambia Group: the Committee of Returned Volunteers (CRV). CRV membership 
consisted primarily of Peace Corps volunteers who had become disillusioned with 
American policy during their time abroad. They were joined by a handful of other 
volunteers and missionaries who had spent time in the developing world, notably former 
FIM member Eileen Hanson.631 In contrast to MACSA, the CRV had not formed with the 
specific intention of publicizing the issues of southern Africa in one area. The CRV’s 
critique of the American system was far broader, and its membership numbered in the 
thousands across nearly a dozen major cities.632 It aimed at combating what it understood 
as a pernicious American imperialism that manifested itself in the developing world in 
terms of predatory capitalism, reactionary militarism, and indifference to deep political 
inequalities. Service abroad had disillusioned members with development strategies they 
felt were paternalistic and incremental at best.633 The organization believed that more 
revolutionary measures were necessary to realistically improve the lives of Third World 
peoples, which included drastic structural changes and perhaps emancipatory violence on 
the part of Third World peoples.634 The CRV adopted the view that the American anti-
revolutionary mindset began at home, and it was by linking international and domestic 
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structural inequalities that the group began to build solidarity with revolutionary groups 
abroad. As one member explained bluntly, “we are bound together by our belief that great 
domestic changes are needed in the U.S., and our conviction that the United States is 
screwing the underdeveloped countries.”635 The CRV demanded the abolition of the Peace 
Corps and similar programs they believed constrained such foreign revolutions, and it 
focused secondarily on opposing the Vietnam War as the example of American overreach 
par-excellence. Yet few of the returnees had actually served in Southeast Asia, so the 
committee soon adopted another regional focus that was more familiar to many: southern 
Africa and the Portuguese colonies.636 
Most of the CRV leadership had worked either in Africa or Latin America, and they 
felt that American involvement in these nations should receive at least some attention 
alongside opposition to the Vietnam War.637 The result was the creation of a number of 
regional committees that objected to, in the CRV’s words, an American government that 
maintained “the status quo of wealth and privilege for the few and poverty and ignorance 
for the many” around the globe.638 Africa committee members had served all over the 
continent, but the immediacy of the Portuguese wars and the influence of individuals like 
Hanson and Nancy Freehafer, who had worked with FRELIMO in Dar es Salaam, focused 
action on the outstanding issue of colonialism.639 Freehafer also had the support of 
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639 Nancy Freehafer worked at the Mozambique Institute shortly before returning to join the CRV.  
 277 
Sharfudine Khan, whose presence in New York, accessibility, and encouragement made 
the focus on Mozambique seem almost “automatic,” as Peace Corps alumna Mimi 
Edmunds remembered.640 At the first CRV Congress in 1969, the group voted to focus on 
southern Africa as one of two primary campaigns alongside the war in Southeast Asia. The 
ongoing revolutions represented to the young radicals an example of Che Guevara’s widely 
cited dictum that there must be “1, 2, many Vietnams” in order to undermine the 
“international system of oppression and exploitation” that linked the United States to 
colonial institutions.641 With this predilection for revolutions in mind, the struggles in 
Mozambique and Angola quickly became the main points of the campaign, informing two 
of the committee’s most ambitious research studies. Mirroring closely the FRELIMO party 
members with whom some of them had worked, these activists hoped to isolate Portugal 
and prevent new countries – specifically the United States – from asserting their power in 
the wake of decolonization.642   
More overtly radical than MACSA, the CRV Africa Committee also defined its 
mission along research and educational lines but placed greater emphasis on engagement 
with a consciously leftist audience. The CRV developed an aggressive plan of action that 
included letter writing campaigns, informational sessions, protests, and direct support for 
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the liberation movements.643 Pamphlets like Mozambique Will Be Free aimed to make 
leftists “aware of what is happening in another part of the world” so they could organize in 
its defense.644 In so doing, the group acted as a surrogate propagandist for FRELIMO. The 
CRV certainly took many of its ideological and rhetorical cues from the party, but they 
followed Khan’s call to action and tailored their activism for American readers entrenched 
in a specific culture. The group equated Vietnam with the Portuguese colonies, predicting 
that they would follow a similar path from colonies to Cold War battlefield and sites of 
American intervention to preserve the status quo.645 In so doing, the CRV made the 
argument that southern Africa might “become another Vietnam” in its most powerful form 
yet, which directly influenced the direction of the anti-war movement as troop levels 
declined in Southeast Asia after 1970.646 The CRV and its network of over two dozen local 
branches injected the Lusophone colonial wars into the discourse of the anti-war left, while 
participating in the southern African solidarity network through the personal ties of its 
members.647 After it moved its headquarters from the city of New York to the heartland 
                                                 
643 The New York Chapter among other things planned to create a high school curriculum on southern 
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capital of Chicago, the committee became the center of a new radicalism that would 
encompass disillusioned youth, religious, and myriad other constituencies under a single 
anti-imperial umbrella. In so doing, it reinforced the creation of a new internationalist left 
by merging the priorities of the anti-war and solidarity communities.   
 The surprisingly good relations between the various components of the solidarity 
movement become apparent in the actions of arguably the most influential of these 
organizations: the border-crossing Marxist organization known as the Liberation Support 
Movement (LSM). LSM emerged from the work of the radical anthropologist Don Barnett, 
whose dissertation at the University of California-Los Angeles had been among the first to 
provide a sympathetic account of Kenya’s Mau Mau rebellion based on extensive 
interviews with veterans of the movement.648 The activist scholar traveled widely in East 
Africa, spending over a year living in Dar es Salaam, where he made contacts with a 
number of liberation movements. Barnett’s strongest bonds developed with the MPLA, 
whose firmer commitment to Marxist politics proved more appealing than FRELIMO’s 
more moderate socialism.649 As Barnett explained later, he had been impressed by the 
MPLA’s plans for rebuilding the country and hoped it could use its riches and geopolitical 
position to become “Africa’s Cuba . . . or perhaps its ‘Vietnam.’” For its part, the Angolan 
party welcomed interest from an enthusiastic American who seemed willing to work on 
behalf of their cause in the United States and Canada. They granted Barnett access to senior 
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leaders who explained their goals and methods. Agostinho Neto even invited the 
anthropologist into Angola to document the first party assembly to be held in liberated 
territory in August of 1968, in the temporary camp aptly named (from Barnett’s 
perspective) Hanoi II, roughly 175 miles from the Zambian border.650 The scholar wrote 
approvingly of these experiences in a number of articles for widely read radical periodicals 
such as The Guardian, introducing American audiences for the first time in detail to the 
individuals and ideologies motivating the MPLA, and by implication other 
revolutionaries.651  
 When Barnett returned to the United States to assume a university teaching 
position, developing a solidarity movement became a priority. At the University of Iowa, 
he began cultivating a following among radical students that would become the LSM. His 
politics won few admirers in late 1960s farm country, so he moved to Canada’s Simon 
Fraser University in 1968, which had become a hotbed of activist scholarship. The 
professor, who LSM member Ole Gjerstad remembered as an “extremely charismatic, 
demanding, disciplined person,” pushed his students to understand world events firmly in 
the context of Marxist ideology. He aggressively used his academic position not for any 
kind of career advancement but rather to recruit dedicated youth to his movement. 
Politically minded students naturally gravitated to the serious academic, especially those 
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who had taken a more circuitous path to collegiate studies and had less patience with the 
chaotic, ideologically vacuous protests that typified many student actions. By 1970, 
Barnett’s LSM stretched from Vancouver, through Seattle, to its headquarters in the Bay 
Area with a small amount of support remaining in the Midwest. Barnett envisioned this 
dedicated, professional cadre as the radical center of a larger movement, mobilizing action 
through educational outreach, publishing, and material aid to foreign revolutions.652  
 From its founding in 1969, the LSM became one of the primary national 
organizations providing a radical informational alternative to groups like ACOA. While 
never openly hostile to the more centrist perspective, the emphasis on Marxist anti-
imperialism and solidarity with the MPLA set the group apart. The other was an emphasis 
on presenting the stories of radical liberation leaders in their own words. The most 
important publications were a series of interviews that allowed MPLA revolutionaries to 
explain their goals to foreign audiences at length. A related FRELIMO pamphlet featured 
Marcelino Dos Santos, the most outspoken Marxist leader in the front to that time.653 These 
“life histories,” as the LSM referred to them, provided an unvarnished view of party 
philosophy and strategy that proved entertaining, educational, and broadly appealing. As 
LSM member Rick Sterling remembers them, they were seen by many as “a testament to 
what the realities were in that time and place,” and they cut through debates on proper 
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ideologies or ways of waging freedom struggles.654 The LSM also reproduced documents 
and speeches from Agostinho Neto, along with a popular liberation calendar that featured 
quotes, noteworthy dates, and photos primarily of the Portuguese movements.655 Through 
these publications the LSM built the impression of personal connections with the ongoing 
liberation movements, with the calendar providing a daily reminder of the need for 
solidarity.   
 The LSM promoted an integrated strategy of information dissemination aided by 
consciousness-raising protests locally and at the national level. Articles in The Guardian 
greatly raised the profile of the group, and it soon found itself in high demand as the voice 
for Africa on the left.656 From 1971 until 1977, the movement conducted national 
educational tours featuring slide shows and films on the African liberation movements. 
Appearances at college campuses and community centers from the Midwest to the East 
Coast reinforced the growing knowledge of Southern Africa, but forays into the South with 
a mobile film unit introduced hundreds in places like Mississippi and Alabama to assertive 
black revolution for the first time. The predominantly white members were 
overwhelmingly welcomed by black communities there, though visits were cut short by 
hostile authorities on several occasions.657 The LSM also became an important channel for 
connecting domestic audiences with radical African revolutionaries, working not just with 
FRELIMO’s Khan but Marxists who rarely found themselves invited to the United States. 
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In 1970, for instance, the Seattle branch arranged for a tour by Angolan guerrilla José 
Condesse, who spoke at local universities and met with Black Panthers before visiting Iowa 
City, Detroit, Reading, Harlem, and Ontario with the aid of LSM.658 The national scope of 
the group raised its profile still further, and orders for publications and requests for aid 
came in from all over the country and Europe.659 The publications, events, and personal 
appearances collected tens of thousands of dollars, funding propaganda training for MPLA 
cadres, the production and distribution of medical textbooks, and the shipment of medical 
supplies, radio equipment, surplus military gear, and a printing press.660  
Despite the centrality of Marxism to the LSM, it adopted the same cooperative 
attitude as other solidarity organizations and avoided the political infighting that hobbled 
anti-war coalitions. The MPLA was itself a front, filled with a diverse array of perspectives. 
It embraced a Leninist communism more readily than any of its other CONCP allies, but 
still refused to adopt a single label. No activist who understood the situation in the 
Portuguese colonies could realistically take a strong ideological line. Rather, as was the 
case in Europe, activists in the LSM and other groups “always followed [the African 
parties’] lead” in casting a wide net to build solidarity, conflicting only with advocates of 
Roberto’s FNLA that they associated with American imperialism. The LSM was willing 
to work with any group seriously dedicated to pursuing liberation on behalf of the CONCP 
parties. As Rick Sterling remembers, “We tended to work well with the groups that were 
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actually doing things on the ground, either through material support or really good effective 
outreach activity.” This included ACOA, MACSA, the Dutch Angola Comité, the SAC, 
Youth Against Fascism and War, and on occasion United Nations subcommittees.661 The 
New York branch of the LSM even worked with Newark Black Power sage Amiri Baraka 
after he embraced the Marxist revolutions in Portuguese Africa in the mid-1970s (see next 
chapter).662 In fact, the broad appeal of the LSM provided critical inroads into the black 
community due to its emphasis on African voices and cooperation with Bay Area groups, 
becoming one of the first non-black American organizations to print articles in the Black 
Panther and mainstream black newspapers.663 By late 1970, the extensive contacts 
throughout the continent led the liberation movements and European activists to identify 
LSM as a “priority centre” for coordinating literature distribution and solidarity activities 
in North America.664 Though the LSM occupied a position at the far left, it too found in 
the African liberation struggles a reason for forging unity across the political spectrum.  
By 1970, the essence of the radical network had formed. The SAC, LSM, and 
organizations with ties to the Zambia Group like MACSA acted as the informational center 
of the movement. Most drew heavily on a core of activists composed of veterans of the 
religious youth, supplemented by anti-imperial leftists from a variety of other backgrounds. 
Southern Africa provided the monthly news on the region that rarely appeared in 
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mainstream newspapers. LSM gave voice to the revolutions, disseminating their Marxist-
inspired analysis and illustrating in gritty detail the realities of their wars and national 
reconstruction projects. CRV and MACSA research provided critical analysis of American 
activities in the region, as did other organizations such as the Boston-based Africa Research 
Group, which had been founded with the assistance of SAC members. Each of these 
groups, their individual branches, and others like them around the country undertook 
varying levels of grassroots protest to dramatize their findings for the public and 
government officials. The main purpose of this activism was to provide an avenue for 
people to feel part of the movement, bring the issues to the attention of new audiences, and 
increase public pressure on governments and businesses to reassess their ties to Portugal 
and the minority governments.  
At the center of this movement was not a single ideology but rather a more general 
internationalist outlook. The Marxist LSM, radical CRV, and academic MACSA all rallied 
behind a criticism of Western policy that backed a deeply unequal status quo and 
unrestrained global capitalism. There was an element of Christian moralism, but more 
central was a leftist critique of an international structure skewed against Third World 
peoples. Change would emerge from the periphery where Euro-American control had 
begun to fray under the weight of colonialism. They worried that any movement centered 
strictly on a domestic context and lacking in this international solidarity component 
represented limited reformism that lacked the power to truly restructure the unequal 
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system.665 Hostility to the status quo and commitment to empowering Southern actors as 
part of a direct assault on the U.S. power structure provided a firm foundation for solidarity. 
It allowed them to focus on two key activities, providing what material support they could 
and building a domestic movement aimed at removing the greatest barrier to liberation: 
official American support for colonial wars. This latter issue proved vital for integrating 
African activism with the anti-war movement.  
Though the combined membership of these committees working on Africa never 
exceeded more than a few hundred to a thousand across the country during this period, 
their work raised the profile of the Portuguese African wars and southern Africa generally. 
The Lusophone revolutions would never displace Vietnam as the preeminent radical cause, 
but they were quickly becoming secondary fronts in the domestic war against global 
American imperialism. In 1968, the Portuguese colonies would be cited along with 
Vietnam during the occupation of Columbia University, where many of SAC’s secular 
members worked.666 Activists also convinced major national campaigns to pay greater 
attention to the Portuguese colonies, most notably the New Mobilization Committee to End 
the War in Vietnam (New Mobe).667 The (in)famous activist Bill Ayers would look back 
at the Lusophone struggles as integral parts of a global revolution, explaining  
The world is in flames, we thought, the people of the world rising against the 
octopus of imperialism and cutting off its tentacles one by one. It was a compelling 
image, apocalyptic: Cuba, one, Korea, two, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Angola, 
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Algeria, Ghana, and Viet Nam, of course, number eight, where the monster had 
overextended itself once and for all.668 
 
Groups like LSM, CRV, and MACSA helped tear down regional barriers and integrate 
southern Africa into a radical critique that had focused overwhelmingly on Southeast 
Asia.669 When Mondlane had traveled around the United States, he often entertained small 
and sometimes unreceptive gatherings. After 1970, Khan found that he spoke to well-
informed crowds, who more often than not wanted guidance on what actions to take as 
compared to justification for FRELIMO’s existence. This new state of affairs testified to 
the valuable legwork done by American allies of the Lusophone leaders.670 The Portuguese 
African revolutions had entered the American consciousness.  
The growth of the solidarity movement did not proceed smoothly on all fronts. 
Groups generally cooperated, but they faced internal issues. Most prominent was the 
continuing issue of racial diversity – or a lack there of – within the movement. All of the 
groups were multiracial, but in reality most were predominantly white in their leadership 
and membership. Robert Maurer remembers being troubled by the fact that the SAC had 
no blacks attending meetings in the 1960s, since the one African American associated with 
the committee resided in Chicago.671 Whites and African students and faculty constituted 
much of MACSA’s membership, though the organization worked regularly with African 
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American student groups.672 Some like Maurer felt that black leaders had simply failed to 
fully articulate the linkages between the international and domestic freedom struggles, but 
the reality was a combination of this and an ongoing suspicion of alliances with whites that 
developed from the Black Power movement. Where groups had black memberships, there 
were tensions over the perceived inappropriateness of whites leading an anti-colonial 
solidarity movement with black African revolutions.673  
Yet for the most part, the expansion of the solidarity movement did not lead to 
internal bickering and collapse, which affected some parts of the anti-war movement. The 
network of personal relationships that helped produce the student activists led them to 
maintain relationships with the liberal protest organizations that had preceded them. Above 
all there was ACOA, which through Houser’s stewardship maintained the largest research 
files, the best contacts, and the most extensive (though still meager) resources. The major 
activist groups from the Marxist LSM to the more moderate SAC would recommend fact 
sheets and letters from ACOA, while mining its sources to agitate for Africa within a 
community that continued to view the old guard of the civil rights era with some 
trepidation. Moreover, so long as both the churches and ACOA voiced a criticism of 
government policy in some way, the activists were not going to break with them. All were 
opposed to the same American structures that were inhibiting independence, and, as CRVer 
Mimi Edmunds remembered, it was important to maintain “somewhat of a united front.”674 
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By continuing to work with ACOA and church organizations, the radical youth maintained 
access to information, funding, foreign contacts, and the small handful of policymakers 
interested in African policy. Their presence both in and alongside these more established 
organizations provided the opportunity to help guide their actions, pulling what were once 
consistent if reluctant adherents to Cold War liberalism in increasingly revisionist and 
internationalist directions.   
 
Changing the Culture: The Influence of Youthful Radicals on ACOA and the NCC 
 As the Zambia network and groups like the LSM made headway in joining African 
liberation to the larger youth protest movement, they did not turn their backs on existing 
organizations that championed African issues, albeit from positions more aligned with 
prevailing Cold War concerns. The young radicals appreciated both the commitment and 
influence of ACOA and the church leadership, specifically the liberal subset of ecumenists 
like Margaret Flory that controlled the NCC. Deeply ingrained strategies of non-violence, 
a lingering commitment to liberal anti-communism, and a desire to please donors separated 
older organizations from the younger generation, but no one wished to sever relations. All 
were committed to the same goal of African liberation, and all had a role to play in 
expanding what remained a relatively small movement. Grassroots and national 
organizations cooperated on projects, and young leftists gained access to the highest levels 
of decision making in both ACOA and the churches. As a result, the anti-imperialism and 
internationalist ideology of the younger generation slowly pulled these once stalwart liberal 
groups to the left, empowering a newly assertive activism that challenged both official and 
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unofficial complicity in the maintenance of white minority rule. Youthful activists were 
aided in this mission by the CONCP nationalists, who expanded their efforts to court 
American opinion in the 1970s much as they did successfully in Europe. Whereas the 
Vietnam War had been mired in gray areas of national security and flag-waiving patriotism, 
objections to Portugal’s formal colonialism were less debatable. As a result, the shift away 
from traditional Cold War tenets of anti-communism and North Atlantic solidarity was 
dramatic and sudden, the doors to this political reordering thrust open by the deep national 
soul-searching engendered by Vietnam. The result was a broadening of the anti-colonial 
solidarity movement. By 1972, representatives of the CONCP parties counted among their 
vocal allies everyone from community organizers to the spiritual leaders of major 
Protestant churches.  
 The decentralized network that surrounded the SAC played a vital role in fueling 
this shift. Margaret Flory’s vision of the FIM had included changing the churches from 
within by introducing new methods to engage with the world. She circulated the Zambia 
Group’s 1967 strategy document to many NCC leaders.675 The Group shared her 
conviction, with one of the SAC’s foundational principles being to push the churches “to 
help make the many well-phrased resolutions [on Africa] be something more than 
words.”676 They also concluded at that first strategy session that shifting ACOA from “an 
elitist, single-strategy group to a catalytic membership organization” concerned with mass 
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mobilization would be vital for strengthening the movement. The Zambia Group urged 
individuals like ACOA employee and SAC member Janet McLaughlin (later Hooper) to 
push Houser in that direction, while groups like the SAC should “work as closely as 
feasible with them” in order to help shift the focus of the organization.677 Getting these 
institutions with their experience and resources behind the grassroots organizing of the 
youth generation would be necessary to build an effective national movement.  
 Given the ties of the SAC and the Zambia group to the churches, they became the 
logical starting point. The NCC and the individual Protestant churches had the ability to 
amplify and legitimize the message of the youth organizations. Their membership 
constituted some of the most influential lawmakers and business officials, as well as 
millions of stockholders and consumers. Churches had special ties to foundations, 
universities, and pension funds, and the NCC had communication channels to the top of 
the State Department (however ineffective). By the 1970s, the national institutions held 
roughly $3 billion in various stocks, mostly tied to pensions.678 Swaying the church to 
actively back the liberation movements not only held important ramifications for shifting 
official policy away from cooperation with Portugal and the minority regimes; it had the 
potential to pressure businesses as well. It had been with this political and social clout in 
mind that the SAC had appealed, initially unproductively, to the NCC and the constituent 
churches to join the bank campaign in the mid-1960s. Churches had initially balked at the 
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idea of divesting their funds from any firm, but as initial overtures to the banks were 
politely rebuffed, some of the more progressive churches took action.679 In so doing they 
were consciously following the lead of the student activists, which the churches agreed had 
pioneered the way, investigating southern Africa problems and demanding popular 
attention.680 The movement of young SAC members into the national church structure 
encouraged this shift, beginning with Ken Carstens in 1966, Tim Smith soon after, and Gail 
Morlan intermittently by the end of the decade. 
 By 1967, the NCC stood at a crossroads. Always more international in its outlook 
than the vast majority of parochial parishes, the ecumenical coordinating body had been 
deeply affected by the Vietnam War and the growth of national resistance to it. The result 
was a major reexamination of the churches’ involvement in the Cold War. In a statement 
titled “Imperatives of Peace and Responsibilities of Power,” the council asserted, according 
to historian Jill K. Gill, that “justice must be the foundation for true national security and 
international peace in an increasingly interdependent world – not occupational military 
forces.” The NCC had long articulated a position favoring decolonization and opposing 
minority government, but the newfound willingness to criticize American policy forced it 
to revisit its approach to international relations. The NCC argued that justice must trump 
the search for order and stability at all costs, recommending constraints on military 
adventurism, the protection of human rights, and support for the economic and cultural 
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vitality of all peoples through the creation of indigenous institutions free of American 
control.681 The new program focused on four areas that included global race relations with 
a special emphasis on Vietnam and southern Africa.682 The NCC worried that the 
government had embraced the white status quo in the latter region. Continuing to deny the 
legitimate political and moral demands of African peoples would invariably lead to 
violence unless something was done to move toward greater self-determination. 
Educational programs were needed to change the way that parishioners and the government 
viewed this brewing conflict, lest the hint of communist intrigue turn yet another regional 
conflict into the next Cold War quagmire. Importantly, even as the NCC moved to actively 
lobby its members and the government for a change in policy in the region, it did so with 
the intent of securing local rights without violence. The idea of a military revolution 
remained anathema to religious leaders, who hesitated to commit directly to the Portuguese 
colonies because they had taken up arms against Lisbon.683 Some were also concerned that 
the guns that FRELIMO, PAIGC, and MPLA were using to fight their wars likely came 
directly from communist countries, conflicting with the liberal consensus.684 
 It was here that the sympathetic network motivated by the Portuguese colonies 
played a pivotal role in shifting the debate toward greater solidarity with the revolutionary 
movements. In addition to the members of the SAC and Zambia Group that were slowly 
                                                 
681 Jill K. Gill, Embattled Ecumenism (DeKalb, Northern Illinois University Pres, 2011), 208.  
682 Letter, Robert S. Bilheimer to W.E. Grenville-Grey, 7 December 1967, Box 23, RG 6, NCC Papers, 
PHS.  
683 NCC, Department of International Affairs, “A Position Paper Concerning Southern Africa,” no date [c. 
late 1967], Box 14, RG 6, NCC Papers, PHS.   
684 Unpublished article on Mondlane’s visit to NCC in February 1967, Folder 6, Box 22, RG 8, NCC 
Papers, PHS.  
 294 
entering into consultative circles at the NCC, the International Affairs Department looked 
to former missionaries to guide its new program. Many had ties to Angola and 
Mozambique, including the director of the program, Murray MacInness, a Canadian 
missionary who had been in Angola until 1964. He had seen firsthand the violence the 
Portuguese used in crushing the 1961 rebellion, and he understood why Africans took up 
arms.685 American religious leaders still active in the region accepted the potential of armed 
resistance even sooner, notably Bishop Ralph Dodge whose support for the MPLA and 
Mondlane earned him bans from the Portuguese colonies.686 MacInnes, Dodge, Morlan, 
and Carstens helped shift church emphasis from the relatively peaceful but inactive 
situation in South Africa to the active revolutions in the Portuguese colonies. In late 1967, 
Dodge challenged the NCC to find a “new strategy” for dealing with southern Africa since 
its approach was not working, to which one governor responded that perhaps the temptation 
to focus on apartheid should be shelved “because the real issues is Mozambique, Angola, 
etc.”687 Young radicals and those closest to the revolutionaries urged the church to provide 
support where change was possible, regardless of the presence of violence.  
 Before his death, Mondlane and FRELIMO were pivotal figures in pushing the 
development of this solidarity. As a longtime advocate of Gandhian protest who had once 
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lectured Andrew Young on the issue, the Mozambican appreciated the difficult position 
the churches faced in supporting his and other CONCP movements. In early 1967, he 
visited the NCC headquarters on Riverside Drive to urge church support by presenting his 
vision of the revolution, which combined military confrontation with national 
reconstruction.688 It was these requests for medicines, textbooks, and the like that – as they 
had for the Ford Foundation earlier – provided an opening for church leaders to reevaluate 
their views of revolutionary parties, presented by someone that many knew well. Mondlane 
also had Khan build relationships with church members, and sent the party’s vice president 
to speak with them as well.689 FRELIMO also consciously separated the medical program 
from military operations in order to strengthen appeals to church organization that all 
donations could be directed toward civilian programs.690 The NCC began to support 
FRELIMO after Mondlane’s visit, but there were still reservations at the highest levels. As 
the head of the Church World Services (CWS) – the NCC’s international aid arm – 
explained to one of Mondlane’s close associates in Dar es Salaam, “we are not in the 
business to support political movements,” especially when those movements were waging 
an armed struggle.691 
 The momentum, however, had shifted, and the NCC and the Protestant churches 
drifted toward greater cooperation with the revolutions. The young activists’ overseas 
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experience had made them valuable experts as churches and other institutions looked for 
information on the movements. This was especially true in the case of Portuguese Africa, 
where the removal of missionaries had closed traditional sources of news. During this 
period, Margaret Flory circulated the Zambia Group’s working paper, with its emphatic 
support for educational, medical, and nation-building assistance to FRELIMO. After 
returning from the Mozambique Institute in 1968, for example, Flory also arranged for Bill 
and Ruth Minter to work temporarily in New York, where Bill wrote a scathing critique of 
the Euro-American involvement in the liberation wars (published as Portuguese Africa and 
the West).692 Church leadership even adopted the CRV’s “Mozambique Will be Free” as 
recommended reading.693 The NCC recognized the value of these youthful perspectives as 
it advanced its Africa program, and Morlan, Carstens, Smith, and occasionally Minter 
contributed to deliberations on southern Africa staff work during this formative period.694 
Smith, the field aide for African affairs for the United Church of Christ, became 
particularly outspoken, arguing in an eight page letter that made the rounds of the NCC 
leadership in 1968 that 
Revolution in Southern Africa is totally justifiable theologically, ethically, 
strategically, and politically. . . The time is long past for us to sit and try to justify 
revolution theologically. It is time to try to interpret the African nationalist 
movements to the mass of an American fearful of any form of violence in the world, 
to press for a new American foreign policy (neither reactionary nor anti-
revolutionary) which will insure that American will not intervene on behalf of the 
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white status quo in Southern Africa, and to aid the liberation movements in as many 
ways as we possibly can.695 
 
As the only active revolutions in the region, it was the Portuguese colonies that demanded 
immediate aid if real change was going to occur either there or in the white minority states.  
The revolution bubbling up from the bottom of the NCC was greatly encouraged 
by a coalition of more established leaders. In addition to MacInnes, Bishop Dodge became 
the centerpiece of some denominational programs as early as 1968, telling the leadership 
in New York that both Mondlane and Neto had assured him their parties would “warmly 
welcome any assistance in meeting [humanitarian] needs in the occupied territories.”696 
They were joined by a group of black churchmen under the leadership of Rev. Gayraud 
Wilmore, who were rapidly becoming what one internal memo called “a new force in [the 
NCC’s] involvement with Africa.”697 Wilmore explained in 1970 that the Black Power 
movement had led him to embrace international black solidarity alongside interracial 
coalition, because he now understood “racism as a permanent, institutionalized system 
related to American expansion and intervention.” African Americans connected to the 
NCC argued that “blacks must free themselves. The role of the church is to assist groups 
already engaged in liberation.”698 This had also been the conclusion of the World Council 
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of Churches (WCC) at the Uppsala meeting of 1968, adding yet another layer of support 
for the church’s embrace of the revolutionary African movements.   
 By 1970, a sea change had occurred in the way the NCC and much of the church 
leadership viewed the liberation movements. It had swallowed its objections to violence, 
realizing that the revolutions were the most effective agents of change where the 
Portuguese government brooked no opposition. The NCC began viewing the liberation 
movements as governments-in-waiting which effectively implied “accepting the military 
side of things” within church deliberations.699 It recognized that parties like FRELIMO had 
the right and indeed the moral duty to defend their people. Major contributions began to 
flow to the Mozambicans and the MPLA. This still consisted largely of humanitarian aid, 
but there was an increasing understanding that medicines, clothes, and other material would 
also be used to advance nation building projects in the liberated regions and rear areas 
rather than merely in the refugee centers.700 Even the Quaker-backed American Friends 
Service Committee (AFSC), one of the most firmly pacifist organizations associated with 
an NCC denomination, had embraced the Portuguese African liberation movements by the 
early 1970s, starting their Southern African Program at the specific request of the MPLA 
during this period.701 The head of the CWS also changed his tune, explaining in 1968 that 
he actively wanted medicines to flow with FRELIMO over the border. “My sympathy is 
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clearly with the Mozambique people and not with their foreign masters with whom we 
have through NATO an unholy alliance,” he explained, confident that “our major 
denominational supporters have now complete sympathy with the cause.”702 And this was 
indeed the case. By 1969, the head of the NCC’s international office offered his agreement 
with Gayraud Wilmore that “Assistance to FRELIMO is in this context assistance to social 
change in South Africa.”703 The churches had overcome the veneer of violence to see the 
revolutions as they had always wished to be seen. In the words of one internal NCC 
document, the “Liberation movements are providing hope, change, [and] dignity in contrast 
to the ‘order’ and oppression of the minority regimes.”704 
 In overcoming this initial resistance to violence, the NCC and its most active church 
leaderships were treading new ground. Rather than remaining passive until international 
crises made church actions ineffectual as they had in Vietnam, the denominations were 
trying to play a productive role in shaping discussions on the revolutions before they 
directly affected the United States.705 That the churches had decided to support leftist 
organizations actively fighting a NATO ally meant that they were breaking free of what 
the NCC recognized as the limitations of “’cold war’ thinking.”706 Most importantly, they 
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were doing so in a way that linked them with the youth who were increasingly taking to 
the streets and lecture halls to educate the country on African independence struggles. In 
1969, the NCC asked in internal discussions if a “campaign of military disengagement with 
Portugal [could] be organized with support of anti-Vietnam forces?”707 The answer from 
members of the Zambia Group and the SAC – a number of whom participated in these 
specific deliberations – was an enthusiastic yes.  
The search for justice that informed the creation of the new southern African 
program inspired a new vision of American interaction with the world that closely 
paralleled youth internationalism. At the heart of this stood a new responsibility for 
Western peoples to recognize the right Third World peoples had in developing their own 
futures. As one consultation between the NCC and WCC concluded, there can be “no 
justice in our world without a transfer of economic resources to undergird the redistribution 
of political power and to make cultural self-determination meaningful.”708 The churches 
were shifting from the paternalistic missionary activities of past generations to a new role 
of “empowerment,” which dovetailed with the vision of a new, flexible church activism 
that Margaret Flory had placed at the heart of the FIM program. Yet perhaps most 
important, the NCC and the churches defined the fight against racism, poverty, economic 
exploitation, and disenfranchisement as globally unified in a single system of reactionary 
repression. “The problems of justice-liberation-development,” one discussion among 
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denominational representatives concluded in 1971, “are problems of peoples of other 
countries, of peoples of our own country, and of peoples in our own neighborhoods.”709 
The change in perspective was also occurring at the churches’ most important ally 
on African affairs, ACOA. Longtime secretary George Houser had been among the most 
assertive civil rights activists in the 1950s, but the necessity of keeping ACOA funded and 
involved in Washington discussions promoted restraint. He feared alienating liberal and 
church institutions as well as official allies, resulting in a careful adherence to a single-
issue stance that was more anti-colonial than in solidarity with the liberation groups. 
ACOA had good relations with individuals like Mondlane, but this did little to dissuade 
youthful activists from viewing ACOA as elitist and overly cautious. And most 
importantly, ACOA’s history of support for Holden Roberto and his FNLA put the 
organization at odds with radicals and youths generally, whose leftist politics placed them 
firmly in the camp of the CONCP and the MPLA. Despite an influx of new staff, Houser’s 
presence and loose associations with the government led many to believe that the 
committee was, as fieldworker Prexy Nesbitt captured, “CIA . . . or somethin’.”710 
 Yet like the churches, ACOA continued to work with the young generation of 
activists, which pulled the institution increasingly to the left. New blood entered in the 
form of SAC member Janet Hooper and Robert Van Lierop, an African American lawyer 
who represented the NAACP on the ACOA board and had close relations with FRELIMO. 
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Van Lierop helped recruit another radical young African American in Charles Hightower, 
who became the second head of the Washington office. Like the churches, ACOA also 
looked to knowledgeable activists like Bill Minter to consult on new informational 
programs.711 Each of these individuals agitated for more radical strategies to support the 
liberation movements, a firmer commitment to their socialist programs, and for ACOA to 
a take a more anti-imperial approach to international affairs. Houser hesitated, but he was 
encouraged by the shifting attitudes of major donors like the churches. The Zambia Group 
was pivotal in arranging for a donation that stipulated ACOA’s creation of a new, 
grassroots arm that would mobilize African Americans and youth.712 This initiative 
resulted in the creation of a field work position in Chicago for 1970, which Houser filled 
with the outspoken Prexy Nesbitt, a satellite SAC member recently returned from working 
with FRELIMO’s propaganda office in Dar es Salaam.713 This influx of youthful vigor 
combined with the rise to prominence of Jennifer Davis, a progressive South African exile, 
within ACOA moved the committee away from its rhetorical commitment to liberal anti-
communism toward a more radical position.  
There is perhaps no greater evidence of this shift in thinking than George Houser’s 
reluctant embrace of the least successful of the CONCP groups, the MPLA. Even after 
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Holden Roberto’s paranoia and ironfisted rule had taxed the FNLA’s relationship with 
ACOA, Houser had refused to abandon his old ally. The MPLA had made contact with 
Houser as early as 1963, but they received no aid. He justified the decision according to 
the strategy of avoiding involvement in the tug-of-war between competing nationalist 
parties, but such attitudes were somewhat disingenuous. Roberto had long received the 
lion’s share of ACOA and church assistance, which Houser influenced as Roberto’s 
primary U.S. contact. In later years, Houser could not recall fully what influenced his 
preference for Roberto, but a vestigial belief that anti-communists were more acceptable 
partners in the Cold War context likely prejudiced the decision.714 Whatever the reason, 
Houser’s position put him in conflict with ACOA’s younger elements, whose radicalism 
led them to back the MPLA as a socialist movement and the natural Angolan extension of 
the CONCP.715 As internal agitation grew and influential allies like the churches abandoned 
Cold War pretenses, Houser gradually shifted his position. In 1969 ACOA assisted the 
medical services of the MPLA for the first time, under pressure from internal forces to 
recognize the MPLA’s advent as the more successful liberation group.716 Once this initial 
hurdle had been cleared, avenues for cooperation between ACOA and the MPLA 
increased, though Houser refused to abandon the FNLA completely.717 This continued 
cautiousness frustrated young members of ACOA, but it was a start. 
                                                 
714 George Houser, phone interview with author, 10 March 2014.  
715 Prexy Nesbitt was the leading critic to put his thoughts to paper, but there were a number that shared his 
views. See memo, Prexy Nesbitt to Staff and Board of ACOA, 14 September 1970, Reel III, ACOA 
Microfilm. 
716 Letter, George Houser to Agostinho Neto, 11 June 1969, Box 79, ACOA Papers.  
717 Memo, George Houser to Murray MacInnes, 23 June 1971, Reel III, ACOA Microfilm.  
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 As the Roberto debate shows, there were limitations to how much ACOA could 
change. It never adopted a broad anti-imperial approach to Africa as did the churches. 
Attempts by staff members to rally support by linking the African revolutions with 
struggles in Palestine and Latin America were quashed by Houser and the executive 
board.718 He feared expanding advocacy work beyond southern Africa would dilute 
ACOA’s effectiveness, fueling internal debates over where to focus efforts, alienating 
funders who held different views on Israel or communist internationalism, and sacrificing 
ACOA’s prominent position in the field of African information. Houser was right from the 
organizational standpoint, but it stifled and frustrated young employees, notably Charles 
Hightower and Prexy Nesbitt. Moreover, this singular focus on Africa by a predominantly 
white, moderate leadership prevented ACOA from making inroads into the black 
community, where most viewed it with suspicion precisely because it seemed starkly 
removed from the radical internationalism of the Black Power movement.719 The one 
concession that young activists were able to achieve is that in the late 1960s, ACOA began 
to connect southern Africa and the Vietnam War. While it never equated FRELIMO or the 
PAIGC with the North Vietnamese, it promoted a narrative in its election position paper of 
1968 that American complicity in Portuguese colonialism closely mirrored the gradualist 
entry into Southeast Asia.720 This new approach to selling the African revolutions among 
                                                 
718 Copy of Letter, Peter Weiss to Charles Hightower, 7 August 1970, Reel III, ACOA Microfilm.  
719 Prexy Nesbitt to Staff and Board of ACOA, 14 September 1970, Reel III, ACOA Microfilm. 
720 ACOA, “The United States and Southern Africa: A Position Paper for the 1968 Campaign,” 1968, 
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liberal audiences provided a gateway for anti-war youth to begin engaging with ACOA, 
who some had long suspected of representing government interests. 
 The problem was that ACOA and Houser were unsure of their identity. Though 
both had been steeped in the tradition of grassroots popular dissent, the committee’s rise to 
prominence as a respected resource on Africa demanded it avoid an overly ideological 
gloss. As the head of the Washington Office on Africa, Ted Lockwood, commented a few 
years later, Houser’s ACOA “has always been a bit uncertain as to whether it was really 
liberal or whether it was more left than that.”721 Whatever his natural inclinations, Houser 
felt that ACOA could not be too radical without undermining its own authority. He 
considered the organization non-establishment but not anti-establishment, meaning it was 
independently trying to shape policy by working with government contacts.722 Houser did 
not disapprove of others taking more assertive approaches, but ACOA had to tread 
carefully lest it alienate important allies and become lost in the ideological infighting that 
undermined the anti-war movement. Rather, Houser understood ACOA as a “meeting 
ground for various forces” – a force for coordinating and promoting interest in southern 
Africa from the grassroots to the halls of power.723  
A number of younger staffers and associates appreciated Houser’s perspective. 
They understood that an effective solidarity movement required a variety of perspectives 
in order to wield political influence, and ACOA appealed to powerful constituencies still 
                                                 
721 Letter, Ted Lockwood to Peter Weiss, 21 January 1981, Box 2, Series 2, Papers of the Washington 
Office on Africa, Yale Divinity Library.  
722 Memo, Houser to Executive Board, 29 September 1970, Reel III, ACOA Microfilm.  
723 Memo, Houser to Executive Board, April 1970, Reel III, ACOA Microfilm.   
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skeptical of student activists, much as the NCC was important for mobilizing religious 
communities. The problem then was how to involve ACOA in the grassroots aspects of 
consciousness raising without inheriting the suspicion youthful radicals attached to the 
organization – rightly or wrongly. As Robert Van Lierop explained in early 1972: 
I do not think the ACOA can or should become a radical “movement” organization 
. . . [it] is and probably should remain one which is capable of pressuring churches, 
corporations, organs of government, etc. . . . The answer I think lies in the need for 
ACOA itself to recognize its own limitations and to be willing to support field work 
and other projects without having itself necessarily identified as the sponsor of such 
activities. . . the ACOA may never see a return (such as increased membership or 
increased contributions) from supporting such efforts. But the fact remains that 
efforts such as these go a long way towards raising the political consciousness of 
many individuals within the United States.724  
 
Houser had long hesitated to commit ACOA to anything for which it could not achieve at 
least partial recognition and maintain some modicum of control.725  Houser was also 
skeptical that there was an immediate possibility for any grassroots movement on behalf 
of southern Africa, but the sudden proliferation of activist organizations around 1970 such 
as MACSA, LSM, CRV, and others chipped away at these doubts.726 It was these attitudes 
that had to be adjusted, and it was here that young members had the most success in 
changing the old community organizer’s mind. ACOA had an opportunity to help build a 
wider movement, if only it would embrace its role as the mentor rather than the center. It 
was this realization along with the shift in church attention that helped fuel popular 
solidarity. Beginning in the early 1970s, ACOA began to act – in Houser’s own words – 
                                                 
724 Memo, Van Lierop to Members of the Executive Board of ACOA, 22 February 1972, Reel III, ACOA 
Microfilm.  
725 ACOA’s ambiguous relation with the ARG was the most prominent example.  
726 Memo, Houser to Executive Board, April 1970, Reel III, ACOA Microfilm.   
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as a “catalytic agent” in the creation and support of new organizations that would play 
invaluable roles in building the mass movement.727 
 In one example, ACOA provided the seed money necessary to launch the Chicago 
Committee for the Liberation of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea (CCLAMG). Here, the 
full diversity of the radical solidarity movement came together to demonstrate the 
intertwined nature of transnational anti-imperial politics. Nesbitt’s experience in Chicago 
had illustrated the limitations of ACOA, and it pushed Van Lierop and other more radical 
members of the executive board to convince Houser to accept ACOA’s new role in 
supporting separate community endeavors.728 ACOA needed an organization that could 
distribute information on the African revolutions free of institutional baggage, and the 
solution lay in the newly formed CCLAMG (pronounced “clam”).  
 CCLAMG emerged from the intersecting activisms of religious internationalism 
and radicalism. Eileen Hanson, the former Frontier Intern and CRV member, founded the 
group with Nesbitt and CRV alumnae Nancy Freehafer and Mimi Edmunds.729 The group 
focused on raising awareness and activism around the Portuguese colonies, since by 1971 
they had become the unquestioned leaders in the southern African revolutions. They were 
one piece of an anti-imperial network that had emerged from the CRV in Chicago, where 
                                                 
727 Memo, George Houser to Steering Committee of WOA, 27 November 1972, Reel IV, ACOA 
Microfilm.  
728 ACOA Executive Board Meeting Notes, 14 September 1970, ACOA Papers, Proquest History Vault; 
Memo, Robert Van Lierop to Members of the Executive Board of ACOA, 22 February 1972, Reel III, 
ACOA Microfilm. 
729 Both Freehafer and Edmunds had been involved with the CRV and the Committee for a Free 
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date, Folder: CAIC, Carole Collins Papers, MSU; Letter, Deb Brewster to Dwight, 20 May 1973, Box 11, 
New World Resource Center Papers, Chicago History Museum (Chicago, IL). [Hereafter, NWRC, CHM] 
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a number of regionally focused groups operated in a single collective known as the New 
World Resource Center (NWRC).730 The goal of the NWRC and its component 
organizations was to “awaken people in this country to the problems of injustice and 
oppression around the world, to deepen people’s understanding of the fundamental causes 
of these problems, and to enable them to work actively for a world based on social and 
economic justice.”731 Though Vietnam still raged, CCLAMG was the most active 
component within the NWRC, and it championed broad Third World empowerment versus 
the more constrained message of anti-war movement.732 CCLAMG’s anti-imperialism was 
exactly the kind of politics Houser had traditionally avoided, but ACOA nonetheless 
became the single largest donor to the establishment of the NWRC during its genesis in 
1971.733  
 CCLAMG became a new hub in the growth of the grassroots solidarity movement. 
Through the NWRC, it distributed a broad variety of literature to Chicago and the 
surrounding states including publications from ACOA, LSM, CRV, FRELIMO, and other 
regional organizations like MACSA and the Committee for a Free Mozambique (another 
product of the SAC-CRV nexus).734 The group traveled widely in order to participate in 
                                                 
730 Hanson-Kelley interview. 
731 Funding Proposal for the New World Resource Center, no date, Box 13, NWRC, CHM.  
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anti-imperial conferences, becoming with the LSM one of the two most active groups 
internationally through attendance at the European Easter solidarity gatherings.735 
Members spoke in cities across the region, including Toronto, Ottawa, Washington, DC, 
and Iowa City.736 Yet like many groups such as MACSA and SAC, the most important 
work involved constant appeals to the community. They introduced Chicago directly to the 
liberation movements by bringing in representatives such as Khan and Fernandes, while 
Nesbitt and other speakers with direct experience in the movements spoke regularly.737 
CCLAMG sponsored African dinners, visited schools, worked with churches, and 
boycotted local businesses involved in southern Africa including Gulf Oil and General 
Electric.738 When Prexy Nesbitt had first returned to Chicago in 1969 he had found a 
“media wasteland” on southern Africa, but just four years later CCLAMG information 
saturation had become so extensive that they were able to broadcast a four part series on 
southern Africa on local television.739 Though there was some tension within the collective 
about accepting money from the liberal ACOA, which Hanson remembered as a bit stodgy 
from the youth perspective, CCLAMG and the NWRC depended on the organization in 
their early phases as they operated just above the red.740 
                                                 
735 In 1973 alone, CCLAMG attended more than ten conferences outside Chicago. NWRC, Funding 
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  Most importantly, CCLAMG like its youth counterparts developed a broad reach. 
It took a leading role in the local anti-imperial movement, and by 1973 Angola had become 
part of an international triumvirate of Third World causes alongside Vietnam and (later) 
Chile, discussed at the majority of radical gatherings.741 CCLAMG also reached out to 
other New Left causes. The “founding mothers” of the NWRC such as Hanson and 
Edmunds were also active in women’s liberation, and they created bridges between the 
movements. They actively collaborated with women of the MPLA’s Organização da 
Mulher de Angola (Angolan Women’s Organization, OMA) who encouraged solidarity 
organizing among women’s groups, which led local feminists to urge support for the 
southern African struggles.742 Nesbitt helped provide entrance into the black community, 
while Hanson’s church connections (despite her drift away from religion) offered a chance 
to reinforce the NCC’s national program at the local level. When Robert Van Lierop 
worked with FRELIMO to produce a thirty minute film on their liberation struggle in 1972, 
CCLAMG showed it more than 100 times in 1973, dividing its showings evenly between 
black groups, churches, and students organizations.743 CCLAMG encouraged the various 
constituencies to continue their research into the revolutions by directly contacting ACOA 
and other groups like the LSM. In this way, the CCLAMG legitimized Houser’s non-
establishment organization for new audiences by linking it to radical groups like LSM and 
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disseminating literature. The symbiotic relationship between the two organizations 
illustrated the unique nature of the solidarity movement, which crafted a unity based on the 
common goal of international support for southern African liberation despite ideological 
differences. 
If groups like the CCLAMG translated ACOA and indeed the churches for New 
Left activists, ACOA became an important conduit for connecting grassroots organizers 
with those in power. Houser and the churches had both forged respectable working 
relationships with congressmen and low level State Department officials, but they had been 
disappointed by the lack of action regarding southern Africa, and the Portuguese colonies 
in particular. Even sympathetic congressmen like Charles Diggs, the chair of the House 
subcommittee on Africa, were moving slowly.  In early 1970, Charles Hightower 
complained of Diggs’ “ambiguous approach” to African affairs, which clearly sought 
confrontation but relied heavily on academic and business interests who advised a gradual 
approach to Portugal and the minority regimes. “Diggs did not seem to know what he 
wanted: a conference of specialists, or an educative meeting of grassroots Africanists, or 
some combination,” Hightower vented. It was up to ACOA and other influential movement 
organs to introduce new blood into Congressional discussions.744 Over the next few years, 
ACOA and to a lesser extent the churches helped Diggs discover grassroots organizing, 
aided by the rise of black activism on the topic beginning in 1972 (see next chapter).  
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Specifically, ACOA and the churches helped legitimize the New Left activists as 
reliable sources on the revolutions. Moderate institutions had come to depend on the 
Zambia Group and radical solidarity organizations like LSM for information, and they 
urged their governmental allies to do the same. Bill Minter landed high on the list of 
witnesses that ACOA recommended to Congressman Diggs when he began his 
investigation into American commitments to Portugal in 1969, as did the CRV and SAC.745 
Within a year, Diggs was reading movement materials such as the Dutch Angola Comité’s 
Facts and Report and the Committee for Freedom in Mozambique’s profile of 
FRELIMO.746 Other congressman also embraced the more radical grassroots perspective. 
In February of 1972, Robert Van Lierop joined George Houser in testifying against the 
Azores base agreement in front of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which inspired 
a scathing letter from Ted Kennedy to President Nixon a short time later.747  
The growth of ties between the Congress and the solidarity movement became 
formalized in 1972 with the founding of the Washington Office on Africa (WOA). 
ACOA’s D.C. office had been in operation for four years at that point with support from 
individual church denominations, and the NCC had increased its lobbying efforts in the 
late 1960s.748 But both had found that the Portuguese propaganda had worked in 
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combination with similar efforts by Rhodesia and South Africa to build a broad sympathy 
in the congress, especially among influential southern congressmen who had little interest 
in interfering with white rule. The “southern African lobbies are working very well,” a 
former State Department official had told NCC officials in 1968, “The only way to combat 
this . . . was by sustained concentrated staff work.”749 It was just such staff work by the 
churches and ACOA that had helped open new avenues for cooperation with Diggs and 
beyond, but the growth of congressional interest in regional politics and the increasing 
cooperation of solidarity groups provided a new opportunity. In late 1971, the NCC and 
ACOA agreed to combine their efforts along with a few small trade unions to create WOA. 
They chose Rev. Edgar “Ted” Lockwood to direct the office. An episcopal priest and 
lawyer who had been active in civil rights causes, Lockwood became interested in Africa 
when he began researching church investments in the region. The card-carrying member 
of the socialist party became a vocal proponent of full divestment and an ally of 
internationalist youth pushing this perspective within the churches (see below).750 His 
appointment heading WOA was a victory for radical youth, and WOA took a polite if 
increasingly internationalist approach to its lobbying of Congress on African issues.  
WOA was in many ways the culmination of the Zambia Groups ambitions to 
reshape domestic policy. It emerged as the result of cooperation between the NCC and 
ACOA, which had taken increasingly aggressive tacks in confronting continued white 
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minority rule. After its founding, it became an important source of both pressure and 
information opposing continued cooperation with the white minority regimes, focusing 
heavily on continued NATO aid to Portugal and the importation of Rhodesian chrome 
under the notorious Byrd Amendment. Lockwood also helped bridge the gap between the 
grassroots and policymakers. His close cooperation with congressmen like Gale McGee, 
the head of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa, was accompanied by 
strong ties built with grassroots organizations such as CCLAMG.751 WOA provided a 
consistent pathway through which activists, their publications, and their ideas could gain a 
hearing on Capitol Hill. As a result of this work, a new flow of information critical of 
Portugal and the minority regimes of southern Africa began to have greater and greater 
influence on Congressional decision-making. In 1973, for instance, Congressman Charles 
Rangel would introduce a bill to halt exports of chemical herbicides to Portugal, 
specifically citing one of the LSM’s interviews with an MPLA soldier as his inspiration.752 
It was in part through WOA – and before it ACOA and the churches – that legislators 
discovered in the early 1970s that a growing number of young people were taking an 
interest in southern Africa and particularly the Portuguese colonies. They looked to 
solidarity organizations and their plethora of publications for information on the 
revolutions and ways they could join the struggle. The extension of the Congressional-
activist coalition to the grassroots began slowly in the early 1970s, but it picked up speed 
as popular action demonstrated the true breadth of solidarity sentiment. 
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Solidarity in the Streets and at the Pumps: The Beginning of the Gulf Boycott 
 Solidarity with the revolutions manifested most widely in attacks on businesses 
operating in southern Africa. The promotion of conscientious investment had been the most 
public activity on behalf of southern Africa since 1965, when SDS, SAC, CORE, and 
ACOA initiated the protest of Chase Manhattan. The churches haltingly followed their 
youth, but major institutional divestment was slow, highlighted by actions from the 
Methodist Board of Missions in 1968 and the United Methodist Church the following 
year.753 The effects were important within the churches, as it provoked some like the United 
Church of Christ to define policies aimed at promoting “Corporate social responsibility” 
in a number of areas, including racial and economic justice, peace, Third World 
development, environmental protection, and gender equality.754 But the bank campaign had 
passed its zenith by 1970 when the alliance on southern Africa had truly begun to congeal. 
South Africa did not renew the loan in 1969 after conditions had greatly improved,  
providing a pyrrhic victory for the movement while robbing it of an effective rallying 
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point.755 More importantly, the Chase protest had spread slowly beyond New York and the 
enclaves where SAC alumni were working to build activism.756  
 The problem with the bank campaign was its timing as the first such action, but it 
failed to grab the popular imagination because it tried to build a movement in revolutionary 
times around a cause for which there was no revolution. Apartheid was widely reviled, but 
the South Africans had effectively exiled both the ANC and the PAC. With no active 
resistance in the country, anti-apartheid solidarity became a relic of the civil rights 
movement, which failed to capture the zeitgeist of the post-1968 United States. The 
Portuguese colonies and their dynamic liberation movements better fit the moment, but 
they lacked the symbol that dramatized U.S. involvement in the region. NATO complicity 
worked well for attracting the anti-war crowd, but activists wanted to place the Lusophone 
struggles near the level of Vietnam not as an addendum to it. The problem, as one ACOA 
staffer pondered in 1969, was finding “ways of ‘Chase Manhattanizing’ the economic and 
military institutions through which we work with Portugal.”757 The growing success of the 
liberation movements provided an opportunity to invest domestic activism with renewed 
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energy if only they could find something that directly connected the African struggles with 
domestic issues in an immediate and concrete way.  
Gulf Oil provided the solution. The CONCP parties had long urged their supporters 
to protest the foreign investments in the Portuguese colonies, which they asserted directly 
funded the metropolitan war effort. During the 1960s, the largest payments were coming 
from the oil companies who descended on what one official report referred to as the 
“sleeping giant” of Africa.758 Speculation occurred at various points in all three of the 
mainland colonies. The most successful and therefore most offensive company was Gulf 
Oil, which had first negotiated exploration for rights Angola and Mozambique in 1964. 
FRELIMO criticized Gulf for its role in assisting the metropolis to exploit Africa's natural 
resources. The company, the party argued, provided the expertise and capital in a situation 
“where the mother-country has no economic possibilities of its own.”759 In the social 
scientific theories of the CONCP movements, this investment made Angola, Mozambique, 
and other southern African states virtual colonies of the United States.760 Gulf’s payments 
to the Lisbon government for exploration and drilling rights in Angola indirectly funded 
the military ventures, since almost half of the annual Portuguese budget went to 
maintaining three wars by the early 1970s. Fortunately for the regime, Gulf discovered 
viable oil deposits near Cabinda off the coast of Angola and began operations in the mid-
1960s. As military costs rose for Lisbon, so too did the payments for Angola’s mineral 
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wealth, with the production of crude tripling between 1968 and 1969 alone.761 The $61 
million paid by Gulf to the state in 1972 amounted to almost sixty percent of military 
expenditures in Angola or just under a third of those in Mozambique.762 For a country as 
poor as Portugal, these revenues were a major windfall.  
 In 1969, the decentralized network responded to the CONCP parties’ calls for 
action.763 ACOA had known about Gulf’s activities but wondered if these payments to 
Portugal would be enough to incite public action. Gas was after all a necessity, and there 
were other targetable products.764 Radical grassroots organizations had fewer doubts due 
to their ideological agreement with FRELIMO and MPLA that the company’s presence 
represented a clear form of American economic imperialism in a way colonial coffee 
production, for example, did not. The CRV spearheaded the campaign, first identifying 
Gulf as a major backer of Portuguese colonialism in its study of Mozambique.765 A few 
months later, Bill Minter and ACOA’s Jennifer Davis published a carefully research 
investigation of American involvement in the Portuguese colonies for Africa Today, 
including a searing criticism of oil investments.766 Finally n 1971, the CRV New York 
branch that included FRELIMO associate and future CCLAMG founder Nancy Freehafer 
                                                 
761 Bureau of Mines, International Petroleum Annual 1969 (Washington: Department of the Interior, 
1971), 8. 
762 ACOA Fact Sheet, “Why We Protest Gulf Oil in Angola,” June 1973, AAA. See also Houser, 185.  
763 FRELIMO complained “the policy of encouraging these companies is part of the Portuguese war 
against the people of Mozambique.” “Caetano, Capitalism, Cahora-Bassa,” Mozambique Revolution 40 
(September 1969), 6.  
764 Reflecting its non-establishment nature, ACOA flirted with the idea of “mount[ing] a public campaign 
plus resolutions in Congress to get the U.S. government, by Executive Act, to ban Angolan coffee.” Letter, 
Gary Gappert to Diggs, 8 December 1969, Box 208, Diggs Papers, MSRC, HU.  
765 CRV/NY, Mozambique Will be Free (New York: CRV, 1969), 23.  
766 “Allies in Empire,” Special Issue, Africa Today 17:4 (July-August 1970).   
 319 
produced a detailed attack on Gulf’s operations in Angola. Its analysis focused on Africa, 
but it argued the company “literally engulfed the globe” with an equally “long (oily) 
history” supporting reactionary regimes in South Africa, Bolivia, Iran, the Philippines, and 
Taiwan. Puns aside, the CRV was among the first to reveal the extent to which Gulf 
payments aided Lisbon’s wars.767 These numbers, along with the firm’s close ties to the 
American military, made it a perfect symbol of domestic complicity in Portuguese 
exploitation and repression, which linked it to a number of wider New Left causes.  
As the New York CRV finalized its research, it began to organize a protest at the 
1970 Gulf stockholder’s meeting in Pittsburgh. It joined with the SAC to make overtures 
to ACOA and the NCC, who offered their support to the young activists.  In contrast to 
earlier bank divestment, the churches were now fully on board, approving plans for an 
extended campaign to be undertaken in coordination with other elements of the emerging 
solidarity movement.768 ACOA felt the time was right for broader action.769 The New York 
based organizations then reached out to the Gulf Action Committee, a group of Pittsburgh 
radicals opposing the corporation’s activities abroad and hostility to unions at home.770 It 
was this coalition that disrupted the Gulf meeting described at the beginning of the chapter. 
That the churches, ACOA, and radical students rallied around Gulf was a major step in the 
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development of the solidarity movement. The bank campaign had focused narrowly on 
institutions directly lending to the apartheid state, but this was something new. Boycotting 
Gulf extended the critique to any corporation that aided colonialism and minority rule with 
proceeds generated in the territories, opening up a new and more expansive form of 
resistance and international pressure that would become one of the primary aspects of 
future organizing.771 It would also develop methods for establishing a boycott among 
myriad constituencies through the utilization of the decentralized activist network.  
In the months following the board meeting, all elements of the coalition worked to 
expand the movement. SAC, MACSA, CRV, and LSM promoted the Gulf boycott, linking 
it to Vietnam for the anti-war crowd.772 ACOA concentrated on promoting campus actions, 
distributing a list of major university investors in Gulf and working with students to mount 
peaceful protests.773 The NCC continued to engage with local Pittsburghers and prepared 
for an internal insurrection through a more aggressive use of its stocks. A number of 
Protestant churches publicly criticized Gulf, led by the United Church of Christ (UCC). In 
early 1971, the United Presbyterian Church introduced four resolutions to that year’s Gulf 
proxy statement urging the company to study the Angola situation, increase the size of the 
board to improve democratic control of the corporation, and end its activities in all colonial 
areas. The church contacted 600 university stockholders, ten banks, and several mutual 
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funds with requests to support the proxy statement.774 Both the NCC and ACOA also 
appealed to contacts in Congress who showed interest in the matter. In April 1971, 
Representative Jonathan Bingham (D-NY) invited his colleagues to join in signing a letter 
supporting the United Presbyterian Church’s resolutions for Gulf. With Republican 
colleague from New York Ogden Reid, Bingham offered public bipartisan support to the 
churches and openly criticized the oil giant.775 The next month, the Gulf issue became the 
center of Digg’s House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee hearing on business in southern 
Africa, where the head of the Presbyterian task force endured a withering assault from 
Pittsburgh Republican Rep. James Fulton.776 From the streets to the Capitol, Gulf’s 
involvement in Angola inspired strong feelings and words.  
 No reaction was more dramatic or surprising than that of Gulf Oil. It attacked the 
first church that launched a boycott. While the NCC and the Presbyterians were strategizing 
in late 1970, the Ohio Conference of the UCC adopted a resolution criticizing Gulf for its 
cooperation with Portugal and urged constituent churches to cease using the company’s 
products “until Gulf Oil discontinues the use of its African operations in ways that cause 
human suppression and suffering.” It asked stockholders to retain their shares to maintain 
voting power but encouraged the return en masse of Gulf credit cards.777 The move was 
                                                 
774 Minutes, Southern Africa Task Force, 6 November 1970, Box 23, RG 6, WCC Papers, PHS; Arthur H. 
Lubow, “Presbyterians Lead Proxy Fight Over Gulf Involvement in Angola,” Harvard Crimson, 17 April 
1971; Lubow “Ship Passes in Night: Harvard Votes Proxies with Gulf Management,” Harvard Crimson, 24 
April 1971. Wayne State, Charles Diggs’ alma mater, was the only school to respond positively to any of 
the resolutions.  
775 Dear Colleague Letter from Jonathan B. Bingham, 12 April 1971, Box 127, Diggs Papers, MSRC, HU;  
776 Betty Medsger, “Get Us All into Heaven,” Washington Post, 15 May 1971.  
777 Resolution, 1970 Annual Meeting of the Ohio Conference of the Church of Christ, in Righter, 6-7.  
 322 
unprecedented and infuriated the Pittsburgh corporation. It issued a strongly worded letter 
and may have threatened to sue the church for defamation, garnering national headlines 
and revealing the seriousness with which Gulf viewed the boycott. Reporters had a field 
day, speculating that the courtroom drama would reveal the inner workings of the country’s 
tenth largest company, while a Gulf victory would send bailiffs into “sanctuaries to seize 
the silver crosses . . . to be melted down and recast in the shape of little oil derricks.”778 
Gulf denied threatening a suit, but it was the first time a major corporation had responded 
publicly to charges of international immorality by a religious organization.779 Church 
members and fellow Protestants were a mixture of encouraged and furious, and the 
publicity fueled the expansion of the campaign.  
The lawsuit also had the unintended side effect of inspiring the formation of the 
Gulf Boycott Coalition (GBC). It evolved from the Congregation of Reconciliation in 
Dayton, a non-denominational community associated with the UCC and dedicated to social 
action. In March, 1971, Pastor Richard Righter and congregant Pat Roach formed the Gulf-
Angola Committee to aid the expansion of the movement nationwide. Though fearful of 
retribution from Gulf, the community justified its action with scripture and the right to self-
determination advanced by the United Nations. The result was a project that the 
Congregation hoped would appeal to both religious and secular groups.780 The fledgling 
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organization hosted a conference in July that provided a forum for organizations who had 
launched the protests to coordinate their efforts. Attendees included representatives from 
ACOA, the UCC, and unspecified participants from New York, Chicago, San Francisco, 
and Philadelphia (likely including the SAC, CRV, and LSM).781 ACOA in particular was 
effusively supportive of the project, providing material to build the educational aspects of 
the newly rechristened GBC and lending staff member Paul Irish to act as spokesman for 
the group. The event closed with a Fourth of July procession through Dayton that ended at 
Kelly’s Gulf Station, where Pat Roach raised a massive “Boycott Gulf” balloon amidst 
American flags and pennants demanding Angolan independence, much to the 
consternation of Mr. Kelly.782  
 The balloon that angered the Dayton storeowner signaled the ascent of a new era in 
the movement. The GBC had assembled a network that encompassed ten cities within a 
few weeks, mostly in the Midwest and Northeast. It urged allies to spread the word about 
the boycott, even as it sought to escalate its impact by moving from issues of personal and 
congregational decisions to official policy. The GBC’s first major action was to urge that 
the city of Dayton not renew its contract with Gulf when the agreement expired at the end 
of the year. Worth more than $50,000, loss of the contract would not bankrupt Gulf, but it 
would dramatize the power of civic action on foreign issues. Months of protests, 
campaigning, and education followed, culminating in December when Dayton rejected 
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Gulf’s low bid for gasoline in favor of Standard Oil, citing Angola as the reason for the 
decision. The GBC hailed the moment as its “first real victory.”783 For its part, Gulf 
dismissed the growing activism as the result of an overzealous Christian elite who, in the 
words of B.R. Dorsey, “tend to sit in parish headquarters and worry about world 
problems.”784 Yet the corporation’s casual dismissal of its antagonists ignored both the 
grassroots foundations of the GBC and the high profiles of its growing list of collaborators.  
 With the GBC, the churches, and ACOA as central nodes, the boycott exploded. 
The GBC expanded on this support by presenting its criticism of Gulf in a language that 
appealed broadly to American activists tied to both the Old and New Left. Rev. Righter 
convinced close friends in the American for Democratic Action to provide a mailing list, 
and dozens of influential supporters lent their names to the movement.785 Using headlines 
like “Southern Africa will not be the next Vietnam; it already is Vietnam,” the GBC also 
expanded on existing rhetorical devices linking southern Africa to the anti-war 
movement.786 It even pioneered new themes, taking advantage of the environmental 
movement stimulated by the 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill and growing anti-capitalist 
agitation as the United States entered a recession.787 Union leaders also took notice, 
adopting the Gulf issue to appeal to youth and minorities who blanched at Nixon’s policies 
and the rally-around-the-flag complacency of national bodies like the American Federation 
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of Labor.788 The GBC newsletter offered strategies that individuals and local groups could 
adopt to take part in the movement without formally joining an organization. Reports of 
boycott actions flooded in recounting these small actions and suggesting additional ones. 
A United Farm Workers member sent receipts for gas bought at competing stations to Gulf 
headquarters, while 8th grade students In Philadelphia wrote term papers on the company’s 
involvement in Angola.789  
It was this potential for daily and weekly acts of solidarity that promoted real 
identification with the revolutions, humanizing their social struggles. Individuals not 
ensconced in the movement learned about the Lusophone parties and U.S. support for 
Portugal. Solidarity activists achieved this not just through the creation and distribution of 
literature, but by sponsoring travel for the movements themselves. Khan remained the most 
accessible, followed by Gil Fernandes. But the focus that the Gulf campaign placed on 
Angola provided a new opportunity for the MPLA to sell its brand in the United States. 
The party was enthusiastic about the new attention and applauded the boycott. When asked 
by a journalist what Americans could do to help, two leading officials responded 
emphatically: “Expose and demonstrate against Gulf Oil’s investments in Angola.”790 The 
party struggled to send representatives overseas, but the coalition did its best to put a human 
face to the campaign. Abel Guimaraes, a student in Brooklyn and a member of the National 
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Union of Angolan Students loosely associated with the MPLA, traveled widely with the 
campaign. He specifically rebuffed Gulf’s claims that they were benefiting the country’s 
local population.791 ACOA even invited MPLA President Agostinho Neto on a multi-city 
speaking tour that would coincide with Gulf Oil activities.792 He could not make the trip, 
but the invitation alone demonstrated how far ACOA had come in supporting the leftist 
liberation party.  
The GBC and its allies had struck upon a strategy for success. Gulf’s ubiquity 
brought the Portuguese revolutions into the lives of everyday people, and the quotidian 
choice of whether or not to buy its products offered “a practical action for the ‘little’ people 
who want to effect freedom” in Africa.793 Revelations of corporate involvement provided 
an impetus for deeper reflection on American complicity with Portugal, which helped 
expand identification with the movements. In 1973, for example, the War Resisters League 
and the Vietnam Peace Parade Committee in New York City joined together to protest the 
Portuguese Consulate partially as a result of the boycott.794 In 1974, Pat Roach boasted that 
the Coalition had active associates in more than fifty metropolitan areas in the United States 
made up of local GBC chapters, unions, student organizations, and others. These numbers 
did not include the irregular individual and group protests that filled the GBC newsletters, 
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nor could it account for the thousands of unreported acts of resistance.795 Indeed, GBC 
members were consistently surprised by how large the movement became.  The 1972 
Easter Conference in Lund introduced the cause internationally, from which it quickly 
expanded. A Toronto-based activist organizations with ties to FRELIMO and Flory’s FIM 
launched their own campaign, CCLAMG and boycott proponents addressed rallies for the 
End the Alliance Campaign in the United Kingdom, and Sietse Bosgra negotiated with 
Gulf to ban imports from Angola to Holland.796 Religious, radical, and simply concerned 
citizens found a rallying point for their internationalism in the symbol of Gulf.  
It also attracted an important new constituency: African Americans. The church 
appeal to universities in 1971 had fallen flat, but it inspired action by a Harvard law 
alumnus who objected to his alma mater’s investment in Gulf Oil, the largest of any 
academic institution.  After spending time in Dar es Salaam, where he met personally with 
FRELIMO leaders, Randall Robinson returned to Boston to found the Pan-African 
Liberation Committee (PALC) with a number of law students and South African exile 
Chris Nteta. When the Harvard president balked at their request to divest the stocks, the 
PALC joined with the Harvard African American student association to occupy the 
university’s main administration building for nearly a week, dramatizing the Gulf issue and 
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receiving national attention.797 Beginning in June 1972, the Boston-based group worked 
with a growing network of internationally minded community organizations to mobilize 
black public opinion against Gulf in over a dozen states, including seven of the most 
lucrative markets for the oil giant.798 As Robinson explained to Congressman Diggs, “if in 
the key states we can win overwhelming Black support in addition to marginal support 
from whites, Gulf’s profit margin can be substantially reduced.”799 Utilizing the company’s 
poor record in hiring minorities, the PALC linked local black frustrations with the 
international freedom struggles much as the radical students had first done with unions.  
PALC called “on all Black people and others who believe in freedom to boycott the 
products of the Gulf Oil Company.”800 The activity would serve the twofold purpose of 
educating about the liberation movements, while providing sympathetic African 
Americans with a local symbol of collective racial oppression. It also sought to carve out 
a leadership role for black activists within a solidarity movement that had been lacking in 
diversity for much of the 1960s. Tapping into an emerging African American interest, 
Robinson’s PALC had contacts in more than 20 states by the end of 1973, who helped 
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inspire coordinated protests across the country in the fall of that year.801 The PALC and its 
local affiliates had expanded the boycott into a national, multiracial movement.  
 There was little real possibility that the protests would force Gulf out of Angola, 
but that had never been more than an ideal objective. Rather, purpose had been to expand 
the movement through concrete action and, as one ACOA staffer had explained in 1969, 
to undertake action that “makes the Portuguese worry, costs them time, money, and 
diplomatic manpower, and puts them for once on the defensive.”802 Gulf certainly felt such 
pressure, and it scrambled to assemble some good press to offset its stained reputation, 
particularly in the black community. It took out full-page advertisements in popular black 
publications that gave a more positive spin to its role in the community, while also 
increasing investments in minority training programs.803 Gulf even proposed creating 
“betterment programs” in Angola that it could use to defray the domestic impact of 
protests.804  
The boycott also raised the costs for new companies interested in the colonies, 
giving them pause whether the potential profit was worth the criticism they would face 
domestically. Tim Smith ably summarized the viewpoint when he explained that it was not 
yet feasible that the protests would force the oil giant out of Angola, but “it didn’t seem 
                                                 
801 See chapter 5 for additional details on the emergence of a Black Power interest in Portuguese Africa 
and details or Robinson’s organizing in the wake of 1972’s African Liberation Day celebrations.  
802 Letter, Gary Gappert to Diggs, 8 December 1969, Box 208, Digs Papers, MSRC, HU. 
803 Gulf Advertisement, Ebony (Aug 1973), p128. See for example, “The OIC and Gulf,” Forward Times 
(Houston), 5 May 1973.  
804 The program was proposed in response to Church protests that coincided and partially inspired the 
PALC protests. Harvard would use plans for these programs to help defend its refusal to divest. Telegram, 
Lisbon to Secstate, 10 November 1971, Box 2040, Political and Defense, Subject Numeric Files, 1970-
1973, RG 59, NARA. 
 330 
possible to stop the Vietnam War in 1965 either. We must begin to mount pressure and 
raise American consciousness on Gulf’s support for the Portuguese. At the least this will 
cause other companies to assess investment or expansion in the colonies.”805 And such 
roadblocks were necessary as Portugal continued to look abroad to find new sources of 
income. Cabral had warned in 1970 that ESSO was considering drilling in the Bijagós 
Archipelago near Bissau, while other corporations had shown interest in exploring Angolan 
territory.806 Portugal remained confident that Gulf would not leave Angola, but the 
Portuguese ambassador warned his colleagues in Lisbon that they should not 
“underestimate what the campaign can do.”807 The statement proved prophetic when Exxon 
abandoned proposed investments in Angola in 1973 after ACOA, the Unitarian Church, 
and a number of youth activists threatened to expand the oil boycott.808 Gulf even pledged 
it would not invest in either Mozambique or South Africa, a business decision but one that 
must have been influenced by the threat of additional protests.809 The boycott could not 
force Gulf’s hand, but it helped deny Portugal additional funds to maintain its war efforts 
while building an important political awareness of the extensive existing official and 
corporate ties to the colonial regime.  
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 And Gulf was not the only business affected. Boycotts of Portuguese wine and other 
products flourished on college campuses, while the momentum created by the GBC and its 
allies inspired plans to replicate the Dutch coffee campaign.810 Gulf activism was merely 
the most successful due to the consensus that formed around it, its symbolic value within 
the new internationalism, and the able leadership of groups like CRV and GBC. 
Importantly, the growth of the movement was more than just an amusing sideshow or a 
manifestation of popular frustration with rising gas prices. It was a sincere and widespread 
expression of solidarity with southern Africa liberation movements and a rejection of 
reactionary American foreign policy that continued to engage with colonialism. And it was 
poised to grow in both power and influence as the middle of the decade approached.  
 
Conclusion 
By the time coffee joined oil in stoking the ire of activists, the outlines of an 
American movement were becoming clear. Youth activism had taken the lead uniting a 
diversity of perspectives. A network that had first discovered the cause of African 
liberation through religious institutions had united and intermixed with radicals dedicated 
to reorienting American foreign policy away from its traditions of power projection and 
amoral economic expansion. These young people had helped drag to the left the institutions 
from which many of them had come and continued to rely upon for support, notably the 
churches and liberal advocacy groups like ACOA. This coalition had been fueled by the 
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political disruption of the Vietnam conflict and indeed mirrored the anti-war movement in 
its myriad components, but it illustrated a much different reality than have the more 
familiar stories of the heroic 1960s. Yeats’ axiom that the center cannot hold had aptly 
described the massive, sometimes contradictory anti-war movement, but at the margins 
where less popular causes like southern Africa informed the growth of independent 
networks, a different reality emerged. Here, the CONCP parties’ repeated urgings to unite 
in an effort to change official and corporate policy provided a unity that did not exist 
elsewhere. Individuals and groups disagreed on tactics and ideologies, but they understood 
the necessity of merging mass grassroots protests with political lobbying and mobilization. 
Far left radicals like those in the LSM may have envisioned a revolution in the future, but 
they appreciated the necessity of utilizing political power in the near term to aid the African 
freedom struggles. They were therefore willing to work with groups closer to the center 
that shared their end goals and valued their commitment.  
The key to this unity was in fact the decentralized nature of the solidarity 
movement. It provided the necessary independence for individual components to retain 
their own political and ideological identities, while allowing them to work on specific 
projects with a rotating list of allied organizations. They were tied together through 
networks that began with the liberation movements, but eventually developed into 
extensive personal relationships and shared memberships. Though never exceeding a much 
more than a few hundred active members at its core, few of whom were employed full time 
in activist work, the network survived the vicissitudes of life, movement, and employment 
changes based on a dedication to common goals and a handful of static allies such as 
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FRELIMO’s Khan, ACOA, and the NCC. Local and regional organizations appeared and 
disappeared based on a number of factors including interpersonal relationships, but the 
dispersal of one group often meant the creation of another or access to a new community 
of potential supporters – all connected to this informal network. As CRVer Mimi Edmunds 
recalled, “You stayed connected to the African solidarity groups. We were like homing 
pigeons. That’s where we felt we could do the most good.”811 It was this dedication to 
action that allowed the core movement to survive and slowly expand to include allies – 
likely numbering by 1974 in the thousands – willing to boycott, protest, and write their 
congressmen on behalf of African freedom in Portuguese Africa and beyond.  
 It was the decentralized diversity of this solidarity network that allowed it to 
expand. Its components each appealed to different constituencies within the United States, 
who had come to question American foreign relations for different reasons and who often 
proposed different strategies. The kaleidoscopic situation in southern Africa provided 
lessons for all of its viewers, and the diversity of the solidarity movement allowed 
individual organizations to tap into these realities to expand the base of support. As 
CCLAMG provided an entry point for revolutionaries, so the NCC’s appeal to left-center 
parishioners brought in people concerned about human rights, and ACOA’s non-
establishment credentials appealed to liberal progressives with access to power. The result 
was a single movement with many leaders, but leaders who were able to speak to each 
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other and mobilize support – often in fits and starts – from the streets of Washington state 
to the halls of power in Washington, D.C.  
 These various constituencies did have one point of unity beyond the liberation 
movements. Each had come to question the pattern of American policies overseas. Vietnam 
and the domestic turmoil it caused had shattered the liberal international consensus that 
had defined the post-McCarthy era, but what would replace it was not yet clear. What 
bound those in and sympathetic to the solidarity movement was what might be called a 
new left internationalism, based on sincere support for political and economic self-
determination in the developing world. Its proponents sought to constrain American 
interventionism in the Third World and provide the support necessary to redress the long 
history of North-South inequality. It was a movement centered on Africa but adhering to 
an ideology that stretched further afield. As one church leader captured succinctly, this 
coalition of internationalists understood that Third World peoples wanted to “be truly free 
to pursue their own road to national development, unshackled by either rigged Western 
market exploitation or subversive Western political infiltration, communist or anti-
communist.”812  
 One component remained largely absent from the movement: African Americans. 
For better or worse, the country saw African freedom as a black issue. African Americans 
were essential components to the work of many organizations, evidenced by Robert Van 
Lierop, Prexy Nesbitt, Randall Robinson, and the invaluable role played by Charles Diggs 
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in Washington. But there was not, for much of the early 1970s, a black mass movement 
that could grab popular attention and invest solidarity with the political potential wielded 
by the country’s largest minority. But black internationalism percolated below the surface 
of liberal civil rights politics, emerging finally in the Black Power movement. If this 
cacophony of angry and frustrated voices could be mobilized alongside the solidarity 
movement, it would provide the political boost necessary to create the political pressure 
necessary to achieve change.  
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Chapter 5: “We Are an African People”  
The Transformation of a Pan-African Solidarity 
 
In May of 1972, over ten thousand African Americans gathered in Washington, 
D.C. Young and old, radical and moderate, they streamed through the capital streets 
demanding recognition for freedom fighters waging wars of independence in Africa.  At 
the first African Liberation Day (ALD), black peoples in the Diaspora sought to change 
American foreign policy, which continued to support Portual and its minority neighbors. 
The crowd carried signs proclaiming solidarity with the liberation struggles and 
condemning the economic discrimination that kept blacks subservient at home as well as 
abroad. The activists made stops at the State Department and the embassies of South Africa 
and Portugal, where Congressman Charles Diggs, Angela Davis, and community leaders 
urged listeners to adopt the African revolutions as their own and boycott corporate partners 
like Gulf Oil that fed the coffers of colonial rule. The demonstration culminated on the 
National Mall – renamed Lumumba Square for the festivities – where some onlookers 
estimated that between 15,000 and 25,000 people joined organizer Owusu Sadaukai 
(Howard Fuller) in chants of “We are an African People.”813  
This demonstration in Washington was a symbol of a much larger movement a 
decade in the making. Transnational solidarity with the liberation movements had not come 
easily to African Americans, but a shift in domestic politics and the renewed emphasis on 
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personal diplomacy by the Lusophone African parties had finally inspired success. 
Disillusioned both with the slow pace of civil rights in the mid-1960s and internal divisions, 
African American activists sought a more assertive common ground on which they could 
build a political and social movement that would unite the entirety of the black community. 
They found a solution in the ongoing revolutions occurring in Portuguese Africa.  
The thousands who gathered for the first ALD attested to the nascent power of 
blacks to shape issues of foreign policy, but achieving this unity of purpose had a history 
distinct from the development of radical and religious solidarity explored in preceding 
chapters. Whereas groups like the American Committee on Africa (ACOA) had sought to 
transcend racial concerns in its support for Lusophone African independence, the 
mobilization of the black community depended on the integration of radical 
internationalism, black identity politics, and domestic reform. The tendency of Cold War 
American identity to denigrate the connection between these major poles of African 
American thought helped stymy the growth of solidarity, as did the CONCP parties own 
marginalization of race as a global currency. As a result, it was largely the responsibility 
of black Americans frustrated by the confining domesticity of the Civil Rights movement 
to create what historian Melani McAlister has called an “alternative moral geography” 
through the forging of new bonds with revolutionaries both from Africa and elsewhere.814  
As interest in continental revolutions grew, the leaders of the PAIGC and 
FRELIMO recognized the importance of using identity politics to provide a natural avenue 
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for building Western support for the idea of transnational liberation. They began to use 
race as a gateway for discussions of global exploitation, which they explained as a single 
component in a larger system of international imperialism that marginalized colored 
peoples for sociological and historical reasons. This socialist Third World - what many 
termed at the time Tricontinental – reading of global politics allowed African Americans 
to integrate the elusive elements of radicalism, racialism, and domestic political 
participation into a single internationalist ideology best exemplified by the mass 
demonstration of the ALD. While this Tricontinental ideology embraced the idea of a 
common struggle that united peoples from all the colonized regions, it remained Africa and 
the idea of a black Diaspora that could best mobilize the average person who more readily 
identified kinship positively in terms of race rather than shared exploitation. This Black 
Power identity provided an agent for introducing large swaths of African Americans to the 
socialist ideology at the heart of the Tricontinental idea, merging the radical and racial 
together in an uneasy truce that formed the foundation of much black international thought 
in this period.  
Yet without fully resolving the tensions between these elements, such unity was 
short-lived. The growth of real bonds of solidarity pushed African Americans to engage 
directly with the philosophies and activities of leaders like Amílcar Cabral and FRELIMO. 
This activity helped to develop popular understanding of liberation ideology and the global 
critique of American imperialism, but it also demanded an ideological commitment that 
superficial anti-colonialism had not. As Portuguese African nationalists privileged a 
Marxist-inspired socialism over the entry point of racial solidarity, the growth of their 
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specific influence within the African American community helped undermine the unity 
provided by the subsuming of competing traditions of race and class under the 
Tricontinental umbrella. A real dialogue emerged between black Americans and the 
Portuguese Africans at the expense of domestic unity. Each of these feuding viewpoints 
used African revolutionaries to legitimize their perspectives, drawing particularly on the 
MPLA-UNITA competition to define their positions. The African American unanimity 
would prove fleeting, but the embrace of a leftist reading of racial issues in the United 
States provided an opening for black nationalist to organize across racial lines. In so doing, 
it laid the foundation for a much more effective model of black advocacy than could have 
been achieved in isolation.   
 
The Radical Element Remains  
The story of this solidarity organizing has largely escaped the attention of historians 
due to a narrative of Cold War repression against black internationalism. A focus on the 
major personalities of Paul Robeson, W.E.B. DuBois and their ultimately unsuccessful 
Council on African Affairs has implied that government harassment effectively 
undermined the black leftist critique of American domestic and international policy in the 
late 1950s.815 Radicalism did not disappear from African American life with the political 
demise of these key figures, though it did recede from the national level. Local black groups 
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continued to feel alienated from the government and its Cold War liberal ideology, and 
they looked to the African continent for inspiration on how to express this frustration, 
especially in the wake of the Angolan insurrection of early 1961. The socialist anti-
colonialism advanced by the CONCP parties appealed to African Americans in two 
overlapping but sometimes complicated ways: in terms of racial solidarity and leftist 
reform politics. The solidarity championed by the liberal, multiracial ACOA in the early 
1960s and civil rights leaders of the American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa 
(ANLCA) simply did not connote the same kind of transnational restructuring of power 
relations – both economic and racial - desired by these marginalized ideologues. As a 
result, most solidarity organizations operated below the level of national attention in the 
1960s, their ideas only emerging onto the national stage as new advocates of Black Power 
incorporated these critiques into their confrontational tactics and rhetoric toward the end 
of the decade. As the most visible movements operating on the continent, the leftist 
Portuguese African revolutions fed these subterranean criticisms of the Western capitalist 
system, even if the nationalists concentrated their diplomacy elsewhere.  
 The complicated and sometimes tense relationship between radical and race-based 
solidarity appeared most clearly during the early 1960s in the form of the Liberation 
Committee for Africa (LCA) and its publication, The Liberator. The New York City based 
organization had arisen as a response to the Sharpeville Massacre and the ongoing Congo 
crisis. Headed by architect-cum-activist Daniel Watts and white communist Lowell P. 
Beveridge, Jr., the LCA had at its core a leftist critique of the imperial system that centered 
on the capitalist exploitation of Africa and African peoples – connecting it directly with 
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the legacy of the Council on African Affairs.816 As its first action, members participated in 
the “riot” at the United Nations following the announcement of Patrice Lumumba’s 
death.817 Historians have generally seen the LCA through the lens of this reaction to 
Lumumba, but the group was also actively involved in supporting the Portuguese liberation 
struggles, particularly Angola. The LCA and other Harlem organizations provided forums 
for revolutionaries to present their cases directly to the African American public, hosting 
live discussion with anti-colonial leaders where blacks learned about their anti-colonial 
ideologies and discovered ways to aid the movements. Though rare, these public 
appearances featured unfettered access to leaders such as Angola’s Holden Roberto and 
the Mozambican Eduardo Mondlane, still at the UN in 1961 but soon to become president 
of FRELIMO.818 Most importantly, the nature of the LCA as a radical grassroots 
organization based within the community endowed its speakers with a legitimacy among 
African Americans that they did not always have when mediated through the auspices of 
churches or the liberal ACOA. 
 Though it would remain relatively small, the LCA reached thousands through its 
influential newsletter, which developed into one of the leading radical magazines of the 
era. Watts launched The Liberator in March 1961, the same month that the armed conflict 
                                                 
816 Beveridge had worked with the CAA while in College, was close with Alphaeus Hunton, and likely saw 
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began in Angola. It sought to create a new popular leftist internationalism among the black 
community by attaching it to natural Pan-African sympathies. Proclaiming itself “the voice 
of the Afro-American protest movement in the United States and the liberation movement 
of Africa,” the magazine acted as a bridge between nations.  It became one of the first 
homes for radical intellectuals writing on Pan-African issues in the 1960s, while also acting 
as a megaphone for continental nationalists wanting to speak to the black community. Early 
issues featured letters directly from the Lusophone colonies and South Africa, refusing to 
shrink from nationalist discussions of armed insurrection.819 The editorial tone was 
consciously aggressive, criticizing mainstream black presses for denigrating Portugal while 
failing to take up a more active support for the liberation struggles.820 Yet most importantly, 
The Liberator introduced American audiences to Marxist inspired organizations such as 
the MPLA that had yet to gain a foothold in the United States, presenting it as an equal 
partner with the more celebrated anti-communism of Roberto.821 In its attempts to both 
promote and defend the African revolutions, The Liberator was tying together events on 
the two continents and pushing at the boundaries of what constituted acceptable 
internationalism in the midst of the Cold War. It eschewed Cold War concerns to present 
what it believed was the authentic voice of Africa – the liberation parties.  
The LCA became the first primarily African American organization to champion 
the armed revolutions of southern Africa in the 1960s, but it was far from the only one. 
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Rather, it represented the most organized element of a much deeper sentiment that existed 
on the fringes of black communities around the country. The rich ideological soil of Harlem 
allowed it and a number of other groups to flourish during this period, since the 
neighborhoods history of radicalism insulated the groups to a certain degree.822 But from 
Chicago to the Deep South, African Americans used the events of 1960 and 1961 to help 
define a new and more aggressive style of self-determination that challenged the limitations 
of peaceful civil rights reform. Central to this new radicalism was the acceptance of armed 
revolution as a legitimate strategy for resisting exploitation and marginalization, in the 
African context if not yet in the United States. Unlike the LCA though, most voices backed 
these movements not for their politics but as part of a black international movement 
resisting white superiority.823 Often such calls remained vague in their programs, but there 
was an underlying militancy in the pleas for unity along the color line. The civil rights 
movement did not capture the frustrations of people who were coming to accept that 
Africans were facing a global system of racial subjugation, which operated in Chicago and 
North Carolina as much as on the continent.824 Angola emerged as an early symbol of this 
nascent transnational resistance, and it became a rallying cry for African Americans who 
sought to establish more aggressive and, in some cases, armed movements to claim equality 
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of civil and human rights. With the expansion of its increasingly influential publication, 
the LCA became the voice of these scattered pockets of resistance around the country, 
helping to introduce leftist criticisms into national discussions of empire, black liberation, 
and American inequality.  
The problem, however, was that the LCA was a strictly domestic organization. It 
lacked strong ties to the Portuguese and South African parties about which it wrote, 
preventing a true dialogue on the goals and tactics of global black liberation. The CONCP 
parties did not actively cultivate ties in the United States along racial lines during these 
early years and neither did Roberto, though leaders like Mondlane appreciated the leftist 
slant of the group. Lusophone nationalists used claims to socialism and multiracialism to 
gain support from governments concerned about growing racial tensions, which meant that 
the appeals to Pan-Africanism implicit in Watts’ writings or explicitly a component of 
Harlem’s Garveyites were not part of early diplomacy. Mondlane built relationships with 
many African Americans, but he hesitated to use overt references to Pan-Africanism.825 As 
some Mozambican critics pointed out, when Mondlane visited New York, he did not stay 
in Harlem’s Hotel Teresa as Fidel Castro had famously done, but rather in mid-town near 
the United Nations and his predominantly liberal contacts.826 During this period, the trans-
Atlantic bond remained a commitment to achieving equal rights on a domestic and global 
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scale regardless of color. Even Roberto, the Bakongo nationalist vocally hostile to the 
mestiços leading the MPLA in Angola, did not use race as a bargaining chip in the United 
States. He, Mondlane, and Agostinho Neto of the MPLA were interested in changing 
official American policy, and they did not begin their search for support for solidarity at 
the fringes of society but among individuals who had access to the levers of power – most 
of whom were firmly ensconced in the liberal mainstream during this early period. When 
the liberation leaders worked with the LCA or the Garvey-inspired African Nationalist 
Pioneer Movement, it was due primarily to the efforts of the African American 
organizations who sought them out.827  
The LCA’s distance from the center of power did have one advantage, it provided 
the room necessary to offer a critical reading of American policy toward Portugal that 
aligned much more closely with the liberation groups than did the opinions of the civil 
rights leadership. Watts and Beveridge had been among the first to criticize the Kennedy 
administration from the left for its handling of Lisbon’s imperial war in Angola. After the 
first ever vote against Portugal at the UN had brought Kennedy praise from many black 
moderates in early 1961, The Liberator dismissed it as posturing for “political capital.” The 
measure was toothless. 828 African Americans needed to understand the realities of 
colonialism in Africa and fight for the real isolation of Portugal – military and economic –
if American actions were to have any effect. The position flew in the face of black liberals 
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who had traded relative silence on international affairs for civil rights success, but it drew 
praise from Eduardo Mondlane. At the first ANLCA in 1962 attended by Watts, the 
Mozambican praised the LCA as the only black organization to break with Cold War 
liberalism and agitate seriously for African freedom on a socialist model. The “little-known 
group,” Mondlane explained during a speech, “is about [the] only American Negro group 
who have managed to combine any active interest in the American Negro struggle for 
equality with an intense interest in African freedom.”829 Yet Mondlane’s admonishing 
praise achieved little besides gratifying Watts. The potential backlash of tying together the 
armed African struggles and peaceful domestic ones were simply too much for the civil 
rights leadership, who avoided serious discussion of the ongoing revolutionary wars on the 
continent and the role of American support for Portugal. Deeply disillusioned by his 
experience at the ANLCA, Watts began moving in more radical directions. The question 
would be whether this movement would go in a leftist or racialist direction.  
By 1963, The Liberator and the LCA had established themselves at the forefront of 
radical Pan-Africanism, but it had perhaps come too late to establish the kind of solidarity 
between the continents that both the LCA and African revolutionaries had envisioned. 
There is no record of Mondlane contacting Watts after praising his organization at the 
ANLCA, and ties to the MPLA did not materialize as hoped. The emergence of the LCA 
in 1962 and 1963 also coincided with a difficult moment in the history of the revolutions, 
between Angolan defeat and the PAIGC’s armed struggle. Moreover, Mondlane had 
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returned to Mozambique by this point. His visits to the United States became scarcer, and 
when he did arrive he consulted primarily with protestant student groups and ACOA, which 
had access to generous donors and a handful of government officials.830 Devoid of any 
tutelage in leftist politics of the CONCP with whom they identified, Watts and The 
Liberator rejected the civil rights leadership in favor of a more racialist, Pan-African 
approach advanced by a new staff that included among others the strident critic of 
integration Harold Cruse. As it defined a more confrontational black led approach to the 
domestic struggle, it alienated white communists like Beveridge, who found himself 
increasingly isolated within The Liberator until he finally exited in 1965.831 Radical pan-
Africanism had won the day over the more inclusive leftist critique of the American system, 
but importantly this new definition of racial solidarity incorporated an attention to the 
problems of global capitalism that would help develop a new generation of blacks 
sympathetic to left ideas.  
During this transition, The Liberator was pivotal in the establishment of a new 
nationalist form of black radical internationalism. Its early writings had done a great deal 
to promote a Marxist-influenced reading of the global system as essential to understanding 
American segregation and policy.832 As Watts moved in more Pan-Africanist directions 
and Beveridge lost influence, however, articles began to closely equate control of capital 
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with white hands. Contributors like Cruse pushed for an assimilation of Marxist rhetoric 
within a new dominant Pan-African ideology that rejected integration in favor of nationalist 
concepts of black communal self-determination within the United States.833 His movement 
worried about capital and exploitation of resources in the United States and Africa, but it 
made little room for white participation. Solidarity was defined in this instance primarily 
by race. But Cruse offered more of a challenge to existing liberal heterodoxy than a 
complete theory of action. Defining a movement along color lines did a great deal to 
identify enemies; it provided little assistance in forming a plan of action. In looking to 
Africa and the idea of revolution, he had not yet found a specific model on which to base 
the American rebellion. The search was on to define a movement that could fully 
incorporate race-first and leftist criticisms of the international system.  
Cruse’s search for a new form of internationally influenced protest reflected the 
desires of a generation that Black Power thinker Roland Snellings called “the Africanists.” 
While participating in the civil rights movement, they had grown disaffected by the slow 
pace of change and its ability to address the economic crisis of the black community. 
Calling for complete systemic reform, they found themselves in closer alignment with the 
popular perception of African revolutionaries demanding wholesale change at a quicker 
pace.834 Unfortunately, the period after 1962 lacked clear revolutionary leaders from the 
continent, since the parade of freedom fighters visiting the United Nations and New York 
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had slowed to a trickle in the wake of the Congo debacle and the Portuguese and South 
African crackdowns on nationalist activity. As a result, radical black youth lacked what 
one author called a “revolutionary ideology,” leading to unfocused manifestations of anger 
as would occur during the Watts Riots of 1965. What was needed for this Africanist 
generation was “a revolutionary group, with real roots among the people, to explain to the 
people what they are fighting for and to organize that fight.”835 This was the missing 
component in the pursuit of equality and the development of meaningful solidarity with 
the continental liberation struggles. Africans were waging wars in the jungles of Angola 
and the streets of Los Angeles. They needed a common ideology and leadership to bridge 
the trans-Atlantic gap.  
For a brief period, Malcolm X positioned himself to be the voice and organizer for 
this nascent movement. The charismatic speaker had not followed the path of Snellings’ 
Africanists, since he was a vocal critic of the non-violence preached by Martin Luther King 
and other civil rights leaders. He had ascended the ranks of Elijah Muhammad’s Nation of 
Islam preaching against cooperation with whites in power, urging self-defense, and using 
sometimes violent rhetoric that sold papers and appealed to those unwilling to abide by 
Gandhian tactics.  Yet Malcolm X was little if not thoughtful, and he began to clash with 
the authoritarian Muhammad as he traveled the world and began to moderate his view of 
whites, incorporate more leftist perspectives, and embrace the core teachings of 
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mainstream Islam. In a way he was traveling the path opposite Watts and The Liberator. 
When he split with the Nation of Islam in 1963, Malcolm X did not shrink from the 
spotlight. Rather, he offered an alternative nationalism based on a Pan-African ideology 
that emphasized a leftist reading of the world situation, which he formalized in the creation 
of the Organization of Afro-American Unity.836 He owed this transformation to his sojourn 
in Africa and the Middle East, where he made connections with socialist African 
revolutionaries –specifically those from Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) 
– who challenged Malcolm on the centrality of race in his traditional thinking. They, along 
with Arab and independent West African leaders, urged him to adopt a more nuanced, 
systematic approach to global race issues. Influenced by these individuals and contact with 
Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah, Malcolm transformed his once strident racial 
rhetoric toward a new anti-colonial, anti-capitalist critique of the international system.837  
The results of this transformation in thinking were twofold. First, Malcolm wanted 
to reproduce the national unity among black Americans that had occurred in the creation 
of revolutionary fronts such as FRELIMO. He quieted his once strident criticism of 
moderate leaders like Martin Luther King and urged all blacks to come together. With 
unity, they could negotiate from a position of power. Second, his new view of the racial 
problem as an example of human rights struggle led him to look to the tactics of 
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revolutionaries as models. He argued that African Americans needed to stop focusing on 
and appealing to the racist government of the United States. The situation of blacks in the 
United States was more like “South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Hungary, the Arab 
refugee problem  . . . a world problem.”838 A comparison of these various pursuits of 
freedom illustrated to Malcolm that black people in the United States and on the continent 
had a “common exploiter” which aligned closely but not completely with the color line.839 
Anti-colonials would have to unite together on the world stage to oppose this global 
imperialism. Though Malcolm continued to refine his thinking, his internationalist critique 
of the U.S. state increasingly tied together disparate national ideologies into a single 
campaign. This could lay the foundation for an American solidarity that merged leftist 
strategies for interacting with the world system and the power of racial sympathies.  
The realization of the global problem of inequality broke down the artificial barriers 
of the Cold War consensus even as it challenged the equally constraining limitations of 
strict black nationalism. The question Malcolm dealt with in the last months of his life was 
how to forge unity domestically and abroad. Having rejected religion, he was in search of 
what biographer Manning Marable has called a “secular basis for common ground.” 840 
Racial identification provided one obvious answer but so then did anti-capitalist solidarity 
against exploitation. The latter seemed to offer the clearest prospects for meaningful action. 
In his final speeches, Malcolm offered both as foundations for a new ideology. The 
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CONCP parties had staked claim to an inclusive leftist internationalism that had clearly 
appealed to Malcolm X during his time on the continent, but he had not yet made the full 
commitment. His assassination prevented him from reconciling these two distinct 
pathways toward solidarity, leaving a legacy of ambiguity that would continue to haunt 
relations with the continent. Events in Angola and elsewhere had inspired Malcolm and 
others to reassess their own beliefs, but it could not yet offer answers to how they could 
translate international trends to their domestic goals.  
 
Globalizing Black Power 
 The early 1960s had demonstrated that radical African American critiques of the 
national system continued to draw upon revolutionary continental symbols and ideologies. 
The multiracial, Marxist inspired CONCP parties had failed to pursue these avenues of 
solidarity in favor of a broader appeal to Western societies. Over the following years, 
Snellings’ “Africanist” generation would guide the Black Power movement, which Peniel 
Joseph has described as “trumpeting a new militant race consciousness that placed black 
identity as the soul of a new radicalism.”841 The heirs to the ideas explored by Watts, Cruse, 
and Malcolm X, they too would gravitate toward revolutionary parties after abandoning 
the pacifist resistance of King and the civil rights movement. Groups like the Black 
Panthers also attempted to merge traditional racial solidarity with class-based Marxist 
readings of the international system, though this sometimes proved as divisive internally 
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as it was unifying internationally. As their power and size grew, Black Power attracted the 
attention of the liberation movements, who felt obliged to reexamine their methods of 
developing ties to foreign populations as part of their larger push for Western support. The 
result was a new form of solidarity that finally mobilized the African American community 
in a way that both the liberation movements and their activist allies had long desired.   
 One of the keys to understanding this new solidarity was a shift in the thinking of 
the emerging young black leadership. Malcolm X had been one of the first national figures 
to articulate a vision of Africa from which black Americans could truly learn. Far too often 
since Du Bois’ exile, the ANLCA model of patronizing aid had typified elite black views 
of the continent. Despite the presence of Mondlane and others, much of the early discussion 
of the civil rights leadership had been about what they could do for southern Africa as 
compared to what nationalists desired.842 Attitudes ranged from respect to condescension, 
but the latter had grown as domestic success in gaining political rights had contrasted with 
difficulties in postcolonial Africa. Stokely Carmichael, the radical head of the Student 
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) had been among the host of American 
leaders who had expressed skepticism of African leadership, supposedly dismissing 
Tanzanian leader Julius Nyerere as a “clown.”843 Yet Carmichael had chafed under the 
restrictive pacifism he had inherited and grew frustrated by the lack of change in economic 
conditions of blacks across the country, as had much of this “Africanist generation.”  
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Like Malcolm, he developed a deep respect for revolutionaries in Vietnam and the 
Middle East who were challenging the American strategic and capitalist system with force 
of arms, but this admiration did not automatically extend south of the Sahara – at least not 
until he visited the continent in 1967.  In the Tanzanian capital, the civil rights organizer 
was hounded by rumors of his earlier comments, but he found an ally in Eduardo 
Mondlane. Seeing an opportunity, the FRELIMO president reached out to Carmichael, 
reassuring him in the words of biographer Joseph “of the political integrity of 
revolutionaries he had too casually dismissed.”844 This began a reassessment of continental 
leadership for Carmichael, who eventually counted among his mentors Pan-Africanist 
socialist triumvirate in Conakry that included Sékou Touré of Guinea, the exiled Kwame 
Nkrumah, and PAIGC head Amílcar Cabral. Carmichael would become a student of this 
generation of continental radicals, eventually changing his name to Kwame Ture in honor 
of the leaders who most directly contributed to his evolving philosophy.  
 Carmichael’s transformation was representative of wider currents of Black Power 
ideology, which was following Malcolm X’s embrace of revolutionary movements on the 
continent. As the only ongoing struggles, the Portuguese colonies rose to become some of 
the premier sources of study and inspiration. In the wake of Carmichael’s call for a black 
centered revolutionary movement, a number of key leaders declared their support and 
admiration for the anti-imperialist campaigns. In 1967, SNCC Chairman Rap Brown said 
that “the struggle against racism, colonialism, and apartheid is an indivisible struggle” and 
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identified Mozambique and Angola as prominent fronts in this battle.845 Newark’s black 
power sage Amiri Baraka looked to Mondlane’s The Struggle For Mozambique, finished 
shortly before his assassination in 1969, along with the English translation of Cabral’s 
“Theory as Weapon” to help build an understanding of the struggle under America’s own 
iteration of colonialism. The Black Panther devoted regular attention to the various 
movements, reintroducing its 100,000 weekly readers to the revolutions that had been 
absent from mainstream papers since 1961.846 Other groups also gravitated toward the 
revolutions, notably the Greensboro-based Pan-African collective known as the Students 
(later Youth) Organized for Black Unity (SOBU or YOBU). Their widely distributed 
newsletter included columns written by and with the African nationalists, reclaiming the 
legacy of The Liberator of the early 1960s. Often, these articles highlighted the American 
government’s ongoing cooperation with Portuguese imperialism, connecting two pieces of 
the anti-imperial movement in a concrete way.847 In collapsing the geographical, linguistic, 
and political differences between Africa and the United States, radical activists legitimized 
their own movements through celebration of continental achievement. Before the decade 
came to a close, Eldridge Cleaver of the Black Panthers could claim that “Definitely [the 
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struggle against Portuguese colonialism] is a source of inspiration, and it has a direct 
influence on the determination of the people fighting the struggle [in the United States].”848  
 This newfound enthusiasm for Portuguese Africa was not exceptionally self-
reflective in its initial stages, depending primarily on imagined ideas of racial kinship and 
a common enemy rather than any strong understanding of shared ideologies or even socio-
political goals. Nonetheless, key to this growth in interest was a greater effort on behalf of 
the Portuguese African nationalists to use racial ties to expand their following. After both 
the PAIGC and FRELIMO had launched their revolutions in 1963 and 1964, respectively, 
each had placed renewed efforts on diplomacy. In order to support these armed struggles, 
the nationalist had looked to comrades in the developing world, specifically Algeria and 
Tanzania. Yet in order to “fight imperialism on all sides” as FRELIMO expressed in one 
article, the parties adopted a form of solidarity that stressed unity across Africa, Asia, and 
Latin America.849 The CONCP members became leaders of the emerging Tricontinental 
movement, which united around shared socialist development strategies in a postcolonial 
context. Cabral became a leading philosopher in this arena, and his speech at the 1966 
Havana conference became one of his first texts to be translated into English, beginning a 
period of widespread international interest in his writings.850 This philosophy was 
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multiracial, but it appealed especially to American minorities who were expanding their 
definition of race to include all darker and oppressed peoples. Tricontinentalism provided 
a common ground that merged race consciousness and Marxist radicalism, providing a 
temporary solution to the vexing problem, especially in the case of solidarity with the 
CONCP parties that combined black African identity with active leftist revolutions.  
 Cabral’s popularity provides an insight into the aspects of the revolutions that most 
appealed to African Americans. Though the West African and Mondlane both applied a 
Marxist-inspired reading of the international system, neither demanded a single unifying 
theory. Rather, Cabral in particular stressed the necessity of each people defining their 
strategies and philosophies to fit within unique national contexts. The most important thing 
was that actions benefit the community. As Cabral explained in an oft referenced 
explanation of the PAIGC’s success, “Always bear in mind that the people are not fighting 
for ideas . . . They are fighting to win material benefits, to live better . . . to guarantee the 
future of their children.”851 To best improve the lives of individuals in any revolution, 
leaders must identity areas of popular need and the tactics most likely to affect change. 
Ideological correctness to both Cabral and Mondlane’s FRELIMO was less essential than 
the measurable improvement of education, healthcare, business, and dozens of other areas 
that had been largely ignored by the Portuguese. Communal unity and struggle were the 
only universal aspects of their model, based on a general understanding and analysis of a 
capitalist world system.852 This flexible leftist ideology and the texts that explained it, 
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combined with similar writings on African socialism by Julius Nyerere, became the core 
of a new black corpus that helped to define the later stages of Black Power. Both the 
Panthers and SOBU incorporated these readings of the revolutionary world situation into 
their influential papers, quoting liberally from the Portuguese Africans, their benefactor 
Nyerere, and the American solidarity organizations such as the Liberation Support 
Movement (LSM).853  
As groups like the Black Panthers and SOBU adopted and adapted the ideologies 
of the Portuguese African revolutions, Mondlane again took the lead in reaching out to 
young African Americans in the years before his death. Sharfudine Khan’s arrival in 1967 
as permanent representative of FRELIMO to the United Nations and unofficial ambassador 
to the American people brilliantly took advantage of this changing American context. Khan 
was a Muslim, and he previously represented the party in Cairo. He was positioned 
perfectly to appeal to young radicals along Tricontinental lines, and he did exactly that, 
becoming a confidant not only for multiracial groups like the Southern Africa Committee 
but African Americans interested in pursuing the Pan-African aspects of Black Power.854 
PAIGC’s Gil Fernandes also acted as a kind of roving ambassador to the African American 
community. Like Khan, he was well positioned to bridge the cultural gap, having attended 
the historically black Lincoln University before completing his degree at New 
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Hampshire.855 Along with increased visits by Mondlane and Cabral, this new personal 
diplomacy to the grassroots of the black community helped feed the growing interest in the 
revolutions. As Black Power advocates adopted the cause of African liberation as their 
own, they became the logical constituency to lead the popular African American movement 
that the Portuguese had feared since the Kennedy era.  
Yet commitment to the CONCP cause remained confined to an elite cadre of 
activists and a few grassroots organizers in 1969. Since the beginning of the decade, the 
individual parties had imagined American solidarity as a way of changing official 
American policy.856 Mobilizing this kind of democratic pressure would require more than 
a few noteworthy advocates like Carmichael and the Black Panthers; it would require a 
mass movement. Publications like SOBU’s recently renamed African World were 
beginning to disseminate these leftist internationalist ideas but it was a slow process. 
Prospects for a mass level of support remained scarce. Recently, Martha Biondi has written 
that the average person had trouble embracing Pan-Africanism in their daily lives during 
the 1960s. Though identification with Africa was on the upswing, the commitment needed 
to undertake activity in concrete ways was simply not present. YOBU member Mark Smith 
recalls that the average individual could not force such solidarity to “connect up, either an 
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explanatory framework or an action path, with the conditions that people felt in their 
lives.”857 To help build a movement, the CONCP parties and their domestic supporters 
would have to overcome this widespread apathy and clarify the relationship between 
foreign and domestic revolutions. Racial and cultural ties would surely play a factor, but 
clearly these were not enough. The CONCP parties would have to work with blacks to 
finally unite African sympathies with a transnational ideology that could inform popular 
action.  
The parties did this through various means familiar from its simultaneous work 
with New Left groups – personal diplomacy, cooperation with local groups, and the 
dissemination of revolutionary writing in national publications like The African World and 
The Black Panther. Yet exploring briefly one example in this construction of a movement 
reveals both the transnational nature of Portuguese African solidarity, the ideology it 
represented, and the vital translation process that transformed African anti-colonialism into 
an American concern. This was the production and distribution of the film A Luta 
Continua, made by none other than ACOA’s ever pragmatic Robert Van Lierop. One of 
Snellings’ “Africanists,” the native New Yorker had worked with the NAACP and civil 
rights organizations before he too looked for more revolutionary ideologies.858 Though 
moderate on racial issues as evidenced by his work with the ACOA board, he had been 
deeply influenced by Malcolm X’s later philosophical wanderings.859 Like many other 
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successful, educated blacks of his generation, he had come to appreciate these teachings 
only after the assassination.860 It had been partially as a result of this epiphany that Van 
Lierop had journeyed to Africa after graduating law school in 1967, where he began his 
collaboration with Mondlane and FRELIMO.861 While a member of the ACOA board, Van 
Lierop had successfully organized the Pan-African Solidarity Committee (PASC) in 1969 
to promote a celebration in New York honoring the slain FRELIMO leader and Malcolm 
X. Featuring Betty Shabbazz and a speech by Khan, the event sought to promote 
“international black political consciousness” through the celebration of an African 
Solidarity week.862 Yet the problems of participation and commitment scuttled ongoing 
activities after the first celebration, ending Van Lierop’s attempts to build a black 
movement from this initial event. 863 This was just one example of a wider phenomenon, 
in which black American organizers committed to a new, revolutionary Pan-Africanism 
struggled to build the serious campaigns from initial displays of solidarity in cities across 
the country.864 To create a self-sustaining movement, the nationalists and their allies 
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needed to inspire self-sustaining grassroots movements based on individual commitment 
to a shared ideology of struggle.    
Van Lierop felt that a film could translate FRELIMO and CONCP ideology for a 
black American audience in a way that could build this kind of support. Mondlane and 
Khan had both discussed the idea with him in previous years, and they had success in 
working with activists in Europe on such projects already. Yet the local concerns of 
Europeans did not necessarily translate to the issues confronting the black American 
community nor the bonds that linked Britons and Dutch to the revolutions. Van Lierop set 
out to make a film that addresses issues of African American solidarity, assembling an all-
black film crew that journeyed into liberated Mozambique with FRELIMO to document 
the armed struggle and the social reconstruction occurring behind the lines.865  
Van Lierop released A Luta Continua (The Struggle Continues) in 1972. Named 
for a line Mondlane often used to close his letters, the film self-consciously teases out the 
universal implications of FRELIMO ideology and its relevance to the black community. 
Brevity and Van Lierop’s sympathetic gloss minimize foibles, but all simplifications reflect 
FRELIMO preferences, hewing closely to the party’s self-styled image as a social-minded 
revolutionary organization that prioritized the construction of an egalitarian state over 
violence.  The film emphasizes three CONCP narratives. First, the global nature of the anti-
imperial struggle, in which Mozambique was a victim of both formal imperialism and the 
economic exploitation of multinational corporations that treated Portugal in essence as a 
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“neo-colony” representing Euro-American economic and strategic interests. Second, Van 
Lierop emphasized the creation of what Mondlane referred to as the “new and popular 
social order,” which established cooperative farms, schools, and health facilities in the 
liberated territories where Portugal had never done so despite half a century of direct rule. 
866 In a film about a revolution, images of war constitute roughly an eighth of the overall 
running time: even footage of a training camp describes it primarily as “an educational 
institution, an agricultural institution, a health institution, and a social services institution” 
rather than a place of war.867 Finally, the film borrowed from FRELIMO in defining real 
victory as the achievement of equality and social cohesion – regardless of race, class, or 
gender. The film detailed FRELIMO’s ideal of democratic participation in the struggle, 
where women and men held equal positions of authority based less on rank than specific 
responsibilities. It ended with FRELIMO’s call to Mozambicans to cast off traditional tribal 
and gender identities in order to be reborn as a single, egalitarian nation. Though idealized, 
the film dramatized the practice of socialist revolution that had long been presented as dry 
theory.  
FRELIMO and Van Lierop believed that depicting the revolution as it was 
occurring (at least in the ideal) would translate the struggle in an understandable way that 
could overcome the skepticism and indifference of American audiences. They understood 
revolution as universal, which could be adapted to circumstances in the United States as it 
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had been in Mozambique. A Luta Continua acted as a filmic guide for reinventing 
communities, with commentary demonstrating how the FRELIMO model compared to 
practices in the African American community. One scene describing the Mozambican 
model of education is illustrative. For FRELIMO, Van Lierop as narrator explains that 
“education is not a way to achieve upward mobility or isolate themselves as an intellectual 
elite nor is it a meaningless abstraction that leads to dependence on external economic 
conditions.” Education lifts students out of ignorance in a way that undermines class 
divisions associated with capitalist exploitation:  
When school is out, the teachers do not go one way, into cars for a trip home to 
exclusive suburbs, while the students go another way deeper into a ghetto. Instead, 
they are all part of the same mass movement, and the teachers live, work, and 
struggle in the bush with all of the people.868  
 
Here, Van Lierop offers the solution to the weakness of the black American community. 
Committed activists must sacrifice the trappings of the capitalist-imperialist system in 
favor of communal unity in order to sustain a meaningful social revolution. During a period 
when African American activists were gaining firsthand experience with the corrupting 
influence of power in places like Newark, this lesson had a major effect on the way they 
came to view both domestic unity and identification with African movements. As one 
activist remembered decades later, blacks could learn directly from the foreign movements 
about the “way things are put together” in practice and not just in theory.869 
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Upon its release in 1972, the film became the key text explaining FRELIMO and 
CONCP ideology to American audiences.870 Activists and occasionally nationalists like 
Khan presented at showings, acting as the visual centerpiece of programs that offered 
viewers of all races a way to participate in the revolution, either by joining in activities or 
donating directly to FRELIMO.871 A discussion guide distributed with the film reveals the 
general tenor of such events. It urged viewers to boycott southern African goods, conduct 
their own educational campaigns, and launch “mass political actions against identifiable 
imperialist targets (e.g. corporations with investments in southern Africa, communications 
outlets that have failed to report on the wars of national liberation).”872  A Luta Continua 
came to represent the entirety of the CONCP struggle for socialist liberation, headlining 
events supporting the MPLA in Angola and the PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau as well as 
Mozambique. As such, the film symbolized the promise of all liberation struggles in 
southern Africa for thousands of blacks, challenging them to reconsider their own lives and 
the future of their communities in light of this universal model. Sylvia Hill, an educator 
who would become a noted anti-apartheid activists in the 1980s, remembered leaving a 
screening of the film and “for the first time having this sense that you can have a science 
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of change because you have to think methodologically about what you're doing. It's not 
just haphazard and just occurring willy-nilly all based on chance factors.”873  
The film was just part of a larger propaganda effort, which finally targeted African 
Americans. The nationalists dramatically increased their personal involvement with the 
community. In addition to the Khan and Gil Fernandes work with local groups and 
appearances on black programs, Amílcar Cabral – the most noteworthy face of the CONCP 
after Mondlane’s death – made multiple trips to the United States where he spoke with 
Black Power leaders. In 1973, he even had a private meeting, where the strictly African 
American audience peppered him with questions about his revolution and how to translate 
it to the American context. Van Lierop’s African Information Service, which he had 
founded with activist extraordinaire Prexy Nesbitt, published this exchange and collected 
speeches in a widely read volume, Return to the Source. While attendees and readers of 
the volume were by and large familiar with much of what Cabral said, one comment had 
special resonance. Speaking to more than 120 representatives from various black 
organizations, the diminutive Cabo Verdean urged the audience to move beyond mere 
racial affinity to political activity. “Naturally we like our brothers,” Cabral commented to 
the crowd who used the sobriquet to refer to him, “but in our conception it is better to be a 
brother and a comrade. . . if we are brothers it is not our fault or our responsibility. But if 
we are comrades, it is a political engagement.”874 Here was the central goal of the 
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Portuguese African parties’ solidarity. They hoped to use race as an introduction to the 
black American community, but they hoped their allies would adopt or at least support 
their leftist political goals as a way of achieving independence.  
This barrage of propaganda and personal diplomacy was paying dividends in the 
early 1970s. The revolutions ideology was clear. Beyond the publications of activist 
organizations, the CONCP parties had broken into the mainstream black press. They 
attracted comment from a diverse array of black leaders who began to quote Cabral in 
particular as they discussed ways to integrate the useful aspects of Black Power into a 
politically influential ideology.875 “A luta continua” became a catchphrase to describe any 
ongoing struggle. Even Ebony joined the fray when it featured a glossy spread on the war 
behind the lines in Mozambique.876 African Americans had finally discovered the 
Portuguese African revolutions, in large part because the nationalists had finally realized 
the potential of appealing to the grassroots of this community and utilizing racial 
connections to break through a veil of indifference. Black Power in its most radical and 
confrontational form may have been on the decline during this period, but the integrated 
leftist Pan-African ethos it inspired laid the foundation for a mass adoption of the 
Portuguese African cause by the black American community. All that remained was to turn 
this growing affinity into visible political action that could supplement, amplify, and 
perhaps lead the wider coalition of solidarity activists.  
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People in the Streets: The Rise and Fall of the African Liberation Support Committee 
African Liberation Day (ALD) was the political manifestation of this expanding 
interest in African revolutions. A national project, it took advantage of the increasing unity 
between the heretofore antagonistic poles of Black Power and civil rights political activism, 
buoyed by the formalization of this alliance in the inclusive National Black Political 
Convention held in Gary, Indiana. Beginning in 1972, it united African Americans from 
across the political spectrum in support of the liberation struggles. At the same time, it used 
the most well-known ideologies of the time – those of Portuguese Africa – to help remake 
the way that African Americans understood the concrete connections between local and 
international action. The celebration of ALD and the African Liberation Support 
Committee (ALSC) that it spawned helped convince many African Americans that their 
full equality depended on the complete freedom on the African continent. Though 
eventually hamstrung by the re-emergence of the nationalist-Marxist divide, the 
momentum that grew behind African liberation solidarity would continue through the fall 
of the Portuguese empire in 1974 and into the next decade.  
Praised by Komozi Woodard as “one of the most important forces for African 
liberation in African American history,” few historians have fully appreciated the debt this 
movement owed to this emerging solidarity with Portuguese Africa.877 It emerged at a time 
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when the decline of militant black power opened an avenue for cooperation between the 
more radical “Africanist” generation and more moderate blacks in positions of power, such 
as ACOA ally Congressman Charles Diggs. Through unity, it was hoped the black 
community could wield greater political power through the election of more 
confrontational black politicians and the use of communal monetary power. This took place 
at the local level through the organization of political vanguard groups like Amiri Baraka’s 
Congress of Afrikan People (CAP), but larger national manifestations included the first 
National Black Political Convention held in Gary, Indiana in 1972. The goal of this new 
movement was to create a single Black Agenda for national politics, that could achieve real 
transformation in minority areas of the country by controlling the government structures. 
Foreign policy goals were part of this agenda, but mass protest on African subjects was not 
necessarily a clear implication of this new project. Rather, it grew from the realization 
encouraged by the CONCP parties that the struggles of African peoples were indelibly 
linked.  
Like A Luta Continua, the ALSC was a product of the personal diplomacy of 
FRELIMO and its interactions with ALD founder Owusu Sadaukai (Howard Fuller). The 
head of Malcolm X Liberation University in Greensboro, North Carolina and closely 
associated with YOBU, Sadaukai championed the education of blacks in the skills 
necessary to reconstruct their communities into autonomous and assertive units. He became 
an important national authority on the role of black education and its role in contributing 
to the new Black Agenda. In the fall of 1971, he traveled to Tanzania in order to learn from 
the country’s education system. What inspired him most in Dar es Salaam was not Julius 
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Nyerere’s African model of governance, but the liberation project in Mozambique. He met 
extensively with the FRELIMO leadership, discussing their model of national 
reconstruction and how African Americans could support their struggle.878 In these 
exchanges, the freedom fighters stressed the importance of explaining the revolution to the 
American people – especially blacks. With knowledge of the revolution and the American 
role in sustaining Portugal, activists would surely provide “strong moral support” and show 
the world “our concern through massive Black protest and demonstration against U.S. 
involvement in Southern Africa.”879  
Sadaukai returned to the United States with a clear mission. Using the broad 
network of that he had developed while founding the university, he helped assemble a 
coalition of black supporters that crossed class and ideological lines. Among the notables 
who agreed to assist in preparing the first ALD were Stokely Carmichael, Newark’s Baraka 
and his nationwide CAP, Betty Shabazz, head of the Southern Christian Leadership 
Council Ralph Abernathy, Black Panthers Huey P. Newton and Angela Davis, Black 
Scholar editor Nathan Hare, Lucius Walker of the Interreligious Foundation for 
Community Organization, four congressmen including Diggs, and dozens of others.880 
Finally, this ad-hoc organization, brought together by the appeal of black liberation, 
achieved the communal unity that Malcolm X had desired and offered the political potential 
                                                 
878 Howard Fuller, telephone interview with author, 5 July 2013;  Nesbitt Interview with author. Sadaukai 
actually joined with Robert Van Lierop temporarily as he filmed for A Luta Continua.  
879 Open Letter, African Liberation day, 17 February 1972, ALSC, FBI, 0983437000 HQ15725073 Section 
1, Archives Unbound. Also,  
880 Interview, Fuller with author; Letterhead, African Liberation Day Coordinating Committee, no date 
(early 1972), provided to author by Fuller.  
 371 
that the liberation parties had long advocated. All that remained was defining the ideology 
that would guide this movement.  
In these earliest stages, however, ideology took a backseat to building sympathy 
with the foreign revolutions. Occurring at the same time that news of FRLEIMO and the 
PAIGC were just entering the mainstream black press, the rally would simultaneously 
educate and politicize a large segment of the African American population. Organizers 
desired to show individual blacks that the distant struggles for economic and political 
equality were inherently linked. Physical protests at major governmental and corporate 
backers of Portugal and South Africa would help Americans connect forms of oppression 
at home and abroad.881 African Liberation Day would break down the traditional barriers 
that separated African Americans from their compatriots abroad, overcoming gaps in 
communication and creating a shared identity in a revolutionary struggle. ALD was 
fighting against the “thinking patterns of the black community” that saw the world “only 
in terms of the local and the immediate, and only in terms of pieces of the whole.”882 Here 
then was the Africanist vision writ large. Advocating for liberation would help groups like 
FRELIMO and the PAIGC, but it also provided the foundation for concerted action by 
African Americans that would be the first step in launching a domestic revolution of 
unknown means and tactics.883 A Luta Continua and similar writings were establishing an 
adaptable model for struggle and unity, now it was up to black Americans to define its 
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contours in their national context and put the plan into action. Timed to follow just two 
months after the Gary convention, it would be a continuation of the struggle for unity and 
the formation of the Black Agenda. “The strengthening of Africa,” Baraka explained in the 
first public announcement of the ALD, “is the strengthening of ourselves.”884 
 Sadaukai and the committee chose visible cities for the rallies with large black 
populations in order to increase the chances that sizeable protests would draw official 
attention. Sites in 1972 included San Francisco, Toronto, and Antigua. The U.S. capital, 
however, would serve as the primary location for the ALD. As Baraka noted, Washington 
represented the ideal location for organizing since it contained “the government of our 
worst enemies, but paradoxically in a stronghold of black life.”885 Marches and rallies in 
front of embassies and the State Department would physically represent the demands for 
the United States to reconsider its policies supporting reactionary, oppressive foreign 
governments. At each location, noted speakers including politicians such as Charles Diggs 
would educate the attendees about the individual crimes of Portugal, South Africa, 
Rhodesia, and the United States against African peoples. Preparations and speeches 
included attention to the entire continent still under minority rule, but organizers singled 
out Portugal.886 Activists praised the Lusophone revolutions as the vanguard of the “newest 
most effective stage in a line of historical resistance [to European rule].” 887 As the 
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campaigns in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau gained ground, African Americans hoped 
that their support might provide the final element needed to tip the scales in their favor. As 
one anonymous fan of the ALD suggested, perhaps “support[ing] the liberation struggles 
on our own homeland” might “thrust the Freedom Fighters [of the Portuguese territories] 
over that crucial hump after which total defeat of colonialism through armed peoples 
struggle will have to be admitted.”888 
 As the chosen day of May 27th approached, all signs pointed toward a truly 
impressive national gathering. Organizers expected a few thousand protesters, but the 
popularity of the liberation movements had grown over the past two years. The largest 
planned demonstration in Washington, D.C. attracted African Americans from as far away 
as Houston. In the culminating rally at the National Mall (renamed Lumumba Park for the 
occasion) Sadaukai spoke before an assembled crowd of roughly 25,000, declaring “We 
are an African people.”889 Organizers proclaimed it the “largest all-Black demonstration in 
Washington’s history” and the largest nationally since Marcus Garvey.890 Another 7,000-
10,000 gathered in San Francisco, while smaller crowds of roughly 3,000 attended the 
rallies in Toronto and Antigua.891 It was by far the largest manifestation of black 
internationalism during the Cold War. It was also likely the single largest show of solidarity 
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with the southern African revolutions to take place in a Western country during the 1970s. 
It was sure to attract political attention.  
The Nixon administration – acquainted with mass dissidence due to its Vietnam 
policies –downplayed the events, but the demonstrations proved more disturbing to 
representatives of governments in southern Africa.892 To these officials, the visible 
manifestation of black discontent with American policy in the region represented a new 
and potentially disturbing trend. Thinking back on the event in the 1990s, the Portuguese 
ambassador tried to claim that the protests did not even disrupt the daily services of the 
embassy, but the rogue black nationalists who attempted to bomb the San Francisco 
consulate just a few days after the marches challenged his bravado.893 After the ALD, it 
appears Portuguese security agents began paying closer attention to African American 
activists. Diplomats at the South African embassy also took note of events. They had been 
observing the preparations for the campaign with unreserved skepticism and expressed 
surprise at the turnout in Washington. The ambassador noted the “special venom” that 
protesters reserved for the Portuguese, but continued to question the commitment of the 
black community to sustaining this activism – especially given the history of antecedents 
like the ANLCA. Officials in the embassy came to the conclusion that “there is not enough 
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evidence at this stage that southern Africa is a high priority in the black community.”894 
The first African Liberation Day had been a success, but it had merely been the first salvo 
in an attempt to push change – both within the black community and in wider American 
society. It had made an impression, but more sustained effort was necessary to expand 
popular participation and convince onlookers that black identification with Lusophone and 
other nationalists was indeed a real phenomenon.  
The movement proved more durable than its detractors predicted. Within months 
of the first ALD, the ad-hoc organizing committee had formalized into the ALSC, which 
established the celebration as an annual event. However, the year between the two rallies 
produced a change in the nature of the program away from racial identification as the 
primary unifying factor. This shift owed a great deal to the ideologies of the CONCP 
nationalists who had captured the imaginations of many black peoples. As interest grew in 
the movements, people sought more information about them. Publications catering to the 
black radical audience including The Black Panther, The African World, and Amiri 
Baraka’s Unity and Struggle all reproduced key texts from Mondlane and Cabral in 
particular, which revealed to many for the first time the multiracial Marxism that stood at 
the core of the movements. Even more important was Cabral’s visit in the fall of 1972 
mentioned briefly above. It was at this point that Cabral urged Africans Americans to 
become both “brother and a comrade.”895 This statement, published within months and 
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widely read after Cabral’s assassination in early 1973, moved the leftist reading of activism 
to the center of the ALSC agenda, shaping the way that the leadership conceptualized its 
future organizing. This shift was reinforced by the inherently leftist perspective of an 
expanding list of propaganda items like A Luta Continua, produced in consultation with 
the CONCP parties. With this continental intervention, the transnational leftist element that 
had been subsumed within the ALSC’s iteration of Pan-African unity began to assert itself 
over the racial component, which would have profound effects on the organization and the 
unity of the black community.  
As part of this embrace of the Marxist inspired economic critique of the 
international system, the ALSC joined with other radical forces in boycotting Gulf Oil. 
ACOA and the predominantly white Gulf Boycott Committee had struggled to integrate 
the black community into grassroots protests against Portugal’s single largest corporate 
partner.896 Now, the ALSC and its constituent parts committed to joining the national 
boycott, led by Randall Robinson and his PALC. Targeting Gulf not only threatened to 
damage the Portuguese war effort, but it would link the PALC’s domestic criticisms of 
unequal hiring practices with the foreign exploitation of Africa.897 Already working with 
the ALSC on its activities in Boston, Robinson and colleague Jim Winston successfully 
pushed for the inclusion of Gulf as an issue in the first ALD celebrations.898 In June 1972, 
Robinson proposed a nationwide campaign that would mobilize black public opinion 
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against Gulf in over a dozen states, including seven of the most lucrative markets for the 
oil giant.899 As Robinson explained to Congressman Diggs, a pivotal member of the ALSC 
coalition, “if in the key states we can win overwhelming Black support in addition to 
marginal support from whites, Gulf’s profit margin can be substantially reduced.” 
Robinson hoped this might lead to Gulf’s exit from Angola, though the campaign’s 
educational value far outstripped the small likelihood of such an event. The ALSC 
approved the plan.900 Local chapters, many of which were associated with Baraka’s CAP, 
coordinated the widespread effort. The activity would serve the twofold purpose of 
educating populations about the liberation movements, while also providing them with a 
local symbol of collective racial oppression on which sympathetic blacks could focus their 
energies. The campaign also linked the first ALD with plans for its second incarnation.  
The results of the campaign were impressive and demonstrated the growth of 
popular feeling on the Portuguese African cause.901  In the run-up to the second May 
celebrations, the PALC coordinated the launch of an informational campaign across 20 
states. In April a “flood” of bumper stickers, posters, and foldouts appeared from Miami to 
Seattle.902 In Florida alone, the Gulf Boycott coordinator distributed 2,000 posters in two 
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weeks across the state, with special emphasis on northern cities like Gainesville. Churches 
and community organizations opened their doors to anti-Gulf speeches, and local radio and 
TV stations allowed for a once-a-week news spot devoted to Gulf campaigning. In New 
York, the PALC representative covered subways with more than 2,500 posters and handed 
out informational booklets at the local celebration of African Liberation Day in 1973. 
Through Diggs, the PALC also assembled dozens of black celebrities and officials who 
would lend their names to the campaign.903 The expansive list of the luminaries appeared 
on full page advertisements in Jet and Ebony declaring the Portuguese African struggle “is 
also our war,” which produced a frantic response from Gulf in the black media.904 The 
barrage helped lay the groundwork for a national picket later in September of 1973, which 
included more than 25 cities.905  
By the end of the year, the PALC and its ALSC affiliates had played a pivotal role 
in establishing the Gulf boycott as a national movement. Gulf remained in Angola, but it 
began to worry about the impact of the protests on its bottom line. It took out full page 
advertisements in popular black publications that gave a more positive spin to its role in 
the community, while also increasing investments in minority training programs.906 Gulf 
even proposed creating “betterment programs” in Angola that it could use to defray the 
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domestic impact of protests.907 Portugal remained confident that Gulf would not leave 
Angola, but the Portuguese ambassador warned his colleagues in Lisbon early that they 
should not “underestimate what the campaign can do.”908 A mass movement had developed 
that targeted the economic imperialism that continued to subjugate both southern Africans 
and blacks in the United States, and it was beginning to achieve results. Most importantly, 
it drew on a specific form of Marxist Pan-Africanism that included room for multiracial 
cooperation, evidenced by the PALC’s cooperation in some cities with existing Gulf 
boycotts dominated by white activists. Though such interracial cooperation with groups 
like the Gulf Boycott Coalition seemed relatively minor to individuals like Robinson 
focused narrowly on achieving the goals of liberation, it hinted at a deeper shift in 
conversation away from strict racialism within the ALSC and its associated organizations.  
Like the black Gulf campaign, the 1973 celebrations also reflected the growing 
CONCP influence. The major change was a shift from the mass rallies of the prior year in 
major cities to a series of smaller demonstrations scattered across the country. These local 
demonstrations highlighted shared elements of imperial exploitation and its impact on 
individual lives, attempting to achieve Cabral’s dictum of directly relating revolution to 
quotidian experiences. Small rallies provided a venue in which local organizers could 
readily connect domestic symbols of oppression with similar situations overseas. In 
Newark, for example, the comparison became centralized around the Portuguese problem. 
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Marchers designed a route that included “stops at many symbols of oppression against 
black people,” which included the Portuguese consulate and the Portuguese airline TAP. 
The result merged the problems and the solutions to African exploitation on the continent 
and in Newark into one interrelated whole.909 At the same time, organizers hoped to gently 
expand the base of their revolution beyond the strict limits of Black Nationalism. Adopting 
the longwinded theme “There is no peace with honor – the war continues in Africa and 
against Black People in this country,” the ALSC hoped to canalize popular radicalism 
focusing on Southeast Asia into the southern African cause. As Sadaukai explained in 
words reminiscent of radical white solidarity organizers at the time, “We feel very strongly 
that as the war ‘winds down’ in Vietnam it will be winding up in Africa.”910 These local 
demonstrations were less likely to affect national policy, but they exposed the uninitiated 
to the looming threat of U.S. adventurism beyond Saigon. They offered opportunities to 
identify local collaborators with minority rule like Gulf Oil and give a wider array of people 
a sense of participating in the revolution. The decentralized activities sought to create a 
seamless connection between international and domestic revolution, spurring people to 
assert power in their own communities as they acted in solidarity with Africans abroad.  
These changes produced an African Liberation Day far different from the previous 
year. In May of 1973, roughly 30 cities across the United States, Canada, and the Caribbean 
held rallies. Attendance differed from one city to the next, but widespread participation 
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demonstrated a surprising depth of feeling among African Americans. New Haven 
produced well over a hundred; Raleigh, North Carolina more than 1500; and the less than 
radical city of Knoxville 400. In Portland, Oregon, over a thousand attended, including 
more than a few white leftists, while another surprise turnout of nearly two thousand filled 
the streets of Columbia, South Carolina. In Houston, a few hundred marched outside of the 
Portuguese Consulate and in front of the Gulf Oil building, before attending a rally of more 
than one thousand. Harlem, San Francisco, and Washington all gathered roughly five 
thousand people for their rallies. Earlier festivities in Los Angeles raised $17,000 from 
3,000 attendees. Only in a few cities like Boston and Rochester did turnouts produce 
discouraging results, with poor weather being blamed for attendance. The turnout for the 
piecemeal ALD proved far greater than many expected, given its diffuse nature.911 Local 
committees raised more than $41,000 in aid for the liberation groups.912 Activist 
publications claimed that more than 100,000 people marched in the various cities, but the 
number was probably closer to 40,000 in the United States.913 This number was 
disappointing in some ways as the movement failed to expand much beyond its previous 
success in terms of numerical turnout, but it likely involved more people in the liberation 
cause than had the more centralized celebrations of the previous year. As one activist 
remembered, for every one person who attended the rallies, there were likely three or four 
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who participated at some level beforehand or after.914 The general success of the second 
ALD pointed to an ongoing solidarity with African liberation struggles and a greater 
incorporation of the socialist ideology into African American activity.  
In spanning the country, African Liberation Day also broke out of the niche of 
strictly racial interest. In locations such as Portland where leftists cooperated across the 
color line, whites participated in ALD activities, though not without some consternation at 
the national level.915 Major media outlets paid greater attention to the marches, devoting 
space to the demonstrations and the transnational ideology they articulated. An article on 
the front page of the Washington Post’s Metro section (above the fold no less) noted that 
the D.C. event was smaller compared to the prior year, but that it showed concretely 
“correlations between the history and problems of both [blacks here and Africans].”916 The 
New York Times and smaller local papers provided similar coverage, noting in particular 
the ways that activists used the event to highlight local issues. In Manhattan, Borough 
President Percy Sutton declared the proposed site of an unpopular state office building in 
Harlem African Liberation Square, effectively delineating it as a battleground that fit with 
the local theme ‘One struggle – many fronts.”917 In places where celebrations received no 
coverage outside the black community, organizers charged racism. In Philadelphia, a group 
of young activists lambasted the Inquirer and other local media for their lack of attention. 
“A press that can uncover the Pentagon papers,” they stated tongue firmly in cheek, “cannot 
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claim to have been unable to uncover information on African Liberation Day.”918 The ALD 
may have been a black project, but its organizers aimed to gain the attention of all segments 
of the country.  
The size and breadth of the celebrations also had a meaningful impact in 
Washington. There had been a sense since the first ALD that Africa could become a 
substantial issue in domestic politics if trends continued. In the wake of the previous year’s 
success, Charles Diggs had organized a congressional delegation that traveled around the 
continent, discussing the growth of black interest in the liberation struggles and urging 
coordinated pressure on the United States by independent governments. At the same time, 
congressional initiatives spurred in part by the ALD celebrations worked – in the words of 
one of Digg’s committee staff – “to push, to pull, to tug, to embarrass, and to cajole the 
government into more considerate action” in the region.919 Some individuals within the 
State Department believed this burgeoning transnational coalition on Africa could have 
real consequences for American policy toward the minority regimes.920 FRELIMO agreed. 
Sharfudine Khan used the ALD celebrations and their enthusiastic reception on the 
continent to needle American officials, who continued to avoid discussions of isolating 
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their Iberian partner.921 One State Department report openly wondered if such a shift in 
policy might not be inevitable if the Congressional Black Caucus and its grassroots allies 
could replicate the sustained successes of similar activities in Europe, which had by that 
point swayed governments in the Netherlands and Sweden to provide support for liberation 
movements.922  
It was this emerging grassroots-political alliance – made visible by the mass rallies 
of 1972 and 1973 – that caused the most concern across the Atlantic. Portugal feared that 
its increasingly good relations with the Nixon administration could succumb to a 
potentially hostile legislature, which threatened to become a reality as popular interest 
developed. Events like the ALD helped promote more active and confrontational strategies 
from elected officials, with Digg’s Congressional Black Caucus demanding an end to all 
aid in Portugal as part of a black “Bill of Rights” formulated shortly after the first ALD in 
1972. Though unsuccessful, the move both infuriated and worried Lisbon, leading the 
generally dismissive Portuguese ambassador to label it “the only initiative with a really 
onerous character.”923 More importantly, the combined efforts of the New Left and black 
activists had made Portuguese Africa more than just an issue of race. Just over a year later 
in the fall of 1973, Congressional pressure materialized in the form of an amendment to 
the Foreign Assistance Act that would enshrine the arms embargo against Portugal as law, 
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which was sponsored by a pair of white senators from states with politically active African 
American minorities – Democrats Ted Kennedy of Massachusetts and John V. Tunney of 
California.924 Both had relationships with groups like the Washington Office on Africa, but 
it was the intersection of lobbying and visible protest that made the sympathetic politicians 
see the value in leading the opposition to Portugal and southern Africa more generally.925 
That Kennedy in particular would do so in the traditional hotbed of pro-Portuguese 
sentiment that was Massachusetts illustrated how effective the anti-colonial solidarity 
movement had become. At the end of the year, the legislation had passed both houses 
despite strenuous objections from the administration.926 Reflecting on the changing attitude 
in Washington, the exasperated Portuguese foreign minister complained to Assistant 
Secretary of State David Newsom that “10,000 people marching in African Liberation Day 
should not form U.S policy.”927  
The importance of this grassroots-Congressional opposition became apparent when 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger attempted to renegotiate Luso-American relations after 
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Caetano regime allowed American jets to refuel in the Azores as they traveled to aid Israel 
during the Yom Kippur War in October 1973. The lone European nation to grant such 
rights to the United States, Portugal combined the event with another set of base 
negotiations to renew its demands for American arms to fight in Africa.  While Kissinger 
was “prepared to explore with [Portugal] the possibility of providing weapons without any 
publicity,” he found domestic and particularly Congressional disapproval a major 
obstacle.928 Despite the fact that a number of congressman had expressed a willingness to 
reassess their approach to Portugal in light of the Yom Kippur aid, enough remained 
committed to colonial independence in the immediate aftermath of the Middle East crisis 
to hamstring the State Department. The administration prepared to send a handful of naval 
missile systems to Portugal, but it could not even obtain permission to provide unarmed C-
130 transport planes for fear of running afoul of the Congress. Hesitant to approach the 
increasingly hostile legislative body, Kissinger was obliged to seek the cooperation of third 
parties such as Israel to even attempt to satisfy Lisbon’s most measured demands.929 The 
administration had been more willing to aid Portugal than at any point since Eisenhower 
held office, but the popular-congressional consensus in favor of independence constrained 
executive flexibility. Supplying arms to Portugal would have made little difference even if 
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Kissinger had gotten his way, but the confrontation proved just how influential solidarity 
organizing had become since the beginning of the 1970s.  
 
The End of the Estado Novo and African American Unity 
Success at the national level could not resolve the ideological split that was 
developing within the ALSC. As leftist thought and its multiracial connotations grew, it 
clashed with parts of the united front that had embraced the organization on strict racial 
lines. Two issues presented themselves in 1973 that fanned tensions, inspiring a year of 
infighting that would eventually split the ALSC. The first was clearly the issue of race. 
Requests to allow additional non-white peoples such as Hispanics and Asian Americans to 
participate in the marches led to a national debate. Though more than a third of committee 
members objected, the ALSC voted to allow any non-white individuals to join the local 
celebrations, though it barred them from holding positions of authority.930 The decisions 
angered many strict black nationalists, though supporters likely justified it on the 
foundations of an emerging emphasis on the inclusive socialist Tricontinentalism that 
informed African revolutionary thought. The decision was quietly monumental in its shift 
away from the primarily Pan-African identity on display in 1972. The shift to the left would 
reach a culmination at the first major ALSC meeting after the second ALD held in 
Frogmore, South Carolina. There, an expanded national committee voted to accept the 
participation of progressive whites as participants in future activities, though it still kept a 
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distance from direct cooperation with any majority white groups.931 The shift to the left 
angered many nationalists who considered race as the defining factor of solidarity over any 
other political ideology.  
The second difference applied this growing split to the question of Angola, which 
proved even more divisive for the ALSC than it had been for the ACOA. Despite the place 
of Angola in such campaigns as the boycott of Gulf Oil, there was no consensus on the 
legitimacy of the three competing parties. Black activist publications often were 
opportunistic in their coverage, celebrating the achievements of any party that claimed a 
victory against the Portuguese. The non-ideological approach to Angola was the norm in 
the black community and had been since the days of the LCA.932 But once the ALSC chose 
to distribute its newfound funds in Africa after the 1973, it faced a problem. All national 
committee members accepted PAIGC and FRELIMO as worthy recipients of aid, but 
Angola presented a problem.  
With Roberto removed from the discussion due both to his image problems in the 
United States and the apparent weakness of the FNLA, the decision came down to two: 
either Agostinho Neto’s MPLA or UNITA under the Mbundu nationalist and former 
Roberto protégé Jonas Savimbi. The MPLA positioned itself alongside its CONCP allies 
as the more politically progressive group, fighting not only imperialism but also the 
“tribalist trends and racist prejudices fostered by the colonialists.”933 Randall Robinson, 
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Robert Van Lierop, and others who worked well with organizations such as ACOA and the 
GBC embraced the MPLA, partially for its ideological commitment and multi-racial goals 
and more often because it flowed naturally from their existing associations with fellow 
CONCP members FRELIMO and PAIGC. The MPLA was also the most openly left-
leaning of the three revolutionary groups, proving attractive for many who adopted Marxist 
readings of the international situation. Nonetheless, even this caused consternation among 
Tricontinental advocates who believed the MPLA was closer to Moscow than Third World 
governments like communist China. Most problematically, the MPLA had been relatively 
inactive in promoting its cause in the United States even more so than in Europe, relying 
on groups like the LSM and students studying in the United State such as Abel Guimarães 
to champion its diplomatic goals.934 
In contrast, UNITA actively cultivated foreign support, in part to offset its 
difficulties waging armed struggle in Angola. Savimbi presented himself as a Third World 
Marxist based on his early embrace of Maoist ideology, but he was also nothing if not an 
opportunist. Among African Americans in the 1970s, he appealed to race-first Black Power 
thinkers by emphasizing a restrictive Pan-Africanism as the centerpiece of his party’s 
revolution.935 Savimbi had first clashed with the MPLA in the 1960s because of its 
supposedly entitled, multiracial leadership, and his party returned to these sentiments a 
decade later. UNITA claimed that the racially and ideologically elitist MPLA could not 
                                                 
934 Guimarães was one of the more active Angolans in the Gulf Boycott Campaign with speaking 
engagements sometimes arranged through ACOA. 
935 Savimbi had been resorting to this argument regularly since the early 1960s, but he rarely adopted this 
approach internationally.   
 390 
relate to the average Angolan peasant, which the predominantly Ovimbundu party claimed 
in terms that mirrored Cabral’s writing on the practical revolution. Jorge Sangumba, 
Savimbi’s traveling ambassador who had attended Lincoln University in the early 1960s 
and later became UNITA’s minister of foreign affairs, adopted this perspective even as he 
espoused a leftist critique of the international system that differed little from sentiments 
expressed by Agostinho Neto and other CONCP leaders.936 He dismissed the MPLA as the 
party of Portuguese educated mestiços and foreign interests, reserving especially harsh 
criticism for Western supporters with limited ties to Angola. Basil Davidson became a 
popular target, for instance, since a number of publications such as the Black Panther had 
reprinted articles praising the MPLA. Sangumba dismissed such praise as the misinformed 
opinions of “white gurus [speaking] on black peoples struggles.”937 Savimbi stressed 
repeatedly that his party alone understood Angolan needs since he lived “where the fight 
is,” contrasting his leadership with that of exiles Roberto and Neto.938 Given that the two 
leading contenders for African American support leaned left and had loosely defined 
ideological structures, the differences between the two parties defined themselves in the 
American mind primarily along such ad hominem attacks. The racialized rhetoric helped 
UNITA find support among American black nationalists increasingly suspicious of serious 
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Marxists willingness to work with multiracial groups at the edges of the solidarity 
movement.  
Moreover, UNITA directly courted the ALSC along racial lines. After the initial 
success of the 1972 ALD, Savimbi astutely sent two representatives to help publicize his 
party. In addition to Sangumba, the former Swedish representative Stella Makunga spoke 
throughout the country around the time of ALD 1973. Another Maoist, Makunga also 
helped muddy the ideological waters by speaking about a favorite CONCP topic: the dual 
liberation of people and women through the act of revolution.939 UNITA also arranged for 
an African American writer for the Washington Post, Leon Dash, to spend ten weeks in 
Angola, where he penned a series of sympathetic articles on Savimbi, party ideology 
(notably difficulties with mestiços), and efforts to build schools and clinics along the 
eastern border – replicating successful CONCP propaganda but with clear Black Power 
overtones.940 By using similar rhetoric and ideas to the MPLA and the CONCP, differences 
for the two parties were again defined primarily along racial lines, as domestic MPLA 
proponents such as LSM and Abel Guimarães were predominantly white or associated with 
organizations like ACOA. As a result of Savimbi’s successful maneuvering, the majority 
of the ALSC membership embraced UNITA in 1973, even sponsoring a fourteen city tour 
of the United States for Sangumba.941 The ALSC eventually decided in a somewhat 
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contentious vote that UNITA was most actively advancing the struggle in Angola, naming 
it an aid recipient alongside CONCP parties PAIGC and FRELIMO.942  
Funding Savimbi’s party was a small victory for the black nationalists, but it was a 
pyrrhic one as the more doctrinaire leftist elements of the ALSC consolidated power that 
same summer. The internal debate over which party to support had highlighted the tensions 
that existed below the surface of the ALSC. Activists were forced to ask whether their 
critique of the international system was defined primarily along leftist lines or race 
concerns, pushing some of the most vocal activists into opposing camps. Moreover, the 
decision to support UNITA came as a number of MPLA sympathizers came to view 
Savimbi with suspicion. Noteworthy among this camp was Robert Van Lierop, whose 
African Information Service– according to Prexy Nesbit – “helped kick-start the process 
of rejecting Savimbi” after the Swedish Africa Groups had shared unflattering information 
on UNITA activities in Europe.943 As a result, the leftists pushed to take the ALSC in a 
new and more radical direction. At the 1973 Frogmore meeting where the ALSC voted to 
accept white involvement, one of the leading socialists on the national committee, Dawolu 
Gene Locke, replaced Sadaukai as national chair. A native of Houston who had helped 
organize a regional precursor to the ALD, Locke was supported in his leadership bid by 
SOBU head Nelson Johnson and influential Chicago sociologist Abdul Alkalimat. 
                                                 
942 Memo, Lucius Walker to Owusu Sadauki, 18 April 1973, Folder: Requests to visit Mozambique, Box 3, 
Robert Van Lierop Papers, NYPL.  
943 Prexy Nesbitt, “[Organizing] Outrage into Action: A Brief Discussion of U.S. Anti-Apartheid and 
African Solidarity Work, Then and Now,” unpublished paper, presented at The International Conference on 
a Decade of Freedom: Celebrating the Role of the International Anti-Apartheid Movement (Durban, South 
Africa: 13 October 2004).  
 393 
Together, this group helped form a statement of Marxist-inspired principles that laid out 
what Johnson and Alkalimat later called the “theory of class struggle with a correct analysis 
of racial oppression.”944  
The statement would set the direction the ALSC for the coming year, helping to 
bring the internal debate to a final destructive end. The new, Marxist-inspired 
organizational goals emphasized resistance to a capital-driven imperialism and the role of 
class in shaping black politics, while opening doors for greater cooperation with whites 
who opposed political and economic exploitation. The leftists argued that only by 
embracing these tenets and empowering a multiracial working class could blacks find true 
unity and advance their cause. The ALSC would act as the center of a united front, which 
would enhance the African American “ability to carry the fight against racism and 
imperialism to different groups of people around different issues, yet maintain our 
course.”945 Here then was a decision to move the ALSC beyond just its racial core, making 
it a black led movement that could ideally act as the head of a wider coalition of peoples 
dedicated to changing conditions for “people of color” on all continents. The language used 
in these documents directly reflected the leftist influence of the African revolutionaries, 
specifically the writings of Cabral. More importantly for the wider solidarity network, it 
provided a legitimacy that could mobilize the black community and guide a multiracial 
movement committed to African issues.  
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The racial nationalists – or what Jonson and Alkalimat called the proponents of 
“pure race theory” – were deeply disturbed by the document and the rapid drift of the 
ALSC. They believed this apparent shift in direction demanded a response. Stokely 
Carmichael had long considered Sadaukai and his closest advisers political neophytes, and 
he became the unofficial leader of the anti-left opposition. For years, Carmichael had 
discussed the importance of understanding the “scientific socialism” taught by Malcolm 
X. His iteration of the ideology was critical of capitalism, but not necessarily because of 
its monopoly characteristics. Rather, capitalism ran counter to traditions of African 
“communalism.” Under this ideology, racism did not evolve from capital’s attempts to 
divide the working class but from the natural clashing of races and European attempts to 
subdue darker peoples. In this view of the world system, Carmichael proclaimed “Pan-
Africanism is the highest form of Black Power.”946 This was an exclusionary vision of 
solidarity, which made room only for darker peoples who understood the specific 
experience of racial exploitation. It was a form of Tri-Continentalism, but one devoid of 
serious Marxist influence and deeply suspicious of non-black people. It coincided closely 
with the American perception of UNITA, which presented itself as a race-conscious 
nationalist party in the Maoist tradition if it followed any at all. Supporters of Carmichael 
such as the poet and ALSC member Haki Madhubuti said that blacks could not benefit 
from following the “white boy” theories of the increasingly Marxist ALSC leadership. 
Dismissing famed international communists Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, Madhubuti 
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gave voice to the suspicions of many black nationalists that they were simply “another set 
of white boys that are just as racist as Thomas Jefferson, George Washington, Abraham 
Lincoln, John Kennedy, etc., each using their special system of control both steeped in and 
based on white supremacy.”947  
Other nationalists may have hesitated to lump Kennedy with Guevara, but many 
would have agreed that most socialists outside of Africa were nothing more than what one 
former ALSC member referred to as “red fascists.”948 Like the MPLA in Angola, Marxists 
could not understand the needs of blacks, and adoption of their tactics threatened to 
undermine the movement toward racial self-determination. These critics found ammunition 
for their fight against the leftists in the liberation leaders, who eschewed defining 
themselves as communists and regularly questioned Marxist preoccupation with the 
working class.949 UNITA, which was self-consciously Third World in its socialist 
tendencies and hostile to the supposed theorizing of groups like the MPLA, became the 
symbol of this black African nationalism. To these activists, the ALSC’s adoption of this 
Marxist ideology betrayed not only blacks in the United States but also Africans fighting 
for a continental form of communal socialism in Portuguese Africa and elsewhere.  
 Over the next year the socialist-nationalist divide would tear apart the ALSC. By 
the fall of 1973, ideological debates at the top of the organization had filtered to the local 
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levels with disastrous results. In local meetings, nationalists and leftists confronted each 
other, often descending into violence. Prexy Nesbitt remembers hearing tales of gunfights 
breaking out over the question of support for the MPLA versus UNITA.950 In less polarized 
communities, local chapters sided with one element or the other of the national leadership. 
Leftists backed the national structure, while nationalist chapters threatened to secede and 
on at least one occasion hosted independent celebrations in 1974.951 As historian Manning 
Marable summarizes the situation, “old friends turned against one another; marriages were 
broken over which African liberation organization one chose to support.”952  
 These divisions were further exacerbated by the achievement of one of the ALSC’s 
primary goals. As domestic American debates over Angolan rivalries came to a head in 
1974, Portugal suffered its own crisis after nearly a decade fighting a three front war. On 
April 25, a group of young military officers toppled the Caetano Regime in a bloodless 
coup. Exhausted by years of fighting and struggling under the weight of a weakened 
economy, the country welcomed what became known as the Carnation Revolution (for the 
Lisbon residents greeted rebel tanks with flowers). The sources of this revolution were 
centered in Africa, where the PAIGC and FRELIMO had stretched the Portuguese military 
to the breaking point while exhausting the treasury that Salazar had worked so assiduously 
to build. But international pressure on Portugal did contribute to the alacrity with which 
the population accepted the change of government. The use of antiquated weaponry – 
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necessitated by the limitation of arms imports – against increasingly advanced material 
provided to the PAIGC and FRELIMO by Eastern bloc countries damaged already flagging 
military morale. Domestically, the country was also suffering an economic downturn under 
the weight of mass mobilization, and industrialists became increasingly frustrated at the 
role the wars played in retarding foreign investment in Portugal and endangering the 
country’s entrance into the European Economic Community.953 It was this mixture of 
colonial, domestic, and international pressure that allowed the toppling of Europe’s oldest 
fascist dictatorship with barely a shot fired.  
 Activists reacted to the events with a mixture of surprise, elation, and 
determination. Few however could have anticipated its timing, and some were actively 
engaged in solidarity work when they heard the news. Stephanie Urdang, the South African 
SAC member, was traveling with PAIGC cadres in Guinea-Bissau when the news came 
over the radio. Euphoria gave way to skeptical disbelief before the revolutionaries began 
the process of patiently waiting to see what plans the still forming Lisbon government had 
for the colonies.954 A world away, Prexy Nesbitt found himself hosting South African 
activist Ruth First at Northwestern University when he first heard the news. He passed a 
note to the speaker, and “without skipping a beat” the anti-apartheid advocate began 
explaining what the events could mean for the wider struggle in southern Africa and the 
future of the continent.955 Activist and revolutionaries alike both understood that the coup 
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was momentous, but it did not solve all problems. Independence was not guaranteed, nor 
was it clear who would inherit power in Angola if decolonization were to occur. As the 
following months saw the temporary victory of more radical elements within the 
Portuguese Armed Forces Movement (Movimento das Forças Armadas, or MFA), the 
constantly changing government in Lisbon inched closer to abandoning its claims to its 
former colonies. But time did little to solve the Angolan question.  
 As a result, the collapse of the Caetano regime became a source of cautious 
optimism for revolutionary parties and their foreign allies, but it only fueled divisions at 
the top levels of the ALSC. With Portugal likely to grant independence to the colonies, 
leftists and nationalist lost one of the key elements of unity. Within a month of the 
Carnation Revolution, the confrontation came to a head at the Howard University 
Conference held in anticipation of the annual ALD of 1974. Now debating not just who 
should receive funds but what party – and ideology – should lead new nations in Africa 
and the diaspora, tensions escalated to the point of rupture. YOBU had increasingly shifted 
to support a Marxist reading of the international situation, and it pushed an agenda at the 
conference that emphasized the organization of black workers as part of a transnational 
movement linking black peoples together against imperialism and exploitative capitalism. 
The organization’s proposals were generally supported, most notably and surprisingly by 
Amira Baraka, the head of the influential nationwide CAP network. Baraka – who one 
observer noted had undergone a conversion under the influence of Cabral and his own 
frustrations with the black elected leadership in his home of Newark – argued for the need 
to recognize and cooperate with whites willing to support a broader revolution. The result 
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was a rejection of Carmichael’s strict black nationalism, which the former SNCC leader 
and his followers at the conference refused to repudiate. Both sides used Cabral’s writings 
and references to the ongoing African revolutions to defend their positions.956  
The result of this ideological impasse was a split in the movement. The ALSC 
would continue, but it would represent the leftist elements of the former united organization 
alone. Opponents occasionally mounted their own demonstrations, sometimes in direct 
competition with the group as it became increasingly Marxist. In 1975, for instance, 
Carmichael would sponsor his own nationalist celebrations in Washington D.C., which 
directly competed with the left-leaning march organized by Baraka and his CAP. Yet 
despite these sectarian feuds, African Americans continued to celebrate African liberation 
day, though primarily at a local level.957 Black activists had finally articulated a meaningful 
solidarity with revolutionary Africa but the consensus on just what this meant in the United 
States had disappeared. What remained in both these sides, however, was a commitment 
to understanding the United States and African Americans as part of a larger global struggle 
for freedom and community control, which included and in many ways was led by the 
Portuguese African liberation leaders.  
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Conclusion 
 Despite the splintering of the ALSC, there was by 1974 a new level of international 
awareness and involvement in the black community. This sentiment had never fully 
disappeared, but it was now mobilized and visible. Both leftists and racial nationalists 
pledged solidarity to the successful parties of southern Africa, though some disagreement 
remained over which parties were legitimate. The PAIGC and FRELIMO had become 
symbols of assertive political and economic self-determination, which appealed to African 
Americans demanding full equality in their own communities. Internationalists such as 
Daniel Watts of the LCA and Owusu Sadaukai linked the liberation cause with domestic 
frustrations, illustrating that even the Cold War conformity of the 1960s did not completely 
silence Pan-African solidarity. As Brenda Gayle Plummer has argued, these “African vistas 
. . . provided an alternative to white nationalism and its political agenda,” as well as an 
alternative to a Civil Rights movement that was often bounded by this same national 
mythos.958 The Black Power movement and the new attention of the African nationalist 
parties helped activists collapse the distance not only between Africa and the United States, 
but between foreign and domestic policy. It was from this new transnational perspective 
that they could break free from the confines of Cold War liberalism and offer more scathing 
critiques of the unequal American system while imagining grander ideas for liberation.  
 Organizing in the early 1970s created a new momentum for the support of African 
liberation, albeit one that had to overcome ongoing conflicts concerning authentic 
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ideology. Malcolm X, the LCA, the ALSC, and myriad local organizations like the Randal 
Robinson’s PALC forged a solidarity with the struggles in southern Africa that would lay 
the groundwork for future organizing. Distance, language, and culture had always 
separated African Americans from their co-racialists abroad. Pan-Africanism had been 
popular among intellectuals, but it had been difficult for such thinking to take root in the 
wider black community until the successful merging of national and radical leftist 
internationalism combined with the practical, flexible ideologies of the Portuguese African 
movements. In supporting the positive cause of liberation advanced by the most successful 
parties of the socialist CONCP, blacks in the United States discovered a new identity with 
which they could challenge the rigid conformity of a Cold War foreign policy based on 
reactionary anti-communism and unrestrained capitalism. These popular organizations 
crafted what scholar Komozi Woodard has referred to as a “fictive kinship” that collapsed 
the distance that had divided Africa and the Diaspora since World War II.959 Unfortunately, 
the creation of this mass solidarity could not overcome the tension between leftist 
international critiques of the United States and race-first identity politics. As serious 
engagement with the ideas and tactics of the Lusophone parties expanded, so too did 
disagreements. The ideological divide would hamper the ability of the African American 
community to organize mass demonstrations on the scale of the first and second ALDs.  
Yet the triumph of the leftist philosophy did have important ramifications for black 
participation in the wider movement, as it opened up avenues for cooperation with 
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predominantly white groups whose embrace of an internationalist ethos shared the same 
goals of global social justice. This new model arrived at by the leadership of the ALSC and 
individuals like Randall Robinson stressed the need for black-led organizations that could 
work with ACOA, LSM, and the GBC. While many black communities had been 
understandably suspicious of the ACOA as unrepresentative of their interests, this new 
model allowed Black Power groups like YOBU, Baraka’s CAP, and later Robinson’s 
TransAfrica – which emerged from remnants of the ALSC in the Northeast – to maintain 
a focus on black priorities while gaining a seat at the proverbial activist leadership table. 
This model of independent black organizations working in cooperation with the 
internationalist, multiracial groups would provide the framework through which future 
solidarity organizing would take place. Black Americans had finally created and 
formalized a structure for expressing their popular will on American foreign matters, which 
linked grassroots interest to black political leadership and all areas in between. It also 
illustrates a continuity of African American internationalism stretching from the postwar 
period into the heights of anti-apartheid activism. Rather than a disrupted narrative of black 
engagement with global issues as claimed by Penny Von Eschen, these events hint at more 
of an ebb and flow of popular manifestations of a consistently radical, left reading of 
African American foreign policy operating consistently if not always visibly within the 
community. African Americans did not necessarily have to “reinvent the wheel” so much 
as reinterpret an existing radical, internationalist tradition to fit the new context of the post-
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civil rights era.960 The political power and visibility of this constant black internationalism 
depended largely on the ability of charismatic African nationalists to provide it with an 
identity and empower it in the face of the specific political problems of the day. 
 In this transitional moment after the collapse of the ALSC and before the formation 
of key organizations like TransAfrica toward the end of the decade, it remained to be seen 
how this new left-leaning black internationalism would play out in American politics. It 
was not clear if it could fully overcome the more exclusive Pan-African nationalism that 
threatened African American participation in the larger solidarity movement. Relationships 
with the GBC and ACOA were still largely interpersonal and developing. There were few 
formal communication networks, depending largely on individuals like Nesbitt and Van 
Lierop who had ties to both worlds, or Baraka who was just beginning to explore such 
relationships. Even among blacks, the collapse of the national structure of the ALSC 
robbed the burgeoning popular movement of its coordinators and leaders. The question of 
capabilities of this new black activist network and it relationship to the wider movement 
would be answered only when the Lusophone nationalists finally gained power, and the 
United States confronted the problem of socialist parties taking power in Portugal’s former 
colonies.  
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Chapter 6: “Welcome Back” 
The Activist Reaction to the Angolan Intervention of 1975 
 
 
More than 200 people stood in sub-freezing temperatures on the steps of the 
national capitol in Washington. It was January 19th of 1976, and they had gathered to 
protest President Gerald’s Ford’s intervention in the former Portuguese colony of Angola. 
“Welcome back,” veteran activist David Dellinger spoke into the microphone. Many of 
those in attendance knew each other well. Most had taken part in the Portuguese African 
solidarity movement at one point or another over the previous decade, though many had 
known each other as part of other movements as well – anti-war, civil rights, and anti-
imperial. White, black, man and woman, they cheered as various presenters spoke 
scathingly of Ford’s attempt to undermine the Soviet-backed government of the MPLA, 
which had already consolidated power in the capital of Luanda. Among the speakers 
besides Dellinger were Cora Weiss, Representative Bella Abzug, Howard University 
professor and member of the ALSC (African Liberation Support Committee) Ronald 
Walters, and Reverend W. Sterling Carey, the former head of the National Council of 
Churches. Under signs reading “Hands off Angola,” the attendees demanded an end to the 
war developing in the far-off state, comparing it to the quagmire in Vietnam that the United 
States had escaped only a few years before. At the beginning of a year that would see the 
president, the House, and much of the Senate seeking re-election, Dellinger stated in no 
uncertain terms that the assembly that took place that cold January day in front of the capital 
 405 
was “a warning.”961 Within a few weeks, this warning would be heeded by the House of 
Representatives when it approved a bill that would deny covert funding for Angola and 
remove the amount already spent there from the defense budget. The legislative 
intervention into the executive’s prerogative in Africa was the culmination of the 
organizing conducted by the Portuguese African nationalists of the CONCP and their 
international allies. After more than fifteen years, the transnational coalition had finally 
legitimized socialist claims to self-determination in the context of American foreign policy.  
 This event and other popular manifestations against the intervention, like the 
organizing that preceded it, has received little scholarly attention. Indeed, such a 
combination of grassroots and congressional interest in combating aggressive American 
adventurism before the 1980s contradicts most movement historians, who have seen the 
period following the Vietnam War as one of general quiescence to a slow reassertion of 
the Cold War.962 This was especially true on the Hill. Robert David Johnson has pointed 
out in his overview of Congressional activity during the Cold War that the liberal 
internationalism that helped force an end to the Vietnam War in 1973 was on the decline 
by the time Angola gained independence two years later. What scholars at the time referred 
to as a legislative “revolution” had greatly expanded the oversight abilities of the Congress 
and its power to influence foreign affairs, but it could not fully overturn the entrenched 
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Cold War values of containment and anti-communism.963 Movement allies like 
Congressman Charles Diggs, Senators John Tunney, and Ted Kennedy had joined with 
Dick Clark, Joe Biden, and a host of other young “radicals” swept into power by popular 
disillusion with the Vietnam, but they struggled to constrain military spending and calls for 
greater resistance to communism after their high-water mark of 1973. Many would be gone 
after only one term on Capitol Hill. By 1979, the Congress, led by a Democratic president 
who entered the Oval Office advocating human rights, would approve the supply of arms 
to Afghan rebels resisting a Soviet invasion in a region where the United States had few 
strategic interests and prior contacts.964 The following decade would witness the rise of the 
Reagan Doctrine, which empowered anti-communists to attack sitting leftist governments 
and fed the coffers of reactionary regimes the world over.  
Explaining what set Angola apart must account for the crowd that occupied the 
Capitol steps on that cold day in January. Bundled in caps, scarves, and heavy jackets, the 
few hundred protesters represented the latest manifestation of popular anger aimed at the 
long American indifference to Portuguese Africa traced in preceding chapters. After five 
years of rapid growth, the decentralized solidarity movement had helped isolate Portugal, 
but it had never achieved the transformation of official policy that had occurred in Europe. 
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In 1974, the expanding cooperation of religious, radical, and African American 
constituencies had promised greater political power, but the Carnation Revolution had 
removed the need for continued lobbying against Portugal. Now the activists and their 
socialist African allies had another chance. 1975-76 represented a period of transition, 
where both the American government and the world attempted to renegotiate relationships 
of power, cooperation, and intervention after the globally divisive conflict in Vietnam 
finally came to a close. The contested independence of Angola, the communist world’s 
clear material support to a leftist-nationalist government in Luanda, and the quadrennial 
debate on national priorities created by a presidential election all converged to create a 
moment of fluidity in the Western alliance, where Cold War priorities could be discussed, 
debated, and perhaps altered. It is in such moments of punctuated equilibrium that 
sociologists Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink have identified advocacy networks 
greatest chances of policy success, so long as organizations exist with sufficient expertise, 
membership, and access to official institutions to shape the emerging political agenda.965 
The socialist nationalists of the CONCP and their network of allies in the United States and 
Europe had positioned themselves perfectly over the preceding decade to control events in 
this moment of transition.  
The convergence of international and domestic factors meant that the protection of 
independent, socialist Angola would be the first moment when the popular-congressional 
linkages forged over the previous years would have a noticeable policy impact, well before 
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an expanded version of this coalition forced South African sanctions on a reluctant Ronald 
Reagan in the 1980s.966 The commitment to anti-colonialism had transitioned for the 
majority of organizations over the previous five years into an internationalist ethos of 
global freedom and independent development, striking at the heart of Cold War American 
programs for the developing world. The constituent components of the Portuguese African 
solidarity movement had not abandoned the hard-won linkages to other groups, nor had 
they forgotten the lessons of the anti-colonial struggle. As Angola and the other Portuguese 
colonies finally prepared to declare their independence, American sympathizers rallied to 
aid in every way they could. Even more so than the financial aid mentioned in previous 
chapters, an MPLA-ruled Angola would be the measure of their accomplishments. After 
years of warning that Western intervention in Africa was inevitable, the solidarity network 
had been proven correct. It quickly prepared to reorient the movement toward guaranteeing 
Portuguese African self-determination against the meddling of their own government in 
Washington.  
When Angola’s independence attracted the attention of President Ford and 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, the critical leftist network went on the offensive. By 
uncovering the existence of covert assistance to Holden Roberto and defining early public 
opposition to it, the network of local activists and lobbyists controlled the discussion of 
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Angola by framing it within the particular heuristic of Vietnam. Congressional 
internationalists seeking to challenge the Cold War narrative offered by the administration 
relied on these informed minorities, fed via the grassroots-to-legislative inroads made over 
the prior decade. Critical propaganda and activist connections to leftist African nationalists 
helped define congressional opinion against the covert intervention before Ford could even 
present his case. While the administration pledged not to send advisers or troops to Africa 
as the government had done a decade earlier in Southeast Asia, the comparison between 
the two conflicts articulated by the activist community won over the Congress as it had 
already large segments of the population.  This link between grassroots organizing, 
lobbying, and the legislative politics – emerging during the waning years of the Vietnam 
era but facing its first test with Angola – would become the model for constraining 
reactionary executive policies for the remainder of the Cold War.  
 
IA Feature and the New Internationalism of the United States 
 Angola reentered the world stage just over a year after the Portuguese Revolution 
toppled the imperial government. Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique had both gained 
independence under the leadership of the CONCP parties of the PAIGC and FRELIMO, 
respectively. Solidarity activists had welcomed the events in the summer of 1975, sending 
volunteers from Europe, Canada, and the United States to help provide expertise for the 
establishment of the new independent governments.967 But the deep divisions between the 
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three nationalist parties in Angola prevented any such smooth transition to peace. The 
MPLA confronted a combined front made up of the erstwhile enemies of the FNLA and 
UNITA. Though Holden Roberto and Jonas Savimbi had been antagonists since the 
Ovimbundu leader had abandoned the FNLA in the mid-1960s, they entered an uneasy 
truce in hopes of combining their meager forces in a confrontation with the still divided 
MPLA. As they had for the past decade, the new FNLA-UNITA coalition looked to the 
outside world for aid, but they now found increasingly important partners in the former 
allies of Portugal. This new arrangement of powers would force the Cold War back into 
the lives of Angolans, while giving the American movement a new reason for organizing. 
In the months leading up to independence, both sides withdrew to their regional 
strongholds in preparation for the fighting that would take place after the transfer of power. 
The MPLA looked to Cuba and the Soviet Union for assistance, while Roberto and Savimbi 
established alliances with Zaire and South Africa, respectively. The final piece in this 
puzzle was the small but vital aid provided by the United States to the nominally anti-
communist forces that came to be known as IA Feature.  
IA Feature had its origins in the early months of 1975. Kissinger remained as 
dismissive of the world beyond Europe as he had been after taking office in 1969.968 
Vietnam and the Middle East crisis had done little to shake this bias, especially as it 
pertained to Africa. In 1974, Kissinger and the State Department had been distracted by 
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events occurring in Portugal, which the administration feared could lead to a communist 
government in Europe.969 Only after Lisbon moved toward the political center and 
independence for the colonies neared did the Ford administration turn its attention to the 
power struggle occurring in Angola. Washington’s troublesome ally Mobutu Sese Seko 
brought the matter to the attention of Kissinger. The Zairean strongman won few popularity 
contests in Washington, but Kissinger wanted above all to maintain the precarious peace 
that he had finally instilled in the former Congo and appreciated his role as a dependable 
anti-communist on the continent. Mobutu worried that events in Angola were working 
against Roberto and the defeat of the FNLA at the hands of the Moscow-backed Luanda 
government could promote unrest along the borders of his massive state.970 He urged 
Kissinger to recognize the importance of the competition brewing in Angola.  
Kissinger had been loath to waste time on Africa for much of the tumultuous year 
of 1974, but he reacted quickly and assertively after he learned that the MPLA might take 
control with Soviet aid. He pushed the administration to expand its support for the FNLA 
and, to a lesser extent, UNITA. The “loss” of Angola could combine with the North 
Vietnamese victory in April to put the country on the defensive, at least in the realm of 
public and international opinion. Given Ford’s upcoming presidential campaign and the 
challenge the inheritor of détente was receiving from the right of his own party, such a 
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perception of weakness was unacceptable to the president, who lent his support to his 
increasingly embattled secretary of state.971 It was the domino effect all over again. With 
Ford’s backing, Kissinger told a group of high-ranking officials in June, “We can’t let the 
communists win there.” The secretary of state was deeply concerned about what American 
inaction would mean for regional politics and African relations with the United States. An 
MPLA victory could alienate Zaire and upset the balance of power in the tenuously stable 
region.972 It could also lead to a deeper global crisis of confidence in Washington’s 
leadership against the Soviets and threaten the administration’s continued tenure in the face 
of the rising conservative challenge in an election year.  
By June, Kissinger and Ford had made the decision to send their new allies millions 
of dollars in financial support and, indirectly and later directly, weapons. Mobutu would 
provide arms to the anti-MPLA forces, with the United States resupplying the Zairean 
military. New M-16s flowed into Kinshasa, while older weapons were redirected into 
Angola. The United States provided some artillery and anti-tank weaponry and backed the 
recruitment of non-American mercenaries to help train the FNLA-UNITA troops.973 
Eventually, Zambia would provide arms to UNITA, as did Israel through purchases by 
South Africa. Portuguese officers provided additional training in Zaire.974 The goal of this 
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massive influx of arms was not necessarily outright victory for the American allies, but to 
“balance off” the Soviet and eventually Cuban aid that was strengthening the MPLA.975 
The Ford-Kissinger administration hoped to maintain a status quo in Angola that would 
force the parties to share power or at least resolve their disputes without direct Soviet 
participation. Conscious of the deep divisions that remained within the United States after 
Vietnam and the pockets of strong feeling about Portuguese Africa, the White House felt 
that it was pursuing a constrained policy that avoided most political pitfalls and remained 
aligned with the larger strategy of détente. No American troops (outside a few CIA advisers 
and trainers secretly in Zaire) were committed to Angola, and expenditures were relatively 
modest. When CIA Director William Colby expressed concern that the Angola issue might 
cause a scandal with Congress or the American public if revealed, Ford responded 
dismissively: “We can’t sit here and worry about six Committees [in the Congress] if we 
do what’s right.”976 The bleed over between passive support to colonial Portugal and active 
support for domestic anti-communists that the solidarity movement had anticipated since 
the late 1960s had come to pass.  
The administration, however, had not accounted for the anti-interventionist zeal of 
the internationalist minority on the Hill. The House had traditionally been the most active 
on African affairs under the influence of Charles Diggs and the Black Caucus, but a 
reorganization of Foreign Affairs subcommittees in mid-1975 and deep political divisions 
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within the body militated against serious action.977 The Senate would have to take the lead 
in opposing the covert operation. Vietnam had pushed the Congress in more activist 
directions during the preceding decade as it had the American public. Many legislators had 
come to oppose the war if only to keep their jobs in the face of increasingly vocal 
challenges from their constituents. After Nixon withdrew troops in 1973 partially as a result 
of legislative attacks on military spending, congressional assertion on foreign affairs 
calmed. Yet there remained a core of critics committed to expanding legislative control 
over matters of international policy and military adventurism in particular. The most 
influential of these men like Stuart Symington (D-Missouri) had undergone a 
transformation from anti-communist crusaders to Cold War critics, spurred largely by what 
they considered overreach in Southeast Asia and a military-industrial complex run amok. 
They made common cause with a young generation of politicians who had defeated the old 
guard by opposing Vietnam and American adventurism. These new Senate classes included 
liberals like Joe Biden (D-Delaware), Floyd Haskell (D-Colorado – a former Republican), 
and John Culver (D-Iowa), who aligned with existing youthful Democrats such as ACOA 
allies Ted Kennedy and John Tunney. This coalition led the charge against Cold War 
politics as usual, opposing Vietnam, questioning major defense projects like the B-1 
Bomber, and famously investigating the covert operations of the CIA with a committee led 
by the increasingly reluctant Frank Church (D-Idaho).  
                                                 
977 Digg’s Subcommittee on Africa would become the Subcommittee on Resources, Food, and Energy, 
though Diggs would remain chair but with a much broader range of issues to cover.  
 415 
The internationalists converged around policy programs very close to those 
championed by the Portuguese African network. At the core of their beliefs was opposition 
to anti-communist adventurism, but they also represented an important break with the 
longer tradition of the great power politics personified by Henry Kissinger. The new 
generation of liberals in particular had stressed the reprogramming of military funds toward 
domestic programs on a Great Society Model, pushed for a more internationally engaged 
foreign policy centered on peaceful trade relationships and cooperative aid, urged greater 
engagement with the United Nations, and emphasized international leadership through 
moral means. The internationalist contingent also believed that these policies had to take 
direct account of the developing world. Many came to support the UN approved target of 
.7% of gross national product to be devoted to development assistance, which put them in 
line with the most ardent champions of decolonization in Sweden, the Netherlands, and the 
United Kingdom. Importantly, such policies were not simply humanitarian but relied upon 
a starkly different calculation of American interests from the Eurocentric ideas of 
Kissinger. The always direct John Culver explained the logic in prophetic terms in the late 
1970s: “the third-world problem [food, development, trade, the potential instability] in the 
year 2000 will be every bit as great a threat to our security as the U.S.-Soviet balance.”978  
For many of these congressmen, intervention was occurring in the wrong ways and 
in the wrong places. The United States needed to use its economic and political leadership 
to address not the form of government in the developing world but what positive effects 
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those governments could have on their people. That was the way to expand American 
prestige. As historian Robert David Johnson explains, the internationalists shared a “vision 
of demilitarized foreign policy that stressed economic cooperation, cultural exchange, and 
ideological issues such as human rights and support for democracy.”979 This rejection of 
suffocating anti-communism made room for leftist regimes like the MPLA that reflected 
the legitimate desires – if not necessarily the democratically demonstrated will – of its 
home nation. What the internationalist ideology did not do, however, was grant great 
authority on its proponents, who remained largely excluded from political leadership and 
struggled to make headway in an institution still dominated by seniority.  
Unfortunately for Kissinger and the administration, Angola’s backwater status on 
the African continent placed it under the purview of one of the most committed and capable 
of these marginalized ideologues, Democratic Senator Dick Clark of Iowa. Clark was 
neither an expert on Africa nor an activist. The Iowa senator had been a history and political 
science professor before entering politics as an aide to then Congressman John Culver, 
helping guide the Democratic Party’s resurgence in the socially conservative farming state. 
After walking 1,312 miles across Iowa during his first campaign in 1972, the personable 
Clark entered Washington firmly committed to liberal, anti-war causes.980 He quickly 
joined the reformers pushing the Congressional revolution in foreign policy. Thoughtful, 
articulate and hardworking – described by one observer as "a spirited and determined 
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academic type, with a puritanical streak" – Clark became one of the leading voices of the 
group.981 Given their natural affinities, the Washington Office on Africa (WOA) identified 
him immediately as an ally and made contact with his staff.982 Outspoken as he may have 
been, his opinions did not carry far for his first two years in the Senate, as he had little clout 
in policymaking circles. This changed slightly at the beginning of the 94th Congress (1975) 
when he received the chairmanship of the Africa subcommittee, the least politically 
desirable chair on the Foreign Relations Committee given to the least senior member (Clark 
ranked above only the equally green Joe Biden). Rejecting Biden’s half-hearted request to 
cede the chair to him, Clark took his role seriously and began to educate himself on the 
continent.983   
 Central to this education was a series of hearings Clark held on southern Africa in 
the summer of 1975, taking advantage of one of the revolutionary changes that had 
occurred in Congress over the past five years. Vietnam had demonstrated that the executive 
branch had a virtual monopoly on information; Congress struggled to verify facts produced 
by the executive and therefore lack an informed independent perspective. As the dangers 
of this conundrum became more apparent in Southeast Asia, there emerged a simple 
solution that would fuel the revisionist internationalist revolution of the 1970s. New laws 
provided the authorization and funds to nearly double personal Congressional staffs, who 
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now had the ability to pursue independent investigations into foreign policy issues.984 Yet 
these congressmen and staffs still faced a daunting challenge of mastering a world of 
history and complicated foreign politics, so they had to rely on existing experts to shape 
their research. When it came to Africa, there were few more knowledgeable or convincing 
in their argumentation than the various members of the activist network that had formed 
around Portuguese Africa. From June through July, Clark and his staff would use a series 
of hearings to learn from some of the few experts on southern Africa outside the executive 
branch– the academics, activists, and church members who had forged alliances with the 
socialist nationalist movements of FRELIMO, the PAIGC, and the MPLA over the prior 
decade.985  
While it is unclear how Clark assembled the list of nearly 30 witnesses, it is likely 
that either ACOA or WOA had a hand in the matter. In addition to WOA’s early 
identification of the senator as an ally in 1973, the office had worked closely with his 
predecessor, Gale McGee, when he chaired the committee during the latter Nixon years. 
Clark remembered later that he “had a lot of close contact with [the two groups].” One of 
his key staffers, Marianne Spiegel, had earned a master’s degree in African Studies and 
was likely familiar with ACOA through its extensive publications.986 The leadership of 
both groups was also well represented at the hearings. WOA Director Ted Lockwood 
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testified as did ACOA Deputy Director Jennifer Davis, with George Houser providing the 
closing commentary of the two month process. An academic at heart, Clark gave preference 
to professors over the grassroots organizers that Diggs had increasingly invited to 
Washington in previous years, but the majority of the witnesses had ties to ACOA, local 
movements like the Madison Area Committee on Southern Africa (MACSA), and close 
personal contact with the CONCP parties themselves.987  
 The hearings covered events in all the countries of southern Africa, but Angola 
stood out as one of the more pressing issues alongside the problem of apartheid in South 
Africa. As Kissinger and Ford were deciding on the levels of American involvement in the 
colony in the summer of 1975, Clark’s experts were warning him of the dangers of 
American involvement. In one of the earliest testimonies, University of Minnesota 
professor, MACSA member, and close FRELIMO associate Allen Isaacman explained the 
long history of American support for the Portuguese wars, which surprised the neophyte 
Clark. The professor hinted that the Ford administration might be providing aid to 
nominally anti-communist groups in the region but did not provide much detail.988 Angola 
experts Douglas Wheeler and Gerald Bender were more forceful than Isaacman. They 
made no claims to secret knowledge but sounded the alarm about potential action.989 
Bender was especially direct in his challenge, requesting that Congress use its oversight 
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powers “to insure that neither the, CIA, DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency] nor any other 
intelligence agency or private corporation is currently providing covert assistance to any 
of the Angolan parties.”990 Here for congressional consumption was the warning of a new 
Vietnam that activists had been sounding for nearly five years.  
Arguably the most important individual who shaped Clark’s thinking was John 
Marcum. Marcum had been an important member of ACOA while living on the East Coast 
in the 1960s, and he was generally acknowledged to be the authority on contemporary 
Angolan nationalism.991 An erstwhile friend of FNLA head Holden Roberto, by 1975 he 
had come to question the Bakongo leader’s ethnocentrism and suitability as a leader of a 
free Angola. In his testimony, he defended the MPLA against allegations that it was 
dangerous to American interests in the region. Marcum expressed concern about the 
governing potential of the alternatives. He also told Clark that the vague reports of 
American aid to Roberto and Savimbi circulating around the country rang true, since the 
FNLA had developed ties with the American government as far back as 1960. It had, after 
all, been Marcum who had worked with the Kennedy administration to administer the 
Lincoln exchange program during the same period. Marcum had mirrored ACOA in 
shifting his Angolan alliances over the past years, but he suspected that Washington 
continued to see Roberto as a capable and dependable anti-communist. Kissinger’s recent 
warnings about spreading Marxist ideologies hinted at the deep suspicion of the MPLA 
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that had developed in the executive branch over the previous decade. Marcum explained 
to Clark that “Washington should, above all, avoid the trap of overreacting to hostile 
rhetoric and socialist advocacy and of identifying potential ‘enemies.’”992 His advice 
effectively recovered the anti-colonial movement’s warnings of American meddling in the 
region and attached it specifically to the bellwether state of Angola.  
Marcum’s testimony had an impact on Clark and the way he understood the 
potential for disastrous intervention in Angola. As he opened his hearing featuring 
administration representatives, the senator quoted directly from Marcum’s testimony: “The 
most important thing the American government can do in Angola is to refrain from 
projecting parochial or ideological intolerance into its perception of the situation there.”993 
This statement set the tone of subsequent questioning, when both Clark and Biden peppered 
the witnesses with questions about arms dealings and the potential for anti-communist aid 
to specific Angolan parties. At all points, the State Department representatives denied 
favoritism or major assistance of any kind, explaining that the White House had backed 
Portuguese efforts to form a government of national unity through diplomatic channels.994 
Clark harbored suspicions, but the government roundly denied American involvement in 
the increasingly tense standoff brewing between the nationalist parties. The activist and 
academic communities continued to push the issue though. On the final day of the hearings, 
when asked by Clark for his recommendations concerning future American policy, Houser 
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urged the senator to conduct an “immediate investigation” into allegations that Zaire was 
providing heavy military material to the FNLA on behalf of the U.S. government.995 
Activists had long ago accepted the likelihood of Cold War intervention in southern Africa. 
They believed that the internationalist wing of the Congress had to step in and act as the 
arbiter of unchecked executive power in international relations. The activists had made 
important connections over the years, but they had finally bridged the gap for real policy 
change in the person of Dick Clark.  
 During the hearings Clark decided to conduct a more thorough investigation of the 
Angola situation. He began arranging a trip to Africa for the August break and requested 
to be briefed on CIA operations. As a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, he had 
the right under the Hughes-Ryan Act passed the year before to receive information on 
covert activities. The CIA had consulted with the Hill but had left Clark out of the closed 
door sessions. Kissinger has since claimed that IA Feature was never “all that covert” due 
to the 40 congressional briefings conducted by various departments. At the time, however, 
he admitted that many of the legislative consultations did not “amount to much more than 
[CIA Director] Colby talking to [Senate Foreign Relations Chair John] Sparkman and 
[ranking minority member Clifford] Case.”996 Both of these men sympathized with the 
constrained covert operation and did not voice objections to the program. In fact, Kissinger 
was upset when he discovered that the senior legislators had shared information with the 
                                                 
995 Ibid. 500. 
996 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 802. Telecon, Hyland and Kissinger, 23 December 1975, Kissinger 
Papers, Library of Congress. Frank Church claimed that not even he had been fully briefed until “after the 
fact.” “Senates Aim: Get Us out of Angola,” New York Post, 16 December 1975.  
 423 
hostile senator from Iowa.997 Shortly before his departure, Colby finally briefed Clark in 
person. According to CIA operative John Stockwell, the spymaster was disingenuous, 
explaining that the United States was only restocking Mobutu’s weapons that he had 
provided to the combined FNLA and UNITA in their attempts to forestall an MPLA 
takeover before the elections. The administration had no specific program of aiding either 
the FNLA or UNITA. For his part, Clark felt like Colby had spoken in platitudes and cannot 
recall anything significant being discussed in the meeting.998 Nonetheless, it represented 
the first time that the internationalist element in Congress had been directly told of any 
operation in Angola. It would be the first step in a six month long campaign that would 
bring covert activities to an end.  
In mid-August, Clark left for Africa accompanied by Joe Biden, aide Mary Ann 
Spiegel, and Foreign Relations staffer Dick Moose. The trip would confirm the expert 
testimony from the summer and steel his resolve to take action. He arranged to visit a 
handful of countries, where he would consult with the competing Angolan nationalists, 
Mobutu, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, and Mozambique’s 
Samora Machel.999 The administration attempted to conceal its activities, with the CIA 
even coaching Roberto and Savimbi on what to discuss with the congressional 
delegation.1000 But Clark’s extensive travel made this deception hard to maintain. No 
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amount of vague responses or fudged numbers could conceal what the critical observer 
could see and hear in the chaotic pre-independence atmosphere. Upon landing in Angola 
to meet Savimbi, the Americans discovered a South African plane waiting on the tarmac, 
which aroused Clark’s suspicions of the connections between the nationalist movement 
and its apartheid neighbor. In Luanda, the American consul general and a CIA agent 
advised him that “putting money into Roberto and Savimbi was a hell of a bad idea and 
wouldn’t work.”1001 Clark returned to the United States even more skeptical of the venture. 
There was something afoot in central Africa, and he was determined to stop it.  
Clark did not, however, know what the most effective form of action would be or 
how he would find sufficient support for his plans. Outside a few key allies like Culver and 
WOA collaborators Tunney and Kennedy, Clark found few willing to help him. He 
remembered later, “no other senator showed much interest” in Angola or the problem of 
the covert operations.1002 In fact, a number were actively hostile to the neophyte senator’s 
cause. At the same time that Clark flew to the continent, South Africa began an extensive 
campaign to build support in the Senate. Targeting conservative Republicans and southern 
Democrats, the Afrikaner government established relationships with some of the most 
powerful men in the upper chamber, including Senate Foreign Relations Chairman John 
Sparkman (D-Alabama) and Appropriations Committee head John McClellan (D-
Arkansas). Throughout the fall, more than twenty senators would agree to approach the 
administration in support of a more positive response to Pretoria’s interests, including its 
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strong opposition to the MPLA.1003 This bloc of anti-communist (and in some cases, 
segregationist) politicians was a challenging hurdle for Clark, especially as their influential 
committee positions gave them power over a large number of indifferent and undecided 
politicians seeking their largesse for projects in their home states. Clark knew that there 
was a large portion of the American public that would support his amendment and help 
nullify such calculations, but the Senate’s rules constrained him from disclosing the facts. 
Fortunately, a deeply divided executive branch and the American press helped solve his 
conundrum. 
In late September, New York Times correspondent and former Pentagon staffer 
Leslie Gelb wrote a front page piece about foreign intervention in Portugal and Angola, 
highlighting the role of Mobutu and providing background on Roberto’s relationship to the 
United States.1004 Gelb’s article – more focused on Portugal than Angola – did not inspire 
popular outrage, but it provided an excuse for the internationalists on the Hill and their 
activist allies to begin making noise about the Ford intervention. It was especially timely 
given that Roberto had used his advantage in American-supplied heavy weapons to push 
back MPLA forces in the north of the country, threatening to overtake Luanda shortly 
before Gelb’s article appeared in print. The MPLA had mounted a spirited defense and 
struck a blow to Roberto’s forces, but the FNLA leader vowed that he would take the city 
in order to be the primary beneficiary of the Portuguese transfer of power. The arrival of 
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Cuban instructors and Eastern bloc weapons helped alleviate the MPLA’s relative military 
disadvantage even as it succeeded in its struggle against UNITA in the south, but it was 
unclear whether September’s events would tip the scales in any one party’s favor.1005 As 
this information trickled through the media to the outside world, American activists 
focused less on the fighting and more on the reactionary intent of the American aid to 
Roberto through the dictatorial Zairean regime. Over the seven weeks preceding the 
independence ceremony on November 11, ACOA and WOA publicized Gelb’s revelations 
and inspired additional articles.1006  
When the Portuguese flag was finally lowered in Angola, the MPLA remained in 
control of Luanda but the fighting continued unabated, with foreign aid continuing to pour 
in from all sides. Shortly thereafter, Clark submitted a rider to the foreign aid bill that would 
ban additional involvement in the newly independent country without congressional 
approval. In addition to his colleagues sensitive to South African interests, the Iowan was 
opposed by such powerful men as Hubert Humphrey (D-Minnesota). The former vice-
president feared appearing soft on communism and urged moderation. The mainstream 
press also provided a surprisingly muted response. A handful of black newspapers who had 
sided with the ALSC socialists offered scathing commentary fed by WOA information, but 
most like the influential Chicago Defender said little. The black newspapers had rallied 
around the freedom struggles, but they hesitated – as they always had – to make firm 
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statements on the interparty rivalries. When reporters criticized Kissinger, they generally 
did so for the covert nature of operations rather than the rote assistance to anti-communists 
in a state where no clear American interests existed.1007 With few willing to speak out 
against a president responding to direct Soviet intervention in far-off Africa, Clark still 
faced an uphill battle.   
Vietnam loomed over the Angola debate, but not always in the way historians have 
suggested. Looking back from a contemporary vantage point, it seems logical that an 
activist Congress forged amidst the Southeast Asian war would overwhelmingly condemn 
foreign adventurism. Yet for much of 1975, Clark and his fellow advocates of a new foreign 
policy had been waging a losing campaign. In the Senate Defense Committee, Symington 
and Culver had scored few victories. Final votes on their bills to rein in the Cold War 
military-industrial complex failed by an average of nearly two dozen. Congress approved 
the expansion of military operations on the Indian Ocean Base of Diego Garcia and refused 
to end arms shipments to Turkey despite liberal protests over the country’s activities in the 
disputed territory of Cyprus. Even the ardor against covert operations, so strong after the 
Chilean coup of 1973, had waned. An attempt by one House critic to publicize the CIA 
budget had been defeated by 120 votes that very summer.1008  In the midst of his 
subcommittee hearings in June, Clark worried that the more constructive foreign policy he 
and his allies championed was in danger. They believed Vietnam repudiated the use of 
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force in foreign affairs, but the senator saw his opponents drawing on another lesson: “the 
administration, and . . . the majority in Congress, have somehow become so embarrassed 
or falsely humiliated by the experience of Southeast Asia, that they may in fact react the 
other way [toward the fetishization of force and an “abrasive” foreign policy].”1009  
The revisionists in Congress struggled to make headway on Angola exactly because 
the lessons of Vietnam remained obscure to many policymakers. Hubert Humphrey, for 
example, had repudiated the strict mentality of the Cold Warrior, but his actions 
demonstrated that he did not wish to appear weak in the face of Soviet expansion.1010 The 
revelation in November that Cuban troops were arriving in Angola, at the (apparent) behest 
of Moscow, offered a new and perplexing problem absent from Vietnam. Many legislators 
did not know how to react. Even the Congressional Black Caucus and Diggs did not 
publicly take a stance, since the Angola issue had proven so divisive in the black 
community over the last few years. The Detroit congressman explained to one black 
newsman that the Caucus had not yet made plans to take any action as late as early 
December, though members had clearly expressed interest in Angola and Diggs had begun 
investigating the situation at WOA’s request.1011 Vietnam did not necessarily impart a 
single lesson but many. One supported by Clark and internationalists viewed the war as a 
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repudiation of American interventionism, which opened the door for a constructive, 
multilateral internationalism based on human rights and ideological flexibility. Another 
more conservative camp believed that Vietnam had been mishandled. American troops 
should not have been on the ground in such a remote part of the world, but confronting 
clearly identifiable Soviet expansion remained necessary. The latter conclusion gave new 
life to the seemingly forgotten emphasis on aid – both covert and overt – to friendly anti-
communist forces. Many in Congress sat undecided between these two poles, worried 
about which direction their constituents might lean. Angola presented the perfect 
opportunity for these two contrasting lessons of Vietnam to do battle for the heart of the 
legislature. Clark needed popular and Congressional outrage to match his own perspective 
if he was going to disrupt the administration’s plan. 
 The Iowan found some help from the same groups who had first pointed him toward 
Angola. The activist network that had emerged from earlier solidarity organizing rallied 
behind the senator and his reading of the international situation. ACOA and WOA took the 
lead shaping Congressional discussions in these early stages. Both groups had invested 
heavily in the activist Vietnam analogy during the anti-colonial struggle, which presented 
covert assistance to reactionary regimes in Africa as the first step in the creation of a new 
anti-communist quagmire. The propaganda had created broad support for the CONCP 
parties just the year before in the form of a mass boycott of Gulf’s operations in Angola, 
and they believed it would be able to sway the Congress now. Letters flowed to 
constituencies beginning in October, and WOA even arranged meetings for congressmen 
to speak with MPLA representatives during a brief visit to Washington that same 
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month.1012 The activist groups hoped this might prepare American politicians to take a 
more pro-active stance when independence ushered in the seemingly inevitable jostling for 
power in Angola.  
 By far the most important event of the fall was the meeting convened by ACOA, 
WOA, and a number of grassroots organizations in Madison, Wisconsin. MACSA hosted 
what it billed as a “work session” to help coordinate solidarity activities in the United States 
and Canada in light of the looming threat in Angola. The conference gathered together 
forty solidarity organizations that represented practically a “who’s who” of 1970s 
organizing – religious, radical, and African American. Attendees included a handful of 
chapters from Amiri Baraka’s Congress of Afrikan People (CAP), the leftist branches of 
the ALSC from Atlanta and elsewhere, the Chicago Committee for the Liberation of 
Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea (CCLAMG), the American Friends Service Committee, 
the Freedom Information Service from Mississippi, various church groups, and a number 
of other smaller organizations. Panels focused on bringing everyone up to speed on the 
latest developments in American policy toward southern Africa and providing a forum in 
which local organizations could discuss potential campaigns with representatives of the 
liberation groups. An entire day of workshops was dedicated to discussing the various 
tactics used by committees, with the hope of “exchang[ing] ideas for strengthening [local 
action].”1013  
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 At the conference, the assembled minds made a number of decisions that would 
shape the movement to oppose Angolan intervention, as well as establishing a formal 
framework for cooperation on anti-apartheid issues. First, they agreed to focus their 
energies on resisting any American attempts to intervene in Angola and other newly freed 
states rather than on the topic of foreign intervention more generally, since the Lusophone 
movements had relied on socialist aid to sustain the military struggles for so long. 
Objecting now to such aid would be hypocritical and a betrayal of solidarity. Second, they 
agreed on a list of action priorities, which included the establishment of a “national 
campaign to stop U.S intervention in Angola, a ‘Hot-Line’ telephone news network,” and 
continued action on the Union Carbide company that was importing Rhodesian steel. 
Finally, the working groups selected individual organizations to help coordinate activities 
on these topics. They tapped WOA to lead the lobbying for legislative opposition to Angola 
and ACOA to be the central distributor of news on solidarity actions.1014  
These conclusions were not arrived at easily or unanimously due to deep 
ideological divides that continued to hamper complete unity, but they offered a starting 
point. The CAP chapters, for instance, refused to sign the final statement due to a 
disagreement over the exclusion of armed struggle as a necessity for liberation, while 
proposals to link southern African demands for equality with domestic class issues was 
narrowly defeated, to the frustration of the more radical MACSA and CCLAMG. Yet all 
parties agreed that cooperation would be necessary to achieve maximum victory for the 
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African revolutions, and most committed to working together even if a little less than half 
joined the formal framework.1015 The result of the Madison conference was a first step in 
the formalization of the decentralized network of activists, who committed to action and 
began to build a structure to help coordinate local activities in order to achieve national 
results. This all came into existence nearly a month before the official independence of 
Angola, preparing the activists to shape the legislative agenda well before most 
congressmen had begun to pay serious attention to the issue.  
Tasked with national coordination of local activism in Wisconsin, ACOA and 
WOA reached out to many former and current allies in hopes of drumming up support for 
the Clark amendment. More than 40 organizations responded, representing an array of 
religious and ideological viewpoints.1016 Church organizations sent communiques to their 
congregations urging them to write their legislators, as did local radical committees 
working on southern Africa. These groups reproduced or drew on information sent from 
the national organizations, including WOA’s eight reasons for opposing the intervention. 
The first of these widely reproduced arguments claimed that “Angola may prove as tragic 
and costly as in Indochina,” while others targeted the CIA and defended the MPLA against 
charges of it becoming a “Soviet puppet.”1017 The office also appealed to its sometime 
allies with clout in Washington. It reached out in particular to unions, using comparisons 
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with Vietnam and the recent revelations of American covert actions in South America to 
cajole them toward support or at least acquiescence to the Clark amendment.1018 Concerned 
activists also made direct contact with congressmen. Ted Lockwood made this point most 
dramatically in his November testimony to Digg’s new committee shortly before Angola’s 
independence in November. Expressing concern at growing evidence of American 
intervention against the MPLA and the muted response of leading foreign policy critics, 
the WOA director counseled  
U.S. intervention in Angola has already become as costly and as dangerous as its 
involvement in Chile only a few years ago. Surely the tragic lessons of Chile should 
teach us to oppose immediately and vehemently every sign of covert or overt 
intervention in the troubled political affairs of another country. We call on the 
United States government to end its intervention in Angola. We urge Congress to 
take every action in its power toward this end.1019  
 
The activists hoped this early lobbying and constituent mail would prejudice Hill 
politicians against Ford’s Angola policy before the administration could make its case.  
Throughout late November and December, WOA’ lobbying emphasized the 
damage such a poorly planned intervention could have on the wider region. WOA and 
ACOA were assisted in their efforts by news that South Africa had sent troops into Angola 
weeks before independence. The influx of communist instructors and eastern bloc weapons 
had greatly improved MPLA prospects in October, and its military forces retained control 
of the capitol as the Portuguese exit passed. South Africa had been providing arms to both 
the FNLA and UNITA since August, and the success of the communist backed government 
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in Luanda deeply concerned officials in Pretoria. In mid-October, it sent troops over the 
border to fight with Angolan forces.1020 It did so without consulting the United States in an 
attempt to prevent a rout of UNITA in the south.1021 The MPLA military forces fell back 
in face of the invasion, but held onto Luanda and were reinforced in November by Cuban 
troops. Soon there were over 1,300 foreign soldiers in Angola, who helped turn the tide 
again the South Africans. Pretoria had kept its role in the fighting secret, but as the MPLA 
took the offensive on the battlefield and in the international media, it became harder to 
deny the participation of white troops from below the border. South Africa denied the 
allegations for the first weeks of December, but the capture of two soldiers by the Cubans 
on December 13 ended all speculation.1022 The activists had the weapon they needed to link 
American policy with the reactionary white regimes. As revelations of the incursion 
became public in the first weeks of December, the National Security Council worried that 
they would “increase significantly the political price we will have to pay in Africa, the 
Third World, and with segments of the American public and Congress.”1023  
The council was right to be concerned, and the already mobilized African activist 
network pounced on the issue. George Houser penned the unofficial manifesto of this 
coalition in an op-ed for the New York Times in December that detailed the Vietnam 
analogy.  “Communism and the War in Angola” cast the administration’s reading of the 
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situation as simplistic, asking why the United States had only rallied to the cause of self-
determination when a foreign government was aiding a socialist liberation group. There 
had been no such intervention – political or otherwise – during the decade of anti-colonial 
struggle. Houser also highlighted the role of South Africa and its use of Angola as a 
smokescreen for reaffirming control of neighboring Namibia. As in Southeast Asia, 
regional competition between socialists and their enemies was pulling the United States 
into a predicament that had little importance to the broader geopolitics. “It would be a 
tragedy for the United States to repeat the errors of Vietnam,” Houser concluded, “because 
it looks upon the Angolan conflict as an occasion for another anti-communist crusade.”1024   
 As Clark and the activists raised the heat on the administration, ham-fisted handling 
of Congress further damaged the prospects for the covert operation. Nearly a month after 
Angola’s independence, Ford and Kissinger continued to publicly deny the accusations.1025 
A number of senators had been briefed on the matter, but like Clark, they had been told by 
CIA and State Department officials that no American arms were entering Angola. Clark 
suspected that the Congress still did not know the whole story. He arranged for secret 
hearings to ascertain details of the program and allow the administration to presents its 
case. In early December, the Foreign Relations Committee invited CIA Deputy Director 
Bill Nelson and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Ed Mulcahy to 
testify. Arriving after Nelson had spoken, Mulcahy confidently stated that the United States 
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was not supplying arms to any Angolan factions, not realizing that the CIA deputy had 
revealed the truth to the committee just minutes before. Confronted by the politicians, 
Mulcahy reversed course, but the damage had been done.1026 Furious with the 
administration’s attempts to conceal its activities from Congress, the Foreign Relations 
Committee recommended termination of future funds for Angola activities and sent the bill 
to the floor.  
 A secret Senate session began on the 17th to deliberate on the bill.  Seeking to 
strengthen Clark’s push against IA Feature, John Tunney of California upped the ante when 
submitted an amendment to the defense bill that would prohibit further aid to Angola and 
reduce the total allocation by $33 million, roughly what Congress believed was spent in 
Angola. The move was designed to shock; no amendment to a defense bill had left the 
Senate unaltered since the start of World War II. Tunney, however, felt the bill would 
work.1027 The son of famed pugilist Gene Tunney, the combative Californian had 
championed non-intervention in Angola since 1973, when he had attempted to block aid to 
imperial Portugal.1028 An old ally of WOA, he felt that congressional outrage and effective 
lobbying would win the day.1029  
Ford and his congressional allies scrambled to mount a workable defense. A 
number of administration-inspired amendments flowed into the chamber aiming to derail 
the forthcoming vote or at least give the administration time to work out a defense over the 
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Christmas break.1030 None succeeded. The White House next turned to a group of 
Republicans, who filibustered the bill on the 19th. The filibuster aimed to put pressure on 
the liberals to accept the compromise offered by Appropriations Committee Chairman John 
McClellan (D-Ark), who offered an additional $9 million to the administration in exchange 
for Congressional consultations before any more funding.1031 Tunney, Clark, and their 
compatriots refused the offer, but the internationalists struggled to find the 60 votes to force 
cloture.1032 Seeing the likelihood of eventual defeat, the White House backed away from 
stalling tactics, allowing the vote to happen. The maneuver sought to place the full onus of 
any Soviet gains in Angola on the Senate, which Ford hoped might give some undecided 
voters – and by extension the House – pause. The tactic did not work, and the chamber 
passed the Tunney Amendment by what two academics would soon refer to as the 
“startlingly decisive result” of 54 to 22.1033 With no time for debate in the House, the 
defense bill would have to wait until next session.1034 Clark’s bill would linger until after 
the recess as well, overtaken by the more sensational defense rider.  
 The Senate vote had been a major victory for the youthful liberal contingent in 
Congress. Through brilliant use of the hearing system and assistance from the activist 
network, they had swayed their colleagues to oppose Ford’s limited intervention. Many 
senators had come to accept Clark’s framing of Angola as a new Vietnam. This included 
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not only fellow Democrats, but Republicans as well. Senator Lowell Weicker (R-CT) 
lambasted Angola as “a mirror of our entry into Vietnam. . . we are being sucked into a 
growing involvement through old Cold War rationales . . . [while] ignoring the history of 
Africa.”1035 Even Humphrey felt obliged to rally around the internationalist flag as the vote 
forced him to take sides. After nearly a month of seeking to give the White House some 
way out of its corner, the senator from Minnesota fell into the ranks of the skeptics when 
confronted by the press. “This is exactly what happened in the Vietnam situation,” he 
exclaimed, “involved a little bit at a time . . . without any oversight.” Faced with a White 
House operating behind the backs of both Congress and the American people, he had no 
other option but to vote with the internationalists.1036 The activist-academic-political 
network had won over the Senate, but a final battle remained in the House.  
 
Popular Organizing, House Votes, and the End of Angolan Intervention 
 The U.S. Congress’ lower body had proved an obstacle to the internationalist 
agenda of the Senate liberals in recent years, and it seemed in January 1976 that it might 
play spoiler again. When Colby had discussed the possibility of reprogramming funds 
toward Angola with the Appropriations Defense Subcommittee in December, he had been 
pleasantly surprised at the mild reactions of its members.1037 The long break also allowed 
interventionists to coordinate their response in a way they had not been able to do in the 
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Senate. Ford quickly made a statement condemning the action in the upper house. Striking 
directly at the Vietnam comparison, the president protested that “Angola is not, never has 
been, and never will be” a question of deploying American troops. Instead, it was an 
attempt to oppose intervention by communist powers that had sent soldiers thousands of 
miles to support a leftist government. In failing to recognize the severity of the situation 
and the important role the US had to play, Ford and Kissinger feared that the Senate had 
undermined the administration’s attempt to maintain the balance of power and the 
foundations of détente. “This abdication of responsibility,” Ford cautioned Congress, “will 
have the gravest consequences for the long term position of the United States and for 
international order in general.”1038 Over the following month, Ford continued to attack 
Congress and its interference with his foreign policy prerogative. While few 
representatives were fans of IA Feature, a good many feared binding the hands of the 
administration.1039 Ford’s harangues only reinforced this opinion. With a sense of unease 
and a vocally critical president, a number of Hill members wondered, in the words of 
Senator Jacob Javits (R-NY), whether the House would be “in any mood to do anything 
about Angola.”1040 
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 The activist network did not rest on its laurels over the break. It continued 
organizing in hopes of swaying the House as it had done the Senate. In this struggle, 
activists and lobbyists had an important partner in the lower house that had been absent 
from the Senate: African Americans. Beginning in the late 1960s, black lawmakers had 
worked with ACOA, WOA, and the ALSC to isolate the southern African regimes. They 
rallied once more around the MPLA cause, especially after South Africa entered the fray 
on the side of UNITA. Andrew Young (D-GA), who had become a vocal advocate of 
southern African liberation struggles after his work with the ALSC and the Gulf Boycott, 
openly wondered why the administration condemned Soviet and Cuban intervention with 
barely a word about the more troublesome meddling of the Afrikaner military.1041 Other 
comments were less measured. From the Organization of African Unity Conference in 
Addis Ababa, Charles Diggs acerbically referred to the Angolan policy as “the biggest 
blunder in the history of [American] relations with Africa” and implied that Kissinger 
should resign over the matter. The congressman spent much of his trip to Ethiopia 
canvassing African leaders and American diplomatic officials on the Angola issue, gaining 
confidence in his existing desire to back the MPLA. He assembled a report for the Black 
Caucus that criticized both UNITA and the FNLA, but lambasted the U.S. government for 
retrogressive policies that demonstrated “a profound perceptual lag and apparent inability 
to adjust fully to the political and economic realities of the seventies.”1042 He also distilled 
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his eleven page report into a Dear Colleague letter.1043 When the House reconvened in late 
January, Andy Young welcomed fellow congressmen with an information session 
featuring ACOA’s Houser, WOA director Ted Lockwood,  MACSA alum Dave Wiley, 
Ron Walters of the ALSC, and Courtland Cox representing the anti-CIA Center for 
National Security Studies.1044 Here then was the perfect example of the multi-racial, anti-
colonial coalition making the final step to become important sources of information for 
policymaking.  
 Popular black opinion also rallied to the cause. Activists previously involved in the 
anti-imperial struggle interpreted the American presence in Angola as a logical outgrowth 
of Portugal’s fall, which had been a common refrain in the black community and the theme 
of the second African Liberation Day. Most importantly, the entrance of South Africa on 
the side of the UNITA-FNLA forces had finally resolved the divisive ideological issue that 
had crippled the ALSC and communal organizing in 1974. Whatever claims to Black 
Power legitimacy Savimbi and his representatives had claimed four years earlier dissolved 
when they accepted the assistance of the apartheid state. The MPLA was justified in 
claiming power in the face of these threats, no matter its ideology or its associations. 
Writing for the Baltimore Afro-American paper, George Daniels gave voice to this 
dominant opinion when he said that Angola had taken the country “a shade closer to seeing 
events in Africa for what they are . . . communism unwittingly has been [Africans’] greatest 
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ally rather than our enemy.”1045 With apartheid as its enemy, most Blacks pledged support 
to the MPLA and demanded an end to American meddling.1046 Impromptu protests targeted 
the South African embassy and the White House around the New Year’s holiday. The 
Afrikaner ambassador dismissed the dozens of protesters as a paltry number compared to 
the displays that had accompanied African Liberation Day, but they represented a return to 
the confrontational style of activism that had gone on hiatus after the Carnation 
Revolution.1047 One group in Harlem even proposed the creation of a “volunteer Lumumba 
Freedom Fighter Brigade” to help defend the MPLA government from South Africa and 
the CIA.1048 The community generally abandoned their ideological infighting in favor of a 
more internationalist, less dogmatic view of global politics. Their vocal condemnations did 
not escape the attention of either the White House or Capitol Hill.   
The vocal black response represented a more general shift back toward popular 
organizing after the Senate vote. Activists hoped that such demonstrations would 
communicate to politicians precisely which Vietnam analogy its constituents accepted 
during the election year and apply pressure on them to vote against Ford’s Angola policy. 
ACOA again led the way. The committee sponsored advertisements in major papers 
warning readers that “We are now at the crucial Gulf of Tonkin stage.” Concerned citizens 
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should organize, demonstrate, and, most importantly, write to Congress urging them to end 
military assistance.1049 Activists had begun organizing their memberships in December, 
and by the New Year these efforts had begun to show.1050 Demonstrations started small, 
with local coalitions of religious, civil rights, and anti-war groups having the most success. 
In one such rally at the end of December, the Fellowship of Reconciliation united with the 
American Friends Service Committee, representatives of The Catholic Worker, the 
Episcopal Peace Fellowship, and the War Resisters League to picket the U.S. and Soviet 
Missions to the United Nations.1051 Rallies spread across the nation in January, 
broadcasting popular discontent with the intervention and surprisingly widespread support 
for the MPLA. Large solidarity gatherings took place in Chicago, Boston, Philadelphia, 
and Norfolk, while smaller pickets and marches occurred nationwide – including the WOA 
organized rally in Washington mentioned above.1052 In one of the largest demonstrations, 
more than one thousand people marched through the streets of downtown New York in 
protest of the government’s policy. Activists designed their efforts to simultaneously 
educate local populations on the issue and demonstrate to legislators how seriously their 
constituents opposed foreign intervention.1053  
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A growing number of solidarity groups also conducted less sensational 
informational campaigns, which rallied ordinary citizens against the policy. With relatively 
little data available about Angola before December, people looked to the activist groups 
for answers. In the Midwest, for example, CCLAMG spent the first third of the year 
speaking, publishing news articles, and holding fundraising events for the MPLA – 
showing A Luta Continua more than 50 times in 1976 as a way of dramatizing the 
constructive CONCP ideologies.1054 Similar activities occurred in the Bay Area, New 
York, and Boston. These campaigns included the diversity of membership that had been 
the hallmark of the final years of the anti-Portuguese demonstrations, but the immediacy 
of the Vietnam comparison acted as a magnet for groups that had always been at the 
outskirts of solidarity organizing. The participation of established anti-war organizations 
such as Clergy and Laity Concerned, Americans for Democratic Action, and Women’s 
Strike for Peace merged with existing activism from the pre-independence period to form 
a new and more visible popular front. Constituent letters flooded into Washington, trending 
strongly against intervention. The numbers of teach-ins and meetings did not approach the 
size of the Vietnam era, but a sense of popular outrage was palpable. South Africa, 
watching closely from the sidelines, noted the unprecedented pressure placed on the 
administration by not just the Congress, but “the media, religious organizations and radical 
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activist groups.”1055 By the time the House prepared for its vote in late January, national 
polls showed more than 70 percent of Americans opposed involving themselves in foreign 
internal wars like the one raging in Angola.1056 
 This popular pressure along with ongoing lobbying swung the House firmly behind 
the Tunney and Clark amendments by the time it reconvened at the end of January.1057 The 
floor debate represented the last chance for the White House to salvage its policy. From 
the White House, Ford warned that passage of the amendment “will send a message of 
irresolution  . . . to United States allies and friends throughout the world.” He appealed 
directly to Speaker Carl Albert to oppose the vote and possibly delay it. Nothing worked. 
Only a handful of conservative Republicans spoke in favor of the intervention.1058 These 
rare statements paled in comparison to the strong sentiment against Angolan aid. Critics 
set the tone and rules of the argument, as almost all statements revolved around the 
comparisons between southern Africa and Vietnam. The two sides haggled over the 
accuracy of various aspects of the analogy, but its centrality to the debate demonstrated the 
victory of Clark’s framing of the issue. 
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Less debatable was where constituents stood just a few months away from going to 
the polls. Congressmen returned again and again to the unpopularity and wrongheaded 
nature of the White House’s actions, quoting among others WOA documents on popular 
opinion.1059 As John Burton of California stated, anyone willing to vote $50 million for the 
unpopular Angola adventure “should get ready to draw retirement.”1060 Appropriations 
Committee Chair George Mahon (D-TX) and other Cold Warriors maintained their 
opposition to the bill, but they recognized that passage was inevitable. “It is perfectly 
clear,” Mahon stated resignedly, “that the sentiment in Congress and in the country is 
opposed to heavy involvement of the United States in Angola.”1061 The American 
commitment may have been small, but that was beside the point. The twin pressures of the 
Vietnam specter and domestic outrage pushed congressmen to overwhelmingly condemn 
the Ford-Kissinger policy in southern Africa. By a three-to-one majority, the House backed 
Tunney and forbade the Administration from granting any additional aid to the competing 
Angolan nationalists. The Clark amendment would become law a short time later.  
 After the House passed the Tunney Amendment, the administration faced a difficult 
decision. It would have to request direct assistance in order to continue its operations. In 
the weeks following the Senate defeat, this hope had kept the anti-communist coalition 
together.1062 Ford’s dilemma had a few solutions, none of which seemed likely to succeed 
                                                 
1059 CR – House, 94th Congress, Second Session 1040 (27 January 1976), 1045-1046, which specifically 
quotes from the Washington Office on Africa.  
1060 Ibid, 19.  
1061 George Mahon, “Statement on the Angola Amendment to the Defense Bill,” 26 January 1976, Box 1, 
Loen and Leppert Files, GRFL.  
1062 Ford had also made preparations for other allies to back the anti-communists, including Saudi Arabia 
and Iran. Cuban exiles also made preparations to travel to Angola to fight Castro’s forces, which the United 
 447 
in light of the overwhelming vote in the lower house. The president retained the power to 
veto the legislation and force it back to the Congress, request additional military aid for 
Zaire, or seek the public approval of funds he had promised Mobutu. While the veto seemed 
an attractive option in a White House that wielded the weapon with great aplomb, the move 
would win few friends among those legislators already angry at the secrecy of the whole 
project. It would certainly not go over well with a hostile public, which was dangerous 
during the election year of 1976. The second option, providing additional military aid to 
Zaire with the implicit understanding it would go on to Angola, raised legal questions. The 
administration came to the conclusion that overt assistance would only be possible through 
new legislation authorizing it or an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act. The solution 
included a bill that tied continuing assistance to the pursuit of a negotiated settlement and 
a prohibition against the deployment of American personnel. The National Security 
Council thought it would be a difficult road, but they believed putting the “hard choice” 
directly to Congress may “bring us unexpected support, especially in the House.”1063  
Republicans and other Cold Warriors encouraged Ford to take the stand. Some 
legislators quietly supported the program, believing that Angola demanded a larger 
American commitment. They, however, feared a public backlash and remained away from 
the limelight. Many abstained or otherwise avoided a firm stand. There existed a possibility 
that Ford could find support in these corners if only he publicly committed himself to 
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opposing the Soviet-Cuban presence.1064 Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) felt this way. 
He assured Ford that the votes existed to pass the funding if only he would submit the 
request directly to the Senate on its own merits. The problem, according to Goldwater, was 
not popular opinion or Congressional sentiment, but that a bunch of “sob sisters on 
Vietnam” had railroaded the legislation through the Senate before pro-intervention 
members were able to gather their forces. Goldwater assured the president in private that 
“if you veto it . . . I think we could support it . . . we got a lotta votes.”1065 Ford had already 
discarded the veto idea, but Goldwater’s encouragement hinted at the possibility of an overt 
funding package finding a positive reception. Some press outlets agreed, estimating that a 
presidential request for Angolan funds stood at least a 50-50 chance.1066 
 The White House had an outside chance of winning the long war, but popular 
dissent continued to demonstrate just how politically dangerous this stance would be as 
campaigns for reelection began. Popular protests continued, with the majority continuing 
to call for official recognition of the MPLA. In Philadelphia, black activists with lingering 
memories of the Gulf Boycott marched on the headquarters of the oil giant, urging 
accommodation with the leftist government of Angola.1067 In California, the former head 
of the Congress of Racial Equality and Elaine Brown formed The Black Coalition Against 
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U.S. Intervention in Angola, which targeted blacks working in favor of UNITA and others 
opposing MPLA interests.1068 Letters of protest also continued to pour into Washington. 
Many that made it into the White House files came from religious organizations with 
connections to the anti-colonial and anti-war movements. In one example, the national 
board president of the Young Women’s Christian Association wrote to Ford offering her 
advice. The letter, which made it to the desk of National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, 
cautioned the president from “increasing the potential for destruction” through further aid 
to warring parties, recommending instead a sole focus on diplomatic initiatives.1069 Ford 
could complain about the decision of the Congress, but he realized that the votes 
represented the most vocal elements of the country. In an election year, ignoring these 
constituents could prove disastrous for his chances of returning to the Oval Office.  
By February, the decision to accept Congress’ decision had essentially been made. 
The administration doubted that Angola would be worth a second black-eye from 
Congress. Kissinger had been one of the first to resign himself to the facts, nearly accepting 
the inevitable defeat during the winter break. “Maybe we should let Angola go,” the 
embattled secretary told Brent Scowcroft, “Maybe we should just not have started that 
operation.” Scowcroft scoffed, “We should not have done what is right[?]” Kissinger 
answered with seeming resignation, “The defeat [Clark and the Congress] are inflicting on 
us is worse.”1070 Deeply frustrated with Congress and in need of reassurance, Kissinger 
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continued to agitate for Angola only because Ford offered his full support to his 
secretary.1071 Ford insisted on the rightness of the policy, but the January vote had forced 
the president to confront the fact that the intervention would not succeed. The president’s 
most forceful reaction was to lash out at Congress for having “lost its guts,” effectively 
turning Angola into an election issue. 1072  Observing closely from the sidelines, the South 
Africans articulated what much of the country had already realized: “the administration is 
powerless to act . . . and the Russians and the Cubans, at least for the foreseeable future, 
have nothing stronger than words to worry about.”1073 In the battle between two views of 
what was the “right” course of action in Angola, the administration had lost to a determined 
Congressional cadre and a vocal popular minority. Ford would continue to see Angola as 
a Cold War crisis and threaten action, but he admitted behind closed doors that he would 
not submit a bill. Kissinger and Ford had lost. The activist network inspired over the years 
by the CONCP parties had finally achieved a major political victory in the United States 
and on the continent. The defeat in Washington sapped the will of the anti-communist 
coalition already on the defensive, and the MPLA was able to consolidate its power across 
much of country as aid to Roberto and Savimbi diminished. Though UNITA would 
continue to employ a guerilla resistance from the southern bush for nearly three decades, 
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the communist backed party had effectively established itself as the legitimate government 
of independent Angola.  
 
Institutionalization of Internationalism and Reaction 
 The Angolan crisis of 1976 heralded a new era of American foreign policy, one in 
which a new, popular internationalism could confront the heretofore dominant Cold War 
tendencies of the government and win. This was not just a reaction to imperial overstretch 
as had occurred in Vietnam or to covert coups as had happened in Chile, but a proactive 
political opposition to Third World intervention in all forms. It sought to change the nature 
of American foreign policy as it happened. The punctuated Cold War equilibrium created 
by Vietnam and other events had found its first true test in Angola. As the largest colony 
of the last European empire, Angola was a symbol of a new era that challenged the 
traditional power politics of the superpower conflict. This new era would be created by 
decolonization and growing global concerns about Third World development, but it 
continued to clash with the traditional bipolar international system. In the midst of the 
debate over IA Feature, the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation published a report claiming 
that the “existing ‘order’ is coming apart, and rightly so.” Unfortunately, the very name of 
this document, “What Now,” testified to the still unidentified nature of this new, 
increasingly decentralized postcolonial era.1074 New governments like that of the MPLA 
were making claims to legitimacy across the strict Manichean confines of the Cold War, 
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with new constituencies like the American solidarity network promoting the interests of a 
leftist – and soon to be officially reorganized as a communist – party in the heart of the 
Western alliance. The cumulative effects of moments like the confrontation over Angola 
would help define the direction of this nascent era.   
 The internationalist victory had important implications for the administration and 
the long-term viability of Cold War foreign policy, but not all of them were obvious at the 
time. In the short term, the Angola debacle forced Ford and Kissinger to reassess their 
African policy. Angola had demonstrated the errors and costly political side-effects of 
continuing to work with recalcitrant regimes like South Africa. In the wake of its defeat in 
Angola, the United States desperately needed to polish its tarnished image. It began by 
relaxing its opposition to the MPLA. The secretary allowed the sale of a Boeing 737 to the 
government and did not protest when Gulf Oil made plans to resume its operations, with 
the government in Luanda benefitting from the revenue. Still, the White House refused to 
normalize relations and would occasionally oppose MPLA requests to join international 
agencies.1075 The fiasco did force a more dramatic transformation of regional policy.  It 
convinced Kissinger to abandon the U.S. tradition of quietly backing the minority regimes 
in favor of more direct involvement in negotiations favoring majority rule. The secretary 
applied his famous shuttle diplomacy to the problem of self-determination in the minority 
state of Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). This policy united the administration with many of its most 
vocal critics, including the activist network, Clark, Tunney, and the Congressional Black 
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Caucus.1076 These strange bedfellows would have been nearly impossible to imagine just a 
few months before. The problems of self-determination, human rights, and majority rule 
that had been perpetually delayed by American governments now came front and center. 
 The MPLA had been largely passive in terms of its appeals to the activist network 
during the Angolan crisis, focused primarily on the military aspects of independence. The 
hallmark of the solidarity movement had always been the irregular involvement of 
nationalist representatives like Sharfudine Khan and Gil Fernandes, which left local action 
largely in the hands of Western allies. This especially had been the case in 1975, since all 
the CONCP parties had been focusing on the foundation of their new states. None had 
established permanent representations in the United States after the transfer of power, and 
only FRELIMO kept Khan at the United Nations. Yet events had demonstrated the power 
of the solidarity network, and the nationalists were eager to continue working with their 
old grassroots contacts despite the diplomatic opportunities offered by control of the state 
apparatus.  
 After the victory of the anti-interventionist coalition, the MPLA sought to 
formalize these popular ties as a way of advancing its international agenda. In February 
1976, the party arranged for a support meeting in Havana, where it gathered nineteen 
organizations sympathetic to its cause in the United States, including ACOA, WOA, the 
CCLAMG, the American Friends Service Committee, the Coalition for a New Foreign 
Policy, the National Council of Churches, and the National Conference of Black 
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Lawyers.1077 For five days, three MPLA representatives fielded questions from the groups 
and laid out the goals of their newly established government in the familiar CONCP areas 
of agriculture, health, and education. The government would pursue a non-aligned policy, 
which provided room for American cooperation even as they continued to depend on 
Cuban and Soviet assistance.1078 The party understood that they would continue to face 
resistance within the United States and some other Western nations, so it urged its allies to 
champion their cause as they focused on the development of the nation. The MPLA 
specifically requested assistance with promoting its image in America, nation-building 
support in the form of medical aid programs as had emerged from Europe, the arrangement 
of functionary visits to the United States, and –most importantly – political lobbying for 
official recognition of the MPLA government.1079 Upon their return, these solidarity 
organizations would become the popular voice for the MPLA and worked closely with 
allies like Diggs and Clark to push legislation acknowledging Luanda’s legitimacy, though 
this would again prove an uphill battle.1080 
This meeting – in the capitol of a communist country which had only recently been 
fighting American backed forces – illustrated how far many of the groups had come in 
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rejecting Cold War ideological divisions. The activists, including traditional centrists like 
ACOA and the National Council of Churches, had adopted a new internationalism that 
emphasized North-South issues over East-West rivalries. This broad front had begun 
during the Vietnam era, but the battle for Portuguese Africa and Angola expanded, 
clarified, and confirmed it. It would remain a loose network dedicated to the pursuit of a 
more progressive foreign policy for the next decade, including but not limited to Africa.1081 
Activists, lobbying agencies, and congressmen would consistently look back to Angola as 
a model for future action against American intervention targeting Latin America and Asia 
as well.1082 The strong linkage between anti-UNITA, anti-apartheid and anti-Contra 
campaigning in the 1980s illustrates the long-term impact of the coalition forged in 
solidarity with struggles of the Portuguese colonies and confirmed in the activism of 
1976.1083  
It is the timing of such transnational initiatives that is especially important for 
understanding the impact of the Portuguese African solidarity movement. Historians 
looking at American policy in southern Africa have long seen the Soweto uprisings that 
began in mid-June as a pivotal moment that helped inspire widespread resistance to 
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apartheid, but Angola galvanized existing networks and heralded emergence of a new, 
more critical voice on American involvement in the developing world and Africa in 
particular. It provided momentum for a segment of American society to push policy in the 
direction of sincere self-determination, based less on style of governance than perceived 
popular will. As one WOA staff member noted at the time with reference to American 
policy, “After Angola, the [liberation of South Africa] entered a new phase w/ new 
possibilities.”1084 At the grassroots level, organizations refocused their work on the 
minority regimes and greatly expanded their campaigns on behalf of the liberation 
movements. As the American Friends Service committee reflected days before Soweto, 
activists had to seize the opportunity to reach new audiences after Angola forced southern 
Africa “into a spotlight for American attention” and revealed the extent to which “church, 
academic, black, and peace activists” had already begun organizing.1085  
Politically, the defeat of IA Feature confirmed and reified the emerging 
internationalist coalition that directly questioned the traditional tenets of the Cold War.  In 
their statement on U.S. policy drafted in April, the Black Caucus revealed the impact of 
the popular-congressional struggle over the former colony: 
The U.S. debacle in Angola exposed the bankruptcy of U.S. policy toward Africa 
– a policy permeated with racism and conceived as a by-product of U.S. relations 
with its European allies and as a minor addendum to U.S. Soviet policy. . . The 
African momentum toward liberation in southern Africa from minority rule and full 
liberation in Black Africa from the shackles of neo-colonialism leaves the United 
States no choice [but to adjust US policy]. Past and present policy for supporting 
white rule in Africa has placed the United States in an untenable position. 
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Internationally, the United States can only lose if it fails to get on the side of 
freedom in Africa. Domestically, such a policy cannot be sustained.1086  
 
Africa became for many in 1976 the cause for the new internationalism supported by 
legislators, liberals, and grassroots activists. As the Black Caucus summarized succinctly, 
“U.S. African relations present a critical test to the U.S. to demonstrate its capacity to adapt 
to the challenges of global interdependence, and the demands for economic equity.”1087 
Activists responded to this challenge with renewed vigor, and legislators showed their 
assertiveness would not end with Vietnam. In the period of political reorientation of 1975-
76, a broad bloc of centrists and leftists had united together behind the goal of supporting 
meaningful economic and political self-determination in the developing world 
unconstrained by anti-communism or the Cold War.  
 The political reorientation that coincided with the collapse of IA Feature did not, 
however, create a consensus to replace the Cold War liberalism that had begun to splinter. 
Angola had a much different effect within the ranks of anti-communists. A segment of the 
population had been deeply disturbed by Soviet and Cuban actions. It came to believe that 
Angola, in the words of columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, symbolized the 
“U.S. inability to respond to Soviet challenges because of the ravages of Vietnam and ten 
years of internal political upheaval.”1088 These opinions had been silenced by the chorus of 
activist voices mobilized by ACOA, the Congressional Black Caucus, and myriad other 
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groups in early 1976, but they re-emerged after the victory in the House. Some moderate 
members of Congress felt that Clark and his allies had crossed a line, even as they acceded 
to constituent calls to vote against the administration. House International Relations 
Committee member Lee Hamilton (D-IN) saw Angola as the latest in a series of “well-
meaning congressional initiatives” that had unintended consequences for American foreign 
interests. 1089 These members felt that Congress was overextended. The body had declared 
itself arbiter of foreign affairs, a role for which its deliberative nature was poorly suited. 
Many critics came to believe that the legislature had been overtaken by an activist minority 
reflecting the beliefs of a relatively thin slice of the American population. The divisive 
nature of Vietnam had empowered this vocal minority over Nixon’s still “silent majority” 
in the 1970s, but with Angola the momentum seemed to have reached its zenith. The 
presence of Soviet and Cuban forces in a foreign country was something new entirely.1090 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld thought that Angola would have a cathartic effect, 
releasing the Vietnam guilt and inspiring a new concern about Soviet expansion: “you’ll 
see the mood in this country shift; you’ll see people become concerned about defense.”1091 
 And shift it did. Angola became the rallying cry for a new generation of Cold 
Warriors. Ronald Reagan used the topic as a bludgeon on the primary campaign trail in 
                                                 
1089 Dana Adams Schmidt, “Congress Waits Impatiently to Press Angola Curbs,” Christian Science 
Monitor, 23 January 1976. 
1090 The apparent defeat at the hands of Cuban forces was especially worrying, since this had direct 
implications for Latin America. Writing to the president, Kissinger argued that “Angola, for Latin America, 
is more important thn Vietnam . . . we tried to do something about it and failed, by our own internal 
division, to stop Cuba.” Report, Kissinger to President, 19 February 1976, Box 13, Series 19, Papers of 
Nelson A. Rockefeller, Rockefeller Archive.   
1091 “Rumsfeld says Congress won’t repeat Angola action,” Boston Globe, 15 February 1976.  
 459 
1976, as did a number of congressional candidates over the next three years. Just months 
after pushing through his defense rider, John Tunney lost his seat to the conservative 
president of San Francisco State University, S.I. Hayakawa, who branded the incumbent 
an isolationist.1092 Dick Clark would not escape a close race in 1978 with an opponent that 
referred to the “radical” legislator as “the senator from Africa.”1093 The shift in electoral 
politics also had a grassroots component. Taking a page from the Vietnam protest 
handbook, young conservatives began to build networks that championed just the kind of 
covert operations that the internationalists had opposed. Often, they would do so by 
mobilizing public and congressional opinion to force executive action.1094 These 
emboldened conservative critics pointed to Soviet involvement elsewhere in Africa as the 
ramifications of Angolan retreat. The country needed a new form of containment. By the 
time Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan in 1979, politicians from both parties saw a 
disturbing trend and backed Democratic President Jimmy Carter’s covert funding to the 
Mujahedeen. Six years later, the Congress would overturn the Clark amendment after 
numerous attempts, freeing the way for the Reagan Doctrine to provide arms to Jonas 
Savimbi’s UNITA, which had retreated into the bush after its ignominious defeat in 1976.  
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Conclusion 
Angola was a pivotal moment in the history of U.S. foreign affairs toward the 
developing world. It helped institutionalize and disseminate a common internationalist 
critique of American interventionism. In contrast to Vietnam and Chile, an assertive 
activist network had helped Congress pro-actively constrain executive power. It articulated 
a clear analogy to Indochina that militated against covert operations and embraced a more 
cooperative approach to the developing world. At the same time, it bred a sincere distress 
among Americans still dedicated to fighting the Cold War, fellow citizens who felt that the 
limitations of the Southeast Asian hangover had been defined in the bush around Luanda. 
In answer to the question of “What Now?” Angola hinted that the future would hold few 
answers. Rather, it introduced and formalized a number of competing ideas that drew less 
on a common view of world order than competing transnational ideologies competing 
against each other in the context of a series of domestic political debates.  
There was no consensus on the future of American policy, but there did exist 
agreement on the role of popular democracy in shaping foreign affairs. As historian Van 
Gosse has argued, Vietnam created a political earthquake opposed to the basic tenets of the 
Cold War and launched a new era of grassroots engagement with the government. The 
multi-tiered activism that emerged in the 1970s around Indochina and the revolutions in 
Portuguese Africa did not disappear – not after the fall of Saigon nor the Lisbon regime – 
but “rather, it melded into the fabric of our political institutions and habits, and by doing 
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so, changed them profoundly.”1095 The institutionalization of this decentralized movement 
relied on the efforts of key activists, lobbyists, and legislators in applying its lessons to 
ongoing problems of American policy, notably in the region of southern Africa. The leftist-
centrist coalition that formed around Lusophone liberation and concrete activities such as 
the Gulf Boycott demonstrated its longevity with Angola in 1976, while also spurring the 
creation of a similarly powerful grassroots conservatism. This domestic conflict over ideas, 
values, and the proper form of international policy would in many ways replace the 
monolithic Cold War that was slowly unravelling at the international level.  As the 
shibboleths of this deeply divided new era, the former colonies of Portuguese Africa – 
Angola and Mozambique – would remain at the heart of this transnational ideological 
debate until the end of the superpower conflict.  
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Conclusion 
 
The surprising defeat of Gerald Ford’s limited intervention in Angola against a 
Soviet-Cuban backed MPLA government hinted at a new era of American foreign policy, 
one that could no longer be justified primarily in terms of anti-communism and narrow 
national interests. As Thomas Borstelmann has recently argued in his expansive look at the 
1970s, the “anti-colonial, pro-human rights environment of American politics in the mid-
1970s” hamstrung Ford and hinted at a new status quo.1096 Yet in attributing the Clark and 
Tunney amendments solely to popular frustration with foreign adventurism and a new 
attunement to human rights – often broadly captured in references to a “Vietnam 
Syndrome” – historians have missed the concrete ways in which transnational solidarity 
networks directly influenced official policy.1097 Congress’ ability to quickly mobilize 
against the president owed much to the maturation of a motivated left-leaning transnational 
advocacy lobby backed by a decentralized grassroots movement. Opponents of American 
policy in Vietnam and Chile suffered from an insufficiently critical and organized public, 
but this was not the case after nearly a decade of organizing on behalf of Portuguese Africa. 
Transnational activists had refined their ability to frame foreign issues and mobilize 
popular-political support in ways that could constrain an executive branch that continued 
to lean toward intervention in situations where a pro-Western stability seemed threatened. 
Angola offered the first demonstration that such an approach could be successful outside 
the unique circumstances of the late Vietnam War, and it established guidelines for action 
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that would inform coming domestic debates on South Africa, El Salvador, Nicaragua, 
Mozambique, and elsewhere.  
That a show of popular-political solidarity with a socialist party in Angola was 
possible owed much to the specific circumstances created by events in the 1960s. The 
Vietnam War shattered the illusions of the just, democratic, and egalitarian societies that 
Western states had sold to the world. Long histories of the intervention in the Third World 
demonstrated that far from idealistic, Western policy was continuously based on cold 
calculations of economic and political power. The treatment of Portuguese Africa in the 
1960s dramatized to many international observers that this reality stretched beyond 
Southeast Asia. Despite the seeming inevitability of decolonization, the United States and 
its European allies continued to cling to the familiar in an attempt to manage the East-West 
conflict at the expense of popular aspirations in the global South. Long-term prospects for 
continued Northern hegemony were prioritized over the immediate demands of African 
peoples. This narrative was not unfamiliar, but in the globalized postwar world, nationalists 
had the ability to move around state borders. Information and travel networks allowed them 
to cultivate alliances with civil society groups through personal diplomacy, confirming an 
openness in the international system that empowered stateless movements.  
The formation of these networks were pivotal in the creation of a transnational civil 
society that, while not truly global, connected Africa, Europe, and the United States. From 
the 1950s through the 1970s, the contentious debate over the rights – civil, political, 
economic, and human – of African peoples and their descendants defined the contours of 
this space. It was the dialectic between the continents that helped fuel the growth of the 
New Left internationalism, but it also contributed to the creation of a reactionary 
internationalism opposed to systemic reform and often clothed in rhetoric of anti-
communism. As a result, battles over the legitimacy of the Cold War that emerged in the 
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1960s incorporated considerations of race and the continued preponderance of the global 
North. The tensions between these competing worldviews demanded the creation of an 
activist solidarity movement in the West in order to combat a conservative internationalism 
that identified the stability offered by colonialism and white rule as an essential element of 
Western security. That Euro-Americans began to question this state of affairs, domestically 
at the behest of civil rights movement and internationally with the encouragement of Third 
World revolutionaries, had deep effects on the way large swaths of society understood 
international relations.  
In the United States, these transnational advocacy networks competed most 
aggressively in the Congress. Even with relatively sympathetic presidents in office, the 
executive branch had shown a clear deference to European interests as part of its strategy 
for managing the superpower conflict. Beginning in the late 1960s, though, a new 
generation of Cold War cynics on the Hill did battle with hawks for majority votes on 
increasingly contentious matters of national security.1098 Victory for one side or the other 
depended less on the general environment and more on the ability of leftist grassroots-
political advocacy networks to build coalitions against traditions of Cold War 
interventionism. Anti-Vietnam dissents had opened a space for such criticism, but reaction 
against the war had not necessarily offered an alternative policy nor an effective model for 
organizing around more marginal causes. The New Left internationalism that lay behind 
the defeat of the Angolan intervention of 1975 addressed both these issues. Grassroots-
political coalitions, committed to more cooperative relationships with the nations of the 
global South, organized against foreign adventurism by framing policy options and 
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providing alternative information, gaining real power without needing to mobilize 
hundreds of thousands for mass protests. This state of affairs encouraged activists and 
reformist policymakers, even as it troubled transnational anti-communists who worried 
about the decline of Western power.  
The deep divisions that informed American policy are apparent in the debates that 
occurred during the presidential administration of Jimmy Carter. Like Kennedy, Carter was 
more ideologically flexible and less cynical in his view of the Third World than were his 
immediate predecessors, but he was still a Cold Warrior. His emphasis on diplomacy and 
human rights was as much a way of combatting the Soviet Union on moral terms as it was 
pursued for its own justness.1099 This internal tension seeped into political debates in 
Washington, much as it had done for Kennedy sixteen years prior. In Carter’s White House, 
National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski continued to champion an anti-communist 
worldview that clashed with that of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, the former diplomat 
under Lyndon Johnson who had adopted a more internationalist, human rights-centered 
approach to international affairs. One of the areas where these two perspectives conflicted 
most consistently was in southern Africa, particularly in Angola where the United States 
had yet to normalize diplomatic relations. Where the Cold Warrior Brzezinski saw an 
upstart communist state inviting Soviet and Cuban presences into the heart of Africa, 
Vance and United Nations Ambassador Andrew Young worried that an obsession with 
communist influence in the region would distract the United States from its central goal – 
the pursuit of a just resolution to the nagging problems of self-determination that would 
better guarantee long-term stability.1100 As it had under Kennedy, Brzezinski’s support for 
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a greater interventionism slowly won out as the pugilistic national security advisor 
outlasted both Young and Vance. He succeeded in delaying the recognition of the Angolan 
government, while laying the groundwork for future aid to Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA in its 
ongoing guerrilla war against the MPLA.  
 Yet in contrast to Kennedy, the debate in the Carter White House occurred 
under sustained pressure from outside forces. Angola had become a Cold War flashpoint 
filled with Soviet weapons and Cuban advisers, but in the new context of the late 1970s 
there was no clear mandate for American action. Vance and Young had an extensive list of 
allies who supported a more positive, less reactionary engagement with the communist-
leaning government of Angola and the region more generally. Beyond the vague spirit of 
human rights present in American discourse or the diffuse “Vietnam syndrome” much 
discussed by historians, a concrete coalition of internationalist activists and reformist 
politicians continuously called for Carter to recognize the MPLA and engage sincerely with 
questions of African self-determination. This coalition was led in the Congress by the 
Black Congressional Caucus, but also included myriad grassroots organizations, ACOA, 
WOA, and – after 1977 – the African American lobbying group TransAfrica under the 
leadership of Randall Robinson.1101 Influenced and encouraged by these groups, a small 
core of congressman regularly urged the president, in the words of Paul Tsongas (D-MA), 
to downplay Cold War considerations in favor of a policy defined by “our own values and 
the aspirations of black Africans.”1102 The Cuban presence and the increase in Soviet 
attention to the continent would embolden hawkish politicians as the 1970s progressed, 
but, for much of the decade, Congressional opinion had a chilling effect on Brzezinski’s 
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ambitions to fund UNITA and reignite the Cold War in Africa.1103 This state of affairs 
owed much to a network of internationalists dedicated to challenging the historic inequities 
and changing traditions of American policy.  
 Here in a nutshell was the new state of American and – to some extent – 
Western engagement with the global South after the Vietnam War. The anti-communist 
consensus that had motivated American policy and pushed it toward intervention in the 
Third World for much of the 1950s and 1960s had disappeared. It had received a heavy 
blow from the conflict in Southeast Asia, but movements against similar activities in places 
like Angola had confirmed its demise. No new consensus had taken its place. Rather, there 
existed inherently conflicting visions of Western engagement with the wider world, defined 
most clearly in the conflict between traditional anti-communism and a New Left 
internationalism dedicated to true self-determination as well as greater cooperation 
between North and South. These two ideologies would clash in the White House, the halls 
of Congress, in the competing pitches of lobbyists around Washington, and in the streets 
of the United States and Western Europe. While both sides would adopt novel rhetoric that 
paid lip-service to the challenge of protecting individual human rights, at stake was another 
equally fundamental right: whether states and peoples in the Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America would define their own futures in the midst of superpower conflict.  
As it had been for over a decade, Portuguese Africa – and its symbolic center in 
Angola – remained a contested piece in this puzzle. As the Carter administration considered 
the possibility of normalizing relations with Angola when Cuban troops still patrolled the 
country, it faced a situation where domestic constituencies were likely to condemn it for 
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any action. Either the president would suffer the wrath of an anti-Cold War left with vocal 
elements in the Congress, or it would be “rake[ed] over the coals” by anti-communist 
organizations such as the AFL-CIO and their Washington allies “for ‘betraying’ a pro-
Western African leader [Savimbi].”1104 The nation and the Congress were deeply divided 
between a core of hawkish Cold Warriors and a newly empowered network of New Left 
internationalists, with both sides winning and losing converts based on the vicissitudes of 
national and international politics.1105 What was unique to this post-Vietnam context was 
that there existed a consistent network of activist groups willing to work with politicians 
against American intervention abroad as political fortunes waxed and waned. The network 
provided information on events and movements in Africa and elsewhere. It helped 
congressmen frame an alternative to the Cold War narrative of the Third World that 
regularly emanated from the White House with increasing frequency as the 1980s dawned. 
At the heart of this network of committed activists and progressive politicians was an 
assertive anti-imperialism, which viewed reactionary Western policies as anathema to the 
legitimate needs of the peoples of the global South.  
Portuguese African nationalists had been pivotal in encouraging the adoption of 
this expansive anti-imperialism as part of the New Left internationalism, which 
encompassed critiques of existing racial, geographic, economic, and even gender relations. 
In all cases, this ideology identified self-determination as a necessary goal, giving 
marginalized communities greater ability to determine their own futures whether as 
independent nations or within existing states. The fact that a generation of young people 
adopted this outlook helped sway more centrist organizations, which had greater access to 
the policymakers that wielded political power. The key in creating this movement was a 
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merging of radical leftism and liberal humanitarianism, which had also proved pivotal to 
the successful diplomacy of the CONCP parties. The left of center groups that adopted this 
Third World perspective believed countries of the global South deserved the right to define 
their own economic and, indeed, political systems so long as they seemed to represent the 
interests of the local people. There is little doubt that the Marxist leaders of North Vietnam 
and China had helped popularize such ideas, but a widespread embrace by centrist groups 
owed much to the attractive and less controversial anti-colonial struggles happening 
outside international hot spots. The socialist parties of the CONCP were important agents 
in selling this ideology, having an especially strong impact among liberals wary of 
communism and religious communities with historic ties to Africa. Lusophone solidarity 
helped institutionalize radical challenges to U.S. foreign policy and society in ways that 
directly affected the tenor of Western politics. According to the prominent Canadian anti-
apartheid activist John Saul, Westerners “learned about the necessary expansiveness of the 
concept of ‘liberation’ from the southern African movements themselves, notably from 
FRELIMO in Mozambique.”1106 The less iconoclastic anti-imperialism promoted by 
CONCP parties such as FRELIMO and PAIGC had a lasting impact on Western 
perceptions of the global South and policy toward it. 
In disseminating this ideology, the solidarity movement that developed around 
Portuguese African liberation produced a network of organizations dedicated to 
empowering reformist, leftist approaches toward the global South. Transnational advocacy 
networks had existed in the Western world for decades, but they had generally accepted 
the limitations defined by the liberal anti-communism of the Cold War. Only after adopting 
more assertive and experimental Third World leftist ideologies did a critical mass of 
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activists begin promoting a sincere Euro-American acceptance of political, economic, and 
social self-determination for postcolonial states. Groups such as the African American-led 
ALSC and British CFMAG created a grassroots campaigns that demonstrated to Western 
governments a mass solidarity with revolutionaries in southern Africa, while the Dutch AC 
and WOA forged permanent contacts with government agencies and politicians. This 
radicalized generation helped compel existing institutions such as ACOA and the various 
church organizations to more directly cooperate with leftist parties long suspect in the 
context of Cold War anti-communism. The result was the merging of radical leftism and 
liberal humanitarianism that created a broad coalition that could more effectively challenge 
widely held beliefs in rigid anti-communism. Histories narrowly focused on the anti-war 
movement have underappreciated the role anti-colonial causes played in uniting these 
diverse constituencies, but in some ways so have better contextualized studies of human 
rights activism. The Lusophone challenge to Western foreign affairs drew on the 
ideological openings created by the Vietnam War, but it extended and formalized them in 
regard to Euro-American policy toward other postcolonial territories rarely at the center of 
international news cycles.  
As with the anti-war movement, dramatic demonstrations gave way to more patient 
organizing and lobbying after the dual victory over Portuguese colonialism and American 
intervention. This shift helped institutionalize negative appraisals of Euro-American 
foreign policy while simultaneously shifting focus away from Portuguese Africa to 
encompass regional and global perspectives. This transition happened fluidly because 
Lusophone solidarity had openly recruited anti-war and anti-apartheid activists through 
appeals to a broad anti-imperialism. Thus, a more general opposition to minority rule in 
southern Africa and Western economic exploitation seemed natural after the collapse of 
the Lisbon regime. In addition to groups like ACOA, LSM, and WOA who had always had 
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such regional approaches as part of their missions, groups emphasizing Lusophone 
solidarity used Western attention to Africa in 1976 to expand their advocacy against 
Rhodesia and South Africa. Notable examples include the transition of the Dutch AC and 
CCLAMG to the Komitee Zuidelijk Afrika and the Chicago Committee for African 
Liberation, respectively. Activist groups that had gained prominence during the 1970s 
continued their missions after 1976, providing an experienced and well-connected 
leadership ready to support the liberation struggles of Zimbabweans, Namibians, and South 
Africans in future years.  
Relationships forged during this period would also continue to shape radical-
religious engagement with foreign policy. Groups organized in the late 1970s and early 
1980s drew on a generation of activists who had first discovered Africa through the 
Lusophone struggles. In Massachusetts, the Boston Coalition for the Liberation of 
Southern Africa – which helped promote the first successful statewide government 
divestment bill aimed at apartheid – emerged from the Gulf Boycott Coalition and its 
members’ reaction to news of the Soweto Uprisings in 1976.1107 The next year, a collection 
of African American leaders linked to African Liberation Day established TransAfrica to 
provide a black voice in U.S. foreign relations. Its longtime leader was the seasoned activist 
Randall Robinson, who had begun working in Washington after making connections with 
Congressman Diggs as part of the Pan-African Liberation Committee.1108 These are but 
two noteworthy examples of a process that occurred throughout the United States, in which 
activists who had first embraced anti-imperial ideologies as part of their solidarity with 
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Lusophone liberation refocused their efforts to different causes.1109 Rather than receding 
to the background, these organizations and individuals used existing strategies, tactics, and 
relationships to agitate more effectively for constructive engagement in Africa and beyond. 
The retention of this network and many of its most important organizations ensured 
the continued expansion of political power of the New Left Internationalism. As political 
scientist Bert Klandermans notes, “Organizations and networks among individuals play an 
important role in the transition from latent to manifest political potential.”1110 By forging 
ties between activists and gaining access to the political process in the late 1960s and 1970s, 
the Lusophone solidarity movement expanded beyond the social mobilization of the 
earliest anti-apartheid organizing to affect policy – albeit at the margins. The introduction 
of congressional constraints on the reactionary anti-communism regularly adopted by the 
executive branch had become a component of politics in the early 1970s and demonstrated 
its full power in undermining the Angolan intervention of 1976. In other parts of the 
Western alliance – in Sweden and the Netherlands –even more noticeable policy shifts had 
occurred. Activists now provided policymakers with information on events in southern 
Africa prejudiced in the favor of socialist nationalists, effectively combating the official 
modes of communication dominated by the minority governments of the region that had 
long set the frameworks for Western decision makers. In so doing, they extended the Third 
World challenge to the Cold War beyond Southeast Asia to include Africa and, by 
extension, other parts of the global South not previously central to Western strategy. 
Activists demonstrated the political potential of a New Left internationalism to 
policymakers through both popular mobilization and effective informational framing, 
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convincing many to adopt this approach not only as an effective form of global justice but 
as a way to please a wide swath of constituents.  
The lasting success of the Lusophone solidarity movement is perhaps best seen in 
the revival of global anti-apartheid activism, which reached new heights in the 1980s. 
Certainly, there was not an unbroken line between the Portuguese African struggles and 
later activism, with everything from the cycle of university enrollment to ANC setbacks 
affecting the movement. Yet there existed a number of continuities that showed the 
important role renewed attention to southern Africa in the early 1970s played in promoting 
and expanding anti-apartheid activism. Examples range from the founding of TransAfrica 
to the British protest against Barclay’s loans to South Africa, which was a direct 
continuation of the Dambusters campaign against Cahora Bassa. Even where breaks 
occurred, organizers in the late 1970s and 1980s could look back on earlier successes to 
legitimize and encourage action. Thus when university students began demanding 
institutional divestment from South Africa in places such as Harvard, they consciously 
drew linkages to the earlier Gulf boycott.1111 While strategies and networks aided the 
expansion of activism, perhaps the Portuguese African solidarity movement’s greatest 
contribution was proof that change was possible in southern Africa, and that Westerners 
could play an active role. Portugal’s collapse after more than a decade of determined 
resistance renewed the momentum of decolonization and self-determination after it had 
seemingly ground to a halt in the 1960s. According to British activist Tony Gifford, these 
events demonstrated that “These regimes are not eternal. They can be brought down. They 
can fade. They can fall. And I think that probably encouraged a lot of people.”1112 
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This longer, broader history shows that the seemingly unique global anti-apartheid 
movement was in many ways an extension, expansion, and perfection of older trends of 
anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism that had taken root in the Western system during the 
1960s and 1970s. While Sifiso Mxolisi Ndlovu and others have credited the ANC with 
building support for regional allies such as FRELIMO and the MPLA, in many ways the 
opposite is true.1113 During the period when the ANC struggled to sell its vision of a free 
South Africa to the wider world, the environment that would allow later activism to flourish 
took shape.1114 The CONCP depiction of an egalitarian social revolution justified Western 
support for leftist parties as an extension of the general challenge to the anti-communist 
consensus. Networks of activists and policymakers formed around southern Africa, while 
the inclusive internationalism of the CONCP parties inspired Euro-Americans to imagine 
their own domestic liberations in terms comparable to African struggles happening an 
ocean away. When anti-apartheid activists went looking for people to support protests and 
divestment campaigns in later years, they found, according to Joseph Jordan, “a receptive 
audience among people whose consciousness had been raised during the campaigns of the 
1970s.”1115  They also found existing pathways for bringing popular concerns about 
Western foreign policy to the men and women who could help remake it. This new 
consciousness and political access routes owed a debt to a generation of activists who had 
united around the global struggles of the CONCP.   
While Lusophone solidarity organizing had its most direct effects on the success of 
anti-apartheid activism, its contributions to the formation of a wider New Left 
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internationalism should not be ignored. More than simply demonstrating the effectiveness 
of popular organizing against traditional Euro-American policy in Africa, the joint victory 
over imperialism and Western interventionism in the former Portuguese colonies 
legitimized a wider critique of the Cold War. Particularly in the United States, Portuguese 
Africa became part of an international trinity symbolizing popular resistance to a status 
quo foreign policy that also included Vietnam and Chile. If the war in Southeast Asia had 
opened many eyes to the inequality of the existing system and Chile had partially 
demonstrated its global character, than the defeat of the Angola intervention in 1975 had 
proven to Western activists that proactive action could end such policies. The complex, 
decentralized grassroots-congressional networks that animated Lusophone solidarity thus 
became models for future organizing.  
The wider anti-imperial influence of Portuguese African solidarity was especially 
apparent in the growth of the Latin American lobby, which would challenge Carter and 
later Ronald Reagan in their cooperation with anti-communist dictatorships and support 
for rightist guerilla movements. One of the most important institutions in this struggle, the 
Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), modeled itself directly on WOA during a 
period when it was combatting the Luso-American alliance and the Angolan intervention. 
After its foundation in 1974, WOLA learned from its African counterpart – according to 
founder John Sinclair – “that such an office could be effective.”1116 Operating out of the 
same United Methodist Building and sharing compatible politics, longtime WOLA director 
Joseph Eldridge remembered observing and learning from WOA’s work in the 1970s – 
notably reproducing the challenging balance of relations between politicians and grassroots 
activist groups. While the two groups would work in largely parallel geographic areas in 
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the 1980s, they both promoted the personal diplomacy of Third World actors, worked with 
similar individuals on the Hill, and adopted common rhetoric of resistance to an imperial 
presidency. There also remained a joint commitment to a common anti-imperial ideology. 
Individuals working on Latin America would join anti-apartheid protests, while WOA 
strengthened its condemnation of official support to UNITA by linking it to similar aid 
programs in Latin America.1117 The informal, interpersonal networks that existed between 
groups such as WOA, ACOA, WOLA, the Coalition for a New Foreign and Military 
Policy, TransAfrica, and other groups helped coordinate information and political 
connections aimed at limiting the power of the executive branch to intervene in the global 
South.1118 Like the Lusophone solidarity movement that played a pivotal role in cementing 
the New Left internationalism of the 1970s, these movements of the 1980s gained strength 
from cooperation that occurred across geographic and ideological boundaries in pursuit of 
common foreign policy goals. 
This coordination owed a debt to the fact that lobbying groups concerned with 
specific regions or nations understood their primary causes as examples of wider foreign 
policy problems, and therefore advocated that policymakers adopt broader global critiques 
of American policy. As WOLA’s Joe Eldridge recalled, “we were all part of the progressive 
foreign policy movement, trying to influence official policy.”1119 Politicians closely 
associated with individual causes like apartheid or human rights in Latin America often 
                                                 
1117 Joseph Eldridge, telephone interview with author, 19 May 2014; see for example of WOA 
connections, Christine Root, draft article for Guardian, 16 March 1981, Folder 109, Box 15, Washington 
Office on Africa Papers, Yale Divinity School Library (New Haven, CT). 
1118 For instance, all the above mentioned groups (or prominent members of them) were part of the Covert 
Operations Task Force along with the Maryknoll Fathers, the Unitarian Universalist Association, the Chile 
Legislative Center, and a half dozen additional groups. Covert Operations Task Force Phone Tree, no date 
[1980/1?], Folder 109, Box 15, WOA Papers, YDL.   
1119 Eldridge interview.  
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lent their voices and leadership to colleagues working on these other, analogous issues.1120 
The limited formalization of this alliance network made it difficult to recreate the mass 
protests of the Vietnam era, but after Angola this model seemed less necessary.1121 Rather, 
parallel networks of Third World actors, grassroots activists, left-leaning lobbyists, and 
sympathetic politicians provided Cold War detractors with access to policymakers. Ad hoc 
exchanges between these geographically defined activist networks helped create common 
languages of dissent, while individual victories in African policy provided encouragement 
for others working on similar issues in Latin America and elsewhere – and vice versa. The 
result was a sustained challenge to the grand vision of Cold War containment that had long 
animated American and wider Western policy. This new state of affairs would define the 
contentious domestic politics of the final fifteen years of the Cold War. 
The complex, decentralized nature of this New Left internationalist movement has 
long obscured its growth and impact. The prominence of individual manifestations such as 
the Vietnam protests of the 1960s and anti-apartheid movement of the 1980s have drawn 
attention away from the consistent organizing, lobbying, and network building that linked 
traditions of anti-colonialism with later human rights-centered internationalism. Western 
solidarity with Portuguese African liberation provides a case study of transnational 
advocacy at the margins of international news, while also capturing a moment of transition 
in the way Euro-Americans engaged with foreign policy. In the wake of the catharsis of 
Vietnam, transnational anti-imperial networks provided pathways for stateless nationalists 
                                                 
1120 For example, Houston Congressman Mickey Leland (D-TX), known as a strong anti-apartheid voice, 
took the lead criticizing Ronald Reagan’s policy in El Salvador in 1981 – which many at the time rightly 
understood as directly related to the White House’s desire to support Jonas Savimbi as a component of the 
Reagan Doctrine.  
1121 Importantly, when mass protests did occur, it was sometimes difficult for organizers to limit their 
scope to only Latin American or Africa. In 1987, for example, popular demands forced the New Mobe to 
expand a plan anti-contra campaign to include South Africa, resulting in the National Mobilization for 
Justice and Peace in Central America and Southern Africa. Roger Peace, A Call to Conscious: the Anti-
Contra War Campaign (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2012), 211.  
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from the global South to appeal to an array of Western constituencies. The result was what 
ACOA head George Houser called a “basis of unity” for “bring[ing] together liberal and 
militant, black and white on a minimum program supporting the liberation struggle in 
Africa.”1122 This broad New Left coalition found in the Portuguese colonies proof of 
concept, demonstrating the political power inherent in cooperation across partisan and 
racial lines. In the wake of a decade of social upheaval that would remain unmatched, the 
Portuguese African liberation struggles had established a replicable model for the 
unification of a transnational civil society opposed to the Cold War. Though never large 
enough to replace the anti-communist consensus that had preceded it, this internationalism 
based on concepts of global social, economic, and racial justice would help define leftist 
politics and foreign policy activism for decades to come.  
 
  
                                                 
1122 Though referring to ACOA’s own role as a clearinghouse, Houser captured one of the main goals of 
the CONCP revolutionaries and the reason they worked closely with his organization. Memo, Houser to 
Executive Board, April 1970, Reel III, Microfilm Records of the American Committee on Africa, Part I: 
ACOA Executive Committee minutes and National Office memoranda, 1952-1975. 
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Acronym Glossary 
 
 
AAM  - Anti-Apartheid Movement 
 
AC – Angola Comité 
 
ACOA – American Committee on Africa 
 
AFL–CIO – American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations 
 
AFSC – American Friends Service Committee 
 
AH – Albert Heijn, Dutch national supermarket chain 
 
ALD – African Liberation Day 
 
ALSC – African Liberation Support Committee 
 
ANC - African National Congress 
 
ANLCA – American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa 
 
ASEA – Swedish hydroelectric engineering firm  
 
CAP – Congress of Afrikan People  
 
CCLAMG – Chicago Committee for the Liberation of Angola, Mozambique, and 
Guinea 
 
CFMAG – Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola, and Guine  
 
CIA – Central Intelligence Agency 
 
CONCP – Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas 
(Conference of Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies) 
 
CORE – Congress of Racial Equality 
 
CRV - Committee of Returned Volunteers 
 
CWS – Church World Services 
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CZA – Comité Zuid-Afrika  
 
FIM – Frontier Internship in Mission 
 
FLN –Front de Libération Nationale (Algerian National Liberation Front) 
 
FNLA – Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (National Liberation Front of Angola) 
 
FOR – Fellowship of Reconciliation 
 
FRELIMO – Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Mozambique Liberation Front) 
 
GBC - Gulf Boycott Coalition 
 
GE – General Electric 
 
GRAE – Govêrno Revolucionário de Angola no Exílio (Angolan Revolutionary 
Government in Exile)  
 
LCA – Liberation Committee for Africa 
 
LSM – Liberation Support Movement  
 
MACSA – Madison Area Committee on Southern Africa 
 
MCF – Movement for Colonial Freedom 
 
MFA –Movimento das Forças Armadas (Portuguese Armed Forces Movement) 
 
MP – member of [British] Parliament 
 
MPLA – Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (Popular Movement for the 
Liberation of Angola) 
 
NAACP – National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
 
OMA – Organização da Mulher de Angola (Organization of Angolan Women) 
 
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
 
NCC – National Council of Churches 
 
New Mobe – New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam 
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NSCF - National Student Christian Federation  
 
NSSM – National Security Study Memorandum  
 
NWRC – New World Resource Center 
 
OAU – Organization of African Unity  
 
OMA – Organização da Mulher de Angola (Angolan Women’s Organization)  
 
PACFA – Portuguese-American Committee on Foreign Affairs 
 
PAIGC – Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (African 
Independence Party for Guinea and Cabo Verde) 
 
PALC – Pan-African Liberation Committee  
 
PASC – Pan-African Solidarity Committee 
 
PCP – Portuguese Communist Party  
 
PIDE – Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado (International and State Defense 
Police [of Portugal]) 
 
PvdA – Partij van de Arbeid (Dutch Labour Party) 
 
SAC – Southern Africa Committee  
 
SARA – Serviço de Assistência aos Refugiados de Angola (The Angolan Refugee 
Assistance Service) 
 
SC – Security Council (United Nations) 
 
SDS – Students for a Democratic Society 
 
SIDA – Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency 
 
SNCC – Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee 
 
SOBU – Students Organized for Black Unity 
 
UCC – United Church of Christ 
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UCM – University Christian Movement, 
 
UDENAMO – União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique (National Democratic 
Union of Mozambique) 
 
UDI – Southern Rhodesia’s unilateral declaration of independence 
 
UN – United Nations 
 
UNITA – União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (The National Union 
for the Total Independence of Angola) 
 
UPA –União dos Povos de Angola (Union of Angolan Peoples) 
 
WCC – World Council of Churches 
 
WOA - Washington Office on Africa 
 
YOBU – Youth Organized for Black Unity 
 
ZAMCO –consortium that coordinated transnational contractors who began construction 
of the Cahora Bassa Dam across the Zambezi River in Mozambique  
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